release: 1.9.2: Review pass: port-25 milters, DMARC validation, rate-limit fix

Review pass over `1.4.0`…`1.9.1`: port 25 no longer shares the submission milter chain, DMARC reports are validated before they are stored, and the auto rate limit is correct for a non-default level-1 window. Schema migration `0010` (index only). Upgrading is a tag bump.
Added:
  - SQLite migration `0010_send_log_app_login_index.sql` —
  - DMARC aggregate reports are accepted as **zip** as well as gzip or plain XML
  - e2e: `checkPort25ConfigCombinations` regenerates the Postfix configuration
Changed:
  - README hero line and a **Positioning** block in `docs/product.md` record the
Fixed:
  - The setup account's password is hashed at bcrypt cost `12` like every other
  - Login/setup rate limiter: protecting blocked buckets from eviction is now
  - `postqueue -p` output is bounded to 4 MiB (the timeout alone left the size of
  - [schema-migrations.md](docs/schema-migrations.md): the schema section was
  - postqueue reader is now time-bounded: `postqueue -p` runs under a 5-second
  … (11 more in CHANGELOG)
Changed:
  - [roadmap.md](docs/roadmap.md) now carries everything the 2026-08-19 code
  - Extracted `internal/configsafe` — the empty-value and forbidden-character
  - Build, deploy and migration comments no longer cite the archived
  - Dropped the `parseDomainRateLimitForm` / `parseAppRateLimitForm` pass-through
  - Extracted shared helpers: `internal/atomicfile` (atomic temp-write+rename) and
  … (7 more in CHANGELOG)
Removed:
  - Unused legacy asset `docs/assets/icon.png` (superseded by the four brand SVGs
  - Plan documents for already-shipped features: `domain-stats-auto-ratelimit`,

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.9.2).

deploy/apache/selfpost-vhost.conf

@@ -1,18 +1,17 @@
-# Example host Apache vhost for the SelfPost panel (spec 10.3, default
-# scenario). Install on the host running Apache — NOT inside the SelfPost
-# container. Requires mod_ssl and mod_proxy/mod_proxy_http enabled
-# (`a2enmod ssl proxy proxy_http`).
+# Example host Apache vhost for the SelfPost panel (default scenario). Install
+# on the host running Apache — NOT inside the SelfPost container. Requires
+# mod_ssl and mod_proxy/mod_proxy_http enabled (`a2enmod ssl proxy proxy_http`).
 #
 # Certificates: obtain with the Apache certbot plugin against THIS vhost
-# (`certbot --apache -d mail.example.com`). Certbot edits this file in place
-# to add the SSLCertificateFile/SSLCertificateKeyFile directives and a
-# :80 -> :443 redirect vhost, and renews in the background via its own timer.
-# The resulting PEM files land at
-# /etc/letsencrypt/live/mail.example.com/{fullchain,privkey}.pem on the host
-# — bind-mount that directory read-only into the SelfPost container (see
+# (`certbot --apache -d mail.example.com`). Certbot edits this file in place to
+# add the SSLCertificateFile/SSLCertificateKeyFile directives and a :80 -> :443
+# redirect vhost, and renews in the background via its own timer. The resulting
+# PEM files land at
+# /etc/letsencrypt/live/mail.example.com/{fullchain,privkey}.pem on the host —
+# bind-mount that directory read-only into the SelfPost container (see
 # ../docker-compose.yml, the `./certs:/etc/postfix/tls:ro` volume) so Postfix
 # can present the very same certificate on 465/587. One certificate, two
-# consumers (spec 10 p.4) — no separate cert just for the panel.
+# consumers — no separate cert just for the panel.
 
