findings of the security review of stage 0

The review of 2c27275..2c8e981 (read-only, a separate agent) found no high
or medium; three small ones, fixed here:

- reauth took a limiter attempt before the compare, right password
  included: with A2 asking on every user save, ten saves in fifteen
  minutes locked the administrator out of Account's password change, the
  backup and the export. A right password now gives its attempt back
  (rateLimiter.Refund, Module.PasswordCheckPassed; a bucket already at its
  limit stays blocked). TestRightAccountPasswordsDoNotUseUpTheLimit.
- LoggedPath hid the tokens of /login/reset/ and /confirm/ but not of the
  first administrator's /setup/<token>; now it does (test case added).
- The entrypoint's own `[ -e ] || : >` lines (sender_login_maps, the four
  inbound maps, mail.log) get the `[ -L ]` guard postfix-config.sh got for
  I2. Safe before too - drop_links runs first on those paths and the panel
  is not running yet - this is the belt and braces.

The review also confirmed, with a probe of the regex against Postfix's
formats, that a port-25 client can place only its own envelope in an
Inbound log row, and that every path to a password, e-mail or role asks
for the signed-in password.

go test ./internal/web/handlers ./internal/web/auth; sh -n entrypoint.sh.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

internal/web/auth/ratelimit.go

@@ -74,6 +74,17 @@ func (r *rateLimiter) Allow(key string) bool {
 	return true
 }
 
+// Refund gives back the attempt Allow took for key, for an attempt that
+// turned out not to be a guess (a right password). A bucket already at its
+// limit stays there: a refund never unblocks.
+func (r *rateLimiter) Refund(key string) {
+	r.mu.Lock()
+	defer r.mu.Unlock()
+	if b := r.buckets[key]; b != nil && b.count > 0 && b.count < r.max {
+		b.count--
+	}
+}
+
 func (r *rateLimiter) makeRoom(now time.Time) {
 	if r.maxBuckets <= 0 || len(r.buckets) < r.maxBuckets {
 		return