docs: stage 2 of the audit - roles, the guard, logs by id, import, logins

security.md
- § Roles: the last-global guard is inside the transaction that deletes or
  demotes (write, then count); setup is one statement; a user is saved in
  one transaction. A log row, outbound or inbound, belongs to a domain by
  id; a domain added again starts with an empty log. The Inbound › Log row of
  the table says by id.
- § Mail path, sender check: the agreement of the check and OpenDKIM is
  tested (the shared list of passed From: lines); the refusal does not say
  which other sender a line names.
- Accepted risks: "a row of the inbound log belongs to a domain by name"
  struck (L12).

guide.md
- Domain export and import: the file is checked like the forms before
  anything is created; a login keeps its case and a case clash is refused.
- The application form: a new login is stored in lower case.

schema-migrations.md was updated with 0008 in its commits. Audit plan line
ticked; stage 2's lines are all done. Roadmap 22/62.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -78,6 +78,21 @@ Format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/); version
   the form's own message, naming the field and the application (audit
   2026-10-12, M10).
 
+- **A domain added again starts with an empty log.** Send-log rows belonged
+  to a domain by its name, so a domain deleted and added again showed its
+  earlier mail to whoever it was assigned to next, and its statistics and
+  level-2 count went on counting it. A row now belongs to the domain of the
+  application that sent it, by id (migration `0008`, filled once from the
+  registry); the rows of a deleted domain are the global role's alone. The
+  inbound log follows the same rule (audit 2026-10-12, L12).
+
+- **A refusal no longer says which other domain sends from this server.**
+  A `From:` line that named another sender of the server was refused with
+  that sender's domain in the reply, which confirmed to whoever tried names
+  that it is hosted here. The reply now stops at "it names another sender of
+  this server"; the line as written stays in the reply and on the refused
+  message's page (audit 2026-10-12, L8).
+
 ### Added
 
 - **The delivery log measures its own guesses** (migration `0007`). A table

docs/audit-2026-10-12.md

@@ -672,7 +672,7 @@ has already run is never edited — the next file is added; the published
 - [x] **Import validates like the form**: route `DMARCRua`, IPs, limit mode,
    window and count through the same parsers; refuse the file with the
    validator's text. Tests per field. — **Opus**
-- [ ] **Send-log rows belong to a domain by id** (L12; owner, 2026-10-12).
+- [x] **Send-log rows belong to a domain by id** (L12; owner, 2026-10-12).
    `send_log.domain_id INTEGER REFERENCES domains(id) ON DELETE SET NULL` in
    migration `0008`, backfilled once by name against the registry as it is at
    migration time (rows of a domain already gone stay NULL); written by the
@@ -686,9 +686,11 @@ has already run is never edited — the next file is added; the published
    migration — my proposal, so that the two logs do not follow two rules.
    Tests: delete-and-re-add shows nothing to the new assignee; the old rows
    are still in the global log. — **Opus**
-- [ ] Docs: security.md § Roles (the guard) and the struck accepted risk, guide
+   *Done 2026-10-14.* DMARC reports stay by name on purpose: a report is
+   about the name in DNS, and whoever holds the name now is its reader.
+- [x] Docs: security.md § Roles (the guard) and the struck accepted risk, guide
    § Domain export, schema-migrations.md. — **Sonnet**
-- [ ] **Which key OpenDKIM signs with, seen and not reasoned** (owner,
+- [x] **Which key OpenDKIM signs with, seen and not reasoned** (owner,
    2026-10-13, from the Not verified list of from-header-binding). The check
    and OpenDKIM read `From:` with two parsers; that they agree was argued
    from the check's two rules, never run. An e2e case sends, as one
@@ -699,7 +701,12 @@ has already run is never edited — the next file is added; the published
    shared with the check's unit test, so a line added to one is run by the
    other. A disagreement found is fixed in the check before the cut, and
    security.md § Mail path says the claim is tested. - **Opus**
-- [ ] **The 550 reply names no other domain** (L8): `sender.go:334` stops at
+   *Done 2026-10-14:* fifteen lines (`internal/milter/testdata/from-lines-passed.txt`),
+   each signed for the application's domain alone, the signature valid. No
+   disagreement. Groups are refused by the check, so none is in the file;
+   a comment before the address - `(the shop) a@domain`, valid RFC 5322 - is
+   refused too ("it must be one address"): strict, not a hole, left as it is.
+- [x] **The 550 reply names no other domain** (L8): `sender.go:334` stops at
    "it names another sender of this server"; the refused message's page
    still shows the `From:` line as written (`header_from`), so the operator
    loses nothing. Test pins the reply text; e2e's sender-check negatives

docs/guide.md

@@ -1098,7 +1098,10 @@ to a domain:
   who the application may send as, its client IP allow-list and its rate limit
   are validated and saved together, or not at all, also when the application
   is created. A password is shown once, on the page that answers the creation
-  or *New password*, and is never shown again.
+  or *New password*, and is never shown again. A new login is stored in lower
+  case - Postfix does not tell `Ops` from `ops`, so the panel does not let two
+  applications be told apart by case - and the page that shows the password
+  shows the login as it was stored.
 - **Domain settings** (`…/settings`) — the *DMARC report address* (see [DMARC
   reports](#dmarc-reports)), the domain's *Rate limit* (see [Rate limiting —
   level 2](#rate-limiting--level-2-domain-and-application)), *Export domain*
@@ -1294,7 +1297,12 @@ applications' **working** SASL passwords, and configured **rate limits**
 instance without regenerating anything, so DNS (the DKIM TXT record)
 doesn't need to change. Unlike a full restore (see [Full backup and
 restore](#full-backup-and-restore)), this works across different
-hostnames/instances. *Import* is for the global role only; *export* is
+hostnames/instances. The file is checked like the forms before anything is
+created - the report address, every rate limit, every client address - and
+refused with the form's own message, naming the field and the application.
+An application login keeps the case it had (new logins are created in lower
+case), and one that differs from a login of this server only in case is
+refused. *Import* is for the global role only; *export* is
 available to any user who can access the domain, **including a user with the
 *domain* role** for a domain assigned to them — so that user can walk away with
 the domain's working SASL passwords, in the clear if they untick the encryption

docs/roadmap.md

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ in `git log` and [CHANGELOG.md](../CHANGELOG.md).
 | from-header-binding | Hold a message's `From:` header against the application that sends it | shipped `2.4.0` | 9/9 | [plans/from-header-binding.md](plans/from-header-binding.md) |
 | panel-redesign | Panel redesign (accepted mockups, design contract) | shipped `2.0.0` | 27/27 | [plans/panel-redesign.md](plans/panel-redesign.md) |
 | schema-squash | Squash SQLite migrations into a 2.x baseline | built in panel-redesign (stage 1) | — | [plans/panel-redesign.md](plans/panel-redesign.md) |
-| audit-2026-10-12 | Follow-ups of the 2026-10-12 full-tree code audit, seven stages | in progress (stage 0 shipped `2.4.2`; next stages 1+2 → `2.5.0`) | 18/62 | [audit-2026-10-12.md](audit-2026-10-12.md) |
+| audit-2026-10-12 | Follow-ups of the 2026-10-12 full-tree code audit, seven stages | in progress (stage 0 shipped `2.4.2`; next stages 1+2 → `2.5.0`) | 22/62 | [audit-2026-10-12.md](audit-2026-10-12.md) |
 
