release: 1.3.0: 1.3.0-1.3.1: security pass, queue persist, full backup layout

[1.3.0]
Security and quality after 1.2.5: domain-admin send-log authorization, fail-closed sign-in and application delete, level-2 rate-limit race fix, restore Resync, expanded tests, operator docs, release CI, and OFL for IBM Plex. Upgrading from 1.2.x is a tag bump; no migration.
Added:
  - licence: the SIL Open Font License 1.1 text now travels with the IBM Plex
  - docs: agreed roadmap item **queue-retries** — show this Postfix's retry
Security:
  - The independent security review of the send-log authorization and
Fixed:
  - test (e2e): send-log status scrapers follow the badge markup in
  - security (panel): the Deliveries list is scoped to a domain administrator's
  - mail (level-2 rate limit): the ceiling is no longer overshot by messages that
  - panel (sign-in): a session that cannot be written to the database no longer
  - panel (applications): deleting an application removes its SASL credentials
  … (2 more in CHANGELOG)
Changed:
  - docs: operator and as-built docs aligned with the code after a full
  - docs: [guide.md](docs/guide.md) reorganised into **Installation**, **Instance
  - docs: the 2026-08-13 full-tree review plan is complete — every phase (P0–P7)
  - licence: [NOTICE](NOTICE) tells modifiers to update `SourceURL` in
  - ci: the release image is published only for a **published** GitHub Release
  … (9 more in CHANGELOG)
[1.3.1]
Retry policy in the panel, persistent Postfix queue, and self-contained full backups. Mail queue and delivery history show this Postfix's first retry, backoff cap, and queue lifetime. Deferred mail survives container recreate. Full backups now archive `data/`, compose, `.env`, and `certs/`; the archive layout breaks 1.3.0 flat backups (unpack those with `tar xzf backup.tar.gz -C ./data` as before). Upgrading from 1.3.0 is a tag bump; no schema migration.
Added:
  - Mail queue and a delivery's history show this Postfix's retry policy
  - docs: **Plan checklists** in [development.md](docs/development.md) — format,
  - docs: **Implementation checklists** with model routing in
  - docs: roadmap candidates **send-log-retention** (panel Settings for delivery
  - Postfix queue under `/data/postfix/queue` — deferred and active mail survive
  … (1 more in CHANGELOG)
Changed:
  - **Breaking:** full-backup archive layout — paths are prefixed with `data/`;
  - docs: operator guide, architecture, security, and backup UI updated for
  - docs: HTML mockups for a full panel UI refresh
Changed:
  - docs: panel UI mockups after review — Status restored to live readings
  - docs: panel UI design system and mockups rebuilt as separate pages
  - docs: panel UI mockups — add-domain sits in the list card (Domains and
Fixed:
  - ci (GHCR): per-arch package tags (`X.Y.Z-amd64`, `X.Y.Z-arm64`) are dropped

Squashed CHANGELOG sections: [1.3.0], [1.3.1].

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.3.0, 1.3.1).
This commit is contained in:
mix
2026-09-22 15:24:52 +03:00
parent 60e08e802e
commit 0730b2090e
124 changed files with 8464 additions and 1121 deletions
+2
View File
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ func New(st *store.Store, cfg Config, v *view.Engine, setupTokenPath string) *Mo
loginLimiter: newRateLimiter(10, 15*time.Minute),
trustedProxies: cfg.TrustedProxyCIDRs,
}
m.setupLimiter.startSweeper()
m.loginLimiter.startSweeper()
m.setup = newSetupManager(st, cfg.Hostname, setupTokenPath)
return m
}
+74 -7
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,17 @@
package auth
import (
"database/sql"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/web/view"
)
@@ -22,6 +26,15 @@ func newTestSessionStore(t *testing.T) *sessionStore {
return newSessionStore(st, 7*24*time.Hour)
}
func mustCreate(t *testing.T, s *sessionStore, username string) string {
t.Helper()
token, err := s.Create(username)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create session: %v", err)
}
return token
}
func mustView(t *testing.T) *view.Engine {
t.Helper()
v, err := view.New("test")
@@ -86,7 +99,7 @@ func TestSessionTokenIgnoresTheOtherName(t *testing.T) {
func TestRequireAuthRejectsDuplicateCookies(t *testing.T) {
m := testModule(t, false)
token := m.sessions.Create("admin")
token := mustCreate(t, m.sessions, "admin")
reached := false
h := m.RequireAuth(http.HandlerFunc(func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) { reached = true }))
@@ -107,7 +120,7 @@ func TestRequireAuthRejectsDuplicateCookies(t *testing.T) {
func TestLogoutClearsBothCookieNames(t *testing.T) {
m := testModule(t, true)
token := m.sessions.Create("admin")
token := mustCreate(t, m.sessions, "admin")
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://panel.example.com/logout", nil)
r.Host = "panel.example.com"
@@ -132,9 +145,63 @@ func TestLogoutClearsBothCookieNames(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// A session that could not be stored must not turn into a cookie: the browser
// would look signed in, and every request it made would be bounced to /login
// with no explanation. Only the sessions table is broken here, so the request
// gets past the user lookup and password check and fails exactly where the
// session is written.
