test: cover the auth, sign-in and RBAC surfaces P0 shipped through (P4)
test / test (push) Has been cancelled
test / test (push) Has been cancelled
- internal/web/auth/ratelimit_test.go: the login/setup limiter's ceiling, per-address scope, window reset and the sweep that keeps finished buckets out of memory. - internal/web/auth/handlers_test.go: sign-in (session issued, refusals that do not reveal which usernames exist, a lockout a correct password cannot bypass, the setup hint before the first administrator) and the one-time setup link (creates the first global administrator and then closes, rejects a wrong or expired token, refuses credentials the panel would not accept later, rate-limited). - internal/web/handlers/authz_test.go: every global-only route answers a domain administrator — and a request with no principal — with 404, with a positive control so the table cannot pass on a handler that always 404s. This is the check that would have caught the send-log leak. - test/e2e: CoreDNS pinned to 1.14.6 instead of latest; the level-1 failure message quoted RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGES_PER_IP=5 while the stand sets 50. docs/plans/code-review.md P4 checked off except the optional backup-boot test; CHANGELOG updated. No production code changed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
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@@ -219,5 +219,5 @@ func testLevel1RateLimit(t *testing.T, sc *scenario) {
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return
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}
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}
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t.Fatalf("level-1 rate limit (RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGES_PER_IP=5) never tripped after %d sends", maxAttempts)
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t.Fatalf("level-1 rate limit (RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGES_PER_IP=50) never tripped after %d sends", maxAttempts)
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}
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