Layers often upload successfully; the final manifest push fails with
unknown blob. Retry docker push and imagetools create a few times with
backoff so the same local image can land without retagging.
Co-Authored-By: Composer <noreply@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Pin compose and local trial to ghcr.io/mixeme/selfpost:1.0.0, close the
CHANGELOG cut, and retire implementation-plan / v1.x-closure-plan.
Includes the post-cut startup fixes needed for a green release e2e gate:
root-owned TLS copies for postfix check, maillog_file_prefixes for /data,
hostname gate and traversable /data, panel /healthz before setup, and
setup-token / TempDir reclaim via docker exec.
Co-Authored-By: Composer <noreply@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Fix setup URL shape, import encryption UI, architecture layering/routes,
and stale plan/roadmap pointers so the prose matches what the tree does.
Co-Authored-By: Composer <noreply@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Fold documentation-plan and progress into development.md, drop docs/archive,
retarget live links, and point README plus agent-rules at the new home.
Co-Authored-By: Composer <noreply@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Move the delivery log from the ephemeral /var/log to /data/log/mail.log so
the lines that resolve a queued send-log row survive a container recreate.
postlogd writes it as postfix, the panel reads it through the selfpost group
(dir 2750, file 0640, normalised every start); backups exclude log/.
Close the residual gap with a queue sweep: rows queued for over two minutes
whose id postqueue -p no longer lists are marked bounced. The sweep waits
until the tailer has read the log to its end and does nothing when the queue
cannot be listed, so a message in flight is never touched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Replace fixed 5 s hx-trigger polling with data-poll markers and panel.js
scheduling: 5 s while active, 30 s when idle, none when tab is hidden.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
development.md and agent-rules.mdc in English; progress.md and roadmap.md stay Russian as internal docs.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
The lines came out as one block of preformatted text, which is what the
system log page does with a tail of mail.log — right there, where the
lines are unrelated to each other and the block is the log itself. Here
they are one message's six or seven lines, and what is read off them is
the pace: the second between the connection and the banner, the ten
between DATA and the reply. Run together, every line began with a
different-width stamp and none of those numbers lined up.
So they are two columns now, when and what, the same shape the send log
itself has. logtail.SplitTimestamp takes the stamp off the head of a
line: postlogd's format, which is what this server writes, and syslog's
traditional one for a deployment that routes the log through syslogd
instead. The stamp loses its microseconds and its offset — five decimal
places are the widest part of the column and the least worth reading —
but is not converted, so the page shows the log's own wall clock rather
than a claim about which zone it was in.
A line whose head is not a stamp either parser recognises keeps its whole
text in the second column and leaves the first empty. The format is the
log's, not ours; a line we cannot split is a line we must not drop, and
the test says so.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The delivery page was a list of the fields the send-log table has no
column for, stacked one per line down the reading measure. Six values of
a few characters each — domain, application, queue id, journal id and two
timestamps — came to a page of mostly empty rows, and none of them
answered the question the log raises when a row is opened: what actually
happened to this message.
So the page states that instead. The subject heads it and the sender,
recipient and outcome are the line under it, which puts what the message
was and how it ended on the first line. Below, two columns: what the
journal recorded on the left, as a grid of tiles rather than a stack, and
on the right the two timestamps stated as the steps they stand for —
accepted and queued, then delivered, deferred, bounced, or refused before
queueing. Each step carries its status in the panel's own
ok/warn/error/unknown vocabulary, so a colour means here what it means on
the status page. A message still queued shows the report it is waiting
for as a step that has not happened, rather than dating it with the
moment the row was written.
Under both, at full width, the mail.log lines for the message's queue id.
The queue id was printed on this page as something to go and search the
system log for by hand; logtail.QueueLines does that search. It scans a
bounded tail of the current file — finding one message's lines means
reading rather than seeking — and anchors the match on the character
before the id, since queue ids are hexadecimal runs and a shorter one is
regularly the tail of a longer one. Send-log rows outlive mail.log
(retention ninety days, rotation fourteen files), so a message with
nothing left to show says so; that is the normal end state, not a fault,
and only a log that cannot be read at all is reported as one.
Two cards abreast and a block of raw log lines do not fit the reading
measure, so the page now declares itself wide — the opposite of what it
did when the column width was unified, where it was the page that stayed
prose. The mechanism is unchanged and is why the reversal costs one line:
how wide a page needs to be is the page's own property, not the
navigation entry's.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Everything under Unreleased goes out as 0.6.0: the per-delivery page, the
DNS badge in the domain list, the machine metrics card, the section index,
the navigation column, and the layout, brand and import-form changes.
Added entries, hence a minor bump.
The import form reading the file extension instead of an "is it encrypted"
checkbox was never written down; it is added under Changed, together with
the follow-up that keeps the field hidden while no file is chosen.
The heading is the version: there is no constant in the tree, only the
VERSION build arg that ldflags stamps into internal/buildinfo.Version, so
the image this deploys under is tagged from here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The page column was the 48rem reading measure, which the send log, the mail
queue and the system log widened to 64rem for their tables. The navigation and
the page are centred as a pair, so that difference did not only change the
page's width: it moved the navigation column and the left edge of every card
on the way between two pages. The column is now 64rem throughout and the
measure lives inside it — a page's heading, cards, back link and version footer
are held to 48rem and centred in the column, and the pages made of data opt out
and take the column whole.
Which pages those are is declared by the page (a "wide" block in its template,
the same mechanism as the section index) rather than derived from the
navigation entry: .Active cannot tell the send log from a single delivery's
page, which is prose and now keeps the measure instead of inheriting the log's
width.
Two rules follow from centring the children rather than the cards. The heading
takes its margins as longhands, since the shorthand re-zeroed the auto side
margins and pinned it a measure's width left of the card under it; and the back
link is a block, since auto margins centre a block and do nothing for an
inline-block.
The scrollbar's width is reserved on every page as well. Without it a short
page and a long one are laid out in viewports differing by that width, which
moved the same things again, in the same direction, for a second reason.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The tab icon carries the initials rather than the two-line wordmark
because the wordmark stops resolving below 32px, but it kept the
wordmark's weights, and those do not survive the size either. The S is
ExtraLight against the P's SemiBold: a 0.90 stem against 3.40, which at
16px is a quarter of a pixel against most of one. The pair rasterised to
a P with a smudge beside it, the S reaching no solid pixel at all at 16
or 32.
It is Medium now. That gives up the Self/Post weight play inside this
one variant, which is the right trade: the contrast needs more pixels
than the variant exists to work in, and the variants big enough to carry
it keep it.
The outlines come from IBM Plex Sans as before, at the same font-size
26, letter-spacing -1 and baseline — only the S's weight moved, and the
pair re-centres on its advances the way live text would, which shifts
the P 0.57 right. The reconstruction was checked by regenerating the
committed ExtraLight/SemiBold outlines from the same pipeline first;
they came back identical, so the new S is the font's, not a thickened
copy of the old one. A stroke was tried before the font was to hand and
is not what shipped: it thickens uniformly, where Medium is modulated at
the joins and keeps the apertures open, which is visible by 64px.
favicon.png is regenerated from the same source. Its border is unchanged
to the pixel and its alpha to the count; only the lettering moved.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
SELF-HOSTED SMTP RELAY was set at font-size 7.2 with letter-spacing 2.8 —
a cap height of 5.2 in a 330-unit artwork, which puts its stems at about
half a device pixel where the mark is actually used. More than half the
line's ink came out as antialiasing: measured against the brown, the
typical tagline pixel reached 2.1:1 where the two colours are worth
7.3:1, and at 330px not one pixel reached full strength. The wordmark
above it renders 66% of its pixels solid.
It is now 11.5/0.15. The line keeps its footprint (154 units against
153) and its monospaced cells, fitted from the grid the outlines were
generated on; the width the tracking was spending went to the glyphs
instead, taking cap height to 8.3. Mean ink coverage goes 0.39 to 0.60
at the README's width and 0.33 to 0.47 at the 330px the login and setup
pages use.
opacity=".78" is gone with it. It cost 30% of the available contrast to
mark the line as secondary, which a 3.4:1 difference in size already
does, and it was multiplying the alpha of stems that were mostly alpha
to begin with.
A stroke to thicken the stems was measured and rejected: at 0.12-0.30 it
lifted mean coverage 0.59 to 0.63 while dropping the share of solid
pixels, since it adds antialiased edges rather than filling stems.
internal/web/static/logo.svg is a byte copy of the docs asset and stays
one. selfpost-proof.html carries the lockup as live text and is where
the metrics come from, so it moves too, or the next regeneration would
put the old spec back.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two scrapes had drifted from the pages they read, and the suite has not
been run since either page changed.
applicationID still looked for an application as a table row
(<td class="code">login</td> ... /applications/N/mode). Applications became
a list of blocks in d35b309, so the lookup had been failing for several
commits, including the one currently deployed — this is stale test, not a
regression. It now anchors on the login heading and takes the id from the
first action posted under it, whichever that is, so reordering a block's
controls will not break it again.
The level-2 rate-limit check looked for the application's login among the
send-log rows. 997af18 took that column off the log — the log identifies a
message and names the application only on a row's own page — so the check
now filters the log by application instead. That is the same attribution
through a server-side WHERE app_login rather than a substring match on
rendered HTML.
Verified on selfpost.example.com: make e2e green, all subtests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Markdown's image syntax carries neither alignment nor size, so the stamp
rendered flush left at its intrinsic 330px. A centred `<p>` with an
`<img width>` is the usual way around that on GitHub, and survives its
HTML sanitiser.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The delivery log now lists what identifies a message and nothing else —
time, sender, recipient, subject, status — and links each row to
/deliveries/{id}, which carries the rest: the sending domain, the
application it was submitted under, the Postfix queue id to search the
system log for, and when the status was last reported. Domain and
application were a column each; they were the widest thing in the table
after the addresses and repeat down every filtered page, and they remain
the log's two filters. Back returns to the page and filters the row was
opened from, rebuilt from the log's own parameters only.
Subjects are now decoded for display as well as on the way in. The milter
has decoded them since d35b309, but the rows it wrote before that still
hold the raw =?utf-8?Q?...?= header, and those are the ones an operator is
most likely to still be reading. The decoder moves to internal/mailhdr,
shared by the milter and the panel; it is idempotent, so a row decoded
once passes through unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The list gave no hint which domains still needed records published — the
verdict lived only on the domain page, one click away per domain. Each row
now carries a badge with the worst of that domain's DKIM, SPF and DMARC
checks, in the panel's shared ok/warn/error/unknown vocabulary, linking to
that domain's DNS status card.
The checks run concurrently across the listed domains: each carries its own
timeout, so in series a dead resolver would multiply that wait by the number
of domains and the list would look hung. They share the checker's cache with
the domain page, so a repeat view costs no lookups and opening a domain
after the list is free.
