inbound-antispam-panel: the filter signs what it judged

Closes what the security review left as an accepted risk: with the
spam filter down - it is attached fail-open - nothing removes verdict
headers a sender wrote himself, and the inbound journal recorded his
verdict as the filter's. The owner asked whether rspamd could add a
header that proves the others are ours (2026-10-12) and agreed to a
signature: a fixed mark could be written by a sender as easily as the
verdict.

  - inbound.FilterKey: a key of 32 random bytes, 64 hex characters, in
    /data/antispam/filter.key, made on the first start with the relay
    on. 0644 like the list files beside it: the filter is another user
    in another container.
  - deploy/antispam/rspamd/milter_headers.conf: a custom routine reads
    the key through the directory the sidecar already mounts and adds
    X-SelfPost-Filter, the HMAC-SHA256 of the message's queue id, hex;
    a header of that name from the sender is removed.
  - internal/milter/inbound.go: the verdict headers are kept as they
    are read, and at end-of-message - when the queue id is known - they
    count only if the signature fits (FilterSignature, hmac.Equal). No
    key, no queue id, no signature or a wrong one: the row is that of
    mail nobody judged (accept, selfpost, no detail).

The signature goes on to the upstream with the mail and is of no use
there: it fits one queue id.

Tried in a throwaway rspamd 3.11 container on the test server before
the Go side was written: the routine loads, signs
(2aa1ca6d... for key 0123...cdef and queue id 4A1B2C3D5E, the value
python's hmac gives and TestFilterSignatureIsWhatTheFilterWrites
pins), removes a sender's header of the same name, and adds nothing
without a queue id.

Tests: signed, unsigned, made-up, another message's, another key's,
the sender's followed by the real one, the next message on the
connection, no queue id; the key made once, read after, replaced when
damaged, left alone by the lists. e2e: filter.key is there, 644, 65
bytes.

docs/security.md: the accepted risk is replaced by a narrower one (the
key is readable on the host); Mail path describes the signature.

Checked on the test server, uncommitted tree: go vet ./... ok,
go test ./... ok (22 packages), make e2e ok.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ Format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); version
   a connection's later messages had no client address; two changes of the
   filter lists at once could leave the filter's files behind the page; a held
   message was logged twice; after an unclean stop of the panel the refusals of
-  its last seconds were logged twice. Recorded as accepted in
+  its last seconds were logged twice; with the spam filter down, a sender's
-  [docs/security.md](docs/security.md): the filter's verdict in the log is the
+  own verdict headers were recorded as the filter's. Recorded as accepted in
-  sender's own while the filter is down; an allow entry for a sender address
+  [docs/security.md](docs/security.md): an allow entry for a sender address
   trusts an address anyone can claim; the list files are readable by anyone on
   the host.
 - `INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER` and `INBOUND_JOURNAL_MILTER_SOCKET` are checked
@@ -91,6 +91,13 @@ Format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); version
   relay on.
 - Help: *Inbound log* and *Filter lists*.
 - New setting `ANTISPAM_DIR` (default `/data/antispam`).
+- **The spam filter signs what it judged.** rspamd adds `X-SelfPost-Filter` to
+  every message it lets through - an HMAC of the message's queue id under a
+  key SelfPost creates in `data/antispam/filter.key` - and the inbound log
+  shows a verdict only next to a signature that fits. Nothing to configure,
+  but the sidecar needs the new `antispam/rspamd/milter_headers.conf` and a
+  restart after SelfPost's first start; until then accepted mail is logged
+  as *selfpost*, with no verdict.
 - A full backup carries the inbound log, the filter lists and their files
   under `data/antispam/`. It does not carry the `antispam/` directory with the
   compose fragment and the rspamd configuration - copy that from

cmd/panel/journal.go

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
 
+	"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/inbound"
 	"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/milter"
 	"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
 )
@@ -33,8 +34,18 @@ func serveInboundJournal(ctx context.Context, cfg config, st *store.Store) error
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
+	// With a filter attached, the key it signs with. Without the key no
+	// verdict can be told from a sender's own, so none is read: the journal
+	// still records the mail, and the log says why it shows no verdicts.
+	key := ""
+	if cfg.inboundAntispamMilter != "" {
+		if key, err = inbound.FilterKey(cfg.antispamDir); err != nil {
+			log.Printf("inbound-journal-milter: no key for the filter's signature, verdicts will not be recorded: %v", err)
+			key = ""
+		}
+	}
 	log.Printf("inbound-journal-milter listening on %s", cfg.inboundJournalSocket)
-	return milter.ServeInbound(ctx, ln, st, cfg.inboundAntispamMilter != "")
+	return milter.ServeInbound(ctx, ln, st, key)
 }
 
