review follow-up: close the gaps left by the phase1-6 pass
test / test (push) Has been cancelled

Verified the tree against docs/plans/code-review-2026-08.md and finished the
tasks that were only partly done, plus two defects the pass introduced.

- bcrypt: the setup account was still hashed at DefaultCost (10). The work
  factor now has one definition, auth.BcryptCost = 12, used everywhere.
- rate limiter: protecting blocked buckets from eviction was unbounded — an
  attacker with many source addresses could grow the map by making each one
  fail its way to blocked. Blocked buckets are now evicted past
  maxBuckets * 4, nearest expiry first, logged once per window. Tests cover
  both halves.
- postqueue: the 5s timeout left the output size unbounded; reads are now
  capped at 4 MiB and report truncation.
- spec references: the ~76 `spec N` citations CHANGELOG [0.5.0] claimed were
  gone are removed from build/, deploy/, the first two migrations and the
  release workflow, with the affected comment paragraphs re-wrapped. Comments
  only; shell/YAML/SQL syntax re-checked.
- schema-migrations.md: schema section was headed v9 with the chain at v10,
  and three links pointed at deleted plan files.
- internal/configsafe: the shared empty/forbidden-character check behind the
  OpenDKIM and Postfix config writers; each writer keeps its own forbidden set.
- dropped the parseDomainRateLimitForm/parseAppRateLimitForm pass-throughs
  left behind by the parser merge (only their own tests still called them).
- plan doc now carries a status table: what shipped, what was already in
  place, what was declined (//go:build linux for the /proc reader) and the
  open CSRF-token question.

Not done, each its own phase: typed template data structs, log/slog, DMARC
service and handler tests, error-page/corrupted-backup tests, backup re-auth.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
mix
2026-08-19 20:03:05 +03:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent 4204ee279c
commit ab2cd885c4
34 changed files with 586 additions and 318 deletions
+9 -5
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ import (
"sort"
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/configsafe"
)
// InboundRoute is one inbound domain's Postfix map material: the relay
@@ -115,13 +117,15 @@ func assertInboundRouteSafe(r InboundRoute) error {
return nil
}
// texthashForbidden is what may never appear in a texthash line: whitespace and
// the newline that would end it, the comma that separates values, and the
// backslash.
const texthashForbidden = " \t\r\n,\\"
// assertMapToken rejects values that could break out of a texthash line.
func assertMapToken(v, what string) error {
if v == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("postfix: empty %s", what)
}
if strings.ContainsAny(v, " \t\r\n,\\") {
return fmt.Errorf("postfix: unsafe character in %s %q", what, v)
if err := configsafe.Token(what, v, texthashForbidden); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("postfix: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
+14 -7
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"sort"
"strings"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/configsafe"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/supervisor"
)
@@ -123,6 +124,15 @@ func appendUnique(list []string, v string) []string {
return append(list, v)
}
// What may never reach a sender-map line: whitespace and the newline that would
// end it, the comma that separates values, the colon a lookup key cannot carry,
// and the backslash. A login additionally may not carry "@" — that would make it
// look like an address.
const (
senderMapAddressForbidden = " \t\r\n,:\\"
senderMapLoginForbidden = " \t\r\n,:@\\"
)
// assertMapSafe rejects any address/login value that could break out of a single
// map line or inject a directive. Addresses are validated to a strict whitelist
// (letters, digits, '@', '.', '-', '_', '+') and logins to an even stricter one
@@ -130,14 +140,11 @@ func appendUnique(list []string, v string) []string {
// letting whitespace, a newline or a comma (the value separator) through into
// the file (security.md).
func assertMapSafe(address, login string) error {
if address == "" || login == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("postfix: empty address or login")
if err := configsafe.Token("address", address, senderMapAddressForbidden); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("postfix: %w", err)
}
if strings.ContainsAny(address, " \t\r\n,:\\") {
return fmt.Errorf("postfix: unsafe character in address %q", address)
}
if strings.ContainsAny(login, " \t\r\n,:@\\") {
return fmt.Errorf("postfix: unsafe character in login %q", login)
if err := configsafe.Token("login", login, senderMapLoginForbidden); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("postfix: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
+40 -3
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package postfix
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"fmt"
"os/exec"
@@ -11,6 +12,35 @@ import (
const postqueueTimeout = 5 * time.Second
// maxQueueOutput bounds how much of `postqueue -p` the panel keeps. A deferred
// queue with a very large backlog prints one paragraph per message, and the
// whole listing is held in memory and then rendered into a page — so the read
// is capped and the remainder reported as truncated rather than being allowed
// to size the panel's memory by the size of the queue.
const maxQueueOutput = 4 << 20
// limitWriter keeps the first remaining bytes written to it and drops the rest,
// recording that it did. Writes always report full consumption so postqueue is
// never killed by a short write; the extra output is simply discarded.
type limitWriter struct {
buf bytes.Buffer
remaining int
truncated bool
}
func (l *limitWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
keep := len(p)
if keep > l.remaining {
keep = l.remaining
l.truncated = true
}
if keep > 0 {
l.buf.Write(p[:keep])
l.remaining -= keep
}
return len(p), nil
}
// Queue returns Postfix's own human-readable mail-queue listing
// (architecture.md § Panel HTTP surface): active, deferred and held messages,
// exactly as an administrator would see via the CLI. The command takes a
@@ -21,14 +51,21 @@ func Queue() (string, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), postqueueTimeout)
defer cancel()
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "postqueue", "-p")
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
out := &limitWriter{remaining: maxQueueOutput}
cmd.Stdout = out
cmd.Stderr = out
err := cmd.Run()
if ctx.Err() == context.DeadlineExceeded {
return "", fmt.Errorf("postqueue -p timed out after %s", postqueueTimeout)
}
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("postqueue -p: %w: %s", err, strings.TrimSpace(string(out)))
return "", fmt.Errorf("postqueue -p: %w: %s", err, strings.TrimSpace(out.buf.String()))
}
return string(out), nil
text := out.buf.String()
if out.truncated {
text += fmt.Sprintf("\n[listing truncated at %d bytes]\n", maxQueueOutput)
}
return text, nil
}
// QueueIDs returns the set of queue ids Postfix is still holding — everything
+31
View File
@@ -41,3 +41,34 @@ func TestParseQueueIDsOnAnEmptyQueue(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("got %v, want no ids", ids)
}
}
// The queue listing is held in memory and rendered into a page, so a very large
// queue must not size the panel's allocation: the writer keeps the cap and
// reports the rest as dropped, while still accepting every write so postqueue
// itself is never cut short.
func TestLimitWriterCapsOutput(t *testing.T) {
w := &limitWriter{remaining: 8}
n, err := w.Write([]byte("12345"))
if n != 5 || err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first write = %d, %v", n, err)
}
if w.truncated {
t.Fatal("truncated before the cap was reached")
}
n, err = w.Write([]byte("67890"))
if n != 5 || err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second write = %d, %v", n, err)
}
if !w.truncated {
t.Fatal("write past the cap was not recorded as truncated")
}
if got := w.buf.String(); got != "12345678" {
t.Fatalf("kept %q, want the first 8 bytes", got)
}
if n, err := w.Write([]byte("more")); n != 4 || err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write after the cap = %d, %v (must still accept)", n, err)
}
if got := w.buf.String(); got != "12345678" {
t.Fatalf("buffer grew past the cap: %q", got)
}
}