release: 0.5.0: Pre-1.0 security review, domain-admin role, doc consolidation

A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
Fixed:
  - A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
  - Log-tailer resumes where it stopped instead of jumping to end-of-file on
  - Level-2 rate limit no longer overshoots under concurrency: messages that
Changed:
  - The project has a single public home: `github.com/mixeme/selfpost`. Codeberg
  - Code comments no longer cite the archived specification. References like
  - `docs/code-review.md` is gone. Its plan is finished — phases 0 (bar the
  - `docs/architecture.md` gained a *Code layers* section: a diagram of
  - Phase 1 doc/code hygiene (`docs/code-review.md`): removed ~30 stale
  … (1 more in CHANGELOG)
Security:
  - Pre-release security review (plan § D, model Fable, 2026-08-06): full pass
  - `saslpasswd2` argv: the application login is now passed after a `--`
Added:
  - Optional password encryption for the two secret-bearing downloads (plan
  - Domain import accepts an encrypted export: the envelope is detected by its
  - `selfpost-backup` writes encrypted archives and reads them back:
  - `TestParseDelivery` covers the exotic mail.log shapes the review asked for
  - docs: README *Encrypting a backup or export*; `docs/security.md` §
  … (14 more in CHANGELOG)
Removed:
  - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk «restore old backup revives session rows»
Changed:
  - docs: `implementation-plan.md` trimmed to the sole open v1.x gate — pre-release
  - docs: `architecture.md` — sessions (SQLite, idle renew, password change),
  - docs: `development.md` — expanded e2e stack and `release.yml` matrix workflow.
  - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk for send-log rows stuck at `queued` after
  - docs: `roadmap.md` — optional send-log / `mail.log` follow-ups under v1.x tail.
  … (10 more in CHANGELOG)

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (0.5.0).

internal/web/handlers_auth.go

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"net/http"
 	"strings"
 
-	"codeberg.org/mix/selfpost/internal/store"
+	"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
 	"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
 )
 
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import (
 // TLS in front, so CookieSecure — it carries the __Host- prefix, which turns
 // what the cookie's attributes merely promise into something the browser
 // enforces: Secure, Path=/ and, the point of the exercise, no Domain
-// attribute, so no other host may set a cookie by this name (phase 14.B).
+// attribute, so no other host may set a cookie by this name.
 // The prefix is only valid on a Secure cookie, so a development instance on
 // plain HTTP has to keep the bare name: with the prefix the browser would
 // discard the Set-Cookie outright and logging in would silently never stick.
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ func (s *Server) sessionCookie() string {
 // is denial of service, not compromise; refusing the request and saying so in
 // the log is what makes it diagnosable instead of an endless login loop. The
 // __Host- prefix prevents this outright, but only where it applies — this
-// check also covers the plain-HTTP development shape (phase 14.B).
+// check also covers the plain-HTTP development shape.
 func (s *Server) sessionToken(r *http.Request) (string, bool) {
 	name := s.sessionCookie()
 	var token string
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ func (s *Server) renderLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, formErr string)
 }
 
 func (s *Server) submitLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-	// Brute-force throttle by client IP (spec 7.6.5).
+	// Brute-force throttle by client IP (security.md).
 	if !s.loginLimiter.Allow(clientIP(r, s.trustedProxies)) {
 		s.renderLogin(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, "Too many attempts. Please wait and try again.")
 		return