 // listenMilter opens a milter's Unix socket where Postfix can reach it.

cmd/panel/main.go

@@ -312,6 +312,13 @@ func run() error {
 			log.Printf("filter lists bootstrap: %v", err)
 		}
 	}
+	// The key the filter signs with has to be in the shared directory before
+	// the filter reads it, whether or not a filter is attached yet.
+	if cfg.inboundEnabled {
+		if _, err := inbound.FilterKey(cfg.antispamDir); err != nil {
+			log.Printf("filter key bootstrap: %v", err)
+		}
+	}
 
 	if err := st.EnsureSendLogRetentionDays(cfg.retentionDays); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("bootstrap send-log retention: %w", err)

deploy/antispam/rspamd/milter_headers.conf

@@ -8,4 +8,36 @@
 # rspamd removes headers of these names that a sender wrote himself before it
 # adds its own. Without this file the journal still lists accepted mail, with
 # no verdict next to it.
-use = ["x-spamd-result", "x-rspamd-action"];
+#
+# The third header is the proof that the other two are rspamd's. The filter is
+# attached so that mail still flows when it is down, and then nothing removes
+# what a sender wrote: he could send his own verdict. So rspamd signs each
+# message - an HMAC-SHA256 of the message's queue id under a key SelfPost
+# generates and leaves in the directory it shares with this container - and
+# SelfPost reads a verdict only next to a signature it can recompute. The
+# signature travels on with the mail and is of no use to whoever sees it: it
+# fits that one queue id.
+use = ["x-spamd-result", "x-rspamd-action", "selfpost-signature"];
+
+custom {
+  selfpost-signature = <<EOD
+local key
+return function(task, common_meta)
+  local remove = { ['X-SelfPost-Filter'] = 0 }
+  if not key then
+    local f = io.open('/etc/rspamd/selfpost/filter.key', 'r')
+    if f then
+      key = f:read('*l')
+      f:close()
+    end
+  end
+  local qid = task:get_queue_id()
+  if not key or key == '' or not qid or qid == '' then
+    return nil, {}, remove, {}
+  end
+  local hash = require "rspamd_cryptobox_hash"
+  local sig = hash.create_specific_keyed(key, 'sha256', qid):hex()
+  return nil, { ['X-SelfPost-Filter'] = sig }, remove, {}
+end
+EOD;
+}

docs/architecture.md

@@ -88,7 +88,14 @@ smtp/inet` removes Debian's stock smtpd). Outbound delivery still uses the
   `inbound_spam_log` row per recipient at an inbound domain - a DMARC report
   address is not one - and never refuses anything
   ([internal/milter/inbound.go](../internal/milter/inbound.go)). The headers
-  are read only while a filter is attached; refused mail never reaches it.
+  are read only while a filter is attached, and only next to the filter's
+  signature: a third header, `X-SelfPost-Filter`, the HMAC-SHA256 of the
+  message's queue id under the key in `/data/antispam/filter.key`
+  (`inbound.FilterKey` makes it on first start; rspamd reads it through the
+  mounted directory and signs in a custom routine of `milter_headers.conf`).
+  With the filter down - it is attached fail-open - a sender's own verdict
+  headers carry no signature and the row is that of mail nobody judged.
+  Refused mail never reaches this milter.
   Refusals come from `mail.log`: this listener logs as `postfix/inbound`
   (`syslog_name`), and the log tailer turns a `reject:` line of
   `postfix/inbound/smtpd` (Postfix's own policy) and a `milter-reject` /

docs/guide.md

@@ -860,6 +860,17 @@ with the message, and the upstream receives them with the mail. Copy the
 `antispam/rspamd/` directory next to the fragment; without the file accepted
 mail is still recorded, with no verdict.
 
