release: 0.5.0: Pre-1.0 security review, domain-admin role, doc consolidation

A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
Fixed:
  - A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
  - Log-tailer resumes where it stopped instead of jumping to end-of-file on
  - Level-2 rate limit no longer overshoots under concurrency: messages that
Changed:
  - The project has a single public home: `github.com/mixeme/selfpost`. Codeberg
  - Code comments no longer cite the archived specification. References like
  - `docs/code-review.md` is gone. Its plan is finished — phases 0 (bar the
  - `docs/architecture.md` gained a *Code layers* section: a diagram of
  - Phase 1 doc/code hygiene (`docs/code-review.md`): removed ~30 stale
  … (1 more in CHANGELOG)
Security:
  - Pre-release security review (plan § D, model Fable, 2026-08-06): full pass
  - `saslpasswd2` argv: the application login is now passed after a `--`
Added:
  - Optional password encryption for the two secret-bearing downloads (plan
  - Domain import accepts an encrypted export: the envelope is detected by its
  - `selfpost-backup` writes encrypted archives and reads them back:
  - `TestParseDelivery` covers the exotic mail.log shapes the review asked for
  - docs: README *Encrypting a backup or export*; `docs/security.md` §
  … (14 more in CHANGELOG)
Removed:
  - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk «restore old backup revives session rows»
Changed:
  - docs: `implementation-plan.md` trimmed to the sole open v1.x gate — pre-release
  - docs: `architecture.md` — sessions (SQLite, idle renew, password change),
  - docs: `development.md` — expanded e2e stack and `release.yml` matrix workflow.
  - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk for send-log rows stuck at `queued` after
  - docs: `roadmap.md` — optional send-log / `mail.log` follow-ups under v1.x tail.
  … (10 more in CHANGELOG)

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (0.5.0).
This commit is contained in:
mix
2026-09-22 15:24:51 +03:00
parent 72b09d60a6
commit 5e5d157496
113 changed files with 4284 additions and 1140 deletions
+37 -33
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
// Package app owns application accounts (spec 4.1, 5.1): the SASL credentials in
// sasldb2, the per-application sender address mode, and the
// smtpd_sender_login_maps bindings that tie each login to the addresses it may
// send from. It keeps those three stores — the SQLite registry, sasldb2 and the
// Postfix map — in agreement and drives the Postfix reload.
// Package app owns application accounts (product.md § Multi-domain model): the
// SASL credentials in sasldb2, the per-application sender address mode, and
// the smtpd_sender_login_maps bindings that tie each login to the addresses it
// may send from. It keeps those three stores — the SQLite registry, sasldb2
// and the Postfix map — in agreement and drives the Postfix reload.
package app
import (
"codeberg.org/mix/selfpost/internal/postfix"
"codeberg.org/mix/selfpost/internal/store"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/postfix"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
)
// SenderMaps is the slice of the Postfix manager the application service needs:
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ type SenderMaps interface {
// Service coordinates application state across SQLite, sasldb2 and the Postfix
// sender_login_maps. Web handlers validate raw input first; the Service performs
// the domain-ownership checks that must not be skipped (spec 7.6.2) and keeps
// the domain-ownership checks that must not be skipped (security.md) and keeps
// the stores consistent.
type Service struct {
store *store.Store
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ func NewService(st *store.Store, sasl *SASLDB, pf SenderMaps) *Service {
return &Service{store: st, sasl: sasl, pf: pf}
}
// List returns a domain's applications with their address lists (spec 7.2.6).
// List returns a domain's applications with their address lists (product.md).
func (s *Service) List(domainID int64) ([]store.Application, error) {
return s.store.ListApplicationsByDomain(domainID)
}
@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ func (s *Service) Get(id int64) (store.Application, error) {
}
// Create adds an application to a domain: it validates the login and (in list
// mode) that every address belongs to the domain (spec 7.6.2), generates a
// mode) that every address belongs to the domain (security.md), generates a
// strong password, writes the SASL account and rebuilds the sender map (spec
// 7.2.5). The generated password is returned so the caller can show it exactly
// once (spec 7.6.1) — it is never persisted in plaintext.
// once (security.md) — it is never persisted in plaintext.
//
// The registry row is written first so its UNIQUE constraint is the sole arbiter
// of a duplicate login (avoiding a check-then-act race and, crucially, avoiding
@@ -92,13 +92,14 @@ func (s *Service) rollbackCreate(id int64, login string) {
_, _ = s.store.DeleteApplication(id)
}
// ImportApplication re-creates an application from a domain-export file (spec
// 7.5.B): it validates the login and (in list mode) that every address belongs
// to the domain, inserts the registry row and writes the SASL account with the
// imported password verbatim, re-keyed under this instance's realm so the
// credential keeps working without regeneration. It deliberately does not
// rebuild the sender map — the caller (domain import) does that once after all
// applications are in — and returns store.ErrLoginExists if the login collides.