 **Recommended order** (not binding; owner, 2026-10-09: feature order follows
 development convenience): **panel-redesign** shipped as `2.0.0` (2026-10-11) and

docs/schema-migrations.md

@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ audit (`2.5.0`).
 | 5 | `0005_send_log_rejected_index.sql` | 2.3.0 | DDL | `idx_send_log_rejected`, a partial index of the refused rows of `send_log` by time; a file of its own because the test installation had run 0004 before the review asked for it |
 | 6 | `0006_sender_check.sql` | 2.4.0 | DDL | `send_log.reason` and `send_log.header_from` (both default `''`: a row refused earlier keeps no reason), and `sender_check_days` |
 | 7 | `0007_delivery_log_days.sql` | 2.5.0 | DDL | `delivery_log_days`: what the reconcile sweep and the log tailer did, a row per UTC day, kept a year, shown nowhere - the measurement that decides the sweep's fate (audit 2026-10-12, stage 1). `send_log.reason` gains the values `reconcile` and `reconcile-contradicted` without a schema change |
-| 8 | `0008_tenant_boundary.sql` | 2.5.0 | DDL | `idx_applications_login_nocase`: an application login is unique without regard to case (audit 2026-10-12, H4) |
+| 8 | `0008_tenant_boundary.sql` | 2.5.0 | DDL + data | `idx_applications_login_nocase`: an application login is unique without regard to case (audit 2026-10-12, H4). `send_log.domain_id` and `inbound_spam_log.inbound_domain_id` (`ON DELETE SET NULL`), each with an index, filled once by name from the registry as it was then: a row belongs to a domain by id, and a domain deleted and added again starts with an empty log (L12) |
 
 **Kind:** *DDL* — schema only; *data* — `INSERT`/`UPDATE` that must stay correct
 for operators upgrading from older 2.x images.

docs/security.md

@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ assigned outbound domains and inbound domains **separately**, each list with
 | Outbound: domain page, applications, Domain settings (report address, rate limit, export), log | every domain | assigned outbound domains |
 | Outbound › DMARC reports | every report, with the server's ingest statistics | reports of assigned domains, without the ingest box |
 | Inbound: domain page, upstream, recipients | every inbound domain | assigned inbound domains |
-| Inbound › Log | every row, including those of a domain deleted since | rows of assigned inbound domains (by name), without the links into the filter lists |
+| Inbound › Log | every row, including those of a domain deleted since | rows of assigned inbound domains (by id: not those of an earlier domain of the same name), without the links into the filter lists |
 | Inbound › Filter lists; the inbound log's retention | yes | no — 404 |
 | Add or delete a domain, either direction; import a domain | yes | no |
 | Account, Help | yes | yes |
@@ -152,7 +152,17 @@ assigned outbound domains and inbound domains **separately**, each list with
   (`lookupDomain`, `requireInboundDomain`) and lists are filtered by assignment
   in the query. Each denied path has a test for a `domain` user, including
   another tenant's id.
-- The panel will not remove or demote the last `global` user.
+- The panel will not remove or demote the last `global` user. The guard is
+  inside the transaction that deletes or demotes: the write comes first and
+  the count after it, so two administrators deleting or demoting each other
+  at the same moment cannot both succeed; first-user setup is one statement
+  that inserts only into an empty table. A user's name, password, e-mail,
+  role and assignments are saved in one transaction, so a failure part way
+  leaves no domain user with nothing assigned.
+- A log row - outbound or inbound - belongs to a domain by its id, written
+  when the row is: the outbound row's from the application that sent it. A
+  domain deleted and added again starts with an empty log for whoever it is
+  assigned to; the rows of the deleted one are the global role's alone.
 - A `domain` user can export an assigned domain, and an export carries the
   working application passwords (encrypted unless the box is unticked): assign
   domains with that in mind.
@@ -203,7 +213,13 @@ operator can act on it.
   looks at the raw value once more for any other name of OpenDKIM's
   `SigningTable`, so that a line its parser and OpenDKIM's could read
   differently is refused rather than argued about; outside quoted strings
-  the line may hold one `@`. What this does not promise is what a display
+  the line may hold one `@`. That the two agree is tested, not only argued:
+  the e2e sends every `From:` line the check passes - a list it shares with
+  the check's unit test, `internal/milter/testdata/from-lines-passed.txt` -
+  and wants the message signed for the application's domain and no other.
+  The reply to a refusal says that the line names another sender of the
+  server, not which: it would confirm to whoever tries names that a domain
+  is hosted here. What this does not promise is what a display
   name looks like to a person: a name of another sender written without an
   `@` the scan can find (a full-width dot, a space inside the name) passes,
   signed with the application's own key - a forged display name is as old
@@ -420,11 +436,9 @@ deferred item from the roadmap.
   through - but no message data. The inbound journal itself is in the
   database, 0640. Trigger to revisit: a shared host, where the sidecar should
   instead be given the files through a group it shares with the panel.
-- **A row of the inbound log belongs to a domain by name.** A `domain` user
+- ~~**A row of the inbound log belongs to a domain by name.**~~ Struck in
-  sees the rows whose inbound domain has the name of one assigned to them, so
+  `2.5.0` (audit 2026-10-12, L12): both logs now hold a domain by id, see
-  an inbound domain that is deleted and added again shows its earlier rows to
+  § Roles.
-  whoever it is assigned to next. Accepted: the journal is of a mail domain,
-  and the rows age out with the retention.
 - **Level-2 in-flight reservations can outlive a dropped SMTP session until TTL.**
   The journal milter cannot observe connection-close directly through
   go-milter, so if a client disconnects without an explicit `Abort`, its

internal/milter/sender.go

@@ -331,7 +331,11 @@ func (s *senderSession) judge() (shown, why string, err error) {
 			return shown, "", fmt.Errorf("signing table: %w", err)
 		}
 		if signs {
-			return printable(raw), "it names another sender of this server, " + d, nil
+			// Which one is not said: the reply would confirm to whoever
+			// tries names that another tenant sends from this server (audit
+			// 2026-10-12, L8). The line as written is in the reply and on
+			// the refused message's page.
+			return printable(raw), "it names another sender of this server", nil
 		}
 	}
 	// And one that needs to know nothing of OpenDKIM's parser: outside quoted

