store, web: cite the source of what they rely on (assumptions part D)

Comments only, no behaviour changed. modernc.org/sqlite v1.60.1 (the
_pragma list on every connection, busy_timeout first; extended result
codes; a deferred BEGIN; multi-statement Exec) and SQLite 3.53.4's
documentation (transactions, WAL, foreign keys, NOCASE, upsert, julianday,
partial indexes); htmx 2.0.4 src/htmx.js; the Fetch and HTML standards for
Sec-Fetch-Site, Origin, SameSite, __Host-, CSP and defer order; Go's
html/template. Comments the source contradicts are corrected - the driver
does not serialise writes (SetMaxOpenConns(1) does), htmx:load fires per
swapped element, no-store does not keep a page out of history.

Left for their own commits: D-S3 a migration two processes can both run,
D-S20 recipient case, D-B3 Origin: null under Referrer-Policy: no-referrer,
D-H5/H6/H7/H9 (audit M11, stage 4).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

internal/store/applications.go

@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ import (
 // ErrLoginExists is returned when an application login is already taken. The
 // login is globally unique because it is the SASL identity Postfix
 // authenticates (one sasldb2 across all domains, architecture.md § Mail path).
+// It is unique without regard to case too (migration 0008's NOCASE index):
+// Postfix 3.7.11, src/smtpd/smtpd_check.c reject_auth_sender_login_mismatch()
+// compares the SASL login with the map's owners by strcasecmp_utf8.
 var ErrLoginExists = errors.New("application login already exists")
 
 // ErrApplicationNotFound is returned when an application id does not exist.
@@ -74,6 +77,7 @@ type Binding struct {
 // login maps to ErrLoginExists.
 func (s *Store) AddApplication(domainID int64, login, mode string, addresses []string) (Application, error) {
 	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	// The first statement is a write (see UpdateStatus).
 	tx, err := s.db.Begin()
 	if err != nil {
 		return Application{}, fmt.Errorf("begin add application: %w", err)
@@ -90,6 +94,8 @@ func (s *Store) AddApplication(domainID int64, login, mode string, addresses []s
 		}
 		return Application{}, fmt.Errorf("insert application: %w", err)
 	}
+	// sqlite3_last_insert_rowid() of this connection, the transaction's own
+	// (https://sqlite.org/c3ref/last_insert_rowid.html).
 	id, err := res.LastInsertId()
 	if err != nil {
 		return Application{}, fmt.Errorf("application id: %w", err)
@@ -110,6 +116,7 @@ func (s *Store) AddApplication(domainID int64, login, mode string, addresses []s
 // address list atomically (product.md). The login and password are untouched.
 // Returns ErrApplicationNotFound if the id does not exist.
 func (s *Store) UpdateApplicationMode(id int64, mode string, addresses []string) error {
+	// The first statement is a write (see UpdateStatus).
 	tx, err := s.db.Begin()
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("begin update application: %w", err)
@@ -353,9 +360,9 @@ func (s *Store) UpdateApplicationAuthIPs(id int64, restrict bool, ips []string)
 	return nil
 }
 
-// DeleteApplication removes an application and its addresses (via cascade),
+// DeleteApplication removes an application and its addresses (via cascade, see
-// returning the deleted application so the caller can drop its sasldb2 entry
+// DeleteDomain), returning the deleted application so the caller can drop its
-// (product.md). Returns ErrApplicationNotFound if no such row existed.
+// sasldb2 entry (product.md). Returns ErrApplicationNotFound if no such row existed.
 func (s *Store) DeleteApplication(id int64) (Application, error) {
 	a, err := s.GetApplication(id)
 	if err != nil {

internal/store/dmarc.go

@@ -80,8 +80,10 @@ type DMARCIngestStats struct {
 }
 
 // InsertDMARCReport stores a parsed report and its records, replacing any prior
-// row with the same reporter/report_id/domain triple.
+// row with the same reporter/report_id/domain triple; the prior report's
+// records go with it by ON DELETE CASCADE (see DeleteDomain).
 func (s *Store) InsertDMARCReport(rep DMARCReport) (int64, error) {
+	// The first statement is a write (see UpdateStatus).
 	tx, err := s.db.Begin()
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, fmt.Errorf("begin insert dmarc report: %w", err)

internal/store/domains.go

@@ -128,7 +128,10 @@ func (s *Store) GetDomain(id int64) (Domain, error) {
 
 // DeleteDomain removes a domain. Its applications and their address/binding rows
 // go with it via ON DELETE CASCADE (product.md). Returns ErrDomainNotFound if no
-// such row existed.
+// such row existed. SQLite 3.53.4 acts on ON DELETE only on a connection with
+// foreign_keys ON, which Open's DSN sets on every one
+// (https://sqlite.org/foreignkeys.html § 2, § 4.3); the rows the cascade
+// removes are not in RowsAffected (https://sqlite.org/c3ref/changes.html).
 func (s *Store) DeleteDomain(id int64) error {
 	res, err := s.db.Exec("DELETE FROM domains WHERE id = ?", id)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -162,6 +165,11 @@ func scanDomain(r scanRow) (Domain, error) {
 }
 
 // isForeignKeyViolation reports whether err is a SQLite FOREIGN KEY conflict.
+// modernc.org/sqlite v1.60.1, conn.go newConn(): extended result codes are on
+// for every connection, so Error.Code() (error.go) is the extended code
+// (https://sqlite.org/rescode.html#constraint_foreignkey, _unique,
+// _primarykey); a unique index - the NOCASE one on logins too - fails as
+// SQLITE_CONSTRAINT_UNIQUE.
 func isForeignKeyViolation(err error) bool {
 	var se *sqlite.Error
 	return errors.As(err, &se) && se.Code() == sqlite3.SQLITE_CONSTRAINT_FOREIGNKEY
@@ -197,7 +205,9 @@ func (s *Store) SetDomainDMARCAddress(id int64, rua string) error {
 