func TestLoginSetsNoCookieWhenTheSessionCannotBeStored(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "test.db")
st, err := store.Open(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("open store: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { st.Close() })
hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte("correct-horse-battery"), bcrypt.MinCost)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("hash password: %v", err)
}
if err := st.CreateGlobalUser("admin", string(hash)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create user: %v", err)
}
dropSessionsTable(t, path)
m := New(st, Config{}, mustView(t), "")
form := url.Values{"username": {"admin"}, "password": {"correct-horse-battery"}}
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://panel.example.com/login",
strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
r.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
m.HandleLogin(rec, r)
if got := rec.Header().Values("Set-Cookie"); len(got) != 0 {
t.Errorf("a session cookie was issued for a session that was never stored: %v", got)
}
if rec.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 500 (the login failed)", rec.Code)
}
if loc := rec.Header().Get("Location"); loc != "" {
t.Errorf("the browser was sent to %q as if it were signed in", loc)
}
}
// dropSessionsTable breaks session persistence while leaving the rest of the
// schema usable. The SQLite driver is registered by internal/store.
func dropSessionsTable(t *testing.T, path string) {
t.Helper()
db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", "file:"+path+"?_pragma=busy_timeout(5000)")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("open database directly: %v", err)
}
defer db.Close()
if _, err := db.Exec("DROP TABLE sessions"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("drop sessions table: %v", err)
}
}
func TestSessionRename(t *testing.T) {
s := newTestSessionStore(t)
token := s.Create("admin")
token := mustCreate(t, s, "admin")
s.Rename(token, "operator")
@@ -149,8 +216,8 @@ func TestSessionRename(t *testing.T) {
func TestSessionDestroyOthers(t *testing.T) {
s := newTestSessionStore(t)
keep := s.Create("admin")
other := s.Create("admin")
keep := mustCreate(t, s, "admin")
other := mustCreate(t, s, "admin")
s.DestroyOthers(keep)
@@ -165,7 +232,7 @@ func TestSessionDestroyOthers(t *testing.T) {
func TestSessionLookupRejectsExpired(t *testing.T) {
s := newTestSessionStore(t)
s.idle = -time.Minute
token := s.Create("admin")
token := mustCreate(t, s, "admin")
if _, ok := s.Lookup(token); ok {
t.Fatal("expired session was accepted")
@@ -174,7 +241,7 @@ func TestSessionLookupRejectsExpired(t *testing.T) {
func TestSessionTouchThrottled(t *testing.T) {
s := newTestSessionStore(t)
token := s.Create("admin")
token := mustCreate(t, s, "admin")
if s.Touch(token) {
t.Fatal("touch renewed a session created moments ago")
+6 -1
View File
@@ -120,7 +120,12 @@ func (m *Module) submitLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
token := m.sessions.Create(user.Username)
token, err := m.sessions.Create(user.Username)
if err != nil {
logf("panel: login: create session failed: %v", err)
m.renderLogin(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal error. Please try again.")
return
}
m.setSessionCookie(w, token)
http.Redirect(w, r, "/", http.StatusSeeOther)
}
+284
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
package auth
import (
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
)
const testPassword = "correct-horse-battery"
// moduleWithAdmin returns a panel that has already been through setup, with one
// global administrator whose password is testPassword.