// ImportApplication re-creates an application from a domain-export file
// (architecture.md § Persistence): it validates the login and (in list mode)
// that every address belongs to the domain, inserts the registry row and
// writes the SASL account with the imported password verbatim, re-keyed under
// this instance's realm so the credential keeps working without regeneration.
// It deliberately does not rebuild the sender map — the caller (domain import)
// does that once after all applications are in — and returns
// store.ErrLoginExists if the login collides.
func (s *Service) ImportApplication(domainID int64, login, mode string, rawAddresses []string, password string) error {
addresses, err := s.validateForDomain(domainID, login, mode, rawAddresses)
if err != nil {
@@ -118,14 +119,15 @@ func (s *Service) ImportApplication(domainID int64, login, mode string, rawAddre
return nil
}
// Secret returns an application's stored password for a domain export (spec
// 7.5.B). See SASLDB.Secret for why this is possible and safe.
// Secret returns an application's stored password for a domain export
// (architecture.md § Persistence). See SASLDB.Secret for why this is possible
// and safe.
func (s *Service) Secret(login string) (string, error) {
return s.sasl.Secret(login)
}
// UpdateMode switches an application's address mode / list and rebuilds the
// sender map (spec 7.2.7). The login and password are untouched. Addresses are
// sender map (product.md). The login and password are untouched. Addresses are
// re-validated against the application's domain.
func (s *Service) UpdateMode(id int64, mode string, rawAddresses []string) error {
a, err := s.store.GetApplication(id)
@@ -172,22 +174,23 @@ func (s *Service) Delete(id int64) error {
if err := s.sasl.Delete(a.Login); err != nil {
return err
}
// Drop the application's level-2 limit, if any (spec 7.4); rate_limits has no
// cascade of its own.
// Drop the application's level-2 limit, if any (README § Rate limiting);
// rate_limits has no cascade of its own.
if err := s.store.DeleteRateLimit(store.RateLimitScopeApp, id); err != nil {
return err
}
return s.Resync()
}
// RateLimit returns the application-level differentiated rate limit (spec 7.4),
// and whether one is configured, for the application's edit form.
// RateLimit returns the application-level differentiated rate limit (README §
// Rate limiting), and whether one is configured, for the application's edit
// form.
func (s *Service) RateLimit(appID int64) (store.RateLimit, bool, error) {
return s.store.GetRateLimit(store.RateLimitScopeApp, appID)
}
// SaveRateLimit stores the application-level rate limit. The caller has validated
// the IPs and numbers (spec 7.6.2); the milter reads the row live, so no reload
// the IPs and numbers (security.md); the milter reads the row live, so no reload
// is needed.
func (s *Service) SaveRateLimit(appID int64, ips []string, maxMessages, windowSeconds int) error {
return s.store.SetRateLimit(store.RateLimit{
@@ -199,14 +202,15 @@ func (s *Service) SaveRateLimit(appID int64, ips []string, maxMessages, windowSe
})
}
// ClearRateLimit removes the application-level rate limit (spec 7.4).
// ClearRateLimit removes the application-level rate limit (README § Rate
// limiting).
func (s *Service) ClearRateLimit(appID int64) error {
return s.store.DeleteRateLimit(store.RateLimitScopeApp, appID)
}
// PurgeDomainSASL removes the SASL accounts of every application bound to a
// domain. It must be called before the domain's registry rows are cascade-
// deleted, while the logins are still known (spec 7.2.4). The registry rows and
// deleted, while the logins are still known (product.md). The registry rows and
// the sender map are handled by the domain deletion path; this only clears
// sasldb2, which has no cascade of its own.
func (s *Service) PurgeDomainSASL(domainID int64) error {
@@ -223,10 +227,10 @@ func (s *Service) PurgeDomainSASL(domainID int64) error {
}
// Resync rebuilds smtpd_sender_login_maps from the full set of application
// bindings and reloads Postfix (spec 5.1). It is the single idempotent apply
// path shared by create/edit/delete and is also reachable from the manual
// reload button; it doubles as recovery if the map ever drifts from the
// database.
// bindings and reloads Postfix (architecture.md § Mail path). It is the single
// idempotent apply path shared by create/edit/delete and is also reachable
// from the manual reload button; it doubles as recovery if the map ever drifts
// from the database.
func (s *Service) Resync() error {
bindings, err := s.store.ListBindings()
if err != nil {
@@ -241,7 +245,7 @@ func (s *Service) Resync() error {
// validateForDomain resolves the domain, validates the login and address mode,
// and — in list mode — validates that every address belongs to the domain
// (spec 7.6.2). It returns the cleaned address list, which is empty in wildcard
// (security.md). It returns the cleaned address list, which is empty in wildcard
// mode. Resolving the domain here also confirms it exists before any write.
func (s *Service) validateForDomain(domainID int64, login, mode string, rawAddresses []string) ([]string, error) {
d, err := s.store.GetDomain(domainID)