A domain whose DKIM key cannot be read stays "unknown" rather than being
reported as misconfigured — the missing half of the comparison is this
server's, not the domain's.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The mark kept the 110px it had as part of the bar, which was all there was
room for in a row; in a column it ended halfway across, sharing an edge with
nothing below it. At the column's width its edges line up with the page
entries, and the SVG's own inset puts the drawn mark on the entries' icons.
The width/height attributes carry the file's real proportions so the column
still reserves the right height before the SVG loads.
Where the column lies back down into a bar, the mark returns to the compact
size: at full width it would take a row to itself above the entries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mode and rate limit were <details>, so each opened where its own toggle sat
and split the row of four controls in two, pushing New password and Delete
below a block of fields. The toggle is now a hidden checkbox with its label
drawn as the button and the panel is the last child of the row, so the
controls keep their places and the fields are laid out beneath all of them.
Pure CSS, so it still works with JavaScript blocked, as the disclosure did.
The panel buttons take back the form spacing the compact row style zeroes
out, and Save limit and Remove limit share one row: two posts mean two
forms, so the first button is bound to its form by the form attribute
instead of sitting inside it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The field was revealed whenever no file was selected, so the import card
opened asking for a password it had no use for yet. Hide it in that case
too; an unrecognised extension still reveals it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The import form used to ask users to tick "the file is encrypted" before
showing the password field, even though the server already decides purely
from the envelope magic bytes. Reveal the password field automatically for
a .spde file (hide it for .json) so the checkbox is no longer needed.
The navigation was a bar across the top that did not fit on one row — six page
entries and the session block against the panel's width — and had to be split
into two, costing the top of every page. It is now a column down the left edge:
one left edge to scan, the current entry marked down its leading edge, sticky so
it stays in view, and room under the entries for the current page's own
sections. Below the width the two columns need it lies back down into the same
wrapping rows as before; six entries need no drawer.
The section index is for the two pages long enough to need one — the domain page
(nine cards) and the status page (eight). Each card carries an id and the page's
template defines the list by overriding an empty "sections" block in the layout,
so a page that defines nothing renders no index. panel.js marks the section in
view, looking targets up by id on each pass so the status page swapping its
cards out every five seconds cannot leave it measuring boxes that have left the
document; the links themselves are plain fragment links and need no script.
Verified against the real pages rendered by a local panel at 1300px, 924px and
481px wide.
The status page answered "are the components running" but said nothing
about the machine underneath them, so a server slowed to a crawl by a
busy processor or one about to have Postfix OOM-killed looked entirely
healthy until the queue backed up.
internal/health/machine.go reads the kernel's counters in /proc: the
aggregate processor times and core count from /proc/stat, the load
average from /proc/loadavg, memory and swap from /proc/meminfo, and
per-interface byte counters from /proc/net/dev.
CPU busy time and network throughput are rates, so a MachineSampler holds
the previous reading and each call reports the difference — one shared
sampler on the Server, since a per-request one would never have anything
to subtract. A window longer than a minute only re-baselines: a page
opened after the panel sat idle would otherwise average that whole
stretch and present it as the current load.
Memory is derived from MemAvailable rather than MemFree, because Linux
spends every spare page on cache and MemFree would report a permanent
emergency. A fully busy processor (>=90%) warns and an exhausted machine
(>=97%) errors, both counting towards the page's headline verdict, since
either delays or kills the mail path. Throughput has no comparable
threshold — what counts as a lot depends on the link — so it is reported
and never graded. Loopback is excluded: that traffic is the container
talking to itself.
Like every other check here, an unreadable counter degrades to "unknown"
with an explanation instead of failing the page, so the panel still runs
outside Linux for development.
The usage bars are <meter> elements. The panel's CSP has no inline-style
exemption, so a bar's length has to travel on an attribute; the element
also grades its own colour from low/high/optimum, and the percentage is
printed beside it for anything that does not render meters.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Everything under Unreleased goes out as 0.5.0: the log-tailer bounce
mis-parse and offset-persistence fixes, the L2 rate-limit in-flight
accounting, the GitHub-only module path move, the code-review.md
retirement, the pre-release security pass (saslpasswd2 argv hardening),
and optional password encryption for backup/domain-export (Added, hence
a minor bump).
The heading is the version: there is no constant in the tree, only the
VERSION build arg that ldflags stamps into internal/buildinfo.Version,
so the image this deploys under is tagged from here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The review's plan is finished — phase 0 (bar the two release-commit steps),
1, 1.5, 2 and 3 are all closed — and what remained in the document was a second
copy of things that already live in architecture.md, security.md, roadmap.md or
the code comments: the GUI compromise table is in panel.css/panel.js/
middleware.go/handlers_auth.go, the single SQLite connection and the dual
cookie names are explained where they are implemented, the accepted gaps are in
security.md, and the model-routing table names progress.md and development.md
as its own source. A second copy of a fact is a place for it to go stale.
Four items were genuinely open and had no other home, so they moved to
roadmap.md rather than disappearing:
- splitting internal/web into subpackages (2.x) — with the reason to wait: the
flat package still reads at 47 files, and both 2.x features grow it, so the
cut is worth making before that growth, not now;
- a consolidated documentation index in the README (v1.x tail);
- the adaptive polling interval for a tab that is visible but idle — the hidden
case is already handled, and the remainder is explicitly allowed to end as
"decided not to";
- CONTRIBUTING.md, already moved to 2.x in the previous commit.
References retargeted: progress.md (7), roadmap.md (5), implementation-plan.md
(1). The CHANGELOG entries that cite the document are left as written — they
describe what happened at the time. The review text stays in git history at
aaf0711.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codeberg is being retired as the project's public site, so every reference now
points at GitHub. That includes the Go module path (codeberg.org/mix/selfpost →
github.com/mixeme/selfpost): leaving an import path on a host that is going
away would break `go get` and `go install`, so this is not only a docs change.
Touches go.mod, test/e2e/go.mod, all imports, Makefile MODULE, the -ldflags
version stamp in build/Dockerfile and docs/development.md, the licence headers
in the SVG/HTML assets, and README (no more primary/mirror pair).
Comments no longer cite the archived specification. "spec 7.6.1", "spec 5.1"
and friends pointed into docs/archive/specification-v1.0.md, which is marked as
not a source of truth; each is now a reference to the live document that owns
the subject — architecture.md (with section), product.md, security.md or the
README. The review only asked for the 7.x refs (code-review.md § 4), but 4/5/6/
8/9 had the same defect, so they went too. Comments only, no behaviour change.
Also closes the remaining review items: architecture.md gained a Code layers
section with the layer diagram (A2), and TestParseDelivery gained the exotic
mail.log cases (§ 3).
Fixes a bug that last test found: the delivery-line pattern matched status=
greedily, taking the *last* occurrence on the line. Postfix appends the remote
server's reply verbatim, so a rejection whose reply quoted "status=sent" was
filed as a delivered message in the send log. It now takes the first status=
after the recipient, which is the real field.
R7 (CONTRIBUTING.md) moved to roadmap 2.x — one developer, no external PR flow,
so the file would have no audience yet. R1 (compose image tag) and the git tag
stay in roadmap § v1.x as the release-commit steps.
gofmt/go vet clean on both modules; go test ./... green except the three known
Windows-only failures (file perms, backslash paths, renaming an open file).
Not exercised on the dev server — no Docker locally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- logtail: persist the read position (offset + fingerprint of the log's
first 512 bytes) in a new logtail_state table (migration 0003) and
resume from it on start, so delivery lines written while the panel was
down are parsed instead of skipped and their send-log rows no longer
stay "queued" forever. Fingerprint mismatch (rotated/recreated while
down) reads the file from the start — re-parsing is idempotent; a
first-ever start with nothing stored still begins at end-of-file.
Writes are throttled to one per 5s, forced on rotation and shutdown.
- milter: count messages that passed the level-2 check but have not
reached the send log yet (internal/milter/inflight.go), so concurrent
SMTP sessions cannot each spend the same last slot. A literal
count+insert transaction, as the review suggested, is not possible:
the count happens at MAIL FROM and the insert at end-of-message.
Reservations are released after the insert, on ABORT, and after a
10-minute TTL — a client that drops mid-transaction must not be able
to hold a slot, since the limiter is fail-open by design.
Docs: architecture.md (log tailer, persistence, L2 counting),
security.md and roadmap.md (restart gap closed, container recreate
remains), CHANGELOG, progress.md, code-review.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- panel.js: skip HTMX polling requests while the tab is hidden, via
htmx:beforeRequest rather than htmx's eval-based trigger filter (the
panel's CSP allows no unsafe-eval).
- panel.css: replace all dark-mode !important overrides with CSS custom
properties reassigned once under prefers-color-scheme: dark.
- panel.css: consolidate the duplicate main{max-width} rule.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both secret-bearing downloads can now be sealed with a password. Unticked, the
forms produce exactly the files they did before.
- internal/secretfile: envelope format — magic/type/scrypt params/salt/nonce
prefix header, then 64 KiB AES-256-GCM chunks each authenticated with the
header, its counter and an end-of-stream flag, so truncation, reordering and
tampering fail to open instead of restoring a plausible prefix. Streams both
ways, so a full backup never sits in memory.
- Panel: "Encrypt with a password" checkbox on the full-backup and
domain-export forms (shared partial, toggled from panel.js — no inline
script); domain import detects an encrypted export by magic bytes, not by
extension, and asks for the password.
- selfpost-backup: writes .spbk when given a password and converts one back
with -decrypt, which a restore needs. The password comes from
SELFPOST_BACKUP_PASSWORD or -password-file, never argv.
- Docs: README, security.md (+ accepted risk: encryption stays opt-in),
architecture.md, progress.md, CHANGELOG.
Verified locally: panel-encrypted archive decrypts through the CLI and unpacks;
wrong password and password mismatch are refused; UI checked in a browser.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Removes ~30 stale "Phase N" / historical-staging comment references from
code and shell scripts now that v1.0 is done; fixes a stale dashboard
comment claiming applications/send-log were unimplemented; adds a CSRF ADR
to security.md documenting the Origin-check-over-tokens decision; resolves
docs/logo in roadmap.md (directory doesn't exist, criterion already met);
adds a gofmt -l check to CI so unformatted Go fails the build.
The known-limitations write-up for the log-tailer offset gap (the other
Phase 1 item) was already present in architecture.md § Log tailer, so no
change was needed there.
gofmt/go vet/go test clean on both Go modules (main + test/e2e), verified
on the dev server.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The document is closed: no unique content remains — § D (pre-release
security review) is duplicated in progress.md, security.md and the
CHANGELOG, and B.1-B.3/C.4 were trimmed in 60addd5. It stays until the
tag only because it describes the release gate.