 <VirtualHost *:443>
 	ServerName mail.example.com
@@ -26,9 +25,9 @@
 	ProxyPass "/" "http://127.0.0.1:8080/"
 	ProxyPassReverse "/" "http://127.0.0.1:8080/"
 
-	# The panel is plain HTTP behind the proxy; it never terminates TLS
-	# itself (spec 10 p.2). Cookies are still marked Secure by the panel
-	# (spec 7.6.6) because the browser only ever sees this HTTPS vhost.
+	# The panel is plain HTTP behind the proxy; it never terminates TLS itself.
+	# Cookies are still marked Secure by the panel because the browser only ever
+	# sees this HTTPS vhost.
 </VirtualHost>
 
 <VirtualHost *:80>

deploy/caddy/docker-compose.caddy.yml

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 
-# Alternative reverse-proxy: Caddy (spec 10.3) — the simplest option, fully
-# automatic ACME with no separate certbot container. Caddy writes certificates
-# as plain PEM under its own data directory, which this fragment bind-mounts
-# to the host so SelfPost can read the same files.
+# Alternative reverse-proxy: Caddy — the simplest option, fully automatic ACME
+# with no separate certbot container. Caddy writes certificates as plain PEM
+# under its own data directory, which this fragment bind-mounts to the host so
+# SelfPost can read the same files.
 #
-# NOTE (spec 10.3 explicitly flags this): Caddy's on-disk cert path includes
+# NOTE: Caddy's on-disk cert path includes
 # the ACME CA's name as a path segment, e.g.
 #   <data>/caddy/certificates/acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org-directory/<hostname>/<hostname>.crt
 # This has been stable across recent Caddy releases but is an internal

deploy/docker-compose.yml

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 
-# SelfPost — default deployment, reverse-proxy = Apache (spec 10, 10.5).
+# SelfPost — default deployment, reverse-proxy = Apache.
 #
-# This file only runs SelfPost itself. Apache is assumed to already be
-# installed on the HOST (the target audience for this project typically runs
-# Apache there already — spec 10.5) and reverse-proxies HTTPS for the panel;
-# it is not containerised here. See ../apache/selfpost-vhost.conf for a ready
-# vhost fragment, and docs/guide.md "Reverse proxy" for the
-# certbot steps that produce the PEM files this compose file mounts.
+# This file only runs SelfPost itself. Apache is assumed to already be installed
+# on the HOST (the target audience for this project typically runs Apache there
+# already) and reverse-proxies HTTPS for the panel; it is not containerised
+# here. See ../apache/selfpost-vhost.conf for a ready vhost fragment, and
+# docs/guide.md "Reverse proxy" for the certbot steps that produce the PEM files
+# this compose file mounts.
 #
 # Usage:
 #   1. Copy this file (and .env.example as .env) next to your own ./data and
@@ -15,23 +15,22 @@
 #      TLS paths are fixed in this file to match that bind mount, not .env.
 #   3. docker compose up -d
 #
-# The image tag below is FIXED on purpose (spec 10 p.10, 7.5.A): backup
-# restore compares the manifest version against the running binary's version,
-# so ":latest" would make that check meaningless. Bump the tag deliberately
-# when you want to upgrade.
+# The image tag below is FIXED on purpose: backup restore compares the manifest
+# version against the running binary's version, so ":latest" would make that
+# check meaningless. Bump the tag deliberately when you want to upgrade.
 