func moduleWithAdmin(t *testing.T) *Module {
t.Helper()
m := testModule(t, false)
hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(testPassword), bcrypt.MinCost)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("hash password: %v", err)
}
if err := m.store.CreateGlobalUser("admin", string(hash)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create user: %v", err)
}
return m
}
// postLogin submits the sign-in form from remoteAddr (the limiter's key) and
// returns what the handler wrote.
func postLogin(m *Module, remoteAddr, username, password string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
form := url.Values{"username": {username}, "password": {password}}
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://panel.example.com/login",
strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
r.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
r.RemoteAddr = remoteAddr
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
m.HandleLogin(rec, r)
return rec
}
// sessionCookieValue returns the session token the response issued, or "" if it
// issued none.
func sessionCookieValue(t *testing.T, m *Module, rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder) string {
t.Helper()
for _, c := range rec.Result().Cookies() {
if c.Name == m.sessionCookie() {
return c.Value
}
}
return ""
}
func TestLoginSignsInWithTheRightPassword(t *testing.T) {
m := moduleWithAdmin(t)
rec := postLogin(m, "203.0.113.7:5000", "admin", testPassword)
if rec.Code != http.StatusSeeOther || rec.Header().Get("Location") != "/" {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, Location = %q; want a redirect to /", rec.Code, rec.Header().Get("Location"))
}
token := sessionCookieValue(t, m, rec)
if token == "" {
t.Fatal("no session cookie was issued")
}
name, ok := m.sessions.Lookup(token)
if !ok || name != "admin" {
t.Fatalf("the cookie's session resolves to %q, %t; want admin", name, ok)
}
}
// A refused sign-in must not say which half was wrong: the panel is public, and
// distinguishable answers would turn the form into a list of usernames.
func TestLoginRefusesBadCredentialsWithoutSayingWhy(t *testing.T) {
m := moduleWithAdmin(t)
bodies := make(map[string]string, 2)
for name, creds := range map[string][2]string{
"wrong password": {"admin", "not-the-password"},
"unknown user": {"nobody", testPassword},
} {
rec := postLogin(m, "203.0.113.7:5000", creds[0], creds[1])
if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("%s: status = %d, want 401", name, rec.Code)
}
if got := sessionCookieValue(t, m, rec); got != "" {
t.Errorf("%s: a session cookie was issued: %q", name, got)
}
bodies[name] = rec.Body.String()
}
if bodies["wrong password"] != bodies["unknown user"] {
t.Error("the two refusals differ, so the form tells an attacker which usernames exist")
}
}
// The lockout is what makes online guessing pointless, so it has to hold even
// for the request that finally carries the right password — and it has to be
// scoped to the address that spent the attempts.
func TestLoginLocksOutAfterTooManyAttempts(t *testing.T) {
m := moduleWithAdmin(t)
const attacker = "203.0.113.7:5000"
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
if rec := postLogin(m, attacker, "admin", "guess"); rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("attempt %d: status = %d, want 401 (still under the limit)", i+1, rec.Code)
}
}
rec := postLogin(m, attacker, "admin", testPassword)
if rec.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 429; the lockout was bypassed by guessing right", rec.Code)
}
if got := sessionCookieValue(t, m, rec); got != "" {
t.Errorf("a locked-out request was signed in: %q", got)
}
if rec := postLogin(m, "198.51.100.9:5000", "admin", testPassword); rec.Code != http.StatusSeeOther {
t.Errorf("another address got %d; one guesser locked out the whole internet", rec.Code)
}
}
// Before the first administrator exists there is nothing to sign in as, so the
// form is replaced by a pointer to the setup link rather than a password box
// that can never succeed.
func TestLoginPointsAtSetupBeforeTheFirstAdministrator(t *testing.T) {
m := testModule(t, false)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
m.HandleLogin(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://panel.example.com/login", nil))
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200", rec.Code)
}
body := rec.Body.String()
if !strings.Contains(body, "No administrator has been created yet") {
t.Errorf("the login page does not point at the setup link:\n%s", body)
}
if strings.Contains(body, `name="password"`) {
t.Errorf("the login page offers a password field with no account to use it:\n%s", body)
}
}
// getSetup performs the GET the operator's browser makes when it follows the
// one-time link.