Record the retirement as a v1.x tail item in roadmap.md with the
concrete steps: archive the file and retarget its references, including
the stale "plan C.4" pointers in Makefile, release.yml and the e2e test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fable review of the full diff from the v1.0 audit (Phase 11, 65a420d) to
HEAD plus a complete pass over the docs/security.md checklist (former spec
7.6). No exploitable findings. One defence-in-depth fix: the application
login is passed to saslpasswd2 behind a -- end-of-options marker so a
login starting with - can never be parsed as a flag. Accepted risks
unchanged; plan § D closed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Update code-review with phase 1.5 (optional .spbk/.spde encryption, checkbox UI). Remove session resurrection from backup as an accepted risk in security.md.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Record comprehensive code review in docs/code-review.md covering architecture, quality, documentation, GUI, legacy, and risks. Link from implementation-plan and progress; update CHANGELOG.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Mark D1-D9 complete in a slim maintenance documentation-plan; defer
Codeberg Quick start, compose tag bump, and docs/logo to roadmap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add Docker HEALTHCHECK and mail-path /healthz liveness; env-doc regression
test; architecture.md and development.md; product.md and expanded security.md;
retire live specification.md to docs/archive/.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <claude-opus-5-thinking-high@noreply@anthropic.com>
Document stopped-container tar backup with WAL warning and manifest
consumption; refresh status banner and port-587 note; align
implementation-plan B.1 with actual session behaviour on password change.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Close documentation-plan findings 1-3 and part of 10: panel operations
guide, two-level rate limits, public env table with TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR
warning, and compose wiring for the proxy CIDR variable.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
After the documentation pass, specification.md moves to archive once its content lives in product, architecture, development, and security docs.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Records the decision to add these two docs (out of ТЗ scope but needed
so project structure and the dev loop don't live only in memory/context),
with a new D8 task and non-blocking release-gate note.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Keeps implementation-plan.md focused on unresolved v1.0/v1.x questions;
inbound relay (Phase O1) and the domain-admin role now live in
docs/roadmap.md, cross-linked from progress.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Everything under Unreleased goes out as 0.4.0: the mark now in use on the
README and in the panel (an addition, so a minor bump rather than a patch),
the signed-out pages' column width, the monitoring pages' width, and the
Deliveries subject/table-overflow fixes.
The heading is the version: there is no constant in the tree, only the VERSION
build arg that ldflags stamps into internal/buildinfo.Version, so the image
this deploys under is tagged from here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The stamp existed as files and appeared nowhere. It now opens the README, sits
at the left of the panel's navigation bar in its compact form, and stands above
the card on the two pages that carry no navigation — sign-in and first-run setup,
where it is the only thing telling an administrator which service just asked
them for a password. The tab icon moves to the stamp's small-size variant, so
the tab, the panel and the README stop being two different identities; the
earlier envelope drawing stays in docs/assets/icon.png, unreferenced.
The panel serves its own copies under internal/web/static/ because go:embed
cannot reach outside the package; the proof sheet says which file feeds which
slot. favicon.png is regenerated from the same icon at 32x32 for browsers with
no SVG favicon support, and is declared before the SVG so those that do take
the vector.
Sign-in and setup also get a column the width of their own card. Both are a
single .card.narrow, which centres itself while the heading above it stays at
the panel's left edge — with the mark added that would have been three
alignments on a page with four elements.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The four brand files were authored with live <text> set in IBM Plex Sans, and
the proof sheet closed on that being the one thing still to do before they were
used anywhere. It matters more than it sounds: the mark *is* the weight contrast
between Self at 200 and Post at 600, and a machine without Plex resolves neither
weight — browsers synthesise bold but never light, so the two words come out the
same and the wordmark stops being one. Almost no viewer has the font installed.
Laid out from the font's own metrics the way a browser would (advance widths
from hmtx, CSS letter-spacing after every character including the last, the
anchor centred on the result) and emitted as one path per text element, so the
files now render as drawn with no font installed at all. The note at the foot of
the proof sheet records that, and its file list is corrected to docs/assets/,
where these have lived since they were added.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The change itself landed in d35b309, which swept up an unrelated tree while
the layout work was still in progress, so its message says nothing about
Applications. Splitting that commit would mean rewriting a branch already
pushed to origin; the entry here stands in for it instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
48rem is a reading measure, right for the panel's forms and prose and the width
the nav bar's two rows were sized for. Deliveries, Mail queue and System log
hold data instead: seven columns of send-log, and mail.log lines that are long
by nature. They get 64rem; every other page keeps the narrow measure. The page
name travels onto <main> as a class so the stylesheet can tell them apart
without every handler having to pass a second field.
Width alone does not make a table fit, though — a column is at least as wide as
the longest unbreakable run in it, and one 40-character recipient still hung
Status over the card's edge. Cells may now break mid word, with timestamps
exempt, so a column can always be squeezed into the room available.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A non-Latin subject arrives as RFC 2047 encoded-words, which the send-log
printed verbatim: unreadable, and one unbreakable run wide enough to push the
Status column out of its card. Decode at journal time (UTF-8/ASCII; exotic
charsets keep the raw header) and cap at 200 characters, then clip the column
to one line with the full text in the tooltip so no subject can widen the row.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Renames the Unreleased section to 0.3.0 per the versioning convention in
docs/progress.md. What accumulated since 0.2.0 is a coherent release: the
PTR check fix, the monitoring pages moving to URLs that match their nav
labels, and the navigation bar getting icons and a two-row layout. A
SemVer minor bump -- the URL move is breaking for bookmarks, but the
project is still pre-1.0.
The version lives only in the build arg (ldflags into
internal/buildinfo.Version), so this heading is the whole bump; there is
no constant in the tree to follow it.
No git tag and no ghcr push here -- a vX.Y.Z tag is what makes CI publish
images, and that stays an explicit step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The two rows were the right call; the order was not. The session block
belongs at the top right, where a signed-in user expects it, with the
page entries under it and the active one sitting against the bar's
bottom border.
Done by moving the session div ahead of the links div in the layout
rather than with a CSS `order`, so the reading and tab order still follow
what the eye sees. That does make Sign out the bar's first tab stop --
the same as on any site with a user menu up there, and nothing activates
on focus, so it is a reordering rather than a hazard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
It stopped fitting on one line once the entries grew icons: six of them
need about 660px and the session block another 260px, against the 738px
the panel is wide. Flex was already wrapping it, but the wrap put the
session left-aligned directly under the entries, where it read as a third
row of navigation.
So: entries on the first row, session pushed to the right edge on the
second. The two blocks now read as two blocks. Buying the ~200px back by
shortening labels was the other option and would have undone the recent
work naming each entry after its page.
Rows rather than columns -- a two-column grid of entries measured a third
taller (107px against 83px) and was no easier to read. Entries stay first
in document order, so tabbing still reaches the pages before Sign out.
Checked at 1200, 768, 600 and 375px: no horizontal overflow, and below
768 the entries wrap to two rows as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
It was the last bare label in the bar once every page entry had one. An
open door with the arrow leading out -- the one icon here that marks an
action rather than a page.
It needs no colour rule of its own: the compact danger button already
sets the red, and the icon draws in currentColor, so it follows the
button into dark mode with it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The storage box read as a box, not as an archive -- nothing in it said
what the page is for. Two drawers with handles is the picture of an
archive, and at 16px it holds together better than the box did: no lid
seam to lose, no small detail to smear.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The bar was six similar-length words; nothing distinguished them at a
glance. Each entry now leads with a 16px inline SVG.
Inline rather than an icon font or a sprite file: the icons inherit the
entry's colour through currentColor, so the active pill's darker text and
a link's blue need no second rule, they cost no request, and they need no
exemption from the panel's default-src 'self' policy. Each is aria-hidden
because the entry's text is already its accessible name.
Account is included -- it is a page like the others and would otherwise
be the one bare word left in the bar -- so the highlight and padding
rules now cover the session block too, and the bar centres its items
instead of aligning them on the text baseline now that an entry is an
icon-plus-label row rather than a run of text.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The previous two commits renamed the routes and the page titles but left
every identifier underneath still called sendlog/queue/logtail, so a
grep for "deliveries" found the route and nothing that serves it.
Renamed together, since they have to agree for a page to render at all:
the six template files, their {{define}} blocks, the pageFiles and
fragmentFiles keys, the .Active values the nav compares against, the
HTMX target ids, and the six page handlers.
Names that describe the data rather than the page keep their old form:
the send_log table and its store methods, internal/logtail, and the
sendLogData/readQueue/readLogTail helpers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The PTR check reported a correctly published record as wrong. The lookups
went through the container's resolver (127.0.0.11) which forwards to the
host's systemd-resolved, and systemd-resolved synthesises the reverse
lookup of the machine's own addresses from the local hostname rather than
asking public DNS. On the production host that meant
203.0.113.10 -> provider-assigned-hostname (does not match)
while public DNS has had 203.0.113.10 -> selfpost.example.com all along.
These checks exist to report what a receiving mail server sees, so they
now dial recursive resolvers themselves, defaulting to 1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8
and 9.9.9.9 and overridable with SELFPOST_DNS_RESOLVERS. The e2e stand
sets it to its CoreDNS, which the `dns:` directive alone no longer covers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The System log page still said "Mail log" in its heading and browser
title, and Deliveries titled itself "send log".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
/sendlog -> /deliveries, /queue -> /mail-queue, /logtail -> /system-log,
along with the HTMX polling fragments under each.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Renames the Unreleased section to 0.2.0 per the versioning convention in
docs/progress.md — the accumulated panel/CI/ops work since 0.1.0 is a
coherent release (SemVer minor bump; project is still pre-1.0). No git
tag/image push yet; that stays an explicit step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rename technical labels (postqueue -p, mail.log tail, Send log/Queue/Log
in nav) to plain descriptions, and style Sign out as a deliberate danger
action consistent with other destructive buttons.
Nothing in the UI said which build was running, though it is the value a
backup manifest is compared against on restore and the first thing worth
knowing when the panel misbehaves — it was only in the startup log line
and `panel -version`.
Add it as a small footer in the shared layout, supplied from render()
alongside .Active so no handler has to pass it, and gated on .User: the
login and setup pages face the internet and should not advertise a
version. Tests cover both the footer and render() supplying the key,
since neither is visible from any single handler.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
It was a bare link trailing the queue-summary sentence, while the two
other card actions on the same page (Re-check DNS, Reload configuration)
are buttons. Pull it out of the paragraph and give it the filled button
style through a new a.btn class — the same base rule a.danger already
used, so an action that happens to be a navigation still looks like
every other action.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The side-by-side .split row read badly: main is capped at 48rem, so the
applications table had to live in roughly 27rem and its actions column
squeezed four controls into it.
Put the create form directly above the list instead — the order the
domains page already uses for "Add a sending domain" above "Domains" —
and delete .split, which nothing else used. The empty-state text follows
the same page's wording.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The documentation is part of the deliverable (spec 11.5/11.7/11.9), so it has
to describe what the code does, not what was intended. Adds
docs/documentation-plan.md: the package inventory against the spec, the
per-claim sources of truth in the tree, the results of a first cross-check
pass (11 findings, most notably the missing "operations" section required by
spec 11.7, the absent env-var reference, .env.example's dangling link to a
README "Rate limiting" section, and the unwritten "tar while stopped" backup
path from spec 9), and tasks D1-D7 gating the next release tag.
progress.md points at it so it survives a context reset.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The domain page generated and displayed the DKIM record but said only
"also configure SPF and DMARC for the domain (see the documentation)".