+The same file makes rspamd **sign** each message, in a third header,
+`X-SelfPost-Filter`. The filter is attached so that mail still flows when it
+is down, and then a sender could write a verdict of his own into those
+headers; SelfPost therefore records a verdict only next to a signature it can
+recompute. The key is `data/antispam/filter.key`: SelfPost creates it on its
+first start with the inbound relay on, and the sidecar reads it from the
+directory it already mounts - there is nothing to configure. If Inbound › Log
+shows *selfpost* for mail the filter did judge, the sidecar is running without
+this file or started before the key existed: copy `antispam/rspamd/` again and
+restart the sidecar.
+
 The same directory holds
 [multimap.conf](../deploy/antispam/rspamd/multimap.conf), the rules for the
 **allow and deny lists** kept in the panel. SelfPost does not apply the lists

docs/plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md

@@ -59,7 +59,12 @@ smtpd_milters = { antispam, inbound-journal }
 Antispam runs first; inbound-journal runs at end-of-message on the **accept**
 path and reads rspamd-added headers (`X-Rspamd-Action`, and `X-Spamd-Result`
 for the score and symbols - rspamd has no `X-Rspamd-Score`; the sidecar adds
-both through `deploy/antispam/rspamd/milter_headers.conf`).
+both through `deploy/antispam/rspamd/milter_headers.conf`). As built they are
+read only next to rspamd's signature of the message, `X-SelfPost-Filter`
+(owner, 2026-10-12: "А rspamd не может дописывать какой-то заголовок, по
+которому мы будем знать, что это заголовки нашего спам фильтра?") - an HMAC
+of the queue id, since a fixed mark could be written by a sender as easily as
+the verdict itself.
 
 **Antispam rejects** do not reach end-of-message on the journal milter. v1 also
 tails `mail.log` for inbound `postfix/smtpd` **`milter-reject`** / **`reject`**
@@ -317,4 +322,4 @@ Target version cut: **`2.1.0`** (MINOR), after `2.0.0`. One commit per step;
 - [x] [guide.md](../guide.md), [architecture.md](../architecture.md) — **Composer** (kept up with each step; [security.md](../security.md) follows the security review)
 - [x] `go vet`, `go test`, e2e if applicable — **Composer** (on the test server for every step; last on `7192c38`: vet ok, 22 packages ok, e2e ok, which relays, refuses, reads the log page and edits a list through the panel)
 - [x] Technical review of inbound antispam changes — **Opus** (2026-10-12; findings fixed: client address of a connection's later messages, the lists' writer under a lock, the tailer's queue-id memory, hold rows written twice, the cap by time; and, outside the feature, the level-2 limit and client-address list skipped after a connection's first message)
-- [x] Security review inbound antispam path — **Fable** (2026-10-12; no Critical or High; HELO-forged journal rows and the six-hourly row cap fixed, three accepted risks recorded in [security.md](../security.md))
+- [x] Security review inbound antispam path — **Fable** (2026-10-12; no Critical or High; HELO-forged journal rows and the six-hourly row cap fixed; a sender's own verdict while the filter is down closed by the filter's signature, the owner's idea; accepted risks recorded in [security.md](../security.md))

