release: 1.0.0: Public 1.0 image; delivery log; docs and SECURITY.md (incl. 1.0.1)

[1.0.0]
Added:
  - A **Delivery log** on each delivery's page (`/deliveries/{id}`): the
  - A **History** block on the same page: the journal's two timestamps stated as
Fixed:
  - Postfix config: copy TLS cert/key from the (often `:ro`, host-owned) mount
  - Postfix config: allow `maillog_file` under `/data` via
  - E2e: read `/data/setup-token` via `docker compose exec` (file is `0600`
  - Entrypoint: check `SELFPOST_HOSTNAME` before `/data` setup (so a bad identity
  - E2e gate: wait for host-published `/healthz` before panel setup, and stop
  … (3 more in CHANGELOG)
Changed:
  - Document what `.spbk` and `.spde` stand for (SelfPost backup / SelfPost domain
  - Docs aligned with the code: setup URL is `/setup/<token>` (README and
  - Full backups no longer carry `/data/log`. It is Postfix's raw log plus its
  - Monitoring screens (status, mail queue, system log, deliveries) use adaptive
  - Documentation package consolidated into `docs/development.md`: Documentation
  … (4 more in CHANGELOG)
[1.0.1]
A documentation and packaging release: no change to the mail path, the database, or the on-disk layout. Upgrading is a tag bump.
Added:
  - `SECURITY.md` — how to report a vulnerability privately (GitHub private
  - [docs/plans/](docs/plans/) — one document per agreed extension: the optional
Changed:
  - The panel's **Account** entry is now called **Settings** — nav link, page
  - The signed-in name in the panel's nav is now labelled `User:`, so it reads as
  - [docs/product.md](docs/product.md) reframes the future line: the inbound
  - [docs/security.md](docs/security.md) is now in English, matching the rest of
  - The README documentation table now points at `SECURITY.md` for reporting a
  … (2 more in CHANGELOG)
Fixed:
  - The panel's static assets are served with a content ETag and

Squashed CHANGELOG sections: [1.0.0], [1.0.1].

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.0.0, 1.0.1).
This commit is contained in:
mix
2026-09-22 15:24:51 +03:00
parent 83c488cc48
commit 75207f0d1e
80 changed files with 3670 additions and 1662 deletions
+1 -1
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@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/postfix-wrapper.sh /usr/local/bin/postfix-config.sh
EXPOSE 8080 465 587
# Liveness probe: panel HTTP plus mail-path processes (opendkim, panel, postfix).
# Does not verify TLS, DNS, or end-to-end delivery — see README Operations.
# Does not verify TLS, DNS, or end-to-end delivery — see docs/guide.md Operations.
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=90s --retries=3 \
CMD curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:8080/healthz || exit 1
+90 -61
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@@ -1,69 +1,12 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Container entrypoint (runs as root, PID 1 until it execs supervisord).
#
# The persistent root /data is a host bind mount (spec 9), so it arrives owned
# by the host user (typically root), not by the unprivileged panel user that
# actually writes the SQLite database, setup token and DKIM keys (spec 7.6.8).
# Fix its ownership here — the one place still running as root — before handing
# off to supervisord, which starts the panel as the panel user.
# SELFPOST_HOSTNAME is checked first (plan B.3): it must fail fast with a clear
# message before /data normalisation or Postfix config, so a bad identity never
# looks like a permissions or packaging problem (and so the e2e hostname-gate
# tests see the FATAL text rather than an earlier set -e abort).
set -e
chown panel:panel /data
# Restored backups or previously-created state may contain panel-owned files
# under /data; make sure they stay writable without disturbing anything that a
# later phase deliberately hands to another service.
find /data -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 ! -user panel -exec chown -R panel:panel {} +
# DKIM key tree (spec 6, 9). The panel (user `panel`) generates keys and writes
# the OpenDKIM tables; OpenDKIM (user `opendkim`) must read them. Normalise the
# tree on every start so it is correct whether /data is fresh, restarted, or
# just restored from a backup:
# - group `selfpost` + setgid on directories so anything the panel creates
# inherits the shared group OpenDKIM traverses;
# - private keys and tables group-readable (0640);
# - both table files present (empty is fine) BEFORE OpenDKIM starts, so the
# daemon comes up cleanly with no domains yet.
mkdir -p /data/opendkim/keys
for t in /data/opendkim/KeyTable /data/opendkim/SigningTable; do
[ -e "$t" ] || : > "$t"
