release: 0.5.0: Pre-1.0 security review, domain-admin role, doc consolidation
A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's Fixed: - A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's - Log-tailer resumes where it stopped instead of jumping to end-of-file on - Level-2 rate limit no longer overshoots under concurrency: messages that Changed: - The project has a single public home: `github.com/mixeme/selfpost`. Codeberg - Code comments no longer cite the archived specification. References like - `docs/code-review.md` is gone. Its plan is finished — phases 0 (bar the - `docs/architecture.md` gained a *Code layers* section: a diagram of - Phase 1 doc/code hygiene (`docs/code-review.md`): removed ~30 stale … (1 more in CHANGELOG) Security: - Pre-release security review (plan § D, model Fable, 2026-08-06): full pass - `saslpasswd2` argv: the application login is now passed after a `--` Added: - Optional password encryption for the two secret-bearing downloads (plan - Domain import accepts an encrypted export: the envelope is detected by its - `selfpost-backup` writes encrypted archives and reads them back: - `TestParseDelivery` covers the exotic mail.log shapes the review asked for - docs: README *Encrypting a backup or export*; `docs/security.md` § … (14 more in CHANGELOG) Removed: - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk «restore old backup revives session rows» Changed: - docs: `implementation-plan.md` trimmed to the sole open v1.x gate — pre-release - docs: `architecture.md` — sessions (SQLite, idle renew, password change), - docs: `development.md` — expanded e2e stack and `release.yml` matrix workflow. - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk for send-log rows stuck at `queued` after - docs: `roadmap.md` — optional send-log / `mail.log` follow-ups under v1.x tail. … (10 more in CHANGELOG) Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (0.5.0).
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@@ -5,15 +5,15 @@ import (
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"codeberg.org/mix/selfpost/internal/store"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
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)
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// handleAccount serves the administrator's own account settings: the username
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// and password chosen during setup are the only panel credentials (spec 7.6.1),
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// and until now they could be changed only by recreating the state. Changing
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// them here never touches application SASL logins, which are a separate
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// identity system (spec 5.1).
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// and password chosen during setup are the only panel credentials
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// (security.md), and until now they could be changed only by recreating the
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// state. Changing them here never touches application SASL logins, which are a
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// separate identity system (architecture.md § Mail path).
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func (s *Server) handleAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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switch r.Method {
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case http.MethodGet:
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@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ func accountFlash(r *http.Request) string {
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// is always required, so a stolen session alone cannot lock the administrator
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// out of their own panel, and the attempt is throttled on the same limiter as
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// the login form so this route cannot be used to brute-force the password past
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// that limit (spec 7.6.5).
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// that limit (security.md).
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func (s *Server) submitAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if !s.loginLimiter.Allow(clientIP(r, s.trustedProxies)) {
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s.renderAccount(w, r, http.StatusTooManyRequests,
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