password-reset: a confirmed e-mail, then a link to reset the password
Agreed by the owner on 2026-10-13 ("the e-mail must be confirmed");
notifications to an unconfirmed address settled on 2026-10-17: "Без
подтверждения слать". Mockups 2f5f5b2, route guard b7bbb2c, panel guard
0774da2.
Migration 0013: users.email_confirmed_at ('' for every address saved
before it) and user_links - the SHA-256 of a link's token, its user,
purpose (confirm, reset), address, created and expiry. A changed address
loses its mark (keepConfirmed, in UpdateUser and SaveUser).
internal/web/auth/links.go. A link is 256 bits from crypto/rand, mailed as
https://SELFPOST_HOSTNAME/... - never the request's Host. Confirmation:
24 h, sent when an address is saved (Account, or the global role's user
form) and by Account's Send the link again; its page /confirm/<token> has
a button (a GET changes nothing) and confirms only for a session of its
own account. Reset: /login/reset asks for a username and answers the same
for every name (the sign-in page, "If that account has a confirmed e-mail,
the link is on its way"), mailing after the answer; only a confirmed
address gets one, none within ten minutes of the last, five links an hour
per account, five requests in 15 minutes per client address;
/login/reset/<token> (30 min) sets the password with the link taken in
the same transaction that checks the address again
(store.TakeResetLink), then ends every session. Changing the e-mail on
Account asks for the current password. A password set on Account or the
user form removes the reset links; a restore removes every link; the stop
waits for links being mailed (Server.Drain); a rejected request's log line
hides a link's token (loggedPath).
Reviewed for security before the commit (2026-10-17): no high; two
medium and five low, all fixed here - confirming needs the account's
session and the mail does not name the account (a mistyped address was a
takeover); a reset request neither replaces the links already sent nor
spends the account's quota inside ten minutes; take-and-set atomic; the
confirmation mail sent after the answer; the stop waits for mail; a
restore deletes the links; the token kept out of the log.
Tests: store TestUserLinks, TestUserLinkTakenOnce, TestEmailConfirmation,
TestTakeResetLink; auth TestResetSendsALinkOnlyToAConfirmedAddress,
TestResetLinkSetsThePasswordOnce, TestResetLinkDiesWithTheAddress,
TestResetRequestsAreLimited, TestResetRequestsAreSpaced, TestConfirmLink,
TestLinkPathsWithoutAToken; handlers TestAccountEmailIsConfirmedByItsLink,
TestUserFormSendsANewAddressItsLink; web TestLoggedPathHidesTokens; the
view's pages and fixtures; e2e password_reset_by_e_mail runs it through
the sink (and checks a link from before the restore is dead). go vet +
go test (26 packages) and make e2e on the test server for this tree.
Docs: guide § Account, security.md (the bullet and what ends sessions),
architecture (routes), schema-migrations (row 13, users, user_links),
help #account (word for word with the mockup), roadmap row done,
CHANGELOG [Unreleased].
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
+32
-1
@@ -138,7 +138,8 @@ The panel is exposed to the internet — the items below are **not optional**.
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after it was found, so the cookie of a deleted user is dead and cannot become
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the session of whoever is created under the same name later; renaming a user
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leaves their sessions alone.
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- **What ends a user's sessions:** deleting the user (all); a password change on
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- **What ends a user's sessions:** deleting the user (all); a password set
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from a reset link (all, `2.14.0`); a password change on
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Account (that user's *other* sessions — never another user's); a password set
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for them by a global user on the user form (all of theirs, except the current
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one when they set their own); signing out (the current one only); signing
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@@ -148,6 +149,36 @@ The panel is exposed to the internet — the items below are **not optional**.
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held.
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- Polling by the monitoring screens (`HX-Request` `GET`s) does not renew a
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session.
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- **Password reset by e-mail (`2.14.0`).** A link goes only to an address
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its account has confirmed, by a link sent to that address; notifications
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go to an unconfirmed one (owner, 2026-10-17) - they carry no secret. A link
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is 256 random bits (`crypto/rand`); `user_links` keeps its SHA-256 only,
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so the database or a backup opens nothing. A confirmation link lives 24
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hours, a reset link 30 minutes; each is taken once, in the transaction
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that deletes it (`DELETE … RETURNING`), and a newer link of the same kind
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replaces the older. A reset link holds only while the account's address is
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still the confirmed one it was sent to; a confirmation link only while the
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address is the one it confirms. The link's host is `SELFPOST_HOSTNAME`,
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never the request's `Host`, which an attacker would choose to receive the
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token. The request form answers the same for every name and sends the mail
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after answering, so neither the words nor the time tell whether a name
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exists or is confirmed; requests are limited to five in 15 minutes per
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client address, mails to five an hour per account, and a link's page to 30
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requests in 15 minutes per client address. A link's page changes nothing
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on `GET` (a mail scanner opens links): the button does. Setting a password
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from a link ends every session of the account and every other reset link.
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Changing the account e-mail asks for the current password, as the password
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does: the address is where a reset link goes. From the security review
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(2026-10-17): confirming an address also takes being signed in as its
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account, and the confirmation mail does not name the account - a mistyped
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address is a stranger's, who could otherwise confirm it and reset the
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password; a reset request does not replace the links already sent, and
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none is sent within ten minutes of the last, so a stranger repeating a
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username neither kills the link in the mailbox nor spends the account's
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links; the link is taken and the password set in one transaction that
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checks the address again; a restore deletes every link; a rejected
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request's log line hides a link's token; a stop waits for the links still
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being mailed.
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### Roles
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user