The concrete example existed — buried in the check's remediation text,
and only visible once the check had already failed. Show both records up
front, host and value with a Copy button, the way the DKIM record is
shown, plus the two things that actually bite: a domain may carry only
one SPF record (add the mechanism to the existing one rather than
publishing a second), and p=none is safe to publish immediately.
The SPF value names the addresses SELFPOST_HOSTNAME resolves to, taken
from the hostname check the page already runs, and falls back to an "a:"
mechanism when it does not resolve. New dnscheck.SPFExample/DMARCExample
are the single source for both the page and the checks' advice, so the
two cannot drift into recommending different records; dnscheck.Query
gains Hostname for the fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Same kind of control, two appearances: a POST wrapped in form.inline
(Re-check, Export domain, Sign out, New password, Delete), the <details>
toggles in the applications table and the a.danger delete links all
rendered as bold blue/red text, while every other action was a filled
button — sometimes both within one card, as on the backup page where
"Download full backup" was text and "Import domain" right below it was a
button.
Give them one vocabulary: filled for a card's own action, and a compact
outlined variant (the style the Copy buttons already used) where actions
cluster in a table row or the nav bar. An <a> is now only used for
navigation. The <details> summary keeps the pressed background instead of
a disclosure marker, and the row buttons are nowrap so a narrow actions
column widens rather than wrapping every label onto two lines.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
On the domain page the "Add an application" card sat below the domain rate
limit, so adding a login meant scrolling past the list and back. Move it up
next to the Applications table and wrap the pair in a .split grid (1.5fr /
1fr, so the table keeps the wider column). The columns collapse to one below
52rem, list first, and the grid gap keeps the same vertical rhythm as
.card + .card.
The empty-state text said "Create one below", which is no longer where the
form is; it now names the card instead of its position.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Separate test/e2e Go module drives the shipped deploy/docker-compose.yml
(plus a test-only override: self-signed cert, low ports, isolated compose
project) against a fake DNS zone (CoreDNS) and an smtp-sink MX, exactly as
an administrator and their applications would over HTTP/SMTP — covering the
class of failure unit tests can't see (container wiring). Positive path:
setup -> login -> domain -> DKIM record published into the fake zone ->
application -> SMTP AUTH send -> DKIM verified against the DNS-published
key -> send-log queued->sent. Negative: no-AUTH/unauthenticated relay,
sender/login mismatch, L1 (anvil) and L2 (panel) rate limits, journal-milter
fail-open, SELFPOST_HOSTNAME gate, session survives docker restart.
release.yml moves off qemu to a native per-arch build (amd64/arm64), each
gated by this suite before its tag is pushed and merged into the version
manifest.
Verified green on selfpost.example.com via `make e2e`; go vet/gofmt clean in
both modules.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Unset or malformed hostname makes the panel and Postfix diverge on SASL
realm silently (auth breaks for every application) and breaks HELO/PTR
matching (spam), so entrypoint.sh now exits before postfix-config.sh /
supervisord with an explanatory error, plus a syntax check rejecting
missing dots, schemes, ports, and whitespace.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces copytruncate with rename + `postfix reload` (the same mechanism
`postfix logrotate` itself uses), closing the up-to-one-second window where
copytruncate could drop in-flight delivery lines and leave a send-log row
stuck at "queued" forever.
logrotate-mail.conf keeps `create 0644 root root` rather than `nocreate` as
originally planned: verified on a live container that Postfix recreates the
file itself only lazily, on the next write after reload, and at mode 0600 —
unreadable by the unprivileged panel process. `create` hands the file back at
0644 immediately after rename, before Postfix ever touches it.
logtail.follow() re-drains the old file descriptor once more right before
switching to the rotated file, closing the residual gap between the last
poll's drain and the rotation check. readLogTail() treats a momentarily
missing mail.log as an empty screen rather than a logged error.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sessions move from an in-memory map (absolute 12h TTL) to a `sessions`
table (migration 0002), storing only the SHA-256 of the token. Expiry is
now a sliding idle window (PANEL_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS, default 7, no
absolute cap), extended at most once an hour and never by the
monitoring screens' background polling (GET + HX-Request), so a
forgotten open tab doesn't keep a session alive indefinitely. A login
now survives a container restart or redeploy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The plan holds undone work; an accepted risk is a decision, not a task
— it has no place in a queue, only a condition for revisiting it. Both
risks (POST with neither Sec-Fetch-Site nor Origin, no session-bound
CSRF tokens) move verbatim into a new docs/security.md, which also
states where D.5 findings land. Section letters and item numbering in
the plan stay as they were, since progress.md and the commit history
reference them; a note in their place points at the new file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A single security pass once B.1-B.3 and C.4 are in, not four per-item
passes: those four rewrite authentication, log-file handling, the
entrypoint gate and the release workflow, so what matters is the final
state. Scope is the whole diff since v1.0.0 (phases 12-14 included)
plus a fresh walk over spec 7.6, run by Fable rather than Opus so the
reviewer is not the author. Findings are either fixed before the tag
or recorded in section A as accepted risks; together with the C.4 e2e
this gates tagging. The old section D (2.x pointer) becomes E, its
items renumbered 6 and 7.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2FA is dropped from the 2.x candidate list. "Multiple administrators"
is narrowed to one concrete role: an admin scoped to a single domain
(its applications, DKIM/DNS status, filtered send log), with the
globally scoped actions — domain add/delete, reload, full backup,
queue and mail.log tail — left out of it. Still 2.x: a second panel
subject contradicts the out-of-scope list in spec section 3, so it
needs agreement and a spec change before any code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The unit tests all fake the process boundary, so the class of failure that
actually broke this project — container wiring: chroot vs DNS, milter socket
permissions, the SASL realm, the Postfix reload path, cap_add — is invisible
to them. Record the decision to close it with a hermetic containerised e2e:
a separate Go module under test/e2e/, driven against the shipped compose file
plus an override, with a fake DNS zone and an smtp-sink standing in for the
outside world.
It runs before tagging (make e2e on the dev server, plus workflow_dispatch)
and gates image publication on the tag itself, which pulls release.yml off
qemu onto a native amd64/arm64 matrix: build, test, push per-arch tags, merge
the manifest — so the bytes published are the bytes that were tested.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The soft fallback is worse than the plan's wording implied: the panel
falls back to realm "localhost" while postfix-config.sh falls back to the
container hostname, so with the variable unset accounts are written under
one realm and looked up under another — SMTP auth fails for every
application while the panel looks healthy. The second failure (EHLO =
container id, no PTR/SPF match) is invisible entirely. Both are silent
and delayed, which is exactly what a log warning cannot fix.
Decision: entrypoint.sh refuses to start without the variable, with an
explanatory message rather than a one-liner, plus a syntax check on the
value. Records why the "panel up with a banner, mail dead" variant was
rejected: it contradicts the Phase-4 crashexit invariant, cannot be fixed
without a restart anyway, and would let the panel persist SASL accounts
under the wrong realm.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
copytruncate loses log records twice per rotation: everything written
since the tailer's last poll (kept in mail.log.1, but skipped because the
descriptor points at the truncated inode) and whatever lands between the
copy and the truncate (gone for good). Those records carry the final
delivery statuses the send log is reconciled from, so a dropped line
means a row stuck in "queued" — not just a gap in the monitoring view,
as the item previously assumed.
Decision recorded, implementation deferred to its own step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sessions move from the in-memory map to a `sessions` table (migration
0002), so a restart, a redeploy or a restore from a full backup no longer
signs the administrator out. The row holds a SHA-256 of the token rather
than the token itself: a stolen database file or backup archive cannot be
replayed into a login, while the browser that still holds the cookie keeps
working across a restore.
The 12-hour absolute TTL becomes a sliding 7-day idle window, configurable
through PANEL_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS (whole days, mirroring
SEND_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS). No absolute cap: for an administrator who visits
regularly the session lasts indefinitely, which is the accepted trade-off.
The four `every 5s` monitoring fragments deliberately do not renew it —
otherwise a forgotten open tab would hold the session open forever and the
window would mean "seven days without an open tab" rather than "seven days
without the administrator".
Decision only; no code yet.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The plan holds only open work, but section A still retold what phase 14
implemented — security headers, the origin check, the __Host- cookie, the
setup-token documentation — which the CHANGELOG and git history already
describe in full. What is left of A is the two things deliberately *not*
closed: the POST that carries neither Sec-Fetch-Site nor Origin, and the
absence of session-bound CSRF tokens. The XSS note folds into the token item,
which is the only place it was doing work; the "proxy must pass Host through"
requirement is documented in the README and in the CHANGELOG, so it goes.
Section A's numbered items are gone with it, so B-D renumber from 1. Nothing
else in the file has been implemented: the README still says nothing about
restarts signing the admin out or about the copytruncate rotation window,
SELFPOST_HOSTNAME still falls back to localhost without a warning, and CI
still runs only vet and unit tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
14.C needed no code: the setup link is already mirrored to /data/setup-token
at 0600 and removed once setup completes. What was missing is the reason to
prefer it — a deployment whose container logs ship to a central aggregator
otherwise leaves a live bearer token in that pipeline for ten minutes, and in
whatever retains it afterwards.
The reverse-proxy section gains the one requirement 14.A introduces: pass the
original Host header through. Everything else about security stays the
proxy's non-problem, which is the point of emitting the headers from the
panel.
Phase 14 leaves the plan (the file describes only unfinished work), but its
section A keeps what was deliberately left open: the accepted risk for clients
sending neither Sec-Fetch-Site nor Origin, the decision not to add
session-bound CSRF tokens and what would justify revisiting it, and the fact
that XSS inside the panel's own origin is answered by html/template and the
CSP rather than by either of those.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 14.B. The cookie already satisfied everything the __Host- prefix
requires — Secure, Path=/, no Domain — but as a promise the server makes, not
one the browser enforces. With the prefix the browser refuses to store a
same-named cookie carrying a Domain attribute, which is the second lever the
same-site neighbour from 14.A has: set selfpost_session for the parent domain,
and the browser sends two cookies of that name, oldest first. r.Cookie
returned that first one, so the admin logged in successfully and landed back
on the login form, for as long as the planted cookie lived.
The name has to stay conditional: __Host- is only valid on a Secure cookie, so
with PANEL_COOKIE_SECURE=false the browser would discard the Set-Cookie and
the dev instance would fail to log in with no visible reason. Hence the test
on that branch specifically, not just the production one.
requireAuth now reads r.Cookies() and refuses a request carrying more than one
cookie of the name, with a log line naming the cause. That is the only place
the overwrite becomes visible at all, and unlike the prefix it also works in
the dev shape. Sign-out clears both names, so the upgrade does not leave the
old cookie behind; it does sign the administrator out once, which costs
nothing given sessions live in memory and die on restart anyway.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 14.A, both halves of it in one middleware wrapped around the whole
router — outside requireAuth, so POST /login and POST /setup/{token} are
covered too.
