package milter import ( "errors" "net" "strings" "testing" "time" "github.com/emersion/go-milter" "codeberg.org/mix/selfpost/internal/store" ) // fakeRecorder captures inserts and can be made to fail, to prove the milter // swallows recorder errors and still accepts the message. By default it reports // no configured rate limit, so the level-2 check is inert unless a test sets // limits (see fakeRecorder fields). type fakeRecorder struct { entries []store.SendLogEntry rejected []store.SendLogEntry fail bool // limits, keyed by "scope|ref", drive the level-2 rate-limit tests. counts // gives the recent-message count returned for a "scope|ref". lookupErr and // countErr force the store errors that must fail open. limits map[string]store.RateLimit counts map[string]int64 lookupErr error countErr error } func (f *fakeRecorder) InsertQueued(e store.SendLogEntry) error { if f.fail { return errors.New("boom") } f.entries = append(f.entries, e) return nil } func (f *fakeRecorder) InsertRejected(e store.SendLogEntry) error { f.rejected = append(f.rejected, e) return nil } func (f *fakeRecorder) RateLimit(scope, ref string) (store.RateLimit, bool, error) { if f.lookupErr != nil { return store.RateLimit{}, false, f.lookupErr } rl, ok := f.limits[scope+"|"+ref] return rl, ok, nil } func (f *fakeRecorder) CountMessages(scope, ref string, _ time.Time) (int64, error) { if f.countErr != nil { return 0, f.countErr } return f.counts[scope+"|"+ref], nil } func mods(kv map[string]string) *milter.Modifier { return &milter.Modifier{Macros: kv} } // drive replays a typical message through one session and returns the recorder. func drive(t *testing.T, rec Store) *session { t.Helper() s := &session{rec: rec} if _, err := s.Connect("localhost", "tcp4", 0, net.ParseIP("203.0.113.7"), mods(nil)); err != nil { t.Fatalf("Connect: %v", err) } if _, err := s.MailFrom("noreply@example.com", mods(map[string]string{"auth_authen": "app1"})); err != nil { t.Fatalf("MailFrom: %v", err) } if _, err := s.RcptTo("", mods(nil)); err != nil { t.Fatalf("RcptTo: %v", err) } if _, err := s.RcptTo("b@example.net", mods(nil)); err != nil { t.Fatalf("RcptTo: %v", err) } if _, err := s.Header("Subject", "Hello there", mods(nil)); err != nil { t.Fatalf("Header: %v", err) } if _, err := s.Body(mods(map[string]string{"i": "ABC123"})); err != nil { t.Fatalf("Body: %v", err) } return s } func TestSessionRecordsRowPerRecipient(t *testing.T) { rec := &fakeRecorder{} s := drive(t, rec) if s.clientIP != "203.0.113.7" { t.Fatalf("clientIP = %q, want 203.0.113.7", s.clientIP) } if len(rec.entries) != 2 { t.Fatalf("want 2 entries, got %d: %+v", len(rec.entries), rec.entries) } got := rec.entries[0] want := store.SendLogEntry{ QueueID: "ABC123", Domain: "example.com", AppLogin: "app1", From: "noreply@example.com", To: "a@example.net", // angle brackets stripped Subject: "Hello there", } if got != want { t.Fatalf("entry[0]\n got %+v\nwant %+v", got, want) } if rec.entries[1].To != "b@example.net" { t.Fatalf("entry[1].To = %q", rec.entries[1].To) } } // A subject in any non-ASCII alphabet reaches the milter as RFC 2047 // encoded-words; the journal stores the text, not the encoding. func TestHeaderDecodesEncodedSubject(t *testing.T) { long := strings.Repeat("я", subjectMaxRunes+10) for _, tc := range []struct { name, raw, want string }{ {"plain", "Hello there", "Hello there"}, {"utf8 q", "=?utf-8?Q?=D0=9F=D1=80=D0=BE=D0=B2=D0=B5=D1=80=D0=BA=D0=B0?=", "Проверка"}, {"utf8 b, folded across two words", "=?utf-8?B?0J/RgNC40LLQtdGC?=\r\n =?utf-8?B?INC80LjRgA==?=", "Привет мир"}, // No decoder for the legacy single-byte charsets: keep the header as // sent rather than losing the subject entirely. {"unknown charset", "=?windows-1251?B?z/Do4uXy?=", "=?windows-1251?B?z/Do4uXy?