docs/security.md

@@ -45,9 +45,12 @@ HELO name could supply the sender, recipient and reply of a journal row and so
 make a refusal look like the deny list's (the reply now ends at Postfix's own
 `; from=<`); the journal's row cap was applied only every six hours, between
 which refusals were written at whatever rate a stranger sent recipients (the
-tailer now cuts to the cap every 500 rows); and three behaviours are recorded
+tailer now cuts to the cap every 500 rows); and two behaviours are recorded
-under Accepted risks (verdict headers while the filter is down, the allow list
+under Accepted risks (the allow list keyed on an address anyone can claim, the
-keyed on an address anyone can claim, the list files readable by anyone).
+list files readable by anyone). A third it named - with the filter down, a
+sender's own verdict headers were recorded as the filter's - was closed the
+same day at the owner's suggestion: the filter signs each message and a
+verdict is read only next to its signature.
 (2) **Accepted risks** —
 deliberate departures beyond the mandatory, recorded so the decision is not
 lost.
@@ -208,7 +211,16 @@ operator can act on it.
   message it lets through. `test/e2e` sends two `MAIL FROM` on one connection.
 - **The inbound journal is written from what strangers send.** The inbound
   journal milter is the last on port 25, read-only and attached fail-open; it
-  keeps of the filter's verdict only what its patterns recognise. Refusals are
+  keeps of the filter's verdict only what its patterns recognise. **A verdict
+  is read only next to the filter's signature.** The filter is attached so
+  that mail flows when it is down, and then nothing removes verdict headers a
+  sender wrote himself. So rspamd adds a third header, `X-SelfPost-Filter`:
+  the HMAC-SHA256 of the message's queue id under a key SelfPost generates
+  (`data/antispam/filter.key`) and the sidecar reads from the directory it
+  mounts. The journal milter recomputes it at end-of-message; with no
+  signature, or one that does not fit, the row is that of mail nobody judged.
+  The signature goes on to the upstream with the mail and is of no use there:
+  it fits one queue id. Refusals are
   parsed from `mail.log` from the head of the line, with the reply ending at
   Postfix's own `; from=<` so that the HELO name after it - the client's text,
   logged as written - cannot stand in for the sender, the recipient or the
@@ -347,20 +359,14 @@ deferred item from the roadmap.
   the journal from recording sends at all. The trigger to revisit is a
   requirement for the allow-list to hold as a security boundary — at which
   point it must move to the SASL/smtpd layer and fail closed.
-- **With the spam filter down, a sender can write his own verdict into the
+- **The key the spam filter signs with is readable by anyone on the host.**
-  inbound journal.** The filter is attached fail-open by default, and the
+  The inbound journal reads the filter's verdict only next to the filter's
-  inbound journal milter reads its verdict from two headers. Up, rspamd removes
+  signature (see Mail path), and the key for it, `data/antispam/filter.key`,
-  headers of those names that a sender wrote and adds its own (seen on the
+  is 0644 like the list files beside it: the filter is another user in another
-  test server: a forged pair was replaced). Down, the sender's pair is all
+  container. Someone with a shell on the host could therefore sign a verdict
-  there is: the row shows his action and score, a forged `quarantine` shows a
+  of his own - into a monitoring page, on a host where he could do far more.
-  hold that never happened, and a forged allow symbol counts as a match of an
+  Senders on the internet, whom the signature is for, cannot read it. Trigger
-  allow entry that fits him in Filter lists. Mail is not affected - the
+  to revisit: the same as for the list files - a shared host.
-  journal decides nothing - and the page that says the filter is down is
-  Server › Health. Accepted because the alternative is a live check of the
-  filter on every message for the sake of a monitoring page. Trigger to
-  revisit: the journal or the match counts being used to decide something
-  (alerts, automatic removal of entries), or `INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER_ACTION`
-  staying `accept` on an installation whose filter is often down.
 - **An allow entry for a sender address or domain trusts what the sending
   server says.** The filter matches the envelope sender, which is not
   authenticated: anyone who knows or guesses an allowed address can send as it

internal/inbound/lists.go

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 package inbound
 
 import (
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/hex"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/netip"
 	"os"
@@ -401,3 +403,45 @@ func (l *Lists) Usage() (map[int64]Usage, error) {
 	}
 	return out, nil
 }
+
+// FilterKeyFile is the file, beside the list files, that holds the key the
+// spam filter signs messages with.
+const FilterKeyFile = "filter.key"
+
+// FilterKey returns the key the spam filter signs each message with, creating
+// it on first use: 32 random bytes as 64 hex characters on one line, in the
+// directory the filter's container mounts.
+//
+// The filter is attached so that mail flows when it is down. Then nothing
+// removes verdict headers a sender wrote himself, and the inbound journal
+// would record his verdict as the filter's. So the filter signs each message
+// with this key and the journal reads a verdict only next to a signature it
+// can recompute (internal/milter, FilterSignature).
+//
+// The file is readable by anyone on the host, like the list files and for the
+// same reason: the filter is another user in another container. What the key
+// protects is the truth of a monitoring page, against senders on the internet;
+// someone with a shell on the host is not who it is kept from.
+func FilterKey(dir string) (string, error) {
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, FilterKeyFile)
+	if raw, err := os.ReadFile(path); err == nil {
+		if key := strings.TrimSpace(string(raw)); len(key) >= 32 && !strings.ContainsAny(key, " \t\r\n") {
+			return key, nil
+		}
+		// Empty or cut short: not a key anyone should sign with. Replaced below.
+	} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("read %s: %w", path, err)
+	}
+	if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("create %s: %w", dir, err)
+	}
+	buf := make([]byte, 32)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(buf); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("generate the filter key: %w", err)
+	}
+	key := hex.EncodeToString(buf)
+	if err := atomicfile.Write(path, []byte(key+"\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return key, nil
+}