Headers: CSP, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy, and
HSTS only where the deployment is HTTPS-only (the same CookieSecure condition
that gates the cookie's Secure attribute; on the plain-HTTP dev instance HSTS
would pin the browser to a scheme that instance does not speak). HSTS goes
without includeSubDomains on purpose: the panel may sit at an apex, and
forcing HTTPS on every unrelated subdomain of the operator's domain for a year
is not this project's call. They are emitted here rather than delegated to the
reverse proxy, so the part that is easy to get wrong lives in the service.
Origin check: this is what SameSite=Lax cannot do. SameSite is judged per site
(registrable domain), so a neighbouring host — a CMS, a forgotten staging
subdomain — is same-site and its forged POST arrives with the session cookie
attached. Sec-Fetch-Site and Origin are judged per origin and tell it apart.
For the typical deployment, where the panel is a subdomain of a domain used
for other things, that neighbour is the realistic attacker, not a theoretical
one; POST /domains/import is the case that turns a blind write into working
credentials on someone else's relay.
A request carrying neither header is still let through — the risk accepted in
the plan, since a client that old cannot be checked at all and the strict mode
would not protect it, only break the panel in it.
The check compares Origin's host against r.Host, not the full origin: the
panel speaks plain HTTP behind the proxy and does not know its own external
scheme. That makes it depend on the proxy preserving Host. All four shipped
fragments do, but one that rewrites it would turn every form submission into a
403, so the rejection logs both sides of the comparison — otherwise the
symptom reads as "the panel stopped saving anything".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Groundwork for the Content-Security-Policy of phase 14.A. A policy that has to
allow inline script is not worth writing — script-src 'unsafe-inline' gives
back exactly the XSS foothold the policy exists to remove — so the three
inline constructs the templates still had are moved out first:
- the layout's <style> block becomes /static/panel.css;
- the one style="background:#b42318" attribute becomes the .danger class
that already existed for it;
- the four onsubmit="return confirm(...)" handlers become data-confirm,
handled by a delegated listener in panel.js. Delegation matters: the
application rows are also delivered by HTMX swaps.
htmx would otherwise inject a <style> of its own for the request-indicator
classes and become the single reason the policy needs an exemption; the panel
uses no hx-indicator, so the meta config switches it off.
A guard test keeps this from silently regressing later, which it otherwise
would: an inline handler added to a template does not fail, it just quietly
stops working in the browser.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Records both decisions and, more usefully, what the item was actually about.
The prefix was filed as a free nicety ("мелочь, но бесплатная"), which is why
it sat undecided: nothing said what it prevents. It prevents the same-site
neighbour from the CSRF item using its other lever — setting a Domain-scoped
cookie of the same name. The browser then sends two, r.Cookie returns the
older one, and the admin logs in successfully into an endless login loop. That
is denial of service rather than compromise (no valid token can be forged with
a single account), but it is close to undiagnosable from the panel's side, and
the origin check decided in A.2 does nothing about it — the request comes from
the admin's own origin.
Phase 14 gains section B: the cookie name becomes conditional on CookieSecure,
because a __Host- cookie over plain HTTP is rejected outright and would break
the dev mode silently; logout clears both names; and requireAuth switches to
r.Cookies() so a duplicate is refused and logged instead of silently picked.
The setup-token documentation moves to 14.C.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Records variant (b): the panel will check Origin / Sec-Fetch-Site in the same
middleware as the security headers, and will not carry CSRF tokens. The
coverage table above the decision already says what that buys; what the item
was missing is what it does not buy, so both are now written down — the
accepted risk (a client sending neither header still gets through, which is
exactly the old-browser row) and the two escalation paths with their price,
tightening the policy to reject those requests, or session-bound tokens.
Phase 14.A grows the implementation rules: which requests are checked, the
three-way decision, and the fact that only the host is compared because the
panel sits behind a proxy and never sees its own external scheme. The rule
depends on r.Host being the external name — all four shipped proxy fragments
preserve it (checked), but a proxy that rewrites Host would turn every POST
into a 403, so the rejection has to log both sides of the comparison and the
container test has to run through a real proxy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The options were buried in three prose bullets that mixed mechanism, cost and
coverage, so the one question that matters — which attacker each variant stops
— could not be read off the page. They are now a table: four scenarios by
three variants, with the cost and the caveats underneath and the scenario
prose moved below the table for whoever wants the detail.
No change of substance: same variants, same recommendation (the Origin /
Sec-Fetch-Site check in the phase 14.A middleware), same caveat that a naive
double-submit token leaves the subdomain row open.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The item said SameSite=Lax was "enough for modern browsers" but wrong "on a
downgrade to an old browser or unusual proxies", which named the least likely
scenario and missed the most likely one: SameSite is scoped to the registrable
domain, not the origin. The panel runs on a subdomain, so any page anywhere
under the operator's domain — the CMS on www, a stale CNAME, a neighbouring
service — is same-site and its POST carries the session cookie.
It also said nothing about what a successful CSRF would actually buy. Almost
everything is a blind write the attacker cannot read, except POST
/domains/import: multipart is a CORS-simple content type, and a domain export
carries a DKIM key and working SASL passwords, so an attacker uploads
credentials they already know and gains a sending identity on someone else's
relay. That single endpoint, not the destructive ones, is what sets the bar.
The options now carry their cost and their limits: an Origin/Sec-Fetch-Site
check in the phase 14.A middleware closes the subdomain case for ~15 lines,
while a naive double-submit token does not close it at all, since a same-site
neighbour can write the parent domain's cookie. Route facts, cookie
attributes, the export struct and the absence of any hx-post were checked
against the code rather than assumed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The plan is meant to hold only what is still open, but three of its numbered
items had already been implemented and were still being read as pending work:
the TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR-gated X-Forwarded-For handling (A.1), the account
settings page (A.6) and the go vet/go test CI workflow (C.10). Remove them
and renumber; the residual scope note from A.6 (2FA, multiple admins) moves
to section D, which is where deliberately deferred scope belongs.
Same for the "done" notices at the top of the plan and the phase-by-phase
retellings in progress.md: phases 12 and 13 are described in full in the
CHANGELOG and git history, so the tracker now states what is closed and what
is next, and nothing else.
Three code comments cited plan item numbers that this renumbering would have
silently pointed at a different item, and one cited a phase 13 section that
no longer exists; they now state the fact instead of the reference. The CI
test workflow was never recorded in the CHANGELOG, so its entry is added
there before the plan item describing it goes away.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 13. Two new packages and one new screen.
internal/health owns the shared status vocabulary (ok/warn/error/unknown)
and the local checks: supervisord's process table, TLS certificate expiry
and the two milter sockets. Each check reports a problem as a status rather
than an error, so one broken component costs a line and not the page.
internal/dnscheck does the read-only lookups: forward-confirmed reverse DNS
for SELFPOST_HOSTNAME, and per-domain DKIM (compared against the key this
server actually signs with), SPF and DMARC. Every check is bounded by a
timeout and cached, and the resolver sits behind an interface so the tests
drive every branch without touching the network. The SPF check is
deliberately shallow: it looks for a mechanism literally covering the
server's address and does not follow include:/redirect=, so a record that
authorises us through an include is reported as "cannot tell" rather than
as a failure.
/status renders both, with the local checks in an HTMX-polled fragment and
the DNS lookups behind a Re-check button, and becomes the panel's landing
page: / now redirects there and the domain list lives at /domains. The
Reload button moves onto /status, where it reads as what it is — a
drift-recovery for the daemons — with text explaining what it regenerates.
A template test fails on any remaining href="/" so a stale link cannot
silently land on the wrong screen.
Also fixes a defect this made visible: the panel could never read the mail
queue in the documented deployment. postqueue relies on its setgid-postdrop
bit, which the compose file's no-new-privileges disables, so the Queue
screen always said "Could not read the mail queue" — including in the
released 1.0.0 image. The panel user is now a real member of postdrop,
which needs no setgid transition.
Verified in a container on the dev server against real DNS: PTR matching
(selfpost.example.com) and not matching (example.com), DKIM absent and
mismatched, SPF absent and via include:, DMARC p=quarantine/p=reject/absent,
and a resolver timeout degrading to "unknown" without hanging the page.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 12 (UI/UX). The navigation bar now renders once from layout.html
instead of being copied into each content template, so it is present on
every authenticated page — including the domain page and its delete
confirmation, which had no links at all — and the current page is
highlighted via .Active rather than quietly dropping out of the list.
New /account page changes the administrator's username and/or password:
the current password is required and the attempt is throttled on the same
limiter as the login form, so this route cannot be used to brute-force
past that limit. A password change invalidates every other session while
keeping the one performing it; a rename carries that session over.
Backup and domain import move from a card in the middle of the domain
list to their own /backup page, one card each; the handlers themselves
are unchanged, only the page the import form renders its errors on.
The domain page gains a "Sending server settings" card (server, port,
encryption) so a client can be configured without reading the docs; 587
is listed only when SUBMISSION_ENABLE is true for this deployment, which
is a deploy-time flag the panel cannot verify at runtime.
Client-side (static/panel.js, no libraries): Copy buttons on the values
that get carried elsewhere (DKIM record, new application credentials,
server name), and the Addresses field is hidden while the address mode is
wildcard, where the server ignores it.
Verified in a container on the dev server: setup, login, every page's
nav and active item, domain and application creation, all account-form
paths including cross-session invalidation, import errors, full backup
download. gofmt/vet/test/docker build green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security headers and setup-token docs were already decided but had no
concrete implementation phase; also mark A.1 rate-limit and CI test
workflow as done since they landed in recent commits.
A.2: headers emitted from the panel, not reverse-proxy — keep proxy config
minimal and hard to break, push complexity into the service.
A.5: keep stdout as the base setup-link delivery per spec; document the
/data/setup-token file as a more secure alternative for centralized-logging
setups.
Resolves plan item A.1 (option б): login/setup rate-limiting used
RemoteAddr only, which behind the default reverse proxy is the proxy's own
address, making the limiter effectively global and enabling a lockout-DoS.
Now, when the request's direct peer matches the new TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR list
(comma-separated CIDRs, env, empty by default), the last X-Forwarded-For
entry is used instead, giving a real per-client limit. Unset behaviour is
unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fold user feedback into a new Phase 12 covering the panel's UX gaps:
structural nav header on every page with active-state highlighting,
an account settings page for admin login/password, a dedicated
backup/migration page split from domain import, connection settings
on the domain page, copy-to-clipboard for values meant to be pasted
elsewhere, hiding the unused addresses field in wildcard mode, and
moving the Reload button to the new /status landing page (Phase 13,
renumbered from 12).
