findings of the security review of stage 0

The review of 2c27275..2c8e981 (read-only, a separate agent) found no high
or medium; three small ones, fixed here:

- reauth took a limiter attempt before the compare, right password
  included: with A2 asking on every user save, ten saves in fifteen
  minutes locked the administrator out of Account's password change, the
  backup and the export. A right password now gives its attempt back
  (rateLimiter.Refund, Module.PasswordCheckPassed; a bucket already at its
  limit stays blocked). TestRightAccountPasswordsDoNotUseUpTheLimit.
- LoggedPath hid the tokens of /login/reset/ and /confirm/ but not of the
  first administrator's /setup/<token>; now it does (test case added).
- The entrypoint's own `[ -e ] || : >` lines (sender_login_maps, the four
  inbound maps, mail.log) get the `[ -L ]` guard postfix-config.sh got for
  I2. Safe before too - drop_links runs first on those paths and the panel
  is not running yet - this is the belt and braces.

The review also confirmed, with a probe of the regex against Postfix's
formats, that a port-25 client can place only its own envelope in an
Inbound log row, and that every path to a password, e-mail or role asks
for the signed-in password.

go test ./internal/web/handlers ./internal/web/auth; sh -n entrypoint.sh.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/security.md

@@ -503,7 +503,10 @@ operator can act on it.
   user and when a save sets a password, changes the e-mail (where reset
   links go) or changes the role - the signed-in user's own account included -
   and deleting a user asks for it too. A save of the name and the domain
-  assignments alone is not asked: neither reaches an account's secret.
+  assignments alone is not asked: neither reaches an account's secret. Only
+  wrong passwords count against the limiter; a right one gives its attempt
+  back, so an administrator adding users is not locked out of the next
+  backup.
 - Both files are secrets: a full backup carries DKIM keys, `sasldb2`, the
   panel users' password hashes, `docker-compose.yml`, `.env`, and the TLS
   private key from `certs/` when present; a domain export carries the DKIM key