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ci: actions by commit, govulncheck, images pinned, base packages watched (audit I4, I5)

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Security audit 2026-10-17, findings I4 and I5 (low), stage 5.

I4: every action is pinned by commit with its version in a comment - the
latest release of the major each used, so nothing changes in behaviour
(checkout v4.4.0, setup-go v5.6.0, setup-buildx-action v3.12.0,
build-push-action v6.19.2, login-action v3.7.0; commits read with git
ls-remote, the tags are lightweight). govulncheck v1.9.0 runs on the
source in test.yml, and in release.yml on the image's panel and
selfpost-backup binaries before the push (-mode=binary: the base image's
Go, which may lag the runner's - a fixed stdlib advisory then fails the
release until golang:1.26-trixie moves, which is the point). certbot is
pinned to v5.8.0 and Caddy to 2.11.7 (Docker Hub, 2026-10-17).
provenance/SBOM stay off until the GHCR cleanup keeps attestations, as the
plan says.

I5: published tags are never rebuilt, so a Debian security fix reaches
operators with the next release. The guide (§ Upgrading) and SECURITY.md
say so; base-packages.yml runs .github/scripts/base-packages.sh every
Monday: what debian:trixie-slim would install for postfix, libsasl2-2,
libsasl2-modules-db, sasl2-bin, openssl, libssl3t64, libdb5.3t64 against
the table in development.md (the 2.14.3 image's versions), red when one
moved. Tried on the test server: green as it stands, red with a version
changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
mix
2026-10-17 22:33:02 +03:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent bde6a4000e
commit 68493dc097
11 changed files with 141 additions and 17 deletions
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docs/security-audit-2026-10-17.md
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@@ -824,17 +824,25 @@ the argument.
### Stage 5 — supply chain and currency (~2.5 h)
- [ ] **I4.** Actions pinned by SHA with the version in a comment;
- [x] **I4.** Actions pinned by SHA with the version in a comment;
`govulncheck ./...` in `test.yml` and in `release.yml` before the push (a
stdlib advisory fixed in the current patch of the pinned minor fails the
build until the base tag moves — that is the point); `certbot` and
`caddy` pinned in the fragments. Leave `provenance`/`sbom` off until the
GHCR cleanup loop is taught to keep attestation manifests (a follow-up,
1 h). — **Sonnet**, 1 h.
- [ ] **I5.** guide § Upgrading and SECURITY.md: base-package fixes arrive
1 h). — **Sonnet**, 1 h. *Done 2026-10-17:* actions pinned to the
latest release of the major each used (checkout v4.4.0, setup-go v5.6.0,
setup-buildx v3.12.0, build-push v6.19.2, login v3.7.0); govulncheck
v1.9.0 on the source in test.yml and on the image's two binaries
(`-mode=binary`, the base image's Go) in release.yml before the push;
certbot v5.8.0, caddy 2.11.7. provenance/SBOM stay off, as planned.
- [x] **I5.** guide § Upgrading and SECURITY.md: base-package fixes arrive
with the next patch release; the owner's rule on published tags. A weekly
workflow that rebuilds the package list in `debian:trixie-slim` and fails
when postfix/libsasl2/openssl/libdb moved, as the nudge. — **Sonnet**,
when postfix/libsasl2/openssl/libdb moved, as the nudge. — **Sonnet**, *Done 2026-10-17:* the guide, SECURITY.md;
`base-packages.yml` + `.github/scripts/base-packages.sh` against a table
in development.md (seven packages, from the 2.14.3 image), tried on the
test server both ways.
1.5 h.
### Stage 6 — the rest, and what to accept (~3 h)