auth: the duplicate-cookie line hides a link's token (audit A4)

Security audit 2026-10-17, finding A4 (low), stage 0. The line logged when
a request carries two unprefixed session cookies printed r.URL.Path raw,
so GET /confirm/<token> wrote the token to the log (reachable only with
PANEL_COOKIE_SECURE=false, where a sibling host can plant the bare name).
loggedPath moves from internal/web to internal/web/auth as LoggedPath
(web imports auth, not the other way) and both lines - the origin check's
refusal and the duplicate-cookie one - go through it.

Tests: TestDuplicateCookieLineHidesALinksToken; TestLoggedPathHidesTokens
moved with the function. go test ./internal/web ./internal/web/auth.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
mix
2026-10-17 21:35:32 +03:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent da2e8b2ffe
commit 5210cb19f2
7 changed files with 46 additions and 19 deletions
+2
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@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ Format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); version
- **The sender check keeps two `From:` and two `Sender:` lines** (audit M5),
not every one an application sends: the judgement needs no more, and a
hundred long lines were megabytes held per connection.
- **A link's token stays out of the duplicate-cookie log line** (audit A4),
as it already did out of the origin check's.
- **The entrypoint follows no link at the DMARC maps** (audit I2): the
three `dmarc_*` maps root creates at the start were missing from the list
of paths where a symbolic link is removed first.