done
chown -R panel:selfpost /data/opendkim
find /data/opendkim -type d -exec chmod 2750 {} +
chmod 0640 /data/opendkim/KeyTable /data/opendkim/SigningTable
find /data/opendkim/keys -type f -name '*.private' -exec chmod 0640 {} +
# Application SASL accounts (spec 5.1, 9). The panel (user `panel`) writes the
# sasldb2 via saslpasswd2; Postfix (user `postfix`) reads it to authenticate SMTP
# clients. Share it through the `selfpost` group the same way as the DKIM tree:
# setgid directory so new files inherit the group, and the database itself
# group-readable (0640).
mkdir -p /data/sasl
chown -R panel:selfpost /data/sasl
chmod 2750 /data/sasl
[ -e /data/sasl/sasldb2 ] && chmod 0640 /data/sasl/sasldb2
# Postfix sender_login_maps (spec 5.1). The panel writes it; Postfix reads it.
# Ensure the file exists (empty is fine) before Postfix starts so a reload that
# references it never fails on a missing file, and keep it group-readable.
mkdir -p /data/postfix
[ -e /data/postfix/sender_login_maps ] || : > /data/postfix/sender_login_maps
chown -R panel:selfpost /data/postfix
chmod 2750 /data/postfix
chmod 0640 /data/postfix/sender_login_maps
# Milter socket directories (spec 5 p.3, 7.3). Postfix (user `postfix`) must
# actually CONNECT to both milter sockets — OpenDKIM's and the panel's
# journal-milter — not just probe them at start-up. The sockets are
# created by the opendkim and panel users respectively, so bridge them to
# `postfix` through the shared `selfpost` group: group-owned + setgid dirs mean
# each socket created inside inherits group `selfpost`, and group-traversable
# (2750) lets postfix reach it. Without this, smtpd cannot talk to OpenDKIM and,
# because signing is strict (default_action=tempfail), rejects all mail.
mkdir -p /run/opendkim /run/selfpost
chown opendkim:selfpost /run/opendkim
chown panel:selfpost /run/selfpost
chmod 2750 /run/opendkim /run/selfpost
# SELFPOST_HOSTNAME is an identity, not a setting with a safe default: it must
# simultaneously match the PTR/rDNS record, the certificate CN/SAN, and the
# Cyrus SASL realm (spec 5.2 p.3, 8). The panel (main.go saslRealm()) and
@@ -109,6 +52,92 @@ case "$SELFPOST_HOSTNAME" in
;;
esac
# The persistent root /data is a host bind mount (spec 9), so it arrives owned
# by the host user (typically root), not by the unprivileged panel user that
# actually writes the SQLite database, setup token and DKIM keys (spec 7.6.8).
# Fix its ownership here — the one place still running as root — before handing
# off to supervisord, which starts the panel as the panel user.
#
# Mode must stay world-traversable (0755): OpenDKIM and Postfix reach their
# trees under /data as other users. Go's testing.TempDir is 0700, and a bare
# chown would leave that mode in place — opendkim then cannot read KeyTable and
# the container crash-loops (e2e TestHostnameGate/valid_hostname_starts).
chown panel:panel /data
chmod 755 /data
# Restored backups or previously-created state may contain panel-owned files
# under /data; make sure they stay writable without disturbing anything that a
# later phase deliberately hands to another service. /data/log is exempt: it is
# deliberately owned by postfix (postlogd writes the delivery log there) and is
# normalised on its own below.
find /data -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 ! -user panel ! -name log -exec chown -R panel:panel {} +
# DKIM key tree (spec 6, 9). The panel (user `panel`) generates keys and writes
# the OpenDKIM tables; OpenDKIM (user `opendkim`) must read them. Normalise the
# tree on every start so it is correct whether /data is fresh, restarted, or
# just restored from a backup:
# - group `selfpost` + setgid on directories so anything the panel creates
# inherits the shared group OpenDKIM traverses;
# - private keys and tables group-readable (0640);
# - both table files present (empty is fine) BEFORE OpenDKIM starts, so the
# daemon comes up cleanly with no domains yet.
mkdir -p /data/opendkim/keys
for t in /data/opendkim/KeyTable /data/opendkim/SigningTable; do
[ -e "$t" ] || : > "$t"