 // DomainExists reports whether a sending domain with this name is configured.
 // Used by the DMARC ingest path to refuse reports for domains this relay does
-// not send for (security.md: report XML is attacker-supplied input).
+// not send for (security.md: report XML is attacker-supplied input). NOCASE
+// folds ASCII letters only (https://sqlite.org/datatype3.html § 7), which is
+// all a domain name the panel accepts holds.
 func (s *Store) DomainExists(name string) (bool, error) {
 	var n int
 	err := s.db.QueryRow(

internal/store/inbound.go

@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ type InboundDomain struct {
 // caller must have validated name (security.md).
 func (s *Store) AddInboundDomain(name string) (InboundDomain, error) {
 	now := time.Now().UTC()
+	// The first statement is a write (see UpdateStatus).
 	tx, err := s.db.Begin()
 	if err != nil {
 		return InboundDomain{}, fmt.Errorf("begin add inbound domain: %w", err)
@@ -189,6 +190,7 @@ func (s *Store) UpdateInboundTransport(id int64, host string, port int, tlsMode
 // UpdateInboundRecipients replaces the recipient mode and, in list mode, the
 // address list. In any mode the stored list is cleared.
 func (s *Store) UpdateInboundRecipients(id int64, mode string, addresses []string) error {
+	// The first statement is a write (see UpdateStatus).
 	tx, err := s.db.Begin()
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("begin update inbound recipients: %w", err)

internal/store/inboundspam.go

@@ -72,7 +72,8 @@ func (s *Store) InsertInboundSpam(e InboundSpamEntry) error {
 // detail - and says whether it wrote. The log tailer uses it for the lines it
 // reads when it starts: after an unclean stop those are lines it may have read
 // before, and a refusal read twice is otherwise two rows. e.At must be set; a
-// row dated "now" is never the same as another.
+// row dated "now" is never the same as another. The check and the insert are
+// one statement, and one of no row reports 0 (see CreateGlobalUser).
 func (s *Store) InsertInboundSpamOnce(e InboundSpamEntry) (bool, error) {
 	at := e.At.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
 	res, err := s.db.Exec(
@@ -103,6 +104,8 @@ func (s *Store) PruneInboundSpam(cutoff time.Time, keep int) (int64, error) {
 	n, _ := res.RowsAffected()
 	// Oldest by when it happened, not by id: the tailer dates a refusal by its
 	// log line, so after the panel was down the newest ids are old rows.
+	// SQLite 3.53.4, https://sqlite.org/lang_select.html § 5: a negative LIMIT
+	// is no upper bound, so this is every row after the newest keep.
 	res, err = s.db.Exec(
 		`DELETE FROM inbound_spam_log WHERE id IN
 			(SELECT id FROM inbound_spam_log ORDER BY created_at DESC, id DESC LIMIT -1 OFFSET ?)`, keep)

internal/store/notify.go

@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ func (s *Store) DeleteNotifyState(key string) error {
 
 // ListNotifyStateKeys returns the keys that begin with prefix, so that the
 // states of subjects that are gone - a deleted domain - can be found.
+// SQLite's substr counts characters of a TEXT value, len(prefix) its bytes
+// (https://sqlite.org/lang_corefunc.html#substr): the two agree for the ASCII
+// prefixes the callers pass ("dns:", "limit:").
 func (s *Store) ListNotifyStateKeys(prefix string) ([]string, error) {
 	rows, err := s.db.Query(
 		"SELECT key FROM notify_state WHERE substr(key, 1, ?) = ? ORDER BY key", len(prefix), prefix)
@@ -181,7 +184,9 @@ type LimitRefusal struct {
 // reason and is still judged the old way.
 func (s *Store) LimitRefusalsSince(since time.Time) ([]LimitRefusal, error) {
 	// The status is a literal so that the partial index of migration 0005
-	// answers the question.
+	// answers the question: the query's term matches the index's WHERE
+	// exactly (https://sqlite.org/partialindex.html § 3) when the statement is
+	// first prepared.
 	rows, err := s.db.Query(
 		`SELECT d.name, a.login, COUNT(*), MIN(l.created_at)
 		 FROM send_log l

internal/store/sendercheck.go

@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ func (s *Store) AddSenderCheckDeferred(at time.Time, n int64, place string, mess
 	if n <= 0 {
 		return nil
 	}
+	// The first statement is a write (see UpdateStatus).
 	tx, err := s.db.Begin()
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("sender check deferred: %w", err)
@@ -118,7 +119,9 @@ func (s *Store) AddSenderCheckDeferred(at time.Time, n int64, place string, mess
 	}
 	// To the fraction of a second the log gives, and of a fixed width so that
 	// the strings compare as the times do; a re-read log must not move the
-	// mark back.
+	// mark back. SQLite 3.53.4, https://sqlite.org/lang_upsert.html § 2: a
+	// DO UPDATE whose WHERE is false is a no-op, not an error, and excluded.
+	// names the value the INSERT brought.
 	stamp := at.UTC().Format("2006-01-02T15:04:05.000000Z")
 	setting := func(key, value, cond string) error {
 		_, err := tx.Exec(`INSERT INTO settings (key, value) VALUES (?, ?)

internal/store/sendlog.go

@@ -47,6 +47,11 @@ type SendLogEntry struct {
 // application whose login it is, NULL for a login that is no application's
 // (audit 2026-10-12, L12). The domain name of the row stays what the
 // envelope said.
+//
+// The login is matched exactly (BINARY): it reaches the milter and the log in
+// the case it is stored in, because Cyrus SASL 2.1.28 looks it up as given -
+// lib/canonusr.c _canonuser_internal() only trims spaces and appends a realm,
+// sasldb/allockey.c _sasl_alloc_key() copies it byte for byte into the key.
 const loginDomainID = `(SELECT a.domain_id FROM applications a WHERE a.login = ?)`
 