Tests (including the rate-limit suite) previously only ran manually
on the build server; now every push to main and every PR triggers
them via GitHub Actions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a new agreed-upon phase covering /status (supervisord processes,
Postfix queue, TLS cert expiry, milter sockets, PTR/FCrDNS check) and
per-domain DNS correctness status (DKIM/SPF-heuristic/DMARC) on the
domain page. Not part of v1.0 spec scope; scoped and agreed with the
user before implementation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CHANGELOG.md now tracks version history (0.1.0 baseline); progress.md and
implementation-plan.md keep only live process and unfinished work (open
questions, optional 2.x.x phase O1) since phases 0-11 are fully closed and
already covered by git history and the changelog.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Avoids a spurious unknown/unknown platform entry in the ghcr.io
manifest list alongside linux/amd64 and linux/arm64.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
supervisord runs as root inside the container but cap_drop: ALL still
blocked it from signaling opendkim (a different uid) — cross-uid
kill() checks CAP_KILL regardless of the caller's uid. Domain add was
failing in prod with "unknown problem sending sig opendkim ...
PermissionError: Operation not permitted".
Bringing up the production Apache stack for real surfaced a latent bug
in the Phase 10 hardening: cap_drop: ALL with only NET_BIND_SERVICE/
CHOWN/SETUID/SETGID/DAC_OVERRIDE left the root startup phase unable to
chmod the /data dirs it had just chowned to the panel user (needs
CAP_FOWNER) or set their setgid bit (needs CAP_FSETID). The container
crash-looped on "chmod: Operation not permitted". Phase 10 never caught
this because its compose up hit a port conflict before full boot.
Add FOWNER and FSETID to cap_add and document what each capability is
for. Verified: container now starts clean under the hardened compose.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Capture conscious tradeoffs and hardening candidates that go beyond the
mandatory 7.6 requirements: reverse-proxy rate-limit keying, missing
security response headers, CSRF/SameSite stance, __Host- cookie prefix,
session/ops notes, and the gap that CI does not run go test. None are
compliance defects; each is a decide-later item.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Line-by-line audit of all 8 points of spec 7.6 against the code: full
compliance, no code changes required. Acceptance verified on the dev
server (image selfpost:p11): gofmt/vet/build/test green, docker build
ok, clean container start (all processes RUNNING, panel as non-root
uid 999, setup link + 0600 token, bogus token 404, unauth 303, healthz
200). Baseline v1.0 plan (phases 0->11) complete.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- deploy/docker-compose.yml: pinned-tag ghcr image, hardened (cap_drop ALL +
minimal cap_add, no-new-privileges, panel bound to 127.0.0.1 only). Apache
itself runs on the host (spec 10.5), fragment at deploy/apache/.
- Alternative reverse-proxy fragments: nginx (+certbot sidecar), Caddy
(automatic ACME), Traefik (+acme.json PEM extraction script).
- .github/workflows/release.yml: tag-triggered ghcr.io publish, version piped
from the git tag into both the binary ldflags and the image tag (spec 10.1).
- Closed a gap from Phase 1: logrotate was installed but never invoked;
wired up build/logrotate-mail.conf + logrotate-loop.sh + a supervisor
program (copytruncate, since postlogd holds mail.log open with nothing to
signal on rotation).
- README rewritten: site requirements checklist, reverse-proxy comparison,
DNS setup (server- vs domain-level), IP warmup, backup/restore vs domain
export/import, fixed-tag rationale, machine requirements.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Full server backup (spec 7.5.A): internal/backup produces a tar.gz of all of
/data — a consistent SQLite snapshot via VACUUM INTO, DKIM keys, sasldb2 and a
version manifest; TLS certs (tls/) and the Postfix queue are excluded. Two equal
paths: the panel button (POST /backup, no-store) and the selfpost-backup CLI via
docker exec (spec 11.6). CheckRestore runs before store.Open: a manifest version
mismatch refuses to boot with the image tag to use; a match consumes the
manifest so it only guards the first post-restore boot. Restore is not a
separate branch — Postfix/OpenDKIM regenerate from the restored SQLite as on any
start.
Domain export/import (spec 7.5.B): DomainExport carries the DKIM private key and
each application's working password. SASL secrets are read from sasldb2 via
db_dump (the userPassword property is plaintext) and, on import, re-keyed under
the local realm with saslpasswd2 — so credentials keep working on an instance
with a different hostname, with no DKIM DNS change. Import validates and rolls
back atomically on any failure. db-util (db_dump) is now an explicit image dep.
Verified on the server (selfpost:p9): gofmt/vet/test green; container e2e for
cross-realm domain export/import (SMTP AUTH 235 under the new realm), CLI and
panel backups, same-version restore, and version-mismatch refusal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The journal-milter, until now a pure monitor, now refuses a message with a
4xx tempfail (RespTempFail/451) at MAIL FROM when a per-domain or per-
application limit is exceeded. Key is the client IP; the count is
COUNT(DISTINCT queue_id) over a sliding window reusing the send log; the
limit applies only when a non-empty IP binding matches the client (empty
binding => level-1 only, per spec 7.4). Enforcement is fail-open on the
milter's own errors — a limiter malfunction never blocks mail, and Postfix's
level-1 anvil limit stays the independent backstop. Refused messages are
recorded in send_log with status "rejected" for UI visibility.
- store/ratelimits.go: RateLimit type (+Active/AllowsIP), id-keyed get/set/
delete for the panel, name/login-keyed lookup + windowed distinct-message
count for the milter, DeleteRateLimitsForDomain. No migration — the
rate_limits table has existed since Phase 2.
- milter: enforce at MailFrom, fail-open helper overLimit, InsertRejected.
- web: server-side validated IP/ceiling/window forms on the domain page and
per application; routes POST /domains/{id}/ratelimit and
/applications/{aid}/ratelimit. Milter reads rows live, so no reload.
- domain/app services clear limits on deletion (rate_limits has no FK cascade).
Unit tests + container e2e (p8) green: refusal on both scopes, unregistered
IP ignored, fail-open with the panel stopped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three HTMX-polled monitoring screens (spec 7.2.11-13): send log with
server-side domain/application filters and pagination, Postfix queue
(postqueue -p), and a mail.log tail. Fragment endpoints return HTML
snippets, not JSON (spec 7.1); all output is auto-escaped via
html/template (spec 7.6.7).
Adds store.QuerySendLog/CountSendLog/ListApplicationLogins,
postfix.Queue(), and logtail.TailLines (a point-in-time reverse read,
independent of the background follow loop). Verified on the dev server:
gofmt/vet/test green, docker build green, container e2e (filters,
60-row pagination, <script> escaping, real postqueue/mail.log output,
existing Reload button unaffected).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add optional Phase O1 (targeted at the 2.x.x release line, outside the
v1.0 baseline) covering inbound relay as an opt-in/plugin: accept on :25
for explicit relay_domains and forward to an upstream backend, with
strict anti-open-relay/backscatter (relay_domains + relay_recipient_maps
+ reject_unauth_destination). Use cases: backup-MX and fronting a mail
server with no external IP.
Antispam is an important but optional capability: blind forwarding stays
valid. Since a blind relay hides the origin IP from the backend (breaking
downstream DNSBL/SPF), filtering must be attachable at the inbound hop —
provided as a milter hook to an external engine running in a separate
optional container, plus native Postfix DNSBL as a dependency-free
backstop. SelfPost neither bundles nor runs the engine, keeping the image
and the "one container, three processes" model intact.
Requires explicit sign-off (spec 12.6) as it extends beyond out-of-scope
section 3; plan-only, no implementation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implement the structured send log (spec 7.3), the project's highest-risk
component since a milter bug can break the relay itself.
- internal/milter: go-milter v0.4.1 journal-milter. Per-connection session
collects SASL login, From, recipients and Subject across callbacks and
writes one send_log "queued" row per (queue-id, recipient) at EOM
(spec 7.3.3). Monitoring only: callbacks return Continue/Accept, recorder
errors are logged never propagated, so it can never block mail.
- internal/logtail: polling mail.log tailer with rotation handling (inode
change / truncation), parses sent/deferred/bounced/expired by queue-id +
recipient and advances rows; background retention sweep prunes rows past
SEND_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS (default 90) at startup and every 6h.
- internal/store/sendlog.go: InsertQueued, UpdateStatus (case-insensitive
recipient match), DeleteSendLogBefore + status constants.
- cmd/panel: open the store once and share it across http/milter/tailer;
replace the journal/logtail stubs with the real roles.
- build/postfix-config.sh: bounded milter timeouts (15/15/30s) so a hung
milter also fails open in seconds, not the 300s default.
Fix found in-container: SASL login (app_login) was empty because go-milter
keys macros exactly as Postfix sends them, and multi-character macro names
arrive brace-wrapped ({auth_authen}); the SASL-less Phase 0 spike could not
observe this. Added a brace-tolerant macro lookup.
Verified on selfpost.example.com: gofmt/vet/unit tests green; container e2e
records rows with correct fields and advances status via the tailer; fail-open
confirmed for both an unreachable and a hung milter; retention prunes at start.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Live delivery verified end-to-end: dtester@test.example.org -> selfpost@mixeme.ru
accepted by mx.example.net with Authentication-Results dkim=pass
(d=test.example.org s=selfpost) and spf=pass, read back over IMAP. All Phase 5
"done when" criteria met. Records the own-domain-policy pitfall (can't test
delivery from a domain the receiver itself hosts) and the test.example.org sender
workaround for future delivery tests. Next: Phase 6 (journal-milter) on Opus.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 5 code is complete, committed (2c7f0da) and verified on the server.
Everything at SelfPost's boundary is proven (auth, sender binding, no open
relay, valid DKIM signing, delivery to the recipient MX over TLS). The one
open item — the receiver accepting the message into its inbox — is gated by
mx.example.net's DNS cache / own-domain policy, not a relay defect; a background
loop retries until it lands.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Generate the relay config from the environment at container start
(build/postfix-config.sh, run from entrypoint.sh):
- smtps 465 (implicit TLS) primary + optional submission 587 (STARTTLS),
chroot=n so smtpd reaches the sasldb2/sender map under /data.
- Cyrus SASL against the panel-maintained sasldb2; realm left implicit so the
authenticated name equals the bare login in smtpd_sender_login_maps.
- reject_sender_login_mismatch + relay/recipient restrictions with no
permit_mynetworks: credentials-only, open relay impossible (spec 5, 5.1).
- TLS cert/key from TLS_CERT_FILE/TLS_KEY_FILE; daily postfix reload picks up
renewed certs (postfix-cert-reload.sh under supervisord, spec 5.2).
- anvil level-1 rate limit from env (spec 5 p.5).
- Milter chain with per-milter action: OpenDKIM strict (tempfail), journal
fail-open (accept) so monitoring never blocks the relay (spec 7.3).
Two integration fixes found on the server:
- postconf -F '*/*/chroot=n': Debian's chrooted delivery agent can't read
/etc/resolv.conf, so MX lookups failed and mail never left.
