release: 2.10.4: origin-strict - a change with neither header is refused

Cut without asking, as the owner said on 2026-10-15. A POST with neither
Sec-Fetch-Site nor Origin is refused (the commit before this); the e2e
client sends Origin. go vet, go test (26 packages) and make e2e passed on
the test server for that tree. No migration, schema 12.

CHANGELOG [2.10.4]; pins in deploy/docker-compose.yml, README and the guide
(pin, build, the sample restore message); development's "from pin" and
row 36; roadmap row. No tag.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,20 @@ Format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); version
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [2.10.4] - 2026-10-16
+
+The origin check is strict. No migration; schema 12.
+
+### Security
+
+- **A change with no word of where it came from is refused**
+  (origin-strict): a `POST` that carries neither `Sec-Fetch-Site` nor
+  `Origin` is answered 403, as a cross-origin one is. It was let through
+  before, as an accepted risk, which left a browser that sends neither open
+  to a request forged by any site. Every current browser sends `Origin` with
+  a form; a browser too old to (Firefox before 70) can no longer save
+  anything in the panel.
+
 ## [2.10.3] - 2026-10-16
 
 The backup asks for your password. No migration; schema 12.

README.md

@@ -112,8 +112,8 @@ outbound mail will not reach the real internet without DNS, PTR, and port 25.
 > local image and pulls nothing:
 >
 > ```sh
-> docker build -f build/Dockerfile --build-arg VERSION=2.10.3 \
+> docker build -f build/Dockerfile --build-arg VERSION=2.10.4 \
->   -t ghcr.io/mixeme/selfpost:2.10.3 .
+>   -t ghcr.io/mixeme/selfpost:2.10.4 .
 > ```
 
 ```sh
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ docker run --rm -d --name selfpost-try \
   -e SELFPOST_HOSTNAME=mail.local.test \
   -e PANEL_COOKIE_SECURE=false \
   -v selfpost-try-data:/data \
-  ghcr.io/mixeme/selfpost:2.10.3
+  ghcr.io/mixeme/selfpost:2.10.4
 ```
 
 **Get the setup URL** (pick one):

deploy/docker-compose.yml

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
 
 services:
   selfpost:
-    image: ghcr.io/mixeme/selfpost:2.10.3
+    image: ghcr.io/mixeme/selfpost:2.10.4
     restart: unless-stopped
     environment:
       SELFPOST_HOSTNAME: "${SELFPOST_HOSTNAME:?set the mail/panel hostname, e.g. mail.example.com}"

docs/architecture.md

@@ -994,7 +994,8 @@ send it (an older one, or a current one over plain HTTP at a name other than
 `localhost`), `Origin` must name the panel's host - which a form of the panel
 carries under its `Referrer-Policy: same-origin`, the page's own origin (under
 `no-referrer` it would be `null` and refused); a request with neither header
-is let through (an accepted risk). A refusal logs the `Sec-Fetch-Site`,
+is refused too (origin-strict, `2.10.4`; it was let through before, as an
+accepted risk). A refusal logs the `Sec-Fetch-Site`,
 `Origin` and `Host` it compared.
 There are no CSRF tokens — see [security.md](security.md).
 

docs/development.md

@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ than the default «meaningful step» rule in [§ Commits and release build](#com
 2. Git tag `vX.Y.Z` and publish the GitHub Release only on explicit request (see
    [§ Release image](#release-image)).
 
-**Planned version cuts** (from pin `2.10.3`; adjust if semver changes mid-track):
+**Planned version cuts** (from pin `2.10.4`; adjust if semver changes mid-track):
 
 | Stage | ID | Cut |
 |---|---|---|
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ than the default «meaningful step» rule in [§ Commits and release build](#com
 | 33 | long, non-repeating queue ids | `2.10.1` (PATCH) |
 | 34 | phone-desktop-mode | `2.10.2` (PATCH) |
 | 35 | backup-reauth | `2.10.3` (PATCH) |
+| 36 | origin-strict | `2.10.4` (PATCH) |
 
 Docs-only prep (checklists in plans, no product code) uses the same per-step
 commit rule but **no** version cut until the next product stage ships.

docs/guide.md

@@ -204,14 +204,14 @@ cat ./data/setup-token
 #### Fixed image tag
 
 `deploy/docker-compose.yml` pins an explicit version (`ghcr.io/mixeme/selfpost:X.Y.Z`),
-deliberately never `:latest`. The current pin is `2.10.3`. **No 2.x image is
+deliberately never `:latest`. The current pin is `2.10.4`. **No 2.x image is
 published on ghcr.io yet** (the newest there is `1.3.0`); until one is, build
 it from the checkout under the pinned name, and Compose uses the local image
 instead of pulling:
 
 ```sh
-docker build -f build/Dockerfile --build-arg VERSION=2.10.3 \
+docker build -f build/Dockerfile --build-arg VERSION=2.10.4 \
-  -t ghcr.io/mixeme/selfpost:2.10.3 .
+  -t ghcr.io/mixeme/selfpost:2.10.4 .
 ```
 
 `VERSION` must equal the tag: it is the version the backup check compares
@@ -295,6 +295,9 @@ browser that does not send `Sec-Fetch-Site` (Safari before 16.4, or any
 browser on a panel served over plain HTTP at a name): there the panel compares
 `Origin` with `Host` and refuses every change as cross-origin - the log says
 so explicitly, printing the `Sec-Fetch-Site`, `Origin` and `Host` it compared.
+A request that carries neither header - a browser too old to send `Origin`,
+or a script posting to the panel without one - is refused the same way
+since 2.10.4.
 