internal/inbound/lists_test.go

@@ -395,3 +395,46 @@ func TestListable(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+// The key the filter signs with is made once and then read, and is readable by
+// the filter, which is another user in another container.
+func TestFilterKey(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "antispam")
+	key, err := FilterKey(dir)
+	if err != nil || len(key) != 64 || strings.Trim(key, "0123456789abcdef") != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("FilterKey = %q, %v", key, err)
+	}
+	again, err := FilterKey(dir)
+	if err != nil || again != key {
+		t.Errorf("a second call = %q, %v; want the same key", again, err)
+	}
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, FilterKeyFile))
+	if err != nil || string(raw) != key+"\n" {
+		t.Errorf("file = %q, %v", raw, err)
+	}
+	if info, _ := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, FilterKeyFile)); os.PathSeparator == '/' && info.Mode().Perm() != 0o644 {
+		t.Errorf("mode = %o", info.Mode().Perm())
+	}
+
+	// A file that is not a key is replaced, not signed with.
+	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, FilterKeyFile), []byte("short\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	fresh, err := FilterKey(dir)
+	if err != nil || len(fresh) != 64 || fresh == key {
+		t.Errorf("after a damaged file: %q, %v", fresh, err)
+	}
+
+	// The lists leave it alone.
+	st, err := store.Open(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "test.db"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer st.Close()
+	if err := NewLists(st, dir).Sync(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if kept, _ := FilterKey(dir); kept != fresh {
+		t.Errorf("the key changed when the lists were written")
+	}
+}

internal/milter/inbound.go

@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ package milter
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
 	"log"
 	"net"
 	"net/textproto"
@@ -33,10 +36,12 @@ type InboundStore interface {
 type inboundSession struct {
 	milter.NoOpMilter
 	rec InboundStore
-	// filter says whether an external filter is attached in front of this
+	// key is what the filter signs each message with (FilterSignature), or
-	// milter. Without one the verdict headers below can only have been written
+	// empty when no filter is attached. A verdict is read only next to a
-	// by the sender, and are not read.
+	// signature that fits: the filter is attached so that mail flows when it is
-	filter bool
+	// down, and then the verdict headers of a message are whatever its sender
+	// wrote.
+	key string
 
 	// clientIP is taken at Connect and again from {client_addr} with every
 	// MAIL FROM: a session the library made after a non-continue reply never
@@ -49,6 +54,7 @@ type inboundSession struct {
 	action  string // X-Rspamd-Action
 	result  string // X-Spamd-Result
 	seen    bool   // any verdict header of the filter
+	sig     string // X-SelfPost-Filter
 }
 
 func (s *inboundSession) Connect(host, family string, port uint16, addr net.IP, m *milter.Modifier) (milter.Response, error) {
@@ -73,10 +79,12 @@ func (s *inboundSession) RcptTo(rcpt string, m *milter.Modifier) (milter.Respons
 	return milter.RespContinue, nil
 }
 