 // InsertQueued records an accepted message in the send log with status
@@ -108,7 +113,12 @@ func (s *Store) InsertRejected(e SendLogEntry) error {
 // first and then writes fails at once with "database is locked" when another
 // connection - the dmarc-ingest process opens the same file - commits in
 // between, and the line would be lost; a write first takes the write lock,
-// and the busy timeout waits for it.
+// and the busy timeout waits for it. SQLite 3.53.4, btree.c btreeBeginTrans():
+// the busy handler is retried only while the connection has no transaction
+// open, so the upgrade of a read transaction fails with SQLITE_BUSY at once -
+// also while the other connection merely holds the write lock - and with
+// SQLITE_BUSY_SNAPSHOT after it committed (https://sqlite.org/rescode.html#busy_snapshot).
+// Every other transaction of this package opens with a write for this reason.
 func (s *Store) UpdateStatus(queueID, recipient, status string) (int64, error) {
 	now := time.Now().UTC()
 	tx, err := s.db.Begin()
@@ -184,7 +194,9 @@ type QueuedDelivery struct {
 // about them.
 //
 // created_at is stored as RFC3339 UTC, so a lexical comparison against the same
-// format is chronologically correct.
+// format is chronologically correct. SQLite 3.53.4 compares TEXT with the
+// BINARY collation, memcmp() (https://sqlite.org/datatype3.html § 7), and
+// time.RFC3339 of a UTC time is fixed-width, YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ.
 func (s *Store) ListQueuedOlderThan(cutoff time.Time) ([]QueuedDelivery, error) {
 	rows, err := s.db.Query(
 		`SELECT id, queue_id, to_addr FROM send_log
@@ -247,6 +259,12 @@ type SendLogRow struct {
 // order the rows were written, so two refusals of one second take one line
 // each in turn (review of stage 2b). A line already on a row - read again
 // after a restart - goes on no other. It reports whether a row took the line.
+//
+// SQLite 3.53.4: the choice and the write are one UPDATE, a write transaction
+// from its start (https://sqlite.org/lang_transaction.html § 2.1); julianday()
+// reads YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ, the T and the Z included (lang_datefunc.html
+// § 2); NOCASE folds ASCII only (datatype3.html § 7.1); ?1 is bound once and
+// used twice (lang_expr.html § 4).
 func (s *Store) AttachRefusalLine(clientIP, from string, at time.Time, line string) (bool, error) {
 	res, err := s.db.Exec(
 		`UPDATE send_log SET refusal_line = ?1 WHERE id = (
@@ -277,7 +295,8 @@ func (s *Store) AttachRefusalLine(clientIP, from string, at time.Time, line stri
 // and nothing is. The domain is the login's, or - when the tailer did not see the login, its
 // client= line read before a restart - the envelope's, so the row is still
 // its domain's administrator's (review of stage 2b). It reports whether it
-// wrote one.
+// wrote one: the check and the insert are one statement (see
+// CreateGlobalUser), and an INSERT ... SELECT of no row reports 0.
 func (s *Store) RecoverRefusal(e SendLogEntry, at time.Time) (bool, error) {
 	stamp := at.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
 	res, err := s.db.Exec(
@@ -433,7 +452,7 @@ func sendLogWhere(f SendLogFilter) (string, []any) {
 // implementing the configurable retention window (architecture.md §
 // Persistence, SEND_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS). It returns the number of rows pruned.
 // created_at is stored as RFC3339 UTC, so a lexical comparison against the
-// same format is chronologically correct.
+// same format is chronologically correct (see ListQueuedOlderThan).
 func (s *Store) DeleteSendLogBefore(cutoff time.Time) (int64, error) {
 	res, err := s.db.Exec(
 		`DELETE FROM send_log WHERE created_at < ?`,

internal/store/sendloglines.go

@@ -43,7 +43,12 @@ func cutSendLogLine(line string) string {
 // wrote. The tailer calls it with what it read in one pass over the log,
 // whether or not send-log rows exist for the queue ids yet: a commit per line
 // would be a disk sync per line, on the one connection the journal milter
-// writes through.
+// writes through. SQLite 3.53.4 as modernc builds it keeps synchronous at FULL
+// (SQLITE_DEFAULT_WAL_SYNCHRONOUS 2), and in WAL mode FULL syncs the WAL at
+// every commit (https://sqlite.org/wal.html § 2.3, pragma.html#pragma_synchronous).
+// The first statement stepped is an INSERT, a write (see UpdateStatus):
+// tx.Prepare leaves no transaction open (prepare.c sqlite3InitOne() commits
+// the read it opens to load the schema).
 //
 // With once set, a line is written only if the same line is not there already
 // under its queue id. That is for the lines the tailer reads again after an

internal/store/sessions.go

@@ -30,7 +30,10 @@ func (s *Store) CreateSession(tokenHash string, userID int64, expiresAt time.Tim
 