 services:
   selfpost:
-    image: ghcr.io/mixeme/selfpost:1.9.1
+    image: ghcr.io/mixeme/selfpost:1.9.2
     restart: unless-stopped
     environment:
       SELFPOST_HOSTNAME: "${SELFPOST_HOSTNAME:?set the mail/panel hostname, e.g. mail.example.com}"
       # Path Postfix reads inside the container — matches the certs bind mount
-      # below. Point these at your reverse-proxy's PEM output (spec 10 p.2).
+      # below. Point these at your reverse-proxy's PEM output.
       TLS_CERT_FILE: /etc/postfix/tls/fullchain.pem
       TLS_KEY_FILE: /etc/postfix/tls/privkey.pem
-      # Set to true to also publish RFC 6409 submission (587/STARTTLS)
-      # alongside the primary 465/smtps listener (spec 5).
+      # Set to true to also publish RFC 6409 submission (587/STARTTLS) alongside
+      # the primary 465/smtps listener.
       SUBMISSION_ENABLE: "${SUBMISSION_ENABLE:-false}"
       INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE: "${INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE:-false}"
       DMARC_REPORTS_ENABLE: "${DMARC_REPORTS_ENABLE:-false}"
@@ -41,14 +40,14 @@ services:
       INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER_ACTION: "${INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER_ACTION:-accept}"
       INBOUND_RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGES_PER_IP: "${INBOUND_RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGES_PER_IP:-20}"
       INBOUND_MESSAGE_SIZE_LIMIT: "${INBOUND_MESSAGE_SIZE_LIMIT:-26214400}"
-      # Level-1 backstop rate limit (anvil, spec 5.5, 7.4); per-domain/app
-      # limits (level 2) are configured later from the panel itself.
+      # Level-1 backstop rate limit (anvil); per-domain/app limits (level 2) are
+      # configured later from the panel itself.
       RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGES_PER_IP: "${RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGES_PER_IP:-100}"
       RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS: "${RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS:-3600}"
       # How long the send log keeps rows before the background sweep deletes
-      # them (spec 7.3, 9) — the main driver of /data growth over time.
+      # them — the main driver of /data growth over time.
       SEND_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS: "${SEND_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS:-90}"
-      # Sliding idle timeout for the panel login session, in days (spec 7.6.6).
+      # Sliding idle timeout for the panel login session, in days.
       PANEL_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS: "${PANEL_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS:-7}"
       # Resolvers the panel's PTR/SPF/DKIM/DMARC checks query directly, so they
       # report what the internet sees rather than what this host's own stub
@@ -59,27 +58,27 @@ services:
       # client spoof its rate-limit key.
       TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR: "${TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR:-}"
     volumes:
-      # All persistent state lives under /data (spec 9): SQLite DB, DKIM keys,
-      # sasldb2, sender map, setup token. Back this up (panel button or the
-      # selfpost-backup CLI) before you touch it directly.
-      # Postfix's mail.log is here too (./data/log, rotated daily, 14 files
-      # kept) so the delivery lines that resolve a queued send-log row survive
-      # a container recreate; it is diagnostics and is left out of backups.
+      # All persistent state lives under /data: SQLite DB, DKIM keys, sasldb2,
+      # sender map, setup token. Back this up (panel button or the
+      # selfpost-backup CLI) before you touch it directly. Postfix's mail.log is
+      # here too (./data/log, rotated daily, 14 files kept) so the delivery
+      # lines that resolve a queued send-log row survive a container recreate;
+      # it is diagnostics and is left out of backups.
       - ./data:/data
       # Read-only project root for full backups: docker-compose.yml, .env, and
       # certs/ are archived alongside /data (architecture.md § Persistence).
       - .:/selfpost-deploy:ro
-      # Read-only: SelfPost only ever reads certificates, never manages them
-      # (spec 10 p.2). Point this at wherever your reverse-proxy/certbot
-      # writes PEM files, e.g. /etc/letsencrypt on the host.
+      # Read-only: SelfPost only ever reads certificates, never manages them.
+      # Point this at wherever your reverse-proxy/certbot writes PEM files, e.g.
+      # /etc/letsencrypt on the host.
       - ./certs:/etc/postfix/tls:ro
     ports:
       # 465 (smtps, primary) and optionally 587 (submission/STARTTLS) are
-      # published directly — mail traffic bypasses Apache entirely, it only
-      # ever proxies the panel's HTTP(S) (spec 10 p.2-3). The panel itself
-      # (8080) is intentionally NOT published here: Apache reaches it over
-      # the host network at 127.0.0.1:8080 (see the vhost fragment), so the
-      # panel is never directly reachable from the internet without TLS.
+      # published directly — mail traffic bypasses Apache entirely, it only ever
+      # proxies the panel's HTTP(S). The panel itself (8080) is intentionally
+      # NOT published here: Apache reaches it over the host network at
+      # 127.0.0.1:8080 (see the vhost fragment), so the panel is never directly
+      # reachable from the internet without TLS.
       - "465:465"
       # 587 is mapped even when SUBMISSION_ENABLE=false; Postfix listens only
       # when the variable is true — see docs/guide.md "Published ports".
@@ -88,7 +87,7 @@ services:
       # when the variable is true.
       - "25:25"
       - "127.0.0.1:8080:8080"
-    # Hardening (spec 10 p.6). SelfPost's entrypoint still needs to run as
+    # Hardening. SelfPost's entrypoint still needs to run as
     # root very briefly to fix /data ownership and normalise permissions
     # under the shared `selfpost` group (see build/entrypoint.sh) before
     # supervisord drops the panel to an unprivileged user — so this cannot be

