audit 4: sign-in timing and sessions, server timeouts, polling that recovers
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
Steps 1-3 of stage 4, tested together (their docs share files).
Step 1 (M8, L15, L16): an unknown name pays a bcrypt comparison at the
panel's work factor too (noSuchUserHash, made once) -
TestLoginTakesAsLongForAnUnknownName holds the medians within a factor of
two; the Account form's current-password check has its own limiter, per
user (AllowPasswordChange); a sign-in destroys every session the request
presents before it issues its own.
Step 2 (L14): newHTTPServer - ReadTimeout 30 s, WriteTimeout 60 s,
IdleTimeout 2 min beside ReadHeaderTimeout; the full backup moves its write
deadline to two hours through http.ResponseController (e2e: the log shows
no failure to move it).
Step 3 (M11), read in htmx 2.0.4's source (dev/upstream/htmx-2.0.4, the npm
build byte-equal to the shipped htmx.min.js): the poll passes source: box,
and the next refresh is scheduled from htmx:afterRequest, which htmx fires
on load, error, abort and timeout, and after a swap on the nearest parent
left (the box found by detail.target's id); failures in a row double the
wait to 60 s. RequireAuth answers htmx with 401 + HX-Redirect: /login,
which htmx follows before it looks at the status. testdata/poll_test.js
runs panel.js in node against a stand-in DOM and clock (TestPanelJS; skipped
without node, which the test server lacks - run here, and it fails on the
old panel.js).
Also measured: the stage-3 e2e regression for H1 fails as it should on HEAD
with the old entrypoint ("check data/postfix/e2e_extra_map: permission
denied", the panel restarting).
Tested on the test server: go vet + go test of 25 packages, make e2e (all
pass, 639 s) on this tree.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -5,6 +5,33 @@ Format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); version
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## [Unreleased]
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### Security
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- **The sign-in told which usernames exist by how long it took.** A wrong
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password cost a bcrypt comparison, an unknown name none. Both now cost one
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(audit 2026-10-12, M8).
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- **Signing in kept the session the browser already presented.** A sign-in
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now ends it before it issues its own, so a session planted before the
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sign-in is worth nothing after (audit 2026-10-12, L16).
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### Fixed
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- **Ten wrong current passwords on Account locked the address out of
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signing in for 15 minutes.** The check has its own limit now, ten in 15
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minutes per user (audit 2026-10-12, L15).
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- **A client could hold the panel's server as long as it liked** once its
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request header was read. The body now has 30 seconds, the answer 60, an
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idle kept-alive connection 2 minutes; a full backup download moves its own
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limit to two hours (audit 2026-10-12, L14).
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- **One failed refresh stopped a monitoring page for good.** Overview,
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Health and the logs refresh their boxes on a timer; a refresh that failed
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- the panel restarting, the network gone - scheduled no next one, and the
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page stood still until the tab was hidden and shown again. Each refresh
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now schedules the next however it ended, waiting twice as long after each
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failure in a row, up to a minute. A box whose session had expired was
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filled with the sign-in page; the whole page goes to sign-in now (audit
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2026-10-12, M11).
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## [2.5.3] - 2026-10-15
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Stage 3 of the 2026-10-12 audit: persistence and restore. A restore is
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