 // LookupSession returns the session for tokenHash, if any. It does not check
 // expiry itself — callers compare ExpiresAt against time.Now() and call
-// DeleteSession on an expired row, keeping the read side lock-free.
+// DeleteSession on an expired row, keeping the read side lock-free: in WAL
+// mode a reader takes no write lock and is not blocked by a writer
+// (https://sqlite.org/wal.html § 2.2). Within this process it still waits for
+// the one pooled connection (Open).
 func (s *Store) LookupSession(tokenHash string) (SessionRow, bool, error) {
 	var (
 		row       SessionRow
@@ -99,6 +102,8 @@ func (s *Store) DeleteUserSessions(userID int64) error {
 // abandoned session (cookie never presented again) does not sit in the table
 // forever. It piggybacks on session creation rather than running as its own
 // background loop.
+// expires_at is RFC3339 UTC text, so < compares moments (see
+// ListQueuedOlderThan).
 func (s *Store) DeleteExpiredSessions(now time.Time) (int64, error) {
 	res, err := s.db.Exec(`DELETE FROM sessions WHERE expires_at < ?`, now.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339))
 	if err != nil {

internal/store/settings.go

@@ -156,7 +156,8 @@ func (s *Store) GetSetting(key string) (string, error) {
 	return value, nil
 }
 
-// SetSetting upserts a settings key.
+// SetSetting upserts a settings key (https://sqlite.org/lang_upsert.html: on
+// a conflict of the key, excluded.value is the value the INSERT brought).
 func (s *Store) SetSetting(key, value string) error {
 	_, err := s.db.Exec(
 		"INSERT INTO settings (key, value) VALUES (?, ?) ON CONFLICT(key) DO UPDATE SET value = excluded.value",

internal/store/stats.go

@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@ const domainByName = "domain_id = (SELECT d.id FROM domains d WHERE d.name = ?)"
 // login can be taken again in another domain, and its numbers - statistics,
 // the level-2 count - must not start with the old one's (review of audit
 // stage 2). ?1 twice; a plain ? after it takes the next number.
+// SQLite 3.53.4, https://sqlite.org/lang_expr.html § 4: a plain ? is numbered
+// one more than the largest number already assigned; modernc.org/sqlite
+// v1.60.1, conn.go bind() and argFinder.find(): ?NNN takes argument NNN, a
+// plain ? the argument of its number.
 const appByLogin = "app_login = ?1 AND domain_id = (SELECT a.domain_id FROM applications a WHERE a.login = ?1)"
 
 // sendStats counts the rows that match, a condition with one placeholder
@@ -102,6 +106,9 @@ func (s *Store) sendStats(match, ref string, since time.Time, hours float64) (Se
 		return SendStats{}, fmt.Errorf("send stats total %q: %w", ref, err)
 	}
 
+	// The busiest UTC hour: substr counts characters from 1
+	// (https://sqlite.org/lang_corefunc.html#substr), so 1-13 of an RFC3339
+	// UTC stamp is YYYY-MM-DDTHH.
 	var peak int64
 	err = s.db.QueryRow(
 		`SELECT COALESCE(MAX(bucket_count), 0) FROM (

internal/store/store.go

@@ -29,13 +29,23 @@ type Store struct {
 func Open(path string) (*Store, error) {
 	// _pragma parameters are applied on every pooled connection by the driver,
 	// so foreign-key enforcement and WAL survive connection churn.
+	// modernc.org/sqlite v1.60.1, conn.go newConn() -> sqlite.go
+	// applyQueryParams(): the _pragma list runs on every new connection,
+	// busy_timeout first. SQLite 3.53.4: foreign_keys is per connection
+	// (https://sqlite.org/foreignkeys.html § 2), journal_mode=WAL stays in the
+	// file (https://sqlite.org/wal.html § 3.3).
 	dsn := fmt.Sprintf("file:%s?_pragma=journal_mode(WAL)&_pragma=busy_timeout(5000)&_pragma=foreign_keys(ON)", path)
 	db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", dsn)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("open database: %w", err)
 	}
-	// modernc's driver serializes writes anyway; a small pool avoids
+	// One connection: database/sql then runs this process's statements and
-	// "database is locked" surprises under WAL.
+	// transactions one after another, so none of them meets another's lock.
+	// The driver does not serialise across connections (modernc.org/sqlite
+	// v1.60.1, conn.go: the conn's mutex is its own); between processes - the
+	// dmarc-ingest command opens this file too - SQLite allows one write
+	// transaction at a time (https://sqlite.org/lang_transaction.html § 2.1)
+	// and the other waits out busy_timeout.
 	db.SetMaxOpenConns(1)
 
 	s := &Store{db: db}
@@ -83,6 +93,10 @@ func (s *Store) migrate() error {
 	// against today's files would skip the baseline and leave the panel running
 	// on a schema it does not know, so such a file is refused outright; nothing
 	// is migrated from 1.x (docs/schema-migrations.md).
+	// SQLite 3.53.4: the application id is the header's integer at offset 68
+	// (https://sqlite.org/fileformat2.html § 1.3.15); btree.c newDatabase()
+	// zeroes bytes 24-99 of a new file's header, so it reads 0 until set - and
+	// 1.x never set it.
 	if version > 0 {
 		var appID int64
 		if err := s.db.QueryRow("PRAGMA application_id").Scan(&appID); err != nil {
@@ -109,12 +123,22 @@ func (s *Store) migrate() error {
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("begin migration %s: %w", name, err)
 		}
+		// One Exec runs the whole file: modernc.org/sqlite v1.60.1, stmt.go
+		// stmt.exec(), "FALLBACK PATH: Multi-statement script" prepares and
+		// steps each statement of the tail in turn. It runs with foreign_keys
+		// ON, which cannot be switched off inside a transaction
+		// (https://sqlite.org/pragma.html#pragma_foreign_keys): an ADD COLUMN
+		// with REFERENCES needs a NULL default (lang_altertable.html § 4), and
+		// a changed collation means a rebuilt table (§ 8).
 		if _, err := tx.Exec(string(sqlBytes)); err != nil {
 			tx.Rollback()
 			return fmt.Errorf("apply migration %s: %w", name, err)
 		}
 		// PRAGMA does not accept a bound parameter, and target is a trusted
 		// loop index, so formatting it in is safe.
+		// SQLite 3.53.4, pragma.c sqlite3Pragma(), PragTyp_HEADER_VALUE: the
+		// value is the literal's text (sqlite3Atoi), written by OP_SetCookie
+		// under a write transaction, so a rollback takes it back with the rest.
 		if _, err := tx.Exec(fmt.Sprintf("PRAGMA user_version = %d", target)); err != nil {
 			tx.Rollback()
 			return fmt.Errorf("bump schema version for %s: %w", name, err)