internal/milter/sender_test.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package milter
 import (
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
@@ -144,6 +145,14 @@ func TestSenderCheck(t *testing.T) {
 			if !strings.HasPrefix(text, "y 550 5.7.1 From: ") || !strings.Contains(text, c.wantText) {
 				t.Fatalf("reply %q, want a 550 5.7.1 saying %q", text, c.wantText)
 			}
+			// The reason names no other domain of the server (audit L8); the
+			// From: line before it is what the client wrote itself.
+			reason := text[strings.LastIndex(text, " - ")+3:]
+			for _, other := range []string{"example.com", "mail.example.org", "example.org"} {
+				if strings.Contains(reason, other) {
+					t.Fatalf("the reason %q names %s", reason, other)
+				}
+			}
 			if len(rows) != 1 || rows[0].Reason != store.ReasonFrom || rows[0].To != "someone@elsewhere.example" || rows[0].AppLogin != c.login {
 				t.Fatalf("log rows: %+v", rows)
 			}
@@ -271,3 +280,37 @@ func TestSenderCheckRefusalWithNullSenderHasItsDomain(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+// passedFromLines reads testdata/from-lines-passed.txt with {domain} put in.
+func passedFromLines(t *testing.T, domain string) []string {
+	t.Helper()
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join("testdata", "from-lines-passed.txt"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var out []string
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(string(raw), "\n") {
+		line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
+		if line == "" || strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") {
+			continue
+		}
+		s, err := strconv.Unquote(line)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: %v", line, err)
+		}
+		out = append(out, strings.ReplaceAll(s, "{domain}", domain))
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// Every line of the shared file is passed for the domain's application; the
+// e2e then checks OpenDKIM signs each for that domain alone.
+func TestSenderCheckPassesTheSharedLines(t *testing.T) {
+	bind := NewBindings(writeMaps(t, senderMaps))
+	for _, line := range passedFromLines(t, "shop.example.org") {
+		resp, rows := offer(t, bind, "shop", "shop@shop.example.org", [2]string{"From", line})
+		if resp != milter.RespContinue || len(rows) != 0 {
+			t.Errorf("From: %q refused: %s", line, replyText(resp))
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/milter/testdata/from-lines-passed.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# From: lines the sender check lets through for an application of {domain}
+# (audit 2026-10-12, stage 2: which key OpenDKIM signs with, seen and not
+# reasoned). One Go-quoted string per line; {domain} is the application's
+# domain. Two tests read this file: the check's unit test
+# (internal/milter/sender_test.go) wants each line passed, and the e2e
+# (test/e2e/dkim_from_test.go) sends each one and wants the message signed
+# for {domain} and nothing else. A line added here is run by both.
+"a@{domain}"
+"<a@{domain}>"
+"\"The Shop\" <Orders@{domain}>"
+"orders+48213@{domain}"
+"\"shop@{domain}\" <a@{domain}>"
+"\"Orders, returns\" <a@{domain}>"
+"\"The \\\"Shop\\\"\" <a@{domain}>"
+"\"someone@gmail.example\" <a@{domain}>"
+"=?utf-8?b?0JzQsNCz0LDQt9C40L0=?= <a@{domain}>"
+"=?windows-1251?B?zODj4Ofo7Q==?= <a@{domain}>"
+"=?koi8-r?Q?=ED=C1=C7=C1=DA=C9=CE?= <a@{domain}>"
+"\"A very long display name of the shop\"\r\n <a@{domain}>"
+"=?utf-8?b?0JzQsNCz0LDQt9C40L0=?=\r\n\t<a@{domain}>"
+"a@{domain} (the shop)"
+"a@{domain} (the (nested) shop)"

internal/store/inboundspam.go

@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ type InboundSpamEntry struct {
 	At time.Time
 }
 
+// inboundDomainID is the inbound_domain_id a journal row is written with: the
+// inbound domain registered under the row's name now (audit 2026-10-12, L12).
+const inboundDomainID = `(SELECT d.id FROM inbound_domains d WHERE d.name = ?)`
+
 // InsertInboundSpam records one journal row. It is called from the inbound
 // journal milter's hot path and from the log tailer, so it returns any error
 // for the caller to log; neither of them may hold up mail over it.
@@ -52,10 +56,10 @@ func (s *Store) InsertInboundSpam(e InboundSpamEntry) error {
 	}
 	_, err := s.db.Exec(
 		`INSERT INTO inbound_spam_log
-			(inbound_domain, client_ip, from_addr, to_addr, subject, decision, engine, detail, created_at)
+			(inbound_domain, client_ip, from_addr, to_addr, subject, decision, engine, detail, created_at, inbound_domain_id)
-		 VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
+		 VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, `+inboundDomainID+`)`,
 		e.InboundDomain, e.ClientIP, e.From, e.To, e.Subject, e.Decision, e.Engine, e.Detail,
-		at.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
+		at.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339), e.InboundDomain,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("insert inbound_spam_log: %w", err)
@@ -73,13 +77,13 @@ func (s *Store) InsertInboundSpamOnce(e InboundSpamEntry) (bool, error) {
 	at := e.At.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
 	res, err := s.db.Exec(
 		`INSERT INTO inbound_spam_log
-			(inbound_domain, client_ip, from_addr, to_addr, subject, decision, engine, detail, created_at)
+			(inbound_domain, client_ip, from_addr, to_addr, subject, decision, engine, detail, created_at, inbound_domain_id)
-		 SELECT ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?
+		 SELECT ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, `+inboundDomainID+`
 		 WHERE NOT EXISTS (
 			SELECT 1 FROM inbound_spam_log
 			WHERE created_at = ? AND client_ip = ? AND from_addr = ? AND to_addr = ?
 			  AND decision = ? AND engine = ? AND detail = ?)`,
-		e.InboundDomain, e.ClientIP, e.From, e.To, e.Subject, e.Decision, e.Engine, e.Detail, at,
+		e.InboundDomain, e.ClientIP, e.From, e.To, e.Subject, e.Decision, e.Engine, e.Detail, at, e.InboundDomain,
 		at, e.ClientIP, e.From, e.To, e.Decision, e.Engine, e.Detail,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -133,9 +137,10 @@ type InboundSpamRow struct {
 // the UI: an empty field matches everything. Since and Until are days, both
 // inclusive and read as UTC days whatever the time of day they carry.
 //
-// Domains is the authorization scope, which no query parameter may widen: the
+// DomainIDs is the authorization scope, which no query parameter may widen:
-// exhaustive set of inbound domain names the caller may read, applied as an IN
+// the exhaustive set of inbound domains the caller may read, by id - a row of
-// constraint. nil lifts it (the global role reads the whole journal, including
+// a domain deleted since is nobody's (audit 2026-10-12, L12) - applied as an
+// IN constraint. nil lifts it (the global role reads the whole journal, including
 // rows of a domain deleted since); an empty set is a caller who reaches
 // nothing and gets nothing. Unlike SendLogFilter, forgetting the scope is
 // therefore the permissive case - the caller states "all" by leaving it out -
@@ -145,7 +150,9 @@ type InboundSpamFilter struct {
 	Decision string
 	Since    time.Time
 	Until    time.Time
-	Domains  []string
+	// DomainIDs: the inbound domains the caller may read, by id; nil reads
+	// everything (the global role).
+	DomainIDs []int64
 }
 
 // QueryInboundSpam returns journal rows matching filter, newest first, for
@@ -197,16 +204,16 @@ func (s *Store) CountInboundSpam(filter InboundSpamFilter) (int64, error) {
 func inboundSpamWhere(f InboundSpamFilter) (string, []any) {
 	var clauses []string
 	var args []any
-	if f.Domains != nil {
+	if f.DomainIDs != nil {
-		if len(f.Domains) == 0 {
+		if len(f.DomainIDs) == 0 {
 			return " WHERE 1 = 0", nil
 		}
-		marks := make([]string, len(f.Domains))
+		marks := make([]string, len(f.DomainIDs))
-		for i, name := range f.Domains {
+		for i, id := range f.DomainIDs {
 			marks[i] = "?"
-			args = append(args, name)
+			args = append(args, id)
 		}
-		clauses = append(clauses, "inbound_domain IN ("+strings.Join(marks, ", ")+")")
+		clauses = append(clauses, "inbound_domain_id IN ("+strings.Join(marks, ", ")+")")
 	}
 	if f.Domain != "" {
 		clauses = append(clauses, "inbound_domain = ?")