func getSetup(m *Module, token string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
m.HandleSetup(rec, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://panel.example.com/setup/"+token, nil))
return rec
}
func postSetup(m *Module, token string, form url.Values) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://panel.example.com/setup/"+token,
strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
r.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
m.HandleSetup(rec, r)
return rec
}
func setupForm(username, password, confirm string) url.Values {
return url.Values{
"username": {username},
"password": {password},
"password_confirm": {confirm},
}
}
// The setup link creates the first global administrator and then stops
// existing: the persistent fact is the user row, so the link is dead after a
// restart too, not only for the process that served it.
func TestSetupCreatesTheFirstAdministratorAndThenCloses(t *testing.T) {
m := testModule(t, false)
token, ok := m.setup.activeToken()
if !ok {
t.Fatal("no setup token on a panel with no users")
}
if rec := getSetup(m, token); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("GET the setup link = %d, want the form", rec.Code)
}
rec := postSetup(m, token, setupForm("operator", "a-long-enough-password", "a-long-enough-password"))
if rec.Code != http.StatusSeeOther || rec.Header().Get("Location") != "/login" {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, Location = %q; want a redirect to /login", rec.Code, rec.Header().Get("Location"))
}
u, err := m.store.GetUserByUsername("operator")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("the administrator was not created: %v", err)
}
if u.Role != RoleGlobal {
t.Errorf("the first administrator has role %q, want global", u.Role)
}
if err := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(u.PasswordHash), []byte("a-long-enough-password")); err != nil {
t.Errorf("the stored hash does not match the password that was set: %v", err)
}
if rec := getSetup(m, token); rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("the setup link still answers %d after setup completed, want 404", rec.Code)
}
if rec := postSetup(m, token, setupForm("second", "a-long-enough-password", "a-long-enough-password")); rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("a second administrator could be created through the setup link (%d)", rec.Code)
}
}
// A token that is wrong, or one that has aged out and been replaced, is not a
// hint that setup exists: both answer 404, the same as any unknown path.
func TestSetupRejectsAWrongOrExpiredToken(t *testing.T) {
m := testModule(t, false)
token, ok := m.setup.activeToken()
if !ok {
t.Fatal("no setup token on a panel with no users")
}
if rec := getSetup(m, token+"x"); rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("a wrong token answered %d, want 404", rec.Code)
}
expireSetupToken(m)
if rec := getSetup(m, token); rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("the expired token still opens setup (%d)", rec.Code)
}
fresh, _ := m.setup.activeToken()
if fresh == token {
t.Fatal("the expired token was not replaced")
}
if rec := getSetup(m, fresh); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("the reissued token does not open setup (%d)", rec.Code)
}
}
// The first account is the one that can never be locked out of the panel from
// outside, so the rules that apply to every other user apply here too — before
// anything is written.
func TestSetupRejectsCredentialsItWouldNotAcceptLater(t *testing.T) {
for name, form := range map[string]url.Values{
"username too short": setupForm("op", "a-long-enough-password", "a-long-enough-password"),
"username not ASCII": setupForm("оператор", "a-long-enough-password", "a-long-enough-password"),
"passwords differ": setupForm("operator", "a-long-enough-password", "a-long-enough-passwerd"),
"password too short": setupForm("operator", "short", "short"),
"no password at all": setupForm("operator", "", ""),
"no username at all": setupForm("", "a-long-enough-password", "a-long-enough-password"),
} {
m := testModule(t, false)
token, _ := m.setup.activeToken()
rec := postSetup(m, token, form)
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("%s: status = %d, want 400", name, rec.Code)
}
if exists, err := m.store.UserExists(); err != nil || exists {
t.Errorf("%s: an administrator was created anyway (err=%v)", name, err)
}
if rec := getSetup(m, token); rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("%s: the setup link was burned by a rejected form (%d)", name, rec.Code)
}
}
}
// Setup is unauthenticated by definition, so the only thing between the token
// and an offline guesser is the limiter in front of it.
func TestSetupIsRateLimited(t *testing.T) {
m := testModule(t, false)
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
if rec := getSetup(m, "wrong-token"); rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Fatalf("attempt %d: status = %d, want 404 (still under the limit)", i+1, rec.Code)
}
}
if rec := getSetup(m, "wrong-token"); rec.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 429 after the eleventh attempt", rec.Code)
}
}
// expireSetupToken ages the current token out, the state the panel reaches when
// nobody follows the link within setupTokenTTL.