- entrypoint sets /run/opendkim and /run/selfpost to group selfpost + setgid,
and the journal stub chmods its socket 0660, so postfix can connect to both
milter sockets (strict OpenDKIM was milter-rejecting all mail otherwise).
Verified on selfpost.example.com: gofmt/vet/test green, image builds; container
e2e — 465 auth+send DKIM-signed (d=domain,s=selfpost), 587 STARTTLS auth,
cross-domain sender 553, list-mode per-address binding, unauth relay 554,
real outbound delivery reaching the recipient MX over TLS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds application accounts bound to domains: a SASL login/password in
sasldb2, a per-application address mode (wildcard @domain or an explicit
list), and matching smtpd_sender_login_maps bindings — with create,
list, edit-mode, delete and password regeneration (spec 4.1, 5.1,
7.2.5-9). Generated passwords are shown exactly once and never stored in
plaintext (7.6.1).
- internal/store/applications.go: transactional CRUD; globally unique
login; ListBindings (address->login) as the map source; logins-by-
domain for pre-cascade SASL cleanup.
- internal/app: saslpasswd2 wrapper (password via stdin, login as a
whitelisted argv element, no shell — 7.6.3); strong base64url password;
address validation that enforces domain ownership before any config
write (7.6.2); service orchestrating store + sasldb2 + map with full
rollback on partial failure.
- internal/postfix: sender_login_maps regenerated as a pure function of
the registry (many-to-one logins merged per address), atomic write,
injection backstop (7.6.4).
- Postfix reload, corrected: `postfix start-fg` forks a separate master,
so signalling the supervised process never reaches it. Reload now runs
the canonical `postfix reload` via a one-shot supervisord program the
unprivileged panel triggers over the group control socket. Verified in
mail.log.
- domain.Service.Delete purges the domain's SASL accounts, then cascades,
then rebuilds the sender map and reloads; manual reload now covers both
OpenDKIM and Postfix.
- web: application management in the domain page, one-time credential
shown inline; postfix joins the selfpost group and entrypoint normalises
/data/sasl and /data/postfix (setgid, group-readable) with self-heal.
Verified on the dev server: gofmt/vet/test green, image builds, and a
container e2e covers the full application lifecycle, domain-delete
cascade, restart persistence, and a real postfix reload.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add/list/delete of sending domains with per-domain DKIM keys and the
OpenDKIM tables that drive signing (spec 6, 7.2.2-4, 7.2.10).
internal/domain:
- Pure-Go RSA-2048 keygen; PKCS#1 PEM written atomically at 0640; the
published DNS TXT record is derived from the key on disk (single source
of truth) rather than persisted. No os/exec for key generation.
- KeyTable/SigningTable fully regenerated from the registry on every
add/delete (idempotent), written atomically; SigningTable via refile:
with *@domain, KeyTable with absolute key paths. Table writer refuses
any unsafe character as a backstop (spec 7.6.4).
- Reload without root: the unprivileged panel signals OpenDKIM through
supervisord (`supervisorctl signal USR1 opendkim`, fixed args, no
shell, no user input — spec 7.6.3). An existing key is reused, never
overwritten, so re-adding a domain keeps its published DNS valid.
- Service orchestrates registry -> key -> table rebuild -> reload, with
rollback of the row if a downstream step fails; delete cascades apps
via the DB FK and removes the key + table entries.
Infra:
- Shared `selfpost` group bridges panel (writes keys) and opendkim
(reads them); /data/opendkim is setgid so panel-created files inherit
the group, keys are 0640, RequireSafeKeys is disabled by design.
- opendkim.conf moves from verify-only (Mode v) to signing (Mode s).
- entrypoint.sh normalises the DKIM tree on every start (ownership,
setgid, perms, empty tables before opendkim starts) — self-healing
after a restore.
- supervisord control socket opened to the `selfpost` group so the panel
can request the reload.
web/store:
- Strict domain-name validation (whitelist [a-z0-9.-], DNS shape, >=2
labels), lower-case normalisation (spec 7.6.2).
- Domain queries with application counts; delete relies on ON DELETE
CASCADE. Dashboard lists domains + add form; domain page shows the
DKIM record; a dedicated confirm page warns about the app cascade
before deletion (spec 7.2.4); manual reload button (spec 7.2.12,
OpenDKIM side; Postfix reload lands in Phase 5).
- Authenticated routes moved to a sub-mux using Go 1.22 method/wildcard
patterns.
Tests: validateDomain, DKIM keygen/record roundtrip, table rendering +
injection-safety, key reuse, store cascade. Verified on the dev server:
gofmt/vet/test green, image builds, container e2e (add/delete a domain,
DKIM record shown, OpenDKIM reads panel keys and reloads, keys and
tables persist across a restart).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add section 10.1 covering tag-triggered CI build, version from git tag
flowing into both ldflags and the image tag (enforcing the 7.5.A restore
invariant), and publishing to ghcr.io. Document Quay.io as an alternative
registry. Update 11.7 (GitHub is no longer a dumb mirror) and add the
workflow as deliverable 11.10.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Single bookworm-slim image running opendkim + panel + postfix under
supervisord with enforced start ordering (spec 4):
- build/Dockerfile: multi-stage static Go build; runtime installs postfix,
opendkim, cyrus-sasl, supervisor, logrotate; unprivileged panel user (7.6.8).
- build/supervisord.conf: priority ordering opendkim -> panel -> postfix;
crashexit event listener terminates the container on any FATAL process.
- build/postfix-wrapper.sh: waits for both milter sockets (test -S, 30s
timeout) before `postfix start-fg`, exits non-zero on timeout.
- panel: HTTP :8080 stub + /healthz, journal-milter socket stub (so the
wrapper's readiness probe passes), log-tailer stub; SIGTERM graceful stop.
Verified on the dev server: image builds, three processes live, panel serves
the stub, wrapper waits for sockets, and an unrecoverable panel failure brings
the container down cleanly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
De-risk spike confirmed emersion/go-milter v0.4.1 (BSD-2) interoperates with
Postfix 3.7.11 (bookworm) over protocol v6: reads From/To(per-rcpt)/Subject/
queue-id, gets client IP from Connect(), and fails open when the milter dies.
Progress tracker updated; Phase 1 (Docker + supervisord) is next.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Go module (codeberg.org/mix/selfpost), two command skeletons (panel,
selfpost-backup) sharing internal/buildinfo for the -ldflags version stamp,
Makefile (static CGO_ENABLED=0 build), AGPL-3.0 LICENSE, README skeleton and
.gitattributes forcing LF (container scripts must not get CRLF).
Verified on the dev server: go vet clean, make build produces statically
linked binaries, version stamping works.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
12-phase plan derived from the spec, plus a durable progress tracker
(model-per-phase, resume-after-reset protocol, commit conventions).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 14:44:24 +03:00
8 changed files with 111 additions and 366 deletions
**Цель:** опциональный приём почты на порт 25 для явно настроенных доменов и
**Цель:** возможность принимать почту на порт 25 для явно настроенных доменов и пересылать её на заданный вышестоящий backend (роль backup-MX / relay-forwarder), **как выключаемый по умолчанию модуль**, не затрагивающий поведение и поверхность атаки базового исходящего релея.
пересылка на upstream (backup-MX / relay-forwarder). По умолчанию выключено
(`INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE=false`); исходящий тракт без флага не меняется.
**Граница:** расширение v1.0 — [product.md](product.md) исключает приём входящей
**Зачем это нужно (сценарии):**
почты и mailbox'ы. Это relay/forward, не IMAP/POP3/webmail; антиспам-движок — вне
- **Backup-MX** — принять почту, когда основной почтовый сервер домена временно недоступен, и передать её, когда он вернётся.
образа, только точка подключения.
- **Фронт для сервера без внешнего IP** — у оператора есть свой почтовый сервер, который по каким-то причинам **сам не может принимать почту из интернета** (нет статического/внешнего IP, за NAT, серый адрес, закрытый порт 25 на входящую и т.п.). SelfPost с публичным IP и корректным PTR выступает публичным входным узлом для домена (MX указывает на него) и пересылает почту на этот внутренний/недоступный извне сервер.
**Готово, когда:** см. критерии в [plans/inbound-relay.md](plans/inbound-relay.md).
**Граница объёма (критично — что это НЕ):**
- **ЭТО:** приём на 25 для доменов из явного списка + пересылка (relay/forward) на upstream (`relay_domains` + `transport_maps` + `relay_recipient_maps`). Postfix здесь — чистый пересыльщик, без локальной доставки.
- **ЭТО НЕ (out of scope, [product.md](product.md)):** локальная доставка в почтовые ящики, IMAP/POP3, webmail, Dovecot. Никаких mailbox'ов. SelfPost также **не реализует и не тянет в свой образ** движок антиспама/антивируса (rspamd/ClamAV) — но, в отличие от прежней формулировки, и **не** перекладывает фильтрацию на backend (см. блок «Антиспам» ниже): предоставляет точку подключения внешнего фильтра.
**Зависимости / риски:** готовый исходящий тракт; open relay/backscatter;
**Почему как опция/плагин:**
расширение поверхности атаки (порт 25 на приём). Модель: Opus.
- Приём на порт 25 меняет модель угроз (open relay для входящей, backscatter, spam-ingress). Поэтому по умолчанию **выключено** флагом env `INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE=false`; включение — осознанный шаг оператора.
**Порядок:** рекомендуется после [web-split](plans/web-split.md) и
- Изоляция: отдельные таблицы SQLite, отдельные хендлеры/страницы панели, отдельная ветка генерации конфига. При выключенном флаге входной listener, таблицы и UI отсутствуют — базовый исходящий тракт байт-в-байт неизменен.
[domain-admin](plans/domain-admin.md).
**Версия:** целевой bump `1.x`; возможен `2.x` — уточнить по итогам реализации.
**Что делать:**
- Env-флаг `INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE` (default false); при `true` — генерировать входной сервис и его конфиг из состояния панели тем же путём, что остальной конфиг (`postfix-config.sh`).
- **`master.cf`:** входной `smtp inet` на 25 для приёма из интернета (сейчас 25 используется только на исходящую доставку). Отдельный от 465/587: на 25 **не** предлагается SASL и **не** разрешается отправка наружу — только приём для `relay_domains`.
- **Анти-open-relay для входящей (обязательно):**`smtpd_relay_restrictions`/`smtpd_recipient_restrictions` входного smtpd принимают почту **только** для доменов из `relay_domains` и **только** для известных получателей (`relay_recipient_maps`); всё прочее — `reject_unauth_destination`/`reject_unlisted_recipient`. Открытый релей и приём «для кого угодно» невозможны.
- **Backscatter:** предпочтительно знать валидных получателей (reject unknown recipient на этапе RCPT), чтобы не порождать bounce на несуществующие адреса.
- **Панель управляет:** список входящих доменов; для каждого — upstream destination (`host:port`, транспорт), опциональный список валидных получателей, опциональный TLS к upstream. Строгая валидация домена/хоста/порта (whitelist), injection-safe запись map-файлов (как `sender_login_maps` в Фазе 4), `os/exec` без shell ([security.md](security.md)).