internal/store/inboundspam_test.go

@@ -172,6 +172,14 @@ func TestQueryInboundSpamFilters(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Fatalf("InsertInboundSpam: %v", err)
 		}
 	}
+	ids := map[string]int64{}
+	for _, name := range []string{"a.example", "b.example"} {
+		d, err := st.AddInboundDomain(name)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		ids[name] = d.ID
+	}
 	add("a.example", "1@a.example", SpamDecisionAccept, day(20, 23))
 	add("a.example", "2@a.example", SpamDecisionReject, day(21, 0))
 	add("b.example", "3@b.example", SpamDecisionAccept, day(21, 12))
@@ -227,13 +235,13 @@ func TestQueryInboundSpamFilters(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// The scope: nil is everything, a set is its domains, an empty set nothing,
 	// and a chosen domain outside the set is nothing too.
-	if got := to(InboundSpamFilter{Domains: []string{"b.example"}}); got != "43" {
+	if got := to(InboundSpamFilter{DomainIDs: []int64{ids["b.example"]}}); got != "43" {
 		t.Errorf("scope = %q, want 43", got)
 	}
-	if got := to(InboundSpamFilter{Domains: []string{}}); got != "" {
+	if got := to(InboundSpamFilter{DomainIDs: []int64{}}); got != "" {
 		t.Errorf("empty scope = %q, want nothing", got)
 	}
-	if got := to(InboundSpamFilter{Domains: []string{"b.example"}, Domain: "a.example"}); got != "" {
+	if got := to(InboundSpamFilter{DomainIDs: []int64{ids["b.example"]}, Domain: "a.example"}); got != "" {
 		t.Errorf("a chosen domain outside the scope = %q, want nothing", got)
 	}
 

internal/store/migrations/0008_tenant_boundary.sql

@@ -9,3 +9,20 @@
 -- (case-sensitive) stays: SQLite cannot change a column's collation without
 -- rebuilding the table, and this index is the stricter rule.
 CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_applications_login_nocase ON applications (login COLLATE NOCASE);
+
+-- A send-log row belongs to a domain by its id, not its name (audit L12; the
+-- owner, 2026-10-12). A domain deleted and added again under its old name
+-- used to show the earlier rows to whoever it was assigned to next. The id is
+-- the domain of the login the row was written for; a row of a domain deleted
+-- since - and every row older than this migration whose domain is gone - is
+-- NULL and nobody's but the global role's. The name stays for display and for
+-- the global view. Filled once from the registry as it is now.
+ALTER TABLE send_log ADD COLUMN domain_id INTEGER REFERENCES domains(id) ON DELETE SET NULL;
+UPDATE send_log SET domain_id = (SELECT d.id FROM domains d WHERE d.name = send_log.domain);
+CREATE INDEX idx_send_log_domain_id_created_at ON send_log (domain_id, created_at);
+
+-- The inbound journal follows the same rule, so the two logs do not follow two
+-- (security.md's accepted risk of the inbound log, struck).
+ALTER TABLE inbound_spam_log ADD COLUMN inbound_domain_id INTEGER REFERENCES inbound_domains(id) ON DELETE SET NULL;
+UPDATE inbound_spam_log SET inbound_domain_id = (SELECT d.id FROM inbound_domains d WHERE d.name = inbound_spam_log.inbound_domain);
+CREATE INDEX idx_inbound_spam_log_domain_id_created_at ON inbound_spam_log (inbound_domain_id, created_at);

internal/store/notify.go

@@ -185,8 +185,8 @@ func (s *Store) LimitRefusalsSince(since time.Time) ([]LimitRefusal, error) {
 	rows, err := s.db.Query(
 		`SELECT d.name, a.login, COUNT(*), MIN(l.created_at)
 		 FROM send_log l
-		 JOIN applications a ON a.login = l.app_login
+		 JOIN domains d ON d.id = l.domain_id
-		 JOIN domains d ON d.id = a.domain_id
+		 JOIN applications a ON a.login = l.app_login AND a.domain_id = d.id
 		 WHERE l.status = 'rejected' AND l.created_at >= ? AND l.reason IN ('', 'limit')
 		   AND (EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM rate_limits r WHERE r.scope = 'application' AND r.ref_id = a.id)
 		     OR EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM rate_limits r WHERE r.scope = 'domain' AND r.ref_id = d.id))

internal/store/ratelimits.go

@@ -170,13 +170,17 @@ func (s *Store) RateLimit(scope, ref string) (RateLimit, bool, error) {
 // semantics — and excludes rows that were themselves rejected by a limit (they
 // were never sent). It reuses the send log the journal already writes (README
 // § Rate limiting — the limiter reuses the send log).
+//
+// A domain's messages are the rows of the domain registered under ref now, by
+// id: rows a deleted domain of the same name left behind are not its (audit
+// 2026-10-12, L12).
 func (s *Store) CountMessages(scope, ref string, since time.Time) (int64, error) {
-	var column string
+	var match string
 	switch scope {
 	case RateLimitScopeDomain:
-		column = "domain"
+		match = domainByName
 	case RateLimitScopeApp:
-		column = "app_login"
+		match = "app_login = ?"
 	default:
 		return 0, fmt.Errorf("unknown rate-limit scope %q", scope)
 	}
@@ -185,7 +189,7 @@ func (s *Store) CountMessages(scope, ref string, since time.Time) (int64, error)
 	// same format is chronologically correct (as in DeleteSendLogBefore).
 	err := s.db.QueryRow(
 		`SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT queue_id) FROM send_log
-		 WHERE `+column+` = ? AND status != ? AND created_at >= ?`,
+		 WHERE `+match+` AND status != ? AND created_at >= ?`,
 		ref, StatusRejected, since.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
 	).Scan(&n)
 	if err != nil {

internal/store/ratelimits_test.go

@@ -84,6 +84,11 @@ func TestRateLimitByNameAndLogin(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestCountMessagesDistinctAndWindowed(t *testing.T) {
 	st := openTestStore(t)
+	// A domain's messages are those of its applications (send_log.domain_id).
+	d, _ := st.AddDomain("example.com", "selfpost")
+	if _, err := st.AddApplication(d.ID, "app1", AddressModeWildcard, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
 
