release: 0.5.0: Pre-1.0 security review, domain-admin role, doc consolidation

A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
Fixed:
  - A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
  - Log-tailer resumes where it stopped instead of jumping to end-of-file on
  - Level-2 rate limit no longer overshoots under concurrency: messages that
Changed:
  - The project has a single public home: `github.com/mixeme/selfpost`. Codeberg
  - Code comments no longer cite the archived specification. References like
  - `docs/code-review.md` is gone. Its plan is finished — phases 0 (bar the
  - `docs/architecture.md` gained a *Code layers* section: a diagram of
  - Phase 1 doc/code hygiene (`docs/code-review.md`): removed ~30 stale
  … (1 more in CHANGELOG)
Security:
  - Pre-release security review (plan § D, model Fable, 2026-08-06): full pass
  - `saslpasswd2` argv: the application login is now passed after a `--`
Added:
  - Optional password encryption for the two secret-bearing downloads (plan
  - Domain import accepts an encrypted export: the envelope is detected by its
  - `selfpost-backup` writes encrypted archives and reads them back:
  - `TestParseDelivery` covers the exotic mail.log shapes the review asked for
  - docs: README *Encrypting a backup or export*; `docs/security.md` §
  … (14 more in CHANGELOG)
Removed:
  - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk «restore old backup revives session rows»
Changed:
  - docs: `implementation-plan.md` trimmed to the sole open v1.x gate — pre-release
  - docs: `architecture.md` — sessions (SQLite, idle renew, password change),
  - docs: `development.md` — expanded e2e stack and `release.yml` matrix workflow.
  - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk for send-log rows stuck at `queued` after
  - docs: `roadmap.md` — optional send-log / `mail.log` follow-ups under v1.x tail.
  … (10 more in CHANGELOG)

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (0.5.0).
This commit is contained in:
mix
2026-09-22 15:24:51 +03:00
parent 72b09d60a6
commit 5e5d157496
113 changed files with 4284 additions and 1140 deletions
+130 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
// Command selfpost-backup produces the full persistent-state archive from inside
// the container, invoked via `docker exec` for scripted/cron backups — the CLI
// equivalent of the panel's backup button (spec 7.5.A, 11.6).
// equivalent of the panel's backup button (architecture.md § Persistence).
//
// By default the gzip-compressed tar is written to stdout, so the usual form is:
//
@@ -8,22 +8,40 @@
//
// Use -o to write to a file instead. The resulting archive contains DKIM private
// keys, the admin password hash and SASL credentials — treat it as a secret
// (spec 7.5.A).
// (architecture.md § Persistence).
//
// Given a password (SELFPOST_BACKUP_PASSWORD or -password-file, never an
// argument, which would show up in the process list) the archive is written as
// an encrypted .spbk envelope instead. Turn one back into a plain .tar.gz with
// the same password:
//
// docker exec -i <container> selfpost-backup -decrypt < backup.spbk > backup.tar.gz
package main
import (
"flag"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"codeberg.org/mix/selfpost/internal/backup"
"codeberg.org/mix/selfpost/internal/buildinfo"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/backup"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/buildinfo"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/secretfile"
)
// passwordEnv names the environment variable holding the encryption password.
// A password must never be a command-line argument: the process list is
// readable by every process in the container.
const passwordEnv = "SELFPOST_BACKUP_PASSWORD"
func main() {
showVersion := flag.Bool("version", false, "print version and exit")
out := flag.String("o", "", "write the archive to this file instead of stdout")
out := flag.String("o", "", "write the output to this file instead of stdout")
in := flag.String("i", "", "read the encrypted archive from this file instead of stdin (-decrypt only)")
decrypt := flag.Bool("decrypt", false, "decrypt an encrypted backup (.spbk) back to a plain .tar.gz")
pwFile := flag.String("password-file", "", "read the encryption password from this file (first line); "+passwordEnv+" is used when unset")
flag.Parse()
if *showVersion {
@@ -31,40 +49,137 @@ func main() {
return
}
if err := run(*out); err != nil {
password, err := readPassword(*pwFile)
if err == nil {
if *decrypt {
err = runDecrypt(*in, *out, password)
} else {
err = run(*out, password)
}
}
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "selfpost-backup: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
}
func run(outPath string) error {
// run writes a backup, encrypting it when a password was supplied.
func run(outPath, password string) error {
dataDir := envDefault("SELFPOST_DATA_DIR", "/data")
dbPath := envDefault("SELFPOST_DB_PATH", filepath.Join(dataDir, "selfpost.db"))
w := os.Stdout
if outPath != "" {
// Backups are secret; create them owner-only.
f, err := os.OpenFile(outPath, os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY|os.O_TRUNC, 0o600)
w, closeOut, err := openOutput(outPath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer closeOut()
sink := w
var env *secretfile.Writer
if password != "" {
env, err = secretfile.NewWriter(w, secretfile.TypeFullBackup, password)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer f.Close()
w = f
sink = env
}
if err := backup.Create(w, backup.Params{
if err := backup.Create(sink, backup.Params{
DataDir: dataDir,
DBPath: dbPath,
Version: buildinfo.Version,
}); err != nil {
return err
}
if env != nil {
if err := env.Close(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if outPath != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "selfpost-backup: wrote %s (SelfPost %s)\n", outPath, buildinfo.Version)
kind := "plain"
if password != "" {
kind = "encrypted"
}
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "selfpost-backup: wrote %s (%s, SelfPost %s)\n", outPath, kind, buildinfo.Version)
}
return nil
}
// runDecrypt turns a .spbk envelope back into the plain gzip tar, so an
// encrypted backup can be extracted with ordinary tools during a restore.