-// Header keeps the first Subject and the filter's verdict. Postfix hands the
+// Header keeps the first Subject, the filter's verdict and its signature.
-// message to its milters one after another at end-of-message, each seeing what
+// Postfix hands the message to its milters one after another at
-// the one before added, which is how the filter's headers arrive here. The
+// end-of-message, each seeing what the one before added, which is how the
-// filter replaces headers of these names, so the last one read is its own.
+// filter's headers arrive here. The filter replaces headers of these names, so
+// the last one read is its own - when it is up. Whether it was is decided at
+// end-of-message, by the signature.
 func (s *inboundSession) Header(name, value string, m *milter.Modifier) (milter.Response, error) {
 	switch textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey(name) {
 	case "Subject":
@@ -84,21 +92,50 @@ func (s *inboundSession) Header(name, value string, m *milter.Modifier) (milter.
 			s.subject = mailhdr.DecodeSubject(value)
 		}
 	case "X-Rspamd-Action":
-		if s.filter {
+		s.action, s.seen = value, true
-			s.action, s.seen = value, true
-		}
 	case "X-Spamd-Result":
-		if s.filter {
+		s.result, s.seen = value, true
-			s.result, s.seen = value, true
+	case signatureHeader:
-		}
+		s.sig = strings.TrimSpace(value)
 	}
 	return milter.RespContinue, nil
 }
 
+// SignatureHeader is the header the filter signs a message in
+// (deploy/antispam/rspamd/milter_headers.conf writes it).
+const SignatureHeader = "X-SelfPost-Filter"
+
+var signatureHeader = textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey(SignatureHeader)
+
+// FilterSignature is what the filter writes into SignatureHeader for a message:
+// the HMAC-SHA256 of its queue id under the key SelfPost shares with the
+// filter, in hex. The key is used as the text it is stored as. A signature
+// fits one queue id, so the header going on to the upstream with the mail
+// gives nothing to whoever reads it there.
+func FilterSignature(key, queueID string) string {
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(key))
+	mac.Write([]byte(queueID))
+	return hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
+}
+
+// signed reports whether the message carries the filter's signature for its
+// queue id. No key, no queue id or no signature is "no".
+func (s *inboundSession) signed(queueID string) bool {
+	if s.key == "" || queueID == "" || s.sig == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	return hmac.Equal([]byte(strings.ToLower(s.sig)), []byte(FilterSignature(s.key, queueID)))
+}
+
 // Body fires at end-of-message: the message is about to be queued for its
 // upstream. "Continue" lets it through as "accept" would, and keeps this
 // session for the connection's next message.
 func (s *inboundSession) Body(m *milter.Modifier) (milter.Response, error) {
+	// The queue id is known only now, and with it whether the verdict headers
+	// read on the way here are the filter's.
+	if !s.signed(macro(m, "i")) {
+		s.seen = false
+	}
 	s.record()
 	s.reset()
 	return milter.RespContinue, nil
@@ -111,7 +148,7 @@ func (s *inboundSession) Abort(m *milter.Modifier) error {
 
 func (s *inboundSession) reset() {
 	s.from, s.rcpts, s.subject = "", nil, ""
-	s.action, s.result, s.seen = "", "", false
+	s.action, s.result, s.seen, s.sig = "", "", false, ""
 }
 
 // record writes one row per recipient at an inbound domain. Other recipients
@@ -169,9 +206,8 @@ var (
 // rspamdVerdict reduces the filter's headers to an action and a one-line
 // summary: the action, the score against the threshold, and the first few
 // symbols that carried weight. It reads only what it recognises - the headers
-// are the filter's when it is up, but the sender's own when it is not (it is
+// are read only next to the filter's signature, and even so nothing of them is
-// attached fail-open), so nothing of them is kept verbatim except through
+// kept verbatim except through these patterns.
-// these patterns.
 func rspamdVerdict(actionHeader, resultHeader string) (action, detail string) {
 	action = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(actionHeader))
 	for _, r := range action {
@@ -229,11 +265,12 @@ func rspamdVerdict(actionHeader, resultHeader string) (action, detail string) {
 }
 
 // ServeInbound runs the inbound journal milter on ln until ctx is cancelled.
-// filter says whether an external filter is attached in front of it
+// key is what the external filter in front of it signs messages with, or
-// (INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER). It returns nil on a clean shutdown.
+// empty when none is attached (INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER): no verdict is then
-func ServeInbound(ctx context.Context, ln net.Listener, rec InboundStore, filter bool) error {
+// read at all. It returns nil on a clean shutdown.
+func ServeInbound(ctx context.Context, ln net.Listener, rec InboundStore, key string) error {
 	srv := &milter.Server{
-		NewMilter: func() milter.Milter { return &inboundSession{rec: rec, filter: filter} },
+		NewMilter: func() milter.Milter { return &inboundSession{rec: rec, key: key} },
 		Actions:   0,                // read-only
 		Protocol:  milter.OptNoBody, // headers and end-of-message, not the body
 	}

internal/milter/inbound_test.go

@@ -60,9 +60,18 @@ func message(t *testing.T, s *inboundSession, from string, rcpts []string, heade
 	return resp
 }
 