 	// Two recipients share a queue-id → one message. A second message → two.
 	for _, to := range []string{"a@x.net", "b@x.net"} {

internal/store/schema_test.go

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ func TestBaselineSchema(t *testing.T) {
 		"applications":          "id domain_id login address_mode auth_ip_restrict auth_allowed_ips created_at",
 		"application_addresses": "id application_id address",
 		"rate_limits":           "id scope ref_id max_messages window_seconds mode auto_multiplier auto_updated_at",
-		"send_log":              "id queue_id domain app_login from_addr to_addr subject status created_at updated_at reason header_from",
+		"send_log":              "id queue_id domain app_login from_addr to_addr subject status created_at updated_at reason header_from domain_id",
 		"logtail_state":         "path fingerprint read_offset updated_at",
 		"inbound_domains":       "id name recipient_mode created_at",
 		"inbound_transports":    "inbound_domain_id host port tls_mode",
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ func TestBaselineSchema(t *testing.T) {
 		"user_inbound_domains":  "user_id inbound_domain_id",
 		"dmarc_reports":         "id domain reporter report_id period_begin period_end received_at contact_email policy_p policy_sp policy_pct policy_adkim policy_aspf pass_count fail_count recipient",
 		"dmarc_report_records":  "id report_row_id source_ip count disposition spf_result dkim_result header_from",
-		"inbound_spam_log":      "id inbound_domain client_ip from_addr to_addr subject decision engine detail created_at",
+		"inbound_spam_log":      "id inbound_domain client_ip from_addr to_addr subject decision engine detail created_at inbound_domain_id",
 		"inbound_spam_list":     "id list_type entry_type value note created_at",
 		"send_log_lines":        "id queue_id logged_at line",
 		"notify_state":          "key phase count mark since sent_at",
@@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ func TestBaselineSchema(t *testing.T) {
 	rows.Close()
 	wantIdx := []string{
 		"idx_applications_login_nocase", "idx_dmarc_report_records_report", "idx_dmarc_reports_domain", "idx_dmarc_reports_received",
-		"idx_inbound_spam_log_created_at", "idx_inbound_spam_log_domain_created_at",
+		"idx_inbound_spam_log_created_at", "idx_inbound_spam_log_domain_created_at", "idx_inbound_spam_log_domain_id_created_at",
-		"idx_send_log_app_login_created_at", "idx_send_log_created_at", "idx_send_log_domain", "idx_send_log_lines_queue_id", "idx_send_log_queue_id", "idx_send_log_rejected",
+		"idx_send_log_app_login_created_at", "idx_send_log_created_at", "idx_send_log_domain", "idx_send_log_domain_id_created_at", "idx_send_log_lines_queue_id", "idx_send_log_queue_id", "idx_send_log_rejected",
 		"idx_sessions_expires_at",
 	}
 	sort.Strings(wantIdx)

internal/store/sendlog.go

@@ -40,6 +40,12 @@ type SendLogEntry struct {
 	HeaderFrom string
 }
 
+// loginDomainID is the domain_id a row is written with: the domain of the
+// application whose login it is, NULL for a login that is no application's
+// (audit 2026-10-12, L12). The domain name of the row stays what the
+// envelope said.
+const loginDomainID = `(SELECT a.domain_id FROM applications a WHERE a.login = ?)`
+
 // InsertQueued records an accepted message in the send log with status
 // "queued". It is called from the journal-milter hot path, so it returns any
 // error for the caller to log rather than deciding policy here; the milter
@@ -48,9 +54,9 @@ func (s *Store) InsertQueued(e SendLogEntry) error {
 	now := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
 	_, err := s.db.Exec(
 		`INSERT INTO send_log
-			(queue_id, domain, app_login, from_addr, to_addr, subject, status, created_at, updated_at)
+			(queue_id, domain, app_login, from_addr, to_addr, subject, status, created_at, updated_at, domain_id)
-		 VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
+		 VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, `+loginDomainID+`)`,
-		e.QueueID, e.Domain, e.AppLogin, e.From, e.To, e.Subject, StatusQueued, now, now,
+		e.QueueID, e.Domain, e.AppLogin, e.From, e.To, e.Subject, StatusQueued, now, now, e.AppLogin,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("insert send_log: %w", err)
@@ -67,9 +73,9 @@ func (s *Store) InsertRejected(e SendLogEntry) error {
 	now := time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
 	_, err := s.db.Exec(
 		`INSERT INTO send_log
-			(queue_id, domain, app_login, from_addr, to_addr, subject, status, reason, header_from, created_at, updated_at)
+			(queue_id, domain, app_login, from_addr, to_addr, subject, status, reason, header_from, created_at, updated_at, domain_id)
-		 VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
+		 VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, `+loginDomainID+`)`,
-		e.QueueID, e.Domain, e.AppLogin, e.From, e.To, e.Subject, StatusRejected, e.Reason, e.HeaderFrom, now, now,
+		e.QueueID, e.Domain, e.AppLogin, e.From, e.To, e.Subject, StatusRejected, e.Reason, e.HeaderFrom, now, now, e.AppLogin,
 	)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("insert rejected send_log: %w", err)
@@ -201,9 +207,12 @@ func (s *Store) ListQueuedOlderThan(cutoff time.Time) ([]QueuedDelivery, error)
 // Persistence): a SendLogEntry plus the fields that only exist once a row has
 // been written (id, current status, timestamps).
 type SendLogRow struct {
-	ID       int64
+	ID      int64
-	QueueID  string
+	QueueID string
-	Domain   string
+	Domain  string
+	// DomainID is the domain the row belongs to; 0 when it is nobody's but
+	// the global role's (its domain was deleted, or its login was none).
+	DomainID int64
 	AppLogin string
 	From     string
 	To       string
@@ -231,9 +240,9 @@ func (s *Store) GetSendLog(id int64) (SendLogRow, error) {
 		createdAt, updatedAt string
 	)
 	err := s.db.QueryRow(
-		`SELECT id, queue_id, domain, app_login, from_addr, to_addr, subject, status, reason, header_from, created_at, updated_at
+		`SELECT id, queue_id, domain, COALESCE(domain_id, 0), app_login, from_addr, to_addr, subject, status, reason, header_from, created_at, updated_at
 		 FROM send_log WHERE id = ?`, id,
-	).Scan(&row.ID, &row.QueueID, &row.Domain, &row.AppLogin, &row.From, &row.To,
+	).Scan(&row.ID, &row.QueueID, &row.Domain, &row.DomainID, &row.AppLogin, &row.From, &row.To,
 		&row.Subject, &row.Status, &row.Reason, &row.HeaderFrom, &createdAt, &updatedAt)
 	if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
 		return SendLogRow{}, ErrSendLogNotFound
@@ -252,9 +261,10 @@ func (s *Store) GetSendLog(id int64) (SendLogRow, error) {
 // Domain and AppLogin are the operator's own filters, chosen in the UI: an
 // empty field matches everything.
 //
-// Domains and AllDomains are the authorization scope, which no query parameter
+// DomainIDs and AllDomains are the authorization scope, which no query
-// may widen. Domains is the exhaustive set of domain names the caller is
+// parameter may widen. DomainIDs is the exhaustive set of domains the caller
-// entitled to read, applied as an IN constraint; AllDomains lifts that
+// is entitled to read, by id - a row whose domain was deleted is nobody's
+// (audit 2026-10-12, L12) - applied as an IN constraint; AllDomains lifts that
 // restriction and is the only way to read the whole journal. A zero-valued
 // filter therefore matches *no* rows: a caller that forgets to state a scope
 // gets an empty log rather than every tenant's mail, which is the failure mode
@@ -262,7 +272,7 @@ func (s *Store) GetSendLog(id int64) (SendLogRow, error) {
 type SendLogFilter struct {
 	Domain     string
 	AppLogin   string
-	Domains    []string
+	DomainIDs  []int64
 	AllDomains bool
 }
 