- **Милтеры:** OpenDKIM на входящем тракте не нужен (чужую входящую не подписываем). journal-milter опционально переиспользовать для журнала входящих (доп. работа) либо на первом этапе оставить входящий без него; поведение fail-open сохраняется.
- **Rate-limit/размер:** грубый лимит по client IP (`anvil`, как L1) и `message_size_limit` на входном smtpd.
**Антиспам (важная, но опциональная возможность).** Это ценная опция, но она **не обязательна**: часть операторов вполне устроит **слепая пересылка без фильтрации** — например, когда backend сам умеет фильтровать по содержимому, стоит доверенный upstream, или объём/риск невелик. Поэтому антиспам-хук по умолчанию **выключен** (пустой `INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER`), и входящий релей полностью работоспособен без него. Важно другое — где фильтрация возможна технически: при «слепом» relay целевой backend видит подключающимся IP адрес **SelfPost**, а не исходного отправителя, поэтому на backend'е ломается всё, что завязано на origin IP (DNSBL/репутация проверяются против IP SelfPost, SPF даёт fail — SelfPost не входит в SPF домена-отправителя). **Единственная точка, где ещё виден настоящий client IP — входной хоп на SelfPost**; поэтому тем, кому фильтрация нужна, она должна быть *подключаема именно здесь*, а не переложена на backend, который эту информацию уже потерял. Дизайн подключения:
- **Движок антиспама — отдельный опциональный контейнер** (rspamd и т.п.), который оператор запускает **только если нужна эта опция** (тот же принцип, что reverse-proxy — отдельный контейнер вне образа SelfPost). SelfPost его **не содержит и не запускает** — образ и принцип «один контейнер, три процесса» неизменны, [product.md](product.md) out of scope не нарушается (SelfPost не реализует антиспам).
- **SelfPost предоставляет точку подключения:** milter-хук на входном smtpd. Адрес движка задаётся env (например, `INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER=inet:antispam:11332`, пусто → хук выключен) и добавляется в `smtpd_milters`**только входного** тракта (не на 465/587). Postfix передаёт milter'у настоящий client IP/HELO/PTR — фильтр видит истинный origin. `milter_default_action` для этого milter'а — конфигурируемый (fail-open vs tempfail); дефолт определить при реализации.
- **Нативный backstop без зависимостей:** на том же входном хопе доступны средства Postfix по origin IP — `reject_rbl_client` (DNSBL), проверки HELO/PTR — работают даже без внешнего контейнера. Плюс сохранение аутентификации для downstream через ARC/`Received` там, где часть фильтрации всё же остаётся на backend.
- **docker-compose:** задокументировать опциональный фрагмент antispam-сайдкара (как альтернативные фрагменты reverse-proxy) — контейнер поднимается вместе со стеком только при включённой опции.
- **Персистентность:** новые таблицы и map-файлы под `/data` — попадают в полный бэкап автоматически (Фаза 9). Экспорт/импорт домена можно расширить входящей конфигурацией — опционально, пометить.
- **DNS-документация:** для входящего домена нужна `MX`-запись, указывающая на сервер (в отличие от исходящего, где MX не требуется) — отразить в разделе DNS README.
**Безопасность ([security.md](security.md)):** валидация ввода на сервере, экранирование записи в конфиги, `exec` без интерполяции, никакого open relay, защита от backscatter.
**Готово, когда:** при `INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE=true` и настроенном домене письмо на порт 25 для этого домена пересылается на заданный upstream; почта для ненастроенных доменов/получателей отклоняется (не open relay, не backscatter); при заданном `INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER` входящая проходит через внешний фильтр с настоящим origin IP (проверено сайдкар-контейнером), при пустом — хук не мешает; при `INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE=false` — входной порт/таблицы/UI отсутствуют, базовый исходящий релей неизменён; `build`/`vet`/`test`/образ зелёные.
**Риски:** open relay/backscatter (снимается `relay_domains` + `relay_recipient_maps` + `reject_unauth_destination`); потеря origin IP для фильтрации на backend'е при пересылке (снимается milter-хуком антиспама + нативным DNSBL на входном хопе, где origin IP ещё виден); порт 25 на приём расширяет поверхность атаки (по умолчанию выключено). **Модель:** Opus (инфра/безопасность, риск open relay). **Внешняя зависимость деплоя:** опциональный antispam-контейнер — вне образа SelfPost, поднимается оператором при включении опции.
**Зависимости:** не является частью v1.0, зависит только от готового исходящего тракта (уже реализован) и требует отдельного согласования ([.cursor/rules/agent-rules.mdc](../.cursor/rules/agent-rules.mdc)) до кодирования.
---
---
## domain-admin
## Роль администратора домена — кандидат на 2.x
**Цель:** роль с доступом к одному или нескольким назначенным доменам
**Что это.** Сейчас в панели ровно один субъект: `requireAuth` — булев гейт, а не роль ([web.go](../internal/web/web.go) — обёртка `mux.Handle("/", s.requireAuth(authed))`), сессия не несёт ничего, кроме факта входа. Роль выдаёт доступ к одному домену и только к нему: приложения этого домена (создание, режим отправителя, перегенерация пароля, удаление, свой L2-лимит), DKIM/DNS-статус домена и журнал отправки, отфильтрованный по домену — фильтр в журнале уже есть ([sendLogData](../internal/web/handlers_monitor.go)). Вне роли остаётся то, что глобально по своей природе: добавление и удаление доменов, `/reload`, полный бэкап (это весь `/data` вместе с`sasldb2`, то есть все домены сразу), очередь и хвост `mail.log` — они серверные и к домену не привязаны.
(перечень задаёт глобальный администратор) — приложения, DKIM/DNS, журнал
отправки по каждому из них; без глобальных операций (добавление доменов, полный
бэкап, очередь, `mail.log`).
**Граница:** расширение v1.0 — [product.md](product.md) фиксирует одного
**Почему 2.x, а не v1.x.** [product.md](product.md) относит «несколько пользователей
администратора. Не вторая копия всевластного админа, а ограниченный доступ к
панели, роли» к out of scope (один администратор), поэтому появление второго
назначенным доменам (одному или нескольким).
субъекта — расширение границ проекта, как и Фаза O1: сначала согласование
([.cursor/rules/agent-rules.mdc](../.cursor/rules/agent-rules.mdc)), только потом код. Цена — уровня фазы, а не патча: таблица пользователей и их привязка к доменам, роль в сессии, авторизация в каждом хендлере (а не только на маршруте — сейчас `{id}`/`{aid}` не сверяются ни с чем, кроме существования), пересмотр первичного setup'а и смены пароля под нескольких пользователей, учёт нового субъекта в бэкапе и экспорте домена.
**Готово, когда:** см. [plans/domain-admin.md](plans/domain-admin.md).
*(Прежняя формулировка этого пункта — «2FA и несколько администраторов» — заменена: 2FA снята с рассмотрения, а «несколько администраторов» уточнено до одной конкретной роли, потому что нужна не вторая копия всевластного админа, а ограниченный доступ владельца отдельного домена.)*
**Зависимости / риски:** таблица пользователей, роль в сессии, авторизация в
каждом хендлере, setup/бэкап. **Порядок:** рекомендуется после
[web-split](plans/web-split.md), до [inbound-relay](plans/inbound-relay.md).
**Версия:** `1.x` MINOR при совместимой миграции текущего админа в глобального.
---
---
## web-split
## `CONTRIBUTING.md` — кандидат на 2.x
**Цель:** осознанно разрезать `internal/web` (или зафиксировать плоский пакет)
**Что это.** Точка входа для стороннего контрибьютора: dev loop, маршрутизация
перед ростом от inbound-relay и domain-admin.
моделей по типу работы, протокол коммитов, требование
`gofmt`/`vet`/`test`/`make e2e` до PR. Сейчас всё это есть в
[development.md](development.md) (английский процесс) и в этом файле (открытая
работа, русский).
**Граница:** внутренний рефакторинг; поведение панели для оператора не меняется.
**Почему 2.x, а не v1.x.** Файл имеет смысл, когда есть кому его читать: у
проекта один разработчик и внешнего потока PR нет, поэтому сейчас
`CONTRIBUTING.md` был бы документом без аудитории и ещё одним местом, где
расходится правда о dev loop. Уместен вместе с тем, что реально открывает
проект вовне: английская документация процесса ([development.md](development.md),
README, `architecture.md`; [roadmap.md](roadmap.md) — внутренний трекер, на
русском) и первый внешний интерес после публикации релиза.
**Готово, когда:** пакет разрезан по выбранной схеме или зафиксировано, что
**Готово, когда:** `CONTRIBUTING.md` в корне описывает dev loop, требования к
остаётся плоским — см. [plans/web-split.md](plans/web-split.md).
проверкам перед PR и протокол коммитов; [development.md](development.md) не
дублирует его, а ссылается.
**Зависимости / риски:** экспорт пакетно-приватного API. **Порядок:** рекомендуется
**первым** среди согласованных фич (до domain-admin и inbound-relay).
**Версия:** `1.x`, сам по себе breaking не тянет.
---
---
## contributing
## Разбиение `internal/web` на подпакеты — кандидат на 2.x
**Цель:** `CONTRIBUTING.md` в корне — dev loop, проверки перед PR, протокол
**Что это.** `internal/web` — самый крупный пакет проекта: ~50 файлов
коммитов; [development.md](development.md) ссылается, не дублирует.
(включая шаблоны и static), ~25 `.go` / ~4000 строк Go, в одной плоскости
лежат хендлеры всех разделов панели, сессии,
security-заголовки, проверка Origin, валидация форм и рендер шаблонов.
Кандидаты на выделение — `web/handlers` и `web/auth`, либо разрез по доменам
панели.
**Граница:** документация процесса; уместна при внешнем потоке PR.
**Почему 2.x, а не сейчас.** На нынешнем размере плоский пакет читается: имена
работают не хуже каталогов, а разбиение потянуло бы за собой экспорт того, что
сейчас пакетно-приватно, — то есть расширение внутреннего API ради
косметики. Смысл появляется ровно тогда, когда пакет начнёт расти: обе задачи
2.x выше добавляют в него код — роль администратора домена приносит
авторизацию в каждый хендлер, входящий релей — отдельные страницы и хендлеры
входящих доменов. Рефакторинг дешевле делать перед этим ростом, чем после.
**Готово, когда:** файл в корне; development.md не дублирует его.
**Готово, когда:** решение принято осознанно в момент старта 2.x — либо пакет
разрезан, либо зафиксировано, что он остаётся плоским.
**Зависимости / риски:** пока один разработчик и нет PR — низкий приоритет.
**Версия:** без значения для semver.
Reference in New Issue
Block a user
Blocking a user prevents them from interacting with repositories, such as opening or commenting on pull requests or issues. Learn more about blocking a user.
mixeme
mix