+// testKey is the key the tests' filter signs with; the messages they replay
+// have the queue id ABC123.
+const testKey = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+
+var testSig = [2]string{SignatureHeader, FilterSignature(testKey, "ABC123")}
+
 func inboundSessionFor(t *testing.T, rec InboundStore, filter bool) *inboundSession {
 	t.Helper()
-	s := &inboundSession{rec: rec, filter: filter}
+	s := &inboundSession{rec: rec}
+	if filter {
+		s.key = testKey
+	}
 	if _, err := s.Connect("mx.example.net", "tcp4", 0, net.ParseIP("203.0.113.7"), mods(nil)); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("Connect: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -116,6 +125,7 @@ func TestInboundReadsTheFiltersVerdict(t *testing.T) {
 		{"Subject", "Cheap pills"},
 		{"X-Rspamd-Action", "add header"},
 		{"X-Spamd-Result", spamdResult},
+		testSig,
 	})
 	if len(rec.rows) != 1 {
 		t.Fatalf("rows = %+v", rec.rows)
@@ -133,7 +143,7 @@ func TestInboundQuarantineAction(t *testing.T) {
 	rec := &fakeInbound{domains: map[string]bool{"in.example.com": true}}
 	s := inboundSessionFor(t, rec, true)
 	message(t, s, "sender@example.net", []string{"a@in.example.com"},
-		[][2]string{{"x-rspamd-action", "quarantine"}})
+		[][2]string{{"x-rspamd-action", "quarantine"}, {"x-selfpost-filter", strings.ToUpper(testSig[1])}})
 	if len(rec.rows) != 1 || rec.rows[0].Decision != store.SpamDecisionQuarantine || rec.rows[0].Detail != "quarantine" {
 		t.Errorf("rows = %+v", rec.rows)
 	}
@@ -180,7 +190,7 @@ func TestInboundResetsBetweenMessages(t *testing.T) {
 	rec := &fakeInbound{domains: map[string]bool{"in.example.com": true}}
 	s := inboundSessionFor(t, rec, true)
 	message(t, s, "one@example.net", []string{"a@in.example.com"}, [][2]string{
-		{"Subject", "First"}, {"X-Rspamd-Action", "add header"},
+		{"Subject", "First"}, {"X-Rspamd-Action", "add header"}, testSig,
 	})
 	message(t, s, "two@example.net", []string{"b@in.example.com"}, nil)
 	if len(rec.rows) != 2 {
@@ -259,7 +269,7 @@ func TestInboundClientAddressFromTheMailMacro(t *testing.T) {
 // cost it its session.
 func TestInboundOnlyEverContinues(t *testing.T) {
 	rec := &fakeInbound{domains: map[string]bool{"in.example.com": true}}
-	s := &inboundSession{rec: rec, filter: true}
+	s := &inboundSession{rec: rec, key: testKey}
 	check := func(stage string, resp milter.Response, err error) {
 		t.Helper()
 		if err != nil || resp != milter.RespContinue {
@@ -277,3 +287,64 @@ func TestInboundOnlyEverContinues(t *testing.T) {
 	resp, err = s.Body(mods(nil))
 	check("end of message", resp, err)
 }
+
+// The filter is attached so that mail flows when it is down, and then the
+// verdict headers of a message are its sender's own. A verdict is recorded only
+// next to the filter's signature for this message's queue id.
+func TestInboundReadsAVerdictOnlyWithTheFiltersSignature(t *testing.T) {
+	verdict := [][2]string{{"X-Rspamd-Action", "quarantine"}, {"X-Spamd-Result", spamdResult}}
+	for name, c := range map[string]struct {
+		extra  [][2]string
+		signed bool
+	}{
+		"signed":                            {[][2]string{testSig}, true},
+		"no signature":                      {nil, false},
+		"a made-up signature":               {[][2]string{{SignatureHeader, strings.Repeat("ab", 32)}}, false},
+		"another message's signature":       {[][2]string{{SignatureHeader, FilterSignature(testKey, "OTHER1")}}, false},