func expireSetupToken(m *Module) {
m.setup.mu.Lock()
defer m.setup.mu.Unlock()
m.setup.expiresAt = m.setup.expiresAt.Add(-2 * setupTokenTTL)
}
-12
View File
@@ -44,15 +44,3 @@ func CurrentUser(r *http.Request) string {
}
return ""
}
// RequireGlobal wraps a handler that only global administrators may reach.
func RequireGlobal(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
p, ok := CurrentPrincipal(r.Context())
if !ok || !p.IsGlobal() {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ import (
type ctxKey int
const (
usernameKey ctxKey = 0
principalKey ctxKey = 1
usernameKey ctxKey = 0
principalKey ctxKey = 1
)
// Role is a panel user's access level.
+48 -5
View File
@@ -5,11 +5,14 @@ import (
"time"
)
const defaultMaxBuckets = 4096
// rateLimiter is a simple fixed-window per-key counter used to throttle the
// setup and login routes (security.md). Keys are client IPs.
type rateLimiter struct {
max int
window time.Duration
max int
window time.Duration
maxBuckets int
mu sync.Mutex
buckets map[string]*rlBucket
@@ -22,12 +25,25 @@ type rlBucket struct {
func newRateLimiter(max int, window time.Duration) *rateLimiter {
return &rateLimiter{
max: max,
window: window,
buckets: make(map[string]*rlBucket),
max: max,
window: window,
maxBuckets: defaultMaxBuckets,
buckets: make(map[string]*rlBucket),
}
}
func (r *rateLimiter) startSweeper() {
go func() {
ticker := time.NewTicker(r.window)
defer ticker.Stop()
for range ticker.C {
r.mu.Lock()
r.sweep(time.Now())
r.mu.Unlock()
}
}()
}
func (r *rateLimiter) Allow(key string) bool {
now := time.Now()
r.mu.Lock()
@@ -35,6 +51,7 @@ func (r *rateLimiter) Allow(key string) bool {
b := r.buckets[key]
if b == nil || now.After(b.windowEnds) {
r.makeRoom(now)
r.buckets[key] = &rlBucket{count: 1, windowEnds: now.Add(r.window)}
r.sweep(now)
return true
@@ -46,6 +63,32 @@ func (r *rateLimiter) Allow(key string) bool {
return true
}
func (r *rateLimiter) makeRoom(now time.Time) {
if r.maxBuckets <= 0 || len(r.buckets) < r.maxBuckets {
return
}
r.sweep(now)
for len(r.buckets) >= r.maxBuckets {
r.evictOldest()
}
}
func (r *rateLimiter) evictOldest() {
var oldestKey string
var oldestEnds time.Time
first := true
for k, b := range r.buckets {
if first || b.windowEnds.Before(oldestEnds) {
oldestKey = k
oldestEnds = b.windowEnds
first = false
}
}
if oldestKey != "" {
delete(r.buckets, oldestKey)
}
}
func (r *rateLimiter) sweep(now time.Time) {
for k, b := range r.buckets {
if now.After(b.windowEnds) {
+125
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
package auth
import (
"testing"
"time"
)
// The limiter is what stands between the public login form and an unlimited
// guessing rate (security.md), so the ceiling has to be exact: the configured
// number of attempts go through and the next one does not, however often it is
// repeated.
func TestRateLimiterStopsAtTheCeiling(t *testing.T) {
r := newRateLimiter(3, time.Minute)
for i := 1; i <= 3; i++ {
if !r.Allow("203.0.113.7") {
t.Fatalf("attempt %d of 3 was refused before the ceiling", i)
}
}
for i := 4; i <= 6; i++ {
if r.Allow("203.0.113.7") {
t.Fatalf("attempt %d passed after the ceiling of 3", i)
}
}
}
// Buckets are per key, so one locked-out address must not lock out the rest of
// the internet — a shared counter would turn a single guesser into a denial of
// service against every operator.
func TestRateLimiterKeepsKeysApart(t *testing.T) {
r := newRateLimiter(1, time.Minute)
if !r.Allow("203.0.113.7") || r.Allow("203.0.113.7") {
t.Fatal("the first key did not use up its single attempt")
}
if !r.Allow("198.51.100.9") {
t.Fatal("a second address was refused because another one was locked out")
}
}
// The window is fixed, not sliding: once it has elapsed the count starts again
// from zero rather than being carried over. Time is moved by ageing the bucket
// instead of sleeping, so the test states the boundary rather than approaching
// it.