internal/store/users.go

@@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ func (s *Store) UserExists() (bool, error) {
 // CreateGlobalUser inserts the first global user during setup. The check that
 // no user exists yet and the insert are one statement, so two setup requests
 // at once cannot both create one (audit 2026-10-12, M7).
+// SQLite 3.53.4, https://sqlite.org/lang_transaction.html § 2.1: an INSERT
+// starts a write transaction, one at a time, so its SELECT reads what is
+// committed; an insert of no row leaves sqlite3_changes() at 0
+// (https://sqlite.org/c3ref/changes.html).
 func (s *Store) CreateGlobalUser(username, passwordHash string) error {
 	now := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
 	res, err := s.db.Exec(
@@ -249,6 +253,7 @@ func (s *Store) AddUser(c UserChange) (int64, error) {
 	if c.Role == RoleDomain && c.Reach.Empty() {
 		return 0, ErrEmptyReach
 	}
+	// The first statement is a write (see UpdateStatus).
 	tx, err := s.db.Begin()
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, fmt.Errorf("create user: %w", err)
@@ -302,7 +307,12 @@ func (s *Store) SaveUser(c UserChange) error {
 	}
 	defer tx.Rollback()
 	// A write first: it takes the write lock, so what is counted below is
-	// what is committed.
+	// what is committed. SQLite 3.53.4, https://sqlite.org/lang_transaction.html
+	// § 2.2: after a deferred BEGIN, a first statement that writes starts a
+	// write transaction, and § 2.1: there is one at a time. RowsAffected counts
+	// the row its WHERE found even when no value changes: update.c
+	// sqlite3Update() writes every such row through sqlite3CompleteInsertion(),
+	// which marks it counted (OPFLAG_NCHANGE).
 	// An empty hash keeps the stored one: the form read it when it was
 	// opened, and the user may have changed it on Account since.
 	res, err := tx.Exec(
@@ -403,7 +413,9 @@ func (s *Store) SetUserReach(userID int64, reach Reach) error {
 
 // DeleteUser removes a panel user. ErrLastGlobal when deleting the only global
 // user: the delete and the count are one transaction, so two administrators
-// deleting each other at once cannot both succeed (audit 2026-10-12, M7).
+// deleting each other at once cannot both succeed (audit 2026-10-12, M7). The
+// DELETE comes first and so takes the write lock (see SaveUser); the rows its
+// cascade removes are not in RowsAffected (https://sqlite.org/c3ref/changes.html).
 func (s *Store) DeleteUser(id int64) error {
 	tx, err := s.db.Begin()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -517,7 +529,10 @@ func (s *Store) setUserReach(userID int64, reach Reach) error {
 // writeUserReach writes a user's reach inside tx. With an All flag set the
 // rows of that direction are dropped rather than stored: the flag already
 // covers them, and stale rows would come back to life the day the flag is
-// cleared.
+// cleared. Its first statement is a write (see UpdateStatus). A domain deleted
+// meanwhile fails its INSERT at once: SQLite 3.53.4's foreign keys are
+// immediate unless declared deferred (https://sqlite.org/foreignkeys.html § 4.2),
+// and the code is SQLITE_CONSTRAINT_FOREIGNKEY (isForeignKeyViolation).
 func writeUserReach(tx *sql.Tx, userID int64, reach Reach) error {
 	if _, err := tx.Exec("UPDATE users SET all_domains = ?, all_inbound_domains = ? WHERE id = ?",
 		reach.AllDomains, reach.AllInbound, userID); err != nil {

internal/web/auth/handlers.go

@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ import (
 	"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
 )
 
+// draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis § 4.1.3.2: a cookie named __Host- is accepted
+// only with Secure, Path=/ and no Domain, from a secure origin - so no other
+// host can set or overwrite it, and clearing it needs Secure as well.
 const (
 	sessionCookieBase     = "selfpost_session"
 	sessionCookiePrefixed = "__Host-" + sessionCookieBase
@@ -46,6 +49,9 @@ func (m *Module) sessionToken(r *http.Request) (string, bool) {
 	case 1:
 		return token, true
 	default:
+		// RFC 6265 § 5.4: the Cookie header carries every cookie that
+		// matches, a parent domain's of the same name included. The prefixed
+		// name cannot be planted that way (see sessionCookiePrefixed).
 		logf("panel: %s %s carries %d cookies named %q — treating the request as signed out; "+
 			"another host on this domain is overwriting the session cookie, clear the cookies for the parent domain",
 			r.Method, r.URL.Path, n, name)
@@ -130,6 +136,9 @@ func (m *Module) submitLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	http.Redirect(w, r, "/", http.StatusSeeOther)
 }
 
+// setSessionCookie sets the session cookie. SameSite=Lax withholds it from a
+// cross-site request unless that is a top-level navigation with a safe method
+// (rfc6265bis § 5.8.3, § 5.6.7.1), so a cross-site POST arrives without it.
 func (m *Module) setSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, token string) {
 	http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
 		Name:     m.sessionCookie(),

internal/web/auth/middleware.go

@@ -34,6 +34,10 @@ func (m *Module) RequireAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 	})
 }
 
