ci: actions by commit, govulncheck, images pinned, base packages watched (audit I4, I5)

Security audit 2026-10-17, findings I4 and I5 (low), stage 5.

I4: every action is pinned by commit with its version in a comment - the
latest release of the major each used, so nothing changes in behaviour
(checkout v4.4.0, setup-go v5.6.0, setup-buildx-action v3.12.0,
build-push-action v6.19.2, login-action v3.7.0; commits read with git
ls-remote, the tags are lightweight). govulncheck v1.9.0 runs on the
source in test.yml, and in release.yml on the image's panel and
selfpost-backup binaries before the push (-mode=binary: the base image's
Go, which may lag the runner's - a fixed stdlib advisory then fails the
release until golang:1.26-trixie moves, which is the point). certbot is
pinned to v5.8.0 and Caddy to 2.11.7 (Docker Hub, 2026-10-17).
provenance/SBOM stay off until the GHCR cleanup keeps attestations, as the
plan says.

I5: published tags are never rebuilt, so a Debian security fix reaches
operators with the next release. The guide (§ Upgrading) and SECURITY.md
say so; base-packages.yml runs .github/scripts/base-packages.sh every
Monday: what debian:trixie-slim would install for postfix, libsasl2-2,
libsasl2-modules-db, sasl2-bin, openssl, libssl3t64, libdb5.3t64 against
the table in development.md (the 2.14.3 image's versions), red when one
moved. Tried on the test server: green as it stands, red with a version
changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
mix
2026-10-17 22:33:02 +03:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent bde6a4000e
commit 68493dc097
11 changed files with 141 additions and 17 deletions
+22 -8
View File
@@ -66,14 +66,14 @@ jobs:
arch: arm64
runs-on: ${{ matrix.runner }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
with:
ref: v${{ needs.prepare.outputs.version }}
- uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
- uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@8d2750c68a42422c14e847fe6c8ac0403b4cbd6f # v3.12.0
- name: Build image (native, loaded locally for the e2e gate)
uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
uses: docker/build-push-action@10e90e3645eae34f1e60eeb005ba3a3d33f178e8 # v6.19.2
with:
context: .
file: build/Dockerfile
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ jobs:
VERSION=${{ needs.prepare.outputs.version }}
tags: selfpost:e2e
- uses: actions/setup-go@v5
- uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5.6.0
with:
go-version: "1.26"
cache-dependency-path: test/e2e/go.sum
@@ -110,8 +110,22 @@ jobs:
fi
done
# The binaries about to be pushed, as built in the image - with the Go
# of golang:1.26-trixie, which may lag the runner's: a standard-library
# advisory fixed in a later patch fails the release until the base tag
# moves, which is the point (security audit 2026-10-17, I4).
- name: Vulnerabilities in the image's binaries
run: |
set -euo pipefail
id=$(docker create selfpost:e2e)
trap 'docker rm -f "$id" >/dev/null' EXIT
for bin in panel selfpost-backup; do
docker cp "$id:/usr/local/bin/$bin" "/tmp/$bin"
go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@v1.9.0 -mode=binary "/tmp/$bin"
done
- name: Log in to ghcr.io
uses: docker/login-action@v3
uses: docker/login-action@c94ce9fb468520275223c153574b00df6fe4bcc9 # v3.7.0
with:
registry: ghcr.io
username: ${{ github.actor }}
@@ -152,14 +166,14 @@ jobs:
needs: [prepare, build]
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
with:
ref: v${{ needs.prepare.outputs.version }}
- uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
- uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@8d2750c68a42422c14e847fe6c8ac0403b4cbd6f # v3.12.0
- name: Log in to ghcr.io
uses: docker/login-action@v3
uses: docker/login-action@c94ce9fb468520275223c153574b00df6fe4bcc9 # v3.7.0
with:
registry: ghcr.io
username: ${{ github.actor }}