 In every case the proxy terminates HTTPS for the panel; the resulting
 certificate must end up under `./certs` as `fullchain.pem` and `privkey.pem` —
@@ -950,7 +953,7 @@ A version mismatch at step 5 refuses to start and leaves `/data` untouched —
 the panel exits with a message naming the tag to use, e.g.:
 
 ```
-backup: this backup was created by SelfPost 2.10.2 but this image is 2.10.3 — restore into the matching image (selfpost:2.10.2)
+backup: this backup was created by SelfPost 2.10.3 but this image is 2.10.4 — restore into the matching image (selfpost:2.10.3)
 ```
 
 Fix the tag in `docker-compose.yml` (build that tag as under [Fixed image

docs/roadmap.md

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ in `git log` and [CHANGELOG.md](../CHANGELOG.md).
 | health-setup-checks | Server › Health also checks the certificate's name, Postfix's greeting and the trusted proxy (was preflight) | agreed (2026-10-13) | — | — |
 | test-email | Send a test message from the panel (was preflight) | agreed (2026-10-13) | — | — |
 | inbound-antispam-panel | Inbound antispam journal + allow/deny lists | shipped `2.1.0` | 12/12 | [plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md](plans/inbound-antispam-panel.md) |
-| origin-strict | Refuse a state-changing request that carries neither `Sec-Fetch-Site` nor `Origin` (was csrf-tokens) | agreed (2026-10-13) | — | — |
+| origin-strict | Refuse a state-changing request that carries neither `Sec-Fetch-Site` nor `Origin` (was csrf-tokens) | shipped `2.10.4` | — | — |
 | backup-reauth | Ask for the account password before a backup or a domain export is downloaded | shipped `2.10.3` | — | — |
 | review-2026-08-followups | Remaining findings of the 2026-08-19 code review | closed 2026-10-14 (rows placed in [audit-2026-10-12](audit-2026-10-12.md)) | — | — |
 | panel-notifications | E-mail notifications about important events | shipped `2.3.0` | 10/10 | [plans/panel-notifications.md](plans/panel-notifications.md) |
@@ -224,6 +224,12 @@ panel without a browser (the e2e stand, scripts) and make it send `Origin`.
 it, the e2e stand passes, the accepted risk about header-less requests is
 struck from [security.md](security.md) and its ADR states the strict rule.
 
+**Done (2026-10-16):** `originAllowed` returns false in the "neither
+header" branch; the unit test's case is refused, e2e posts with neither
+header and gets 403, and the e2e suite's client sends `Origin` on every
+form it posts. The accepted risk is struck from security.md and the ADR's
+decision says refused; architecture and the guide say so.
+
 **Dependencies / risks:** a browser that sends neither header can no longer
 save anything in the panel - accepted, the panel's users pick their own
 browsers. Tokens stay a recorded alternative, not a task: the conditions under

docs/security.md

@@ -204,6 +204,8 @@ assigned outbound domains and inbound domains **separately**, each list with
   host (the panel's `Referrer-Policy` is `same-origin`, so a browser puts the
   panel's own origin on a form post of the panel); the session cookie is
   `SameSite` as well.
+- A request with neither header is refused as well (origin-strict,
+  `2.10.4`).
 - There are **no CSRF tokens**. The decision, its price and the conditions
   for revisiting it are in the accepted risks and the ADR below.
 
@@ -512,17 +514,6 @@ operator can act on it.
 An accepted risk is a decision with a condition for revisiting it, not a
 deferred item from the roadmap.
 
-- **A `POST` with neither `Sec-Fetch-Site` nor `Origin` is allowed through.**
-  A client that sends neither — a genuinely old browser, or a webview with a
-  frozen engine — stays vulnerable to CSRF from any site. Accepted
-  deliberately: every panel user (role `global` or `domain`) is an operator who
-  picks their own browser, not an untrusted party the panel needs to defend
-  against, and a strict mode would not "protect" such a client, it would
-  simply break the panel in it. Tightening is one line in `originAllowed`
-  ([internal/web/security.go](../internal/web/security.go)): return `false`
-  instead of `true` in the "neither header present" branch. That tightening
-  is agreed (owner, 2026-10-13) as
-  [origin-strict](roadmap.md#origin-strict); this bullet goes when it ships.
 - **Session-bound CSRF tokens are not implemented.** The origin check closes the
   neighbouring-subdomain case but depends on browser behaviour; a token does
   not. The price is a hidden field in roughly two dozen forms. The trigger to
@@ -844,7 +835,8 @@ through the browser.
 **Decision.** `originAllowed` in
 [internal/web/security.go](../internal/web/security.go) checks `Sec-Fetch-Site`
 (when the browser sends it) or `Origin` (fallback) against the panel's host; a
-request carrying neither header is **allowed through** rather than rejected.
+request carrying neither header is **refused** (403), since `2.10.4`
+(origin-strict; until then it was let through as an accepted risk).
 There are no session-bound tokens embedded in forms. The check applies the same
 way regardless of the requesting user's role.
 
