findings of the security review of stage 0

The review of 2c27275..2c8e981 (read-only, a separate agent) found no high
or medium; three small ones, fixed here:

- reauth took a limiter attempt before the compare, right password
  included: with A2 asking on every user save, ten saves in fifteen
  minutes locked the administrator out of Account's password change, the
  backup and the export. A right password now gives its attempt back
  (rateLimiter.Refund, Module.PasswordCheckPassed; a bucket already at its
  limit stays blocked). TestRightAccountPasswordsDoNotUseUpTheLimit.
- LoggedPath hid the tokens of /login/reset/ and /confirm/ but not of the
  first administrator's /setup/<token>; now it does (test case added).
- The entrypoint's own `[ -e ] || : >` lines (sender_login_maps, the four
  inbound maps, mail.log) get the `[ -L ]` guard postfix-config.sh got for
  I2. Safe before too - drop_links runs first on those paths and the panel
  is not running yet - this is the belt and braces.

The review also confirmed, with a probe of the regex against Postfix's
formats, that a port-25 client can place only its own envelope in an
Inbound log row, and that every path to a password, e-mail or role asks
for the signed-in password.

go test ./internal/web/handlers ./internal/web/auth; sh -n entrypoint.sh.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

internal/web/auth/links.go

@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ func loginInfo(r *http.Request) string {
 // Every log line that names a request's path goes through it: the origin
 // check's refusal and the duplicate-cookie line (audit 2026-10-17, A4).
 func LoggedPath(p string) string {
-	for _, prefix := range []string{"/login/reset/", "/confirm/"} {
+	for _, prefix := range []string{"/login/reset/", "/confirm/", "/setup/"} {
 		if strings.HasPrefix(p, prefix) && len(p) > len(prefix) {
 			return prefix + "…"
 		}