@@ -273,7 +283,7 @@ func (s *Store) QuerySendLog(filter SendLogFilter, limit, offset int) ([]SendLog
 	where, args := sendLogWhere(filter)
 	args = append(args, limit, offset)
 	rows, err := s.db.Query(
-		`SELECT id, queue_id, domain, app_login, from_addr, to_addr, subject, status, reason, header_from, created_at, updated_at
+		`SELECT id, queue_id, domain, COALESCE(domain_id, 0), app_login, from_addr, to_addr, subject, status, reason, header_from, created_at, updated_at
 		 FROM send_log`+where+`
 		 ORDER BY id DESC
 		 LIMIT ? OFFSET ?`,
@@ -290,7 +300,7 @@ func (s *Store) QuerySendLog(filter SendLogFilter, limit, offset int) ([]SendLog
 			row                  SendLogRow
 			createdAt, updatedAt string
 		)
-		if err := rows.Scan(&row.ID, &row.QueueID, &row.Domain, &row.AppLogin,
+		if err := rows.Scan(&row.ID, &row.QueueID, &row.Domain, &row.DomainID, &row.AppLogin,
 			&row.From, &row.To, &row.Subject, &row.Status, &row.Reason, &row.HeaderFrom, &createdAt, &updatedAt); err != nil {
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("scan send_log row: %w", err)
 		}
@@ -319,15 +329,15 @@ func sendLogWhere(f SendLogFilter) (string, []any) {
 		// No scope is not "no restriction": a domain administrator whose last
 		// assignment was deleted owns nothing in the journal and must see
 		// nothing, and the same clause catches a caller that never set a scope.
-		if len(f.Domains) == 0 {
+		if len(f.DomainIDs) == 0 {
 			return " WHERE 1 = 0", nil
 		}
-		marks := make([]string, len(f.Domains))
+		marks := make([]string, len(f.DomainIDs))
-		for i, name := range f.Domains {
+		for i, id := range f.DomainIDs {
 			marks[i] = "?"
-			args = append(args, name)
+			args = append(args, id)
 		}
-		clauses = append(clauses, "domain IN ("+strings.Join(marks, ", ")+")")
+		clauses = append(clauses, "domain_id IN ("+strings.Join(marks, ", ")+")")
 	}
 	if f.Domain != "" {
 		clauses = append(clauses, "domain = ?")

internal/store/sendlog_test.go

@@ -274,7 +274,13 @@ func TestUpdateStatusNoMatch(t *testing.T) {
 // decided who is asking, and the safe answer to that is nothing.
 func TestSendLogScopeIsMandatory(t *testing.T) {
 	st := openTestStore(t)
+	ids := map[string]int64{}
 	for _, domain := range []string{"first.example.ru", "second.example.ru"} {
+		d := addTestDomain(t, st, domain)
+		ids[domain] = d.ID
+		if _, err := st.AddApplication(d.ID, "app-"+domain, AddressModeWildcard, nil); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
 		if err := st.InsertQueued(SendLogEntry{
 			QueueID: "Q-" + domain, Domain: domain, AppLogin: "app-" + domain,
 			From: "noreply@" + domain, To: "public@example.net", Subject: domain,
@@ -288,14 +294,14 @@ func TestSendLogScopeIsMandatory(t *testing.T) {
 		want   []string
 	}{
 		"no scope":           {SendLogFilter{}, nil},
-		"empty scope":        {SendLogFilter{Domains: []string{}}, nil},
+		"empty scope":        {SendLogFilter{DomainIDs: []int64{}}, nil},
 		"all domains":        {SendLogFilter{AllDomains: true}, []string{"first.example.ru", "second.example.ru"}},
-		"one domain":         {SendLogFilter{Domains: []string{"first.example.ru"}}, []string{"first.example.ru"}},
+		"one domain":         {SendLogFilter{DomainIDs: []int64{ids["first.example.ru"]}}, []string{"first.example.ru"}},
-		"two domains":        {SendLogFilter{Domains: []string{"first.example.ru", "second.example.ru"}}, []string{"first.example.ru", "second.example.ru"}},
+		"two domains":        {SendLogFilter{DomainIDs: []int64{ids["first.example.ru"], ids["second.example.ru"]}}, []string{"first.example.ru", "second.example.ru"}},
-		"unknown domain":     {SendLogFilter{Domains: []string{"third.example.ru"}}, nil},
+		"unknown domain":     {SendLogFilter{DomainIDs: []int64{9999}}, nil},
-		"filter within":      {SendLogFilter{Domain: "first.example.ru", Domains: []string{"first.example.ru", "second.example.ru"}}, []string{"first.example.ru"}},
+		"filter within":      {SendLogFilter{Domain: "first.example.ru", DomainIDs: []int64{ids["first.example.ru"], ids["second.example.ru"]}}, []string{"first.example.ru"}},
-		"filter outside":     {SendLogFilter{Domain: "second.example.ru", Domains: []string{"first.example.ru"}}, nil},
+		"filter outside":     {SendLogFilter{Domain: "second.example.ru", DomainIDs: []int64{ids["first.example.ru"]}}, nil},
-		"app filter outside": {SendLogFilter{AppLogin: "app-second.example.ru", Domains: []string{"first.example.ru"}}, nil},
+		"app filter outside": {SendLogFilter{AppLogin: "app-second.example.ru", DomainIDs: []int64{ids["first.example.ru"]}}, nil},
 	} {
 		rows, err := st.QuerySendLog(tc.filter, 50, 0)
 		if err != nil {
@@ -352,3 +358,46 @@ func TestDeleteSendLogBefore(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("retention kept wrong rows: %+v", rows)
 	}
 }
+
+// A domain deleted and added again under its old name starts with an empty
+// log for whoever it is assigned to: its earlier rows belong to no domain and
+// only the global role reads them (audit 2026-10-12, L12). Statistics and the
+// level-2 count follow the same rule.
+func TestADomainAddedAgainStartsWithAnEmptyLog(t *testing.T) {
+	st := openTestStore(t)
+	old := addTestDomain(t, st, "shop.example")
+	if _, err := st.AddApplication(old.ID, "shop", AddressModeWildcard, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.InsertQueued(SendLogEntry{QueueID: "OLD", Domain: "shop.example", AppLogin: "shop", To: "a@example.net"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.DeleteDomain(old.ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	again := addTestDomain(t, st, "shop.example")
+	if _, err := st.AddApplication(again.ID, "shop", AddressModeWildcard, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.InsertQueued(SendLogEntry{QueueID: "NEW", Domain: "shop.example", AppLogin: "shop", To: "a@example.net"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	rows, err := st.QuerySendLog(SendLogFilter{DomainIDs: []int64{again.ID}}, 10, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(rows) != 1 || rows[0].QueueID != "NEW" || rows[0].DomainID != again.ID {
+		t.Fatalf("the new domain's log = %+v, want its own row alone", rows)
+	}
+	all, _ := st.QuerySendLog(SendLogFilter{AllDomains: true}, 10, 0)
+	if len(all) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("the global log has %d rows, want both", len(all))
+	}
+	if n, err := st.CountMessages(RateLimitScopeDomain, "shop.example", time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)); err != nil || n != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("level-2 count = %d, %v; want the new domain's one message", n, err)
+	}
+	if stats, err := st.DomainSendStats("shop.example", 90, time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)); err != nil || stats.Total != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("statistics = %+v, %v; want one message", stats, err)
+	}
+}

internal/store/stats.go

@@ -46,10 +46,11 @@ func StatsWindow(retentionDays int, entityCreated time.Time) (since time.Time, h
 }
 