done
chown -R panel:selfpost /data/opendkim
find /data/opendkim -type d -exec chmod 2750 {} +
chmod 0640 /data/opendkim/KeyTable /data/opendkim/SigningTable
find /data/opendkim/keys -type f -name '*.private' -exec chmod 0640 {} +
# Application SASL accounts (spec 5.1, 9). The panel (user `panel`) writes the
# sasldb2 via saslpasswd2; Postfix (user `postfix`) reads it to authenticate SMTP
# clients. Share it through the `selfpost` group the same way as the DKIM tree:
# setgid directory so new files inherit the group, and the database itself
# group-readable (0640).
mkdir -p /data/sasl
chown -R panel:selfpost /data/sasl
chmod 2750 /data/sasl
[ -e /data/sasl/sasldb2 ] && chmod 0640 /data/sasl/sasldb2
# Postfix sender_login_maps (spec 5.1). The panel writes it; Postfix reads it.
# Ensure the file exists (empty is fine) before Postfix starts so a reload that
# references it never fails on a missing file, and keep it group-readable.
mkdir -p /data/postfix
[ -e /data/postfix/sender_login_maps ] || : > /data/postfix/sender_login_maps
chown -R panel:selfpost /data/postfix
chmod 2750 /data/postfix
chmod 0640 /data/postfix/sender_login_maps
# Delivery log (architecture.md § Log tailer). postlogd writes it as user
# `postfix`; the panel reads it for the log-tailer and the System log page. It
# lives under /data — not the ephemeral /var/log — so the delivery lines that
# resolve a "queued" send-log row survive a container recreate.
#
# postlogd creates a missing log itself, but at 0600, which the unprivileged
# panel cannot read; so create it here (and re-normalise an existing one, plus
# whatever logrotate left behind) at 0640 owned postfix:selfpost. The setgid
# directory keeps the shared group on anything created inside it later, and
# 2750 keeps it group-traversable but not group-writable — logrotate refuses to
# rotate a log whose directory is writable by a non-root group.
mkdir -p /data/log
[ -e /data/log/mail.log ] || : > /data/log/mail.log
chown -R postfix:selfpost /data/log
chmod 2750 /data/log
find /data/log -type f -exec chmod 0640 {} +
# Milter socket directories (spec 5 p.3, 7.3). Postfix (user `postfix`) must
# actually CONNECT to both milter sockets — OpenDKIM's and the panel's
# journal-milter — not just probe them at start-up. The sockets are
# created by the opendkim and panel users respectively, so bridge them to
# `postfix` through the shared `selfpost` group: group-owned + setgid dirs mean
# each socket created inside inherits group `selfpost`, and group-traversable
# (2750) lets postfix reach it. Without this, smtpd cannot talk to OpenDKIM and,
# because signing is strict (default_action=tempfail), rejects all mail.
mkdir -p /run/opendkim /run/selfpost
chown opendkim:selfpost /run/opendkim
chown panel:selfpost /run/selfpost
chmod 2750 /run/opendkim /run/selfpost
# Generate the outbound-relay Postfix configuration from the environment (spec
# 5). Kept out of the image build so cert paths, rate limits, hostname and the
# optional 587 service are all driven by env at run time, and re-derived on every
+5 -5
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@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Periodic logrotate for /var/log/mail.log (spec 9, 10). Rotation renames the
# file, recreates it (`create 0644 root root`, matching a cold container
# Periodic logrotate for /data/log/mail.log (spec 9, 10). Rotation renames the
# file, recreates it (`create 0640 postfix selfpost`, matching a cold container
# start), then runs `postfix reload` (the same mechanism `postfix logrotate`
# uses): postlogd keeps writing to the renamed inode until reload, and the
# panel's log-tailer holds its own descriptor on that inode, so nothing
# written before the reload is lost. `create` (rather than `nocreate`) matters
# here beyond timing: a reload-triggered recreate lands the file at 0600,
# which the unprivileged panel process cannot read — confirmed on a live
# container — so logrotate must be the one to create it at 0644.
# here beyond timing: a postlogd-triggered recreate lands the file at 0600
# owned by postfix, which the unprivileged panel process cannot read —
# confirmed on a live container — so logrotate must be the one to create it.
#
# logrotate itself only rotates once the configured "daily" period has elapsed
# (tracked in /var/lib/logrotate/status), so it is safe to invoke this more
+8 -2
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@@ -1,11 +1,17 @@
/var/log/mail.log {
# The delivery log lives under the persistent /data, not the ephemeral
# /var/log, so the lines that resolve a "queued" send-log row outlive the
# container (architecture.md § Log tailer). Path and ownership match
# build/postfix-config.sh (maillog_file) and build/entrypoint.sh: postlogd
# writes it as user postfix, the unprivileged panel reads it through the shared
# selfpost group, hence create 0640 postfix selfpost rather than 0644 root root.
/data/log/mail.log {
daily
rotate 14
missingok
notifempty
compress
delaycompress
create 0644 root root
create 0640 postfix selfpost
postrotate
/usr/sbin/postfix reload
endscript
+47 -4
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@@ -23,8 +23,26 @@ HOSTNAME_VALUE="${SELFPOST_HOSTNAME:-$(hostname -f 2>/dev/null || hostname)}"