func runDecrypt(inPath, outPath, password string) error {
if password == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("-decrypt needs the password (set %s or use -password-file)", passwordEnv)
}
r := io.Reader(os.Stdin)
if inPath != "" {
f, err := os.Open(inPath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer f.Close()
r = f
}
env, err := secretfile.NewReader(r, password)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if env.Type() != secretfile.TypeFullBackup {
return fmt.Errorf("that file is a %s, not a full backup", env.Type())
}
w, closeOut, err := openOutput(outPath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer closeOut()
if _, err := io.Copy(w, env); err != nil {
return err
}
if outPath != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "selfpost-backup: wrote %s (decrypted)\n", outPath)
}
return nil
}
// openOutput returns stdout, or a freshly created owner-only file: both plain
// and encrypted backups are secret enough to keep off other users' eyes.
func openOutput(outPath string) (io.Writer, func(), error) {
if outPath == "" {
return os.Stdout, func() {}, nil
}
f, err := os.OpenFile(outPath, os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY|os.O_TRUNC, 0o600)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return f, func() { _ = f.Close() }, nil
}
// readPassword takes the password from the given file (first line) or, when no
// file is named, from the environment. An empty result means "no encryption".
func readPassword(pwFile string) (string, error) {
if pwFile == "" {
return os.Getenv(passwordEnv), nil
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(pwFile)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("read password file: %w", err)
}
// A password file is usually written with a trailing newline; take the first
// line and strip the line ending, but keep any other whitespace, which may
// well be part of the password.
line, _, _ := strings.Cut(string(data), "\n")
line = strings.TrimSuffix(line, "\r")
if line == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("password file %s is empty", pwFile)
}
return line, nil
}
func envDefault(key, def string) string {
if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
return v
+139
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@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
package main
import (
"archive/tar"
"compress/gzip"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
)
// seedDataDir builds the minimum /data tree a backup can be taken from.
func seedDataDir(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
dataDir := t.TempDir()
st, err := store.Open(filepath.Join(dataDir, "selfpost.db"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("open store: %v", err)
}
if _, err := st.AddDomain("example.com", "selfpost"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("add domain: %v", err)
}
if err := st.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("close store: %v", err)
}
t.Setenv("SELFPOST_DATA_DIR", dataDir)
t.Setenv("SELFPOST_DB_PATH", filepath.Join(dataDir, "selfpost.db"))
return dataDir
}
// An encrypted backup is only worth having if the container it came from can
// hand it back as an ordinary archive during a restore, so the two halves of
// the CLI are tested as the one round trip an operator actually performs.
func TestEncryptedBackupRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
seedDataDir(t)
dir := t.TempDir()
encrypted := filepath.Join(dir, "backup.spbk")
plain := filepath.Join(dir, "backup.tar.gz")
const password = "a long enough password"
if err := run(encrypted, password); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create encrypted backup: %v", err)
}
head, err := os.ReadFile(encrypted)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read backup: %v", err)
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(string(head), "SELFPOST") {
t.Fatalf("encrypted backup does not start with the envelope magic")
}
if err := runDecrypt(encrypted, plain, "the wrong password"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("decryption with the wrong password succeeded")
}
if err := runDecrypt(encrypted, plain, password); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decrypt: %v", err)
}
// What comes out must be the same gzip tar the plain path produces.
f, err := os.Open(plain)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("open decrypted archive: %v", err)
}
defer f.Close()
gz, err := gzip.NewReader(f)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("gzip: %v", err)
}
names := map[string]bool{}
tr := tar.NewReader(gz)
for {
hdr, err := tr.Next()
if err == io.EOF {
break
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("tar: %v", err)
}
names[hdr.Name] = true
}
for _, want := range []string{"manifest.json", "selfpost.db"} {
if !names[want] {
t.Errorf("decrypted archive has no %s (entries: %v)", want, names)
}
}
}
// Without a password the CLI keeps producing the plain archive that existing
// backup scripts consume.
func TestUnencryptedBackupStaysPlain(t *testing.T) {
seedDataDir(t)
out := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "backup.tar.gz")
if err := run(out, ""); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create backup: %v", err)
}
f, err := os.Open(out)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("open archive: %v", err)
}
defer f.Close()
if _, err := gzip.NewReader(f); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("plain backup is not a gzip archive: %v", err)
}
}
// Decrypting needs a password, and it must come from a file or the environment
// — never an argument, which the process list would expose.
func TestReadPassword(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
pwFile := filepath.Join(dir, "pw")
if err := os.WriteFile(pwFile, []byte("from the file\nignored second line\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write password file: %v", err)
}
t.Setenv(passwordEnv, "from the environment")
got, err := readPassword("")
if err != nil || got != "from the environment" {
t.Errorf("readPassword(\"\") = %q, %v", got, err)
}
got, err = readPassword(pwFile)
if err != nil || got != "from the file" {
t.Errorf("readPassword(file) = %q, %v", got, err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(pwFile, nil, 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("truncate password file: %v", err)
}
if _, err := readPassword(pwFile); err == nil {
t.Error("an empty password file was accepted")
}
os.Unsetenv(passwordEnv)
if err := runDecrypt("", "", ""); err == nil {
t.Error("-decrypt without a password was accepted")
}
}