Verified the tree against docs/plans/code-review-2026-08.md and finished the tasks that were only partly done, plus two defects the pass introduced. - bcrypt: the setup account was still hashed at DefaultCost (10). The work factor now has one definition, auth.BcryptCost = 12, used everywhere. - rate limiter: protecting blocked buckets from eviction was unbounded — an attacker with many source addresses could grow the map by making each one fail its way to blocked. Blocked buckets are now evicted past maxBuckets * 4, nearest expiry first, logged once per window. Tests cover both halves. - postqueue: the 5s timeout left the output size unbounded; reads are now capped at 4 MiB and report truncation. - spec references: the ~76 `spec N` citations CHANGELOG [0.5.0] claimed were gone are removed from build/, deploy/, the first two migrations and the release workflow, with the affected comment paragraphs re-wrapped. Comments only; shell/YAML/SQL syntax re-checked. - schema-migrations.md: schema section was headed v9 with the chain at v10, and three links pointed at deleted plan files. - internal/configsafe: the shared empty/forbidden-character check behind the OpenDKIM and Postfix config writers; each writer keeps its own forbidden set. - dropped the parseDomainRateLimitForm/parseAppRateLimitForm pass-throughs left behind by the parser merge (only their own tests still called them). - plan doc now carries a status table: what shipped, what was already in place, what was declined (//go:build linux for the /proc reader) and the open CSRF-token question. Not done, each its own phase: typed template data structs, log/slog, DMARC service and handler tests, error-page/corrupted-backup tests, backup re-auth. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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# Alternative reverse-proxy: nginx (spec 10.3). PEM files land on the host
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# exactly like the Apache+certbot scenario — nginx and certbot are close
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# cousins here, both writing/reading plain PEM under /etc/letsencrypt.
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# Alternative reverse-proxy: nginx. PEM files land on the host exactly like the
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# Apache+certbot scenario — nginx and certbot are close cousins here, both
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# writing/reading plain PEM under /etc/letsencrypt.
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#
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# This is a FRAGMENT, not a full replacement for ../docker-compose.yml: it
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# adds an nginx + certbot pair and removes the panel's host port publish (nginx
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@@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ services:
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volumes: !override
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- ./data:/data
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- .:/selfpost-deploy:ro
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# Same host directory certbot below writes into — plain bind mount,
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# no named volume, so the PEM files are as directly inspectable as in
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# the Apache scenario (spec 10.3).
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# Same host directory certbot below writes into — plain bind mount, no
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# named volume, so the PEM files are as directly inspectable as in the
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# Apache scenario.
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- ./nginx/certbot-etc/live/mail.example.com:/etc/postfix/tls:ro
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nginx:
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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# nginx vhost for the SelfPost panel (spec 10.3). Proxies HTTPS to the panel
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# over the compose network; mail (465/587) is published directly by the
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# selfpost container and never touches nginx.
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# nginx vhost for the SelfPost panel. Proxies HTTPS to the panel over the
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# compose network; mail (465/587) is published directly by the selfpost
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# container and never touches nginx.
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server {
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listen 80;
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