 // DomainSendStats returns 30-day (or shorter when retention is lower) send
-// statistics for a domain name.
+// statistics for a domain, named by its name: the rows that belong to the
+// domain registered under it now (audit 2026-10-12, L12).
 func (s *Store) DomainSendStats(name string, retentionDays int, createdAt time.Time) (SendStats, error) {
 	since, hours, windowDays := StatsWindow(retentionDays, createdAt)
-	stats, err := s.sendStats("domain", name, since, hours)
+	stats, err := s.sendStats(domainByName, name, since, hours)
 	if err != nil {
 		return SendStats{}, err
 	}
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ func (s *Store) DomainSendStats(name string, retentionDays int, createdAt time.T
 // AppSendStats returns send statistics for an application login.
 func (s *Store) AppSendStats(login string, retentionDays int, createdAt time.Time) (SendStats, error) {
 	since, hours, windowDays := StatsWindow(retentionDays, createdAt)
-	stats, err := s.sendStats("app_login", login, since, hours)
+	stats, err := s.sendStats("app_login = ?", login, since, hours)
 	if err != nil {
 		return SendStats{}, err
 	}
@@ -70,30 +71,36 @@ func (s *Store) AppSendStats(login string, retentionDays int, createdAt time.Tim
 	return stats, nil
 }
 
-func (s *Store) sendStats(column, ref string, since time.Time, hours float64) (SendStats, error) {
+// domainByName selects a domain's send-log rows by the id of the domain
+// registered under the name it is given.
+const domainByName = "domain_id = (SELECT d.id FROM domains d WHERE d.name = ?)"
+
+// sendStats counts the rows that match, a condition with one placeholder
+// taking ref.
+func (s *Store) sendStats(match, ref string, since time.Time, hours float64) (SendStats, error) {
 	sinceStr := since.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
 
 	var total int64
 	err := s.db.QueryRow(
 		`SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT queue_id) FROM send_log
-		 WHERE `+column+` = ? AND status != ? AND created_at >= ?`,
+		 WHERE `+match+` AND status != ? AND created_at >= ?`,
 		ref, StatusRejected, sinceStr,
 	).Scan(&total)
 	if err != nil {
-		return SendStats{}, fmt.Errorf("send stats total %s %q: %w", column, ref, err)
+		return SendStats{}, fmt.Errorf("send stats total %q: %w", ref, err)
 	}
 
 	var peak int64
 	err = s.db.QueryRow(
 		`SELECT COALESCE(MAX(bucket_count), 0) FROM (
 		   SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT queue_id) AS bucket_count FROM send_log
-		   WHERE `+column+` = ? AND status != ? AND created_at >= ?
+		   WHERE `+match+` AND status != ? AND created_at >= ?
 		   GROUP BY substr(created_at, 1, 13)
 		 )`,
 		ref, StatusRejected, sinceStr,
 	).Scan(&peak)
 	if err != nil {
-		return SendStats{}, fmt.Errorf("send stats peak %s %q: %w", column, ref, err)
+		return SendStats{}, fmt.Errorf("send stats peak %q: %w", ref, err)
 	}
 
 	avg := float64(total) / hours

internal/web/handlers/authz.go

@@ -57,3 +57,13 @@ func domainNameSet(domains []store.Domain) map[string]bool {
 	}
 	return m
 }
+
+// domainIDSet is the set of the ids of domains; a send-log row's DomainID is
+// in it when the row belongs to one of them (0, a row of no domain, never is).
+func domainIDSet(domains []store.Domain) map[int64]bool {
+	m := make(map[int64]bool, len(domains))
+	for _, d := range domains {
+		m[d.ID] = true
+	}
+	return m
+}

internal/web/handlers/handlers_health_page_test.go

@@ -189,6 +189,10 @@ func TestOverviewPageShowsVerdictsAndDomains(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("AddDomain: %v", err)
 	}
+	// A row is the domain's through its application (send_log.domain_id).
+	if _, err := h.store.AddApplication(d.ID, "app", store.AddressModeWildcard, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
 	if err := h.store.InsertQueued(store.SendLogEntry{QueueID: "Q1", Domain: d.Name, AppLogin: "app", From: "noreply@" + d.Name, To: "public@example.net", Subject: "Hello"}); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("InsertQueued: %v", err)
 	}

internal/web/handlers/handlers_inbound_log.go

@@ -39,9 +39,11 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleInboundLog(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 	names := make([]string, 0, len(assigned))
+	ids := make([]int64, 0, len(assigned))
 	offered := make(map[string]bool, len(assigned))
 	for _, d := range assigned {
 		names = append(names, d.Name)
+		ids = append(ids, d.ID)
 		offered[d.Name] = true
 	}
 
@@ -65,7 +67,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleInboundLog(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	// behind by a domain that has since been deleted; anyone else only what is
 	// assigned to them, however empty that is.
 	if !p.IsGlobal() {
-		query.Domains = names
+		query.DomainIDs = ids
 	}
 
 	total, err := h.store.CountInboundSpam(query)

internal/web/handlers/handlers_monitor.go

@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleDelivery(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
 		return
 	}
-	if !p.IsGlobal() && !domainNameSet(allowed)[row.Domain] {
+	if !p.IsGlobal() && !domainIDSet(allowed)[row.DomainID] {
 		http.NotFound(w, r)
 		return
 	}
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleDelivery(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	// The names link to their pages when there is a page to go to: a domain
 	// that was deleted since, or an application of another domain, is text.
 	for _, d := range allowed {
-		if d.Name != row.Domain {
+		if d.ID != row.DomainID {
 			continue
 		}
 		in.DomainHref = view.DomainHref(d.ID)
@@ -317,8 +317,10 @@ func (h *Handlers) outLogPage(r *http.Request) (*view.OutLog, error) {
 	allowedNames := domainNameSet(assigned)
 
 	domainNames := make([]string, 0, len(assigned))
+	domainIDs := make([]int64, 0, len(assigned))
 	for _, d := range assigned {
 		domainNames = append(domainNames, d.Name)
+		domainIDs = append(domainIDs, d.ID)
 	}
 
 	loginSet := make(map[string]bool)
@@ -341,8 +343,10 @@ func (h *Handlers) outLogPage(r *http.Request) (*view.OutLog, error) {
 		Domain:   q.Get("domain"),
 		AppLogin: q.Get("app"),
 		// A global administrator reads the whole journal, including rows left
-		// behind by a domain that has since been deleted.
+		// behind by a domain that has since been deleted; anyone else the rows
-		Domains:    domainNames,
+		// of the domains assigned to them, by id - not those an earlier domain
+		// of the same name left (audit 2026-10-12, L12).
+		DomainIDs:  domainIDs,
 		AllDomains: p.IsGlobal(),
 	}
 	if !p.IsGlobal() {

internal/web/handlers/handlers_users_test.go

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
+	"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/web/auth"
 )
 