deploy/nginx/docker-compose.nginx.yml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 
-# Alternative reverse-proxy: nginx (spec 10.3). PEM files land on the host
-# exactly like the Apache+certbot scenario — nginx and certbot are close
-# cousins here, both writing/reading plain PEM under /etc/letsencrypt.
+# Alternative reverse-proxy: nginx. PEM files land on the host exactly like the
+# Apache+certbot scenario — nginx and certbot are close cousins here, both
+# writing/reading plain PEM under /etc/letsencrypt.
 #
 # This is a FRAGMENT, not a full replacement for ../docker-compose.yml: it
 # adds an nginx + certbot pair and removes the panel's host port publish (nginx
@@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ services:
     volumes: !override
       - ./data:/data
       - .:/selfpost-deploy:ro
-      # Same host directory certbot below writes into — plain bind mount,
-      # no named volume, so the PEM files are as directly inspectable as in
-      # the Apache scenario (spec 10.3).
+      # Same host directory certbot below writes into — plain bind mount, no
+      # named volume, so the PEM files are as directly inspectable as in the
+      # Apache scenario.
       - ./nginx/certbot-etc/live/mail.example.com:/etc/postfix/tls:ro
 
   nginx:

deploy/nginx/nginx.conf.example

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-# nginx vhost for the SelfPost panel (spec 10.3). Proxies HTTPS to the panel
-# over the compose network; mail (465/587) is published directly by the
-# selfpost container and never touches nginx.
+# nginx vhost for the SelfPost panel. Proxies HTTPS to the panel over the
+# compose network; mail (465/587) is published directly by the selfpost
+# container and never touches nginx.
 
 server {
 	listen 80;

deploy/traefik/docker-compose.traefik.yml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 
-# Alternative reverse-proxy: Traefik (spec 10.3). Traefik does NOT write plain
-# PEM files — everything (cert + key) lives bundled inside acme.json. SelfPost
-# needs separate PEM files for Postfix, so an extraction step is required; see
+# Alternative reverse-proxy: Traefik. Traefik does NOT write plain PEM files —
+# everything (cert + key) lives bundled inside acme.json. SelfPost needs
+# separate PEM files for Postfix, so an extraction step is required; see
 # extract-cert.sh in this directory and the cron/systemd-timer note below.
 #
 # Merge with the base file — run this from the deploy/ directory (Compose

deploy/traefik/extract-cert.sh

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 #!/bin/sh
-# Extracts a PEM cert/key pair for one domain out of Traefik's acme.json
-# (spec 10.3: "Traefik keeps certificates in acme.json, so a PEM extraction
-# step is required"). Run this on the host, after Traefik has issued or
-# renewed the certificate, and again on a schedule (cron/systemd timer) since
-# acme.json is not itself watched by SelfPost/Postfix.
+# Extracts a PEM cert/key pair for one domain out of Traefik's acme.json —
+# Traefik keeps its certificates there, so a PEM extraction step is required.
+# Run this on the host, after Traefik has issued or renewed the certificate, and
+# again on a schedule (cron/systemd timer) since acme.json is not itself watched
+# by SelfPost/Postfix.
 #
 # Requires jq. Usage: ./extract-cert.sh <acme.json path> <domain> <output dir>
 set -eu