@@ -864,9 +856,11 @@ and sends the request itself. XSS is handled by `html/template` auto-escaping
 and CSP, so that is a separate line of defence, not a CSRF token.
 
 **Trade-off.** A client that sends neither `Sec-Fetch-Site` nor `Origin` (a
-genuinely old browser, or a webview with a frozen engine) stays vulnerable — see
+genuinely old browser - Firefox before 70 sent no Origin with a same-origin
-"Accepted risks" above. This is a deliberate choice not to break the panel in
+form - or a webview with a frozen engine) can no longer save anything in the
-such a client, at the price of a narrow residual surface.
+panel: refused rather than left open to a request forged by any site. Until
+`2.10.4` the choice was the other way round, as an accepted risk. A script
+that posts to the panel sends `Origin` itself (the e2e suite's client does).
 
 **Revisit if:** a requirement appears for protection that does not depend on
 browser behaviour, or `domain` accounts stop being trusted operators (for

internal/web/security.go

@@ -146,14 +146,14 @@ func originAllowed(r *http.Request) bool {
 	// https.
 	origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")
 	if origin == "" {
-		// Neither header. A client this old cannot be checked at all; it is
+		// Neither header: nothing says where the request came from, so it is
-		// let through as the risk consciously accepted (single-admin panel,
+		// refused (origin-strict, owner 2026-10-13; until 2.10.4 it was let
-		// the administrator picks the browser). Turning this return into
+		// through as an accepted risk). By Fetch § 3.2 a browser that follows
-		// false is the whole of the stricter policy. By Fetch § 3.2 a browser
+		// it never sends a POST without Origin; Firefox did for a same-origin
-		// that follows it never sends a POST without Origin; Firefox did for a
+		// form before 70 (MDN browser-compat-data 6.0.0, http.headers.Origin),
-		// same-origin form before 70 (MDN browser-compat-data 6.0.0,
+		// and such a browser can no longer save anything here. A script that
-		// http.headers.Origin).
+		// posts to the panel sends Origin itself (test/e2e, panelClient).
-		return true
+		return false
 	}
 	u, err := url.Parse(origin)
 	if err != nil || u.Host == "" {

internal/web/security_test.go

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ func TestOriginCheck(t *testing.T) {
 		req          *http.Request
 		wantRejected bool
 	}{
-		{"no headers at all is let through (accepted risk)", post("", ""), false},
+		{"no headers at all is refused (origin-strict)", post("", ""), true},
 		{"same-origin", post("same-origin", "https://panel.example.com"), false},
 		{"same-site, i.e. a neighbouring subdomain", post("same-site", ""), true},
 		{"cross-site", post("cross-site", "https://evil.example.net"), true},

test/e2e/health_served_test.go

@@ -162,7 +162,9 @@ func testFormPostWithTheBrowsersOrigin(t *testing.T, sc *scenario) {
 			t.Fatal(err)
 		}
 		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
-		req.Header.Set("Origin", origin)
+		if origin != "" {
+			req.Header.Set("Origin", origin)
+		}
 		resp, err := sc.panel.http.Do(req)
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatal(err)
@@ -176,4 +178,9 @@ func testFormPostWithTheBrowsersOrigin(t *testing.T, sc *scenario) {
 	if code := post("null"); code != http.StatusForbidden {
 		t.Fatalf("POST with Origin: null: status %d, want 403", code)
 	}
+	// Neither Sec-Fetch-Site nor Origin: nothing says where it came from, and
+	// it is refused (origin-strict, 2.10.4; allowed before as an accepted risk).
+	if code := post(""); code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("POST with neither header: status %d, want 403", code)
+	}
 }

test/e2e/panel_client.go

@@ -85,8 +85,17 @@ func readSetupToken(s *stack) (string, error) {
 	return strings.TrimPrefix(u.Path, "/setup/"), nil
 }
 
+// postForm posts a form as the panel's own page would: with the Origin a
+// browser sends, which the panel requires of every state-changing request
+// (origin-strict; internal/web/security.go, originAllowed).
 func (c *panelClient) postForm(path string, form url.Values) (*http.Response, string, error) {
-	resp, err := c.http.PostForm(panelBaseURL+path, form)
+	req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, panelBaseURL+path, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
+	req.Header.Set("Origin", panelBaseURL)
+	resp, err := c.http.Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, "", err
 	}