+// isSessionActivity: a GET from htmx is a background poll - every panel hx-get
+// is a load or a poll - and does not renew the session. htmx 2.0.4, src/htmx.js
+// getHeaders(): every request it issues carries HX-Request: true (and
+// loadHistoryFromServer() sets it too).
 func isSessionActivity(r *http.Request) bool {
 	return !(r.Method == http.MethodGet && r.Header.Get("HX-Request") != "")
 }

internal/web/auth/session.go

@@ -31,7 +31,10 @@ func newSessionStore(st *store.Store, idle time.Duration) *sessionStore {
 
 // MaxAge is the session cookie's Max-Age in seconds, kept equal to the
 // sliding idle window so the browser drops the cookie no later than the
-// server would have expired it anyway.
+// server would have expired it anyway. RFC 6265 § 5.2.2: Max-Age sets the
+// expiry to now plus that many seconds, and a cookie set again under the same
+// name, domain and path replaces the old one (§ 5.3 step 11), so each renewal
+// slides it.
 func (s *sessionStore) MaxAge() int {
 	return int(s.idle.Seconds())
 }

internal/web/handlers/handlers_account.go

@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleAccountProfile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
 	f.Username = strings.TrimSpace(r.PostFormValue("username"))
 	f.Email = strings.TrimSpace(r.PostFormValue("email"))
 	// An unticked checkbox is not sent at all: absent is off.
+	// HTML Living Standard, form-control-infrastructure.html#constructing-entry-list:
+	// a checkbox whose checkedness is false is skipped.
 	f.Notify = r.PostFormValue("notify") != ""
 	if f.Username == "" {
 		f.Username = u.Username

internal/web/handlers/handlers_apps.go

@@ -395,6 +395,9 @@ func (h *Handlers) recalcApp(appID int64) error {
 
 // noStore keeps a page that shows a secret out of every cache and out of the
 // browser's history copy: the password on it is shown once.
+// RFC 9111 § 5.2.2.5: no-store keeps it out of every HTTP cache, private and
+// shared. The history part is not what it governs (§ 6), and Pragma has no
+// defined meaning in a response (§ 5.4): assumptions-2026-10-14, D-B13.
 func noStore(w http.ResponseWriter) {
 	w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
 	w.Header().Set("Pragma", "no-cache")

internal/web/handlers/handlers_settings.go

@@ -102,6 +102,8 @@ func (h *Handlers) submitServerSettings(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
 		}
 	}
 	// An unticked checkbox is not sent at all: absent is off.
+	// HTML Living Standard, form-control-infrastructure.html#constructing-entry-list:
+	// a checkbox whose checkedness is false is skipped.
 	notifications := r.PostFormValue("notify") != ""
 	if err := h.store.SetSendLogRetentionDays(days); err != nil {
 		logf("panel: settings: set send-log retention failed: %v", err)

internal/web/security.go

@@ -19,8 +19,17 @@ import (
 //     relative URL on the page, including the form actions;
 //   - form-action 'self' keeps a form from being retargeted at another host.
 //
+// CSP Level 3, https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP3/ § 6.8.3 "Get fetch directive
+// fallback list": script, style, img, font, connect and object fall back to
+// default-src; base-uri (§ 6.3.1), form-action (§ 6.4.1) and frame-ancestors
+// (§ 6.4.2) are not in any list, so each is set here.
+//
 // This is a second line of defence: XSS is already prevented by
-// html/template's contextual auto-escaping (security.md).
+// html/template's contextual auto-escaping (security.md). Go 1.26,
+// html/template doc.go "Security Model": template authors are trusted, the
+// data is not. An attribute it does not know (hx-get, hx-swap, popovertarget)
+// is escaped as plain text (attr.go attrType()), so the hx-get paths are built
+// by the server, never taken from input.
 const contentSecurityPolicy = "default-src 'self'; " +
 	"object-src 'none'; " +
 	"base-uri 'none'; " +
@@ -31,8 +40,10 @@ const contentSecurityPolicy = "default-src 'self'; " +
 // (CookieSecure, the same condition that gates the cookie's Secure attribute):
 // on the plain-HTTP development setup it would be meaningless at best and
 // would pin the browser to a scheme the dev instance does not speak at worst.
+// RFC 6797 § 8.1: a header received over insecure transport is ignored.
 //
-// Deliberately without includeSubDomains. The panel commonly lives on a
+// Deliberately without includeSubDomains (RFC 6797 § 6.1.2: only with it does
+// the policy reach the host's subdomains). The panel commonly lives on a
 // subdomain of a domain used for other things, but it may also sit at the
 // apex — and there the directive would force HTTPS on every unrelated
 // subdomain of that domain for a year, which is not SelfPost's call to make.
@@ -51,6 +62,8 @@ func (s *Server) secure(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 		h.Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
 		// Equivalent to the CSP's frame-ancestors directive, kept for browsers
 		// that predate it. The two never disagree: both mean "never framed".
+		// CSP3 § 6.4.2.2: 'none' is DENY, and where frame-ancestors is
+		// enforced X-Frame-Options is ignored.
 		h.Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
 		// The panel's behaviour never depends on the referrer, so the strictest
 		// value is free: panel URLs carry domain names and record identifiers
@@ -65,7 +78,12 @@ func (s *Server) secure(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 			// being the name the browser actually used, which every reverse
 			// proxy fragment this project ships preserves (Apache
 			// ProxyPreserveHost On, nginx proxy_set_header Host $host, Caddy
-			// and Traefik by default) — but a proxy that rewrites Host turns
+			// and Traefik by default: httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/mod/mod_proxy.html
+			// #proxypreservehost; nginx.org ngx_http_proxy_module
+			// #proxy_set_header, whose default is $proxy_host; Caddy 2
+			// reverse_proxy § Headers > Defaults, "passes through incoming
+			// headers - including Host"; Traefik service load balancer,
+			// passHostHeader true by default) — but a proxy that rewrites Host turns
 			// every form submission into a 403, and without these two values
 			// side by side the symptom just looks like "the panel stopped
 			// saving anything".
@@ -87,6 +105,9 @@ func (s *Server) secure(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 // domain, a forgotten staging host — counts as same-site and its forged POST
 // would arrive with the session cookie attached. Sec-Fetch-Site and Origin are
 // judged per *origin*, so they tell that neighbour apart from the panel.
+// draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis § 5.2 (same-site is the [SAMESITE] "same
+// site" of the two origins); W3C Fetch Metadata § 2.3 (Sec-Fetch-Site:
+// same-origin only if every URL of the request is same origin).
 //
 // Read-only methods are exempt: every GET route in the panel is a read (the
 // delete confirmation at GET /outbound/domains/{id}/delete only renders a form), so
@@ -100,26 +121,40 @@ func originAllowed(r *http.Request) bool {
 	// The browser's own account of where the request came from. It cannot be
 	// set by page script (a forbidden header name), so when it is present it
 	// is the answer: anything but same-origin — including "none", a
-	// navigation with no initiator — is refused.
+	// navigation with no initiator — is refused. Fetch Standard § 2.2.2: a
+	// header name starting with `Sec-` is a forbidden request-header; Fetch
+	// Metadata § 2.3: "none" is a navigation the user started directly.
 	if site := r.Header.Get("Sec-Fetch-Site"); site != "" {
 		return site == "same-origin"
 	}
 