# TLS material supplied by the reverse-proxy through a read-only bind mount
# (spec 5.2). The relay requires TLS on 465; if these files are absent the
# master still starts but TLS handshakes on 465 fail until they appear.
TLS_CERT="${TLS_CERT_FILE:-/etc/postfix/tls/fullchain.pem}"
TLS_KEY="${TLS_KEY_FILE:-/etc/postfix/tls/privkey.pem}"
#
# Postfix insists the private key is root-owned and mode 0600. The bind mount
# is often :ro and owned by the host user (e2e TempDir / CI runner UID), so
# copy into a writable internal dir and normalise ownership before postconf
# and `postfix check`.
TLS_CERT_SRC="${TLS_CERT_FILE:-/etc/postfix/tls/fullchain.pem}"
TLS_KEY_SRC="${TLS_KEY_FILE:-/etc/postfix/tls/privkey.pem}"
TLS_INTERNAL_DIR=/etc/postfix/tls-internal
TLS_CERT="$TLS_CERT_SRC"
TLS_KEY="$TLS_KEY_SRC"
if [ -f "$TLS_CERT_SRC" ] && [ -f "$TLS_KEY_SRC" ]; then
mkdir -p "$TLS_INTERNAL_DIR"
cp -f "$TLS_CERT_SRC" "$TLS_INTERNAL_DIR/fullchain.pem"
cp -f "$TLS_KEY_SRC" "$TLS_INTERNAL_DIR/privkey.pem"
chown root:root "$TLS_INTERNAL_DIR/fullchain.pem" "$TLS_INTERNAL_DIR/privkey.pem"
chmod 0644 "$TLS_INTERNAL_DIR/fullchain.pem"
chmod 0600 "$TLS_INTERNAL_DIR/privkey.pem"
TLS_CERT="$TLS_INTERNAL_DIR/fullchain.pem"
TLS_KEY="$TLS_INTERNAL_DIR/privkey.pem"
fi
# Level-1 rate limit (native Postfix anvil, spec 5 p.5 / 7.4). Conservative
# defaults, sensible during IP warm-up (spec 10).
@@ -45,15 +63,32 @@ SASLDB_PATH="${SASL_DB_PATH:-/data/sasl/sasldb2}"
# when a client library needs STARTTLS on 587 instead of implicit TLS on 465).
SUBMISSION_ENABLE="${SUBMISSION_ENABLE:-false}"
# Delivery log, written by postlogd and read by the panel's log-tailer. It lives
# under the persistent /data (not the ephemeral /var/log) so the delivery lines
# for messages still marked "queued" survive a container recreate — without
# them those rows could never be resolved (architecture.md § Log tailer). The
# default must match cmd/panel/main.go's MAIL_LOG; entrypoint.sh creates the
# directory and the file with the ownership postlogd writes and the panel reads.
MAIL_LOG_PATH="${MAIL_LOG:-/data/log/mail.log}"
# --- main.cf -----------------------------------------------------------------
# maillog_file lives under the persistent /data bind mount (architecture.md §
# Log tailer). Postfix's default maillog_file_prefixes are only /var and
# /dev/stdout — without /data, `postfix check` rejects the path.
postconf -e \
"myhostname=${HOSTNAME_VALUE}" \
"maillog_file=/var/log/mail.log" \
"maillog_file=${MAIL_LOG_PATH}" \
"maillog_file_prefixes=/var,/dev/stdout,/data" \
"mydestination=" \
"relayhost=" \
"inet_interfaces=all" \
"inet_protocols=all"
# postlogd is mandatory whenever maillog_file is set (MAILLOG_README). Debian's
# stock master.cf usually has it; pin it explicitly so a stripped/upgraded
# image cannot lose the service.
postconf -M "postlog/unix-dgram=postlog unix-dgram n - n - 1 postlogd"
# This is an outbound relay: no local delivery, no per-user aliases. Empty
# these so a misfiled recipient never gets delivered locally.
postconf -e \
@@ -181,4 +216,12 @@ EOF
# Validate the generated configuration; fail loudly if postconf produced
# anything Postfix rejects, before the wrapper tries to start it.
postfix check
set +e
check_out=$(postfix check 2>&1)
ec=$?
set -e
if [ "$ec" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "postfix-config: postfix check failed exit $ec" >&2
printf '%s\n' "$check_out" >&2
exit "$ec"
fi
+1 -1
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@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ stdout_logfile_maxbytes=0
stderr_logfile=/dev/stderr
stderr_logfile_maxbytes=0
; Periodic logrotate for /var/log/mail.log (spec 9, 10: daily, 7-14 files kept
; Periodic logrotate for /data/log/mail.log (spec 9, 10: daily, 7-14 files kept
; in the image). Runs as root so logrotate can read/rotate the log; never exits
; non-zero, so it neither trips the crashexit listener nor needs restarting.
[program:logrotate]