+		"a signature under another key":     {[][2]string{{SignatureHeader, FilterSignature(strings.Repeat("f", 64), "ABC123")}}, false},
+		"the sender's first, then the real": {[][2]string{{SignatureHeader, "forged"}, testSig}, true},
+	} {
+		rec := &fakeInbound{domains: map[string]bool{"in.example.com": true}}
+		s := inboundSessionFor(t, rec, true)
+		message(t, s, "sender@example.net", []string{"a@in.example.com"}, append(append([][2]string{}, verdict...), c.extra...))
+		if len(rec.rows) != 1 {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: rows = %+v", name, rec.rows)
+		}
+		got := rec.rows[0]
+		if c.signed && (got.Engine != store.SpamEngineRspamd || got.Decision != store.SpamDecisionQuarantine) {
+			t.Errorf("%s: a signed verdict was not read: %+v", name, got)
+		}
+		if !c.signed && (got.Engine != store.SpamEngineSelfPost || got.Decision != store.SpamDecisionAccept || got.Detail != "") {
+			t.Errorf("%s: an unsigned verdict was recorded: %+v", name, got)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// A signature is of no use to the next message on the connection.
+	rec := &fakeInbound{domains: map[string]bool{"in.example.com": true}}
+	s := inboundSessionFor(t, rec, true)
+	message(t, s, "one@example.net", []string{"a@in.example.com"}, append(append([][2]string{}, verdict...), testSig))
+	message(t, s, "two@example.net", []string{"a@in.example.com"}, verdict)
+	if len(rec.rows) != 2 || rec.rows[1].Engine != store.SpamEngineSelfPost {
+		t.Errorf("rows = %+v", rec.rows)
+	}
+
+	// With no queue id nothing can be checked, so nothing is trusted.
+	rec = &fakeInbound{domains: map[string]bool{"in.example.com": true}}
+	s = inboundSessionFor(t, rec, true)
+	_, _ = s.MailFrom("sender@example.net", mods(nil))
+	_, _ = s.RcptTo("a@in.example.com", mods(nil))
+	_, _ = s.Header("X-Rspamd-Action", "reject", mods(nil))
+	_, _ = s.Header(SignatureHeader, FilterSignature(testKey, ""), mods(nil))
+	_, _ = s.Body(mods(nil))
+	if len(rec.rows) != 1 || rec.rows[0].Engine != store.SpamEngineSelfPost {
+		t.Errorf("no queue id: rows = %+v", rec.rows)
+	}
+}
+
+// What rspamd 3.11 wrote for this key and queue id in a throwaway container
+// (dev trial, 2026-10-12): the two ends must compute the same thing.
+func TestFilterSignatureIsWhatTheFilterWrites(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := FilterSignature(testKey, "4A1B2C3D5E"); got != "2aa1ca6dd1545d3f16c8c0c29ba59bfc28c050224ac2c5c953bd2617f73b6de2" {
+		t.Errorf("FilterSignature = %s", got)
+	}
+}

test/e2e/port25_features_test.go

@@ -283,6 +283,13 @@ func testInboundRelay(t *testing.T, sc *scenario) {
 	}
 
 	// The inbound journal milter saw it go through, and the Inbound log shows it.
+	// Beside the maps, the key the filter signs each message with: there from
+	// the first start with the relay on, whether or not a filter is attached
+	// yet, one line of 64 hex characters, readable by the filter.
+	if key, err := h.execIn("selfpost", "stat", "-c", "%a %s", "/data/antispam/filter.key"); err != nil || strings.TrimSpace(key) != "644 65" {
+		t.Fatalf("/data/antispam/filter.key: %q, %v; want mode 644 and 65 bytes", key, err)
+	}
+
 	// No filter is attached on the stand: the row is an accept by nobody, so its
 	// reason is the engine alone.
 	logRows := func(want string) []string {