-	// Older browsers send only Origin. Compare hosts, not full origins: the
+	// Older browsers send only Origin, and so does a current one over plain
-	// panel speaks plain HTTP behind the proxy and does not know its own
+	// HTTP at a name other than localhost: Fetch Metadata § 3 appends its
-	// external scheme, while Origin will say https.
+	// headers only for a potentially trustworthy URL. Fetch Standard § 3.2: a
+	// request that is neither GET nor HEAD carries Origin. (Which value it
+	// carries under this panel's Referrer-Policy: assumptions-2026-10-14, D-B3.)
+	// Compare hosts, not full origins: the panel speaks plain HTTP behind the
+	// proxy and does not know its own external scheme, while Origin will say
+	// https.
 	origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")
 	if origin == "" {
 		// Neither header. A client this old cannot be checked at all; it is
 		// let through as the risk consciously accepted (single-admin panel,
 		// the administrator picks the browser). Turning this return into
-		// false is the whole of the stricter policy.
+		// false is the whole of the stricter policy. By Fetch § 3.2 a browser
+		// that follows it never sends a POST without Origin; Firefox did for a
+		// same-origin form before 70 (MDN browser-compat-data 6.0.0,
+		// http.headers.Origin).
 		return true
 	}
 	u, err := url.Parse(origin)
 	if err != nil || u.Host == "" {
 		// Unparseable, or the opaque "null" origin (sandboxed iframe,
 		// redirected cross-origin POST) — not this panel either way.
+		// Fetch Standard § 2.2.5 "serializing a request origin": "null" for a
+		// redirect-tainted request; HTML § 7.1.1: an opaque origin serialises
+		// to "null"; url.Parse("null") has no Host. (Fetch § 3.2 also sends
+		// "null" under Referrer-Policy no-referrer: D-B3 of the same register.)
 		return false
 	}
 	return u.Host == r.Host

internal/web/view/components.go

@@ -110,6 +110,12 @@ type Tag struct {
 // why a message was decided the way it was). It is the browser's own popover:
 // the tag is a button that names the sheet by ID, so ID is unique on the page.
 // Its content is a table of name and value.
+//
+// HTML Living Standard, popover.html: popovertarget on a button shows or hides
+// (popovertargetaction="hide") the element with that id, with no script; a
+// browser without the popover attribute (before Chrome 114, Firefox 125,
+// Safari 17 - MDN browser-compat-data 6.0.0, html.global_attributes.popover)
+// does not open it.
 type Sheet struct {
 	ID    string
 	Tag   Tag
@@ -163,7 +169,9 @@ func StatusTag(status string) string {
 
 // wbrAt escapes s and puts a <wbr> after every @ (template function wbr_at):
 // an address in a table cell breaks where it reads naturally, so the column can
-// shrink without splitting a name mid-word.
+// shrink without splitting a name mid-word. Go 1.26, text/template funcs.go
+// HTMLEscape(): HTMLEscapeString escapes < > & ' " and NUL, so the only markup
+// in the result is the <wbr> added here.
 func wbrAt(s string) template.HTML {
 	return template.HTML(strings.ReplaceAll(template.HTMLEscapeString(s), "@", "@<wbr>"))
 }
@@ -283,6 +291,10 @@ type Box struct {
 	Poll    string
 	// OOB marks the box to be swapped into the page by its ID when it comes
 	// in a polled fragment beside the element that asked for the fragment.
+	// htmx 2.0.4, src/htmx.js swap(): the response replaces only the target;
+	// findAndSwapOobElements() takes every hx-swap-oob element out of it,
+	// nested ones too (allowNestedOobSwaps defaults true), and oobSwap()
+	// with "true" swaps it outerHTML over the element of its id.
 	OOB bool
 	// DomainPick: see Box.
 	DomainPick bool

internal/web/view/static.go

@@ -16,7 +16,10 @@ import (
 // a response carries no validator at all and the browser is free to guess how
 // long to keep it — which is how a replaced favicon keeps showing the old mark
 // long after a deploy. Hashing the content gives every asset a validator that
-// changes exactly when the asset does.
+// changes exactly when the asset does. RFC 9111 § 4.2.2: without explicit
+// freshness a cache may assign a heuristic lifetime; Go 1.26, net/http fs.go
+// ServeContent(): no Last-Modified for a zero modtime, and an ETag the caller
+// set answers If-None-Match.
 var staticETags = buildStaticETags()
 
