release: 0.5.0: Pre-1.0 security review, domain-admin role, doc consolidation

A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
Fixed:
  - A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
  - Log-tailer resumes where it stopped instead of jumping to end-of-file on
  - Level-2 rate limit no longer overshoots under concurrency: messages that
Changed:
  - The project has a single public home: `github.com/mixeme/selfpost`. Codeberg
  - Code comments no longer cite the archived specification. References like
  - `docs/code-review.md` is gone. Its plan is finished — phases 0 (bar the
  - `docs/architecture.md` gained a *Code layers* section: a diagram of
  - Phase 1 doc/code hygiene (`docs/code-review.md`): removed ~30 stale
  … (1 more in CHANGELOG)
Security:
  - Pre-release security review (plan § D, model Fable, 2026-08-06): full pass
  - `saslpasswd2` argv: the application login is now passed after a `--`
Added:
  - Optional password encryption for the two secret-bearing downloads (plan
  - Domain import accepts an encrypted export: the envelope is detected by its
  - `selfpost-backup` writes encrypted archives and reads them back:
  - `TestParseDelivery` covers the exotic mail.log shapes the review asked for
  - docs: README *Encrypting a backup or export*; `docs/security.md` §
  … (14 more in CHANGELOG)
Removed:
  - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk «restore old backup revives session rows»
Changed:
  - docs: `implementation-plan.md` trimmed to the sole open v1.x gate — pre-release
  - docs: `architecture.md` — sessions (SQLite, idle renew, password change),
  - docs: `development.md` — expanded e2e stack and `release.yml` matrix workflow.
  - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk for send-log rows stuck at `queued` after
  - docs: `roadmap.md` — optional send-log / `mail.log` follow-ups under v1.x tail.
  … (10 more in CHANGELOG)

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (0.5.0).

test/e2e/go.mod

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-module codeberg.org/mix/selfpost/test/e2e
+module github.com/mixeme/selfpost/test/e2e
 
 go 1.26
 

test/e2e/negative_test.go

@@ -68,8 +68,8 @@ func testLevel2RateLimit(t *testing.T, sc *scenario) {
 }
 
 // testSenderLoginMismatch is plan C.4 negative check 2: an authenticated
-// application cannot send as a sender it does not own (spec 5.1 p.3,
-// reject_sender_login_mismatch) — the core anti-spoofing control.
+// application cannot send as a sender it does not own (architecture.md § Mail
+// path, reject_sender_login_mismatch) — the core anti-spoofing control.
 func testSenderLoginMismatch(t *testing.T, sc *scenario) {
 	res := attemptSend(sendAttempt{
 		authLogin: sc.appLogin, authPassword: sc.appPassword,
@@ -118,10 +118,10 @@ func testForeignRelayRejected(t *testing.T, sc *scenario) {
 }
 
 // testJournalMilterFailOpen is plan C.4 negative check 6: the journal-milter
-// is monitoring-only and fails open (spec 7.3) — stopping the panel process
-// (which owns the milter socket) must not block mail, and must not crash the
-// container (crashexit only fires on PROCESS_STATE_FATAL, a clean supervisor
-// stop is STOPPED, see build/crashexit.py).
+// is monitoring-only and fails open (architecture.md § Mail path) — stopping
+// the panel process (which owns the milter socket) must not block mail, and
+// must not crash the container (crashexit only fires on PROCESS_STATE_FATAL, a
+// clean supervisor stop is STOPPED, see build/crashexit.py).
 func testJournalMilterFailOpen(t *testing.T, sc *scenario) {
 	if _, err := h.execIn("selfpost", "supervisorctl", "-c", "/etc/supervisor/supervisord.conf", "stop", "panel"); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("stop panel: %v", err)
@@ -196,12 +196,12 @@ func testSessionSurvivesRestart(t *testing.T, sc *scenario) {
 }
 
 // testLevel1RateLimit is plan C.4 negative check 4: the native Postfix anvil
-// backstop (smtpd_client_message_rate_limit, spec 5 p.5), set by the override
-// to RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGES_PER_IP=50, rejects once exceeded. It uses a dedicated
-// application with no level-2 limit of its own, and retries well past that
-// count, so the result is unambiguous regardless of how much of the shared
-// per-IP budget earlier subtests already spent (they stay well under 50
-// between them).
+// backstop (smtpd_client_message_rate_limit, README § Rate limiting), set by
+// the override to RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGES_PER_IP=50, rejects once exceeded. It
+// uses a dedicated application with no level-2 limit of its own, and retries
+// well past that count, so the result is unambiguous regardless of how much of
+// the shared per-IP budget earlier subtests already spent (they stay well
+// under 50 between them).
 func testLevel1RateLimit(t *testing.T, sc *scenario) {
 	login, password, err := sc.panel.addApplication(sc.domainID, "l1app", "wildcard", "")
 	if err != nil {

test/e2e/panel_client.go

@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ func (c *panelClient) dkimRecord(domainID string) (name, value string, err error
 }
 
 // addApplication submits the add-application form and returns the one-shot
-// login/password the panel renders inline (spec 7.6.1 — never recoverable
+// login/password the panel renders inline (security.md — never recoverable
 // later, so this is the only place to read it).
 func (c *panelClient) addApplication(domainID, login, mode, addresses string) (appLogin, password string, err error) {
 	resp, body, err := c.postForm("/domains/"+domainID+"/applications", url.Values{
@@ -170,8 +170,9 @@ func (c *panelClient) addApplication(domainID, login, mode, addresses string) (a
 	return appLogin, password, nil
 }
 
-// setRateLimit saves a level-2 differentiated limit (spec 7.4) on either a
-// domain (/domains/{id}/ratelimit) or an application (/applications/{id}/ratelimit).
+// setRateLimit saves a level-2 differentiated limit (README § Rate limiting)
+// on either a domain (/domains/{id}/ratelimit) or an application
+// (/applications/{id}/ratelimit).
 func (c *panelClient) setRateLimit(path, allowedIP string, maxMessages, windowSeconds int) error {
 	resp, body, err := c.postForm(path, url.Values{
 		"allowed_ips":    {allowedIP},