 // The users form's writes, driven through the handlers (audit 2026-10-12, M7
@@ -97,3 +98,55 @@ func TestUserFormCreatesWithEmailAndReach(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("created %+v", u)
 	}
 }
+
+// A domain deleted and added again under its old name starts with an empty
+// log for whoever it is assigned to; its earlier rows are the global role's
+// alone (audit 2026-10-12, L12).
+func TestADomainAddedAgainShowsItsAssigneeNothingOld(t *testing.T) {
+	h, st := inboundHandlers(t)
+	root := userWith(t, st, "root", store.RoleGlobal, store.Reach{})
+	old, _ := st.AddDomain("shop.example", "mail")
+	st.AddApplication(old.ID, "shop", store.AddressModeWildcard, nil)
+	if err := st.InsertQueued(store.SendLogEntry{QueueID: "OLDQ", Domain: "shop.example", AppLogin: "shop", To: "a@example.net", Subject: "old mail"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if err := st.DeleteDomain(old.ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	again, _ := st.AddDomain("shop.example", "mail")
+	st.AddApplication(again.ID, "shop", store.AddressModeWildcard, nil)
+	if err := st.InsertQueued(store.SendLogEntry{QueueID: "NEWQ", Domain: "shop.example", AppLogin: "shop", To: "a@example.net", Subject: "new mail"}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	owner := userWith(t, st, "owner", store.RoleDomain, store.Reach{DomainIDs: []int64{again.ID}})
+	rows, _ := st.QuerySendLog(store.SendLogFilter{AllDomains: true}, 10, 0)
+	var oldID, newID int64
+	for _, r := range rows {
+		if r.QueueID == "OLDQ" {
+			oldID = r.ID
+		} else {
+			newID = r.ID
+		}
+	}
+
+	page := func(p *auth.Principal, id int64) int {
+		return send(h.HandleDelivery, p, "GET", "/outbound/log/"+idStr(id), map[string]string{"id": idStr(id)}, nil).Code
+	}
+	if code := page(&owner, oldID); code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("the old row's page for the new assignee = %d, want 404", code)
+	}
+	if code := page(&owner, newID); code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Errorf("the new row's page for its assignee = %d, want 200", code)
+	}
+	if code := page(&root, oldID); code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Errorf("the old row's page for the global role = %d, want 200", code)
+	}
+	body := send(h.HandleDeliveries, &owner, "GET", "/outbound/log", nil, nil).Body.String()
+	if strings.Contains(body, "old mail") || !strings.Contains(body, "new mail") {
+		t.Errorf("the new assignee's log shows the old row or misses the new one")
+	}
+	body = send(h.HandleDeliveries, &root, "GET", "/outbound/log", nil, nil).Body.String()
+	if !strings.Contains(body, "old mail") || !strings.Contains(body, "new mail") {
+		t.Errorf("the global log is missing a row")
+	}
+}

test/e2e/dkim_from_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+package e2e
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/emersion/go-msgauth/dkim"
+)
+
+// passedFromLines reads the From: lines the sender check passes, the file its
+// unit test reads too, with the application's domain put in.
+func passedFromLines(repoRoot, domain string) ([]string, error) {
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(repoRoot, "internal", "milter", "testdata", "from-lines-passed.txt"))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	var out []string
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(string(raw), "\n") {
+		line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
+		if line == "" || strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") {
+			continue
+		}
+		s, err := strconv.Unquote(line)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", line, err)
+		}
+		out = append(out, strings.ReplaceAll(s, "{domain}", domain))
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// testSignedForItsDomainOnly: the sender check and OpenDKIM read From: with
+// two parsers, and that they agree was argued, never run (audit 2026-10-12,
+// stage 2). Every From: line the check passes for an application is sent as
+// that application, and what arrives must be signed for its domain - with a
+// signature that validates - and for no other: a line the check reads as the
+// application's own and OpenDKIM as another sender's would be signed with
+// that sender's key.
+func testSignedForItsDomainOnly(t *testing.T, sc *scenario) {
+	lines, err := passedFromLines(h.repoRoot, senderDomain)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, line := range lines {
+		token := uniqueToken("dkimfrom")
+		res := attemptSend(sendAttempt{
+			authLogin: sc.appLogin, authPassword: sc.appPassword,
+			from: "alerts@" + senderDomain, headerFrom: line, to: recipient,
+			subject: "e2e " + token, body: "which key signs this",
+		})
+		if !res.ok() {
+			t.Errorf("From: %q was refused: %v", line, res.firstErr())
+			continue
+		}
+		raw, err := findSinkMessage(h.stageDir, token, 30*time.Second)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("From: %q never reached the sink: %v", line, err)
+			continue
+		}
+		verifications, err := dkim.VerifyWithOptions(bytes.NewReader(raw), &dkim.VerifyOptions{LookupTXT: lookupTXTFunc()})
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Errorf("From: %q: dkim verify: %v", line, err)
+			continue
+		}
+		valid := false
+		for _, v := range verifications {
+			if v.Domain != senderDomain {
+				t.Errorf("From: %q was signed for %s", line, v.Domain)
+			}
+			if v.Domain == senderDomain && v.Err == nil {
+				valid = true
+			}
+		}
+		if !valid {
+			t.Errorf("From: %q has no valid signature for %s (%d signature(s))", line, senderDomain, len(verifications))
+		}
+	}
+}

test/e2e/main_test.go

@@ -310,6 +310,9 @@ func TestE2E(t *testing.T) {
 	run("sender_check_holds_the_from_line", func(t *testing.T) {
 		testSenderCheck(t, sc)
 	})
+	run("passed_from_lines_signed_for_their_domain_only", func(t *testing.T) {
+		testSignedForItsDomainOnly(t, sc)
+	})
 	run("panel_down_defers_mail", func(t *testing.T) {
 		testPanelDownDefersMail(t, sc)
 	})

test/e2e/sender_check_test.go

@@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ func testSenderCheck(t *testing.T, sc *scenario) {
 		// DATA for the client; it is permanent and says what is wrong.
 		if e := fmt.Sprint(res.dataErr); res.dataErr == nil || !strings.HasPrefix(e, "550 ") || !strings.Contains(e, "5.7.1 From:") {
 			t.Errorf("%s: want 550 5.7.1 naming the From: line at the end of DATA, got %v", c.name, res.firstErr())
+		} else if reason := e[strings.LastIndex(e, " - ")+3:]; strings.Contains(reason, otherDomain) {
+			// What the client wrote is said back; that the other domain is
+			// a sender of this server is not (audit 2026-10-12, L8).
+			t.Errorf("%s: the reason %q names %s", c.name, reason, otherDomain)
 		}
 		if _, err := findSinkMessage(h.stageDir, token, 2*time.Second); err == nil {
 			t.Errorf("%s: the refused message reached the sink", c.name)