 func buildStaticETags() map[string]string {
@@ -50,6 +53,8 @@ func buildStaticETags() map[string]string {
 // handful of small files on a single-operator panel that trade is the right way
 // round — correctness after a deploy matters more than saving the round trip.
 // http.ServeContent answers the conditional request from the ETag we set here.
+// RFC 9111 § 5.2.2.4: no-cache lets a cache store the response but not reuse
+// it without validating it first.
 func StaticHandler() http.Handler {
 	files := http.FileServer(http.FS(assetsFS))
 	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

internal/web/view/static/panel.js

@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@
   // read from the field itself, so it can never drift from what is shown. Where
   // the clipboard API is absent (plain HTTP outside localhost) the value is
   // selected instead, ready for the operator's own Ctrl+C. The button's icon
-  // stays; only its word changes for a moment.
+  // stays; only its word changes for a moment. W3C Clipboard API, § Navigator
+  // interface: navigator.clipboard is [SecureContext].
   document.addEventListener("click", function (ev) {
     var button = ev.target.closest("button[data-copy]");
     if (!button) {
@@ -69,6 +70,9 @@
   // inline script. The listener is delegated from the document,
   // so it also covers markup swapped in by HTMX. With JavaScript disabled the
   // form submits without asking — exactly as the inline handler behaved.
+  // HTML Living Standard, form-control-infrastructure.html#form-submission-algorithm:
+  // submit is fired with bubbles and cancelable true, and a cancelled one
+  // ends the submission.
   document.addEventListener("submit", function (ev) {
     var form = ev.target.closest("form[data-confirm]");
     if (form && !window.confirm(form.dataset.confirm)) {
@@ -140,6 +144,10 @@
       form.querySelectorAll(rule.target).forEach(function (target) {
         // hidden alone does not hide an element whose own stylesheet gives it a
         // display (Bulma's .box), so Bulma's is-hidden helper goes with it.
+        // HTML Living Standard, rendering.html#hidden-elements: [hidden] is
+        // display: none in the user agent's sheet, which an author rule such
+        // as Bulma 1.0.4's .box { display: block } overrides; .is-hidden is
+        // display: none !important.
         target.hidden = !show;
         target.classList.toggle("is-hidden", !show);
         if (!show && rule.clearWhenHidden) {
@@ -169,19 +177,26 @@
     initShowWhen(document);
   });
 
-  // htmx:load fires for every element htmx puts into the page, so swapped-in
+  // htmx:load fires for each top-level element htmx puts into the page, so
-  // markup starts with its blocks shown or hidden the way a full page does.
+  // swapped-in markup starts with its blocks shown or hidden the way a full
+  // page does. htmx 2.0.4, src/htmx.js insertNodesBefore() queues
+  // makeAjaxLoadTask(child) for each element of the swapped content, which
+  // triggers htmx:load on it (detail.elt); initShowWhen looks inside it.
   document.addEventListener("htmx:load", function (ev) {
     initShowWhen(ev.detail.elt);
   });
 
   // --- Adaptive monitoring polling ---------------------------------------
   // The four monitoring fragments carry data-poll and hx-trigger="load" for
-  // the first fetch only. panel.js schedules the rest: 5 s while the operator
+  // the first fetch only (htmx 2.0.4, src/htmx.js addTriggerHandler(): "load"
+  // fires once, when the element is first processed). panel.js schedules the rest: 5 s while the operator
   // is active on the page, 30 s when the tab is visible but idle, and nothing
   // while the tab is hidden. hx-trigger="every Ns [expr]" could express some
   // of that, but the filter is evaluated with `new Function`, which the
-  // panel's CSP (default-src 'self', no 'unsafe-eval') would silently break.
+  // panel's CSP (default-src 'self', no 'unsafe-eval') would break: htmx
+  // 2.0.4, src/htmx.js maybeGenerateConditional() compiles the filter with
+  // Function(); the EvalError is caught, logged as htmx:syntax:error, and the
+  // trigger is kept without its filter, so it would fire on every tick.
   var pollActiveMs = 5000;
   var pollIdleMs = 30000;
   // No pointer/keyboard/scroll input for this long → treat the tab as idle.
@@ -238,6 +253,9 @@
     }
     // Swapped-in markup still carries hx-trigger="load"; strip it so htmx does
     // not issue a duplicate GET on top of the response we just received.
+    // htmx 2.0.4, src/htmx.js swap(): htmx:afterSwap fires on the new
+    // elements before doSettle() runs the settle tasks, and only those
+    // (makeAjaxLoadTask -> processNode) act on hx-trigger.
     el.removeAttribute("hx-trigger");
     schedulePoll(el);
   }

internal/web/view/templates/layout.html

@@ -32,7 +32,11 @@
      the head for the request-indicator classes. The panel uses no
      hx-indicator, and that injected element would be the one thing the
      Content-Security-Policy has to make an exception for, so it
-     is switched off here. */}}
+     is switched off here. htmx 2.0.4, src/htmx.js: the ready handler runs
+     mergeMetaConfig() before insertIndicatorStyles(), which adds the element
+     only while includeIndicatorStyles is not false. Both scripts are defer:
+     they run in this order once parsing ends and before DOMContentLoaded
+     (HTML Living Standard, parsing.html#the-end). */}}
 <meta name="htmx-config" content='{"includeIndicatorStyles":false}'>
 <script src="/static/htmx.min.js" defer></script>
 <script src="/static/panel.js" defer></script>