func TestRateLimiterReopensAfterTheWindow(t *testing.T) {
r := newRateLimiter(2, time.Minute)
r.Allow("203.0.113.7")
r.Allow("203.0.113.7")
if r.Allow("203.0.113.7") {
t.Fatal("the ceiling was not reached")
}
expire(r, "203.0.113.7")
if !r.Allow("203.0.113.7") {
t.Fatal("the key is still locked out after its window ended")
}
if !r.Allow("203.0.113.7") {
t.Fatal("the new window did not start from an empty count")
}
if r.Allow("203.0.113.7") {
t.Fatal("the new window allowed more than the ceiling")
}
}
// Every address that ever tried to sign in gets a bucket, and the only thing
// that removes the finished ones is the sweep on a new window. It runs on the
// key that triggered it as well as on the others, so a long-running panel does
// not accumulate a bucket per source address for ever.
func TestRateLimiterSweepsFinishedBuckets(t *testing.T) {
r := newRateLimiter(2, time.Minute)
for _, key := range []string{"203.0.113.7", "198.51.100.9"} {
r.Allow(key)
expire(r, key)
}
r.Allow("192.0.2.5") // still inside its window
r.Allow("203.0.113.7") // new window for this key: sweeps the rest
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
if _, ok := r.buckets["198.51.100.9"]; ok {
t.Error("a bucket whose window ended is still held")
}
for _, key := range []string{"203.0.113.7", "192.0.2.5"} {
if _, ok := r.buckets[key]; !ok {
t.Errorf("the sweep dropped %s, whose window is still open", key)
}
}
}
// expire moves a key's window into the past, the same state it would reach by
// waiting for the window to elapse.
func expire(r *rateLimiter, key string) {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
if b := r.buckets[key]; b != nil {
b.windowEnds = time.Now().Add(-time.Second)
}
}
// A long-running panel can see many unique client addresses. Finished buckets
// are swept on every new window, and a hard cap evicts the oldest when the map
// would otherwise grow without bound.
func TestRateLimiterCapsBucketCount(t *testing.T) {
r := newRateLimiter(1, time.Minute)
r.maxBuckets = 3
for i, key := range []string{"203.0.113.7", "198.51.100.9", "192.0.2.5"} {
if !r.Allow(key) {
t.Fatalf("attempt %d for %s was refused under the cap", i+1, key)
}
expire(r, key)
}
if !r.Allow("203.0.113.8") {
t.Fatal("a fourth address was refused even though room was made")
}
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
if len(r.buckets) > 3 {
t.Fatalf("bucket count = %d, want at most 3", len(r.buckets))
}
}
+9 -4
View File
@@ -41,17 +41,22 @@ func hashToken(token string) string {
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}
// Create issues a new session for username and returns its token.
func (s *sessionStore) Create(username string) string {
// Create issues a new session for username and returns its token. It fails
// closed: if the row cannot be written the caller gets an error and must not
// hand out a cookie, because a token that is not in the database looks like a
// signed-in browser while every request it makes bounces back to /login.
func (s *sessionStore) Create(username string) (string, error) {
token := randomToken(32)
now := time.Now()
if err := s.store.CreateSession(hashToken(token), username, now.Add(s.idle)); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: create failed: %v", err)
return "", err
}
// Pruning is housekeeping: the new session is already valid, so a failure
// here is logged and does not fail the login.
if _, err := s.store.DeleteExpiredSessions(now); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: prune expired failed: %v", err)
}
return token
return token, nil
}
// Lookup returns the session username for a token if it exists and is
+3 -2
View File
@@ -16,8 +16,9 @@ const setupTokenTTL = 10 * time.Minute
// setupManager owns the one-time administrator setup token. The token itself is
// ephemeral (regenerated on restart or expiry) and lives only in memory; the
// persistent "setup complete" fact is the presence of the admin row in the
// store, so once that exists the token is gone for good (security.md).
// persistent "setup complete" fact is the presence of any row in the store's
// users table (`store.UserExists`), so once the first global administrator is
// created the token is gone for good (security.md).
type setupManager struct {
store *store.Store
hostname string