="}, {"too long", long, strings.Repeat("я", subjectMaxRunes) + "…"}, } { t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) { s := &session{rec: &fakeRecorder{}} if _, err := s.Header("Subject", tc.raw, mods(nil)); err != nil { t.Fatalf("Header: %v", err) } if s.subject != tc.want { t.Fatalf("subject = %q, want %q", s.subject, tc.want) } }) } } func TestBodyAcceptsEvenWhenRecorderFails(t *testing.T) { rec := &fakeRecorder{fail: true} s := &session{rec: rec} _, _ = s.MailFrom("x@example.com", mods(map[string]string{"auth_authen": "app1"})) _, _ = s.RcptTo("y@example.net", mods(nil)) resp, err := s.Body(mods(map[string]string{"i": "Q9"})) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("Body returned error, must fail open: %v", err) } if resp != milter.RespAccept { t.Fatalf("Body response = %v, want Accept", resp) } } // A single connection may carry several messages; the second must not inherit // the first's recipients or subject. func TestSessionResetsBetweenMessages(t *testing.T) { rec := &fakeRecorder{} s := &session{rec: rec} _, _ = s.MailFrom("a@example.com", mods(map[string]string{"auth_authen": "app1"})) _, _ = s.RcptTo("one@example.net", mods(nil)) _, _ = s.Header("Subject", "first", mods(nil)) _, _ = s.Body(mods(map[string]string{"i": "Q1"})) _, _ = s.MailFrom("b@example.com", mods(map[string]string{"auth_authen": "app2"})) _, _ = s.RcptTo("two@example.net", mods(nil)) _, _ = s.Body(mods(map[string]string{"i": "Q2"})) if len(rec.entries) != 2 { t.Fatalf("want 2 entries, got %d", len(rec.entries)) } second := rec.entries[1] if second.QueueID != "Q2" || second.To != "two@example.net" || second.Subject != "" || second.AppLogin != "app2" { t.Fatalf("second message leaked state: %+v", second) } } // Postfix sends multi-character macro names wrapped in braces ({auth_authen}, // {i} for some versions), so the milter must resolve those too — this is the // case the SASL-less spike missed and that produced empty app_login at first. func TestBracedMacros(t *testing.T) { rec := &fakeRecorder{} s := &session{rec: rec} _, _ = s.MailFrom("app@example.com", mods(map[string]string{"{auth_authen}": "app1"})) _, _ = s.RcptTo("to@example.net", mods(nil)) _, _ = s.Body(mods(map[string]string{"{i}": "QBRACE"})) if len(rec.entries) != 1 { t.Fatalf("want 1 entry, got %d", len(rec.entries)) } e := rec.entries[0] if e.AppLogin != "app1" { t.Fatalf("AppLogin = %q, want app1 (braced {auth_authen} not resolved)", e.AppLogin) } if e.QueueID != "QBRACE" { t.Fatalf("QueueID = %q, want QBRACE (braced {i} not resolved)", e.QueueID) } } // limitAt is the client IP the rate-limit tests connect from; the limits below // register it so the differentiated check applies. const limitIP = "203.0.113.7" func activeLimit(ips ...string) store.RateLimit { return store.RateLimit{AllowedIPs: ips, MaxMessages: 5, WindowSeconds: 3600} } // mailFrom drives just the connect + MAIL FROM stages and returns the response, // which is where the level-2 limit is enforced. func mailFrom(t *testing.T, rec Store, ip, from, login string) milter.Response { t.Helper() s := &session{rec: rec} if _, err := s.Connect("h", "tcp4", 0, net.ParseIP(ip), mods(nil)); err != nil { t.Fatalf("Connect: %v", err) } resp, err := s.MailFrom(from, mods(map[string]string{"auth_authen": login})) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("MailFrom: %v", err) } return resp } func TestRateLimitRefusesWhenDomainOverLimit(t *testing.T) { rec := &fakeRecorder{ limits: map[string]store.RateLimit{ store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": activeLimit(limitIP), }, counts: map[string]int64{store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": 5}, // == max } if resp := mailFrom(t, rec, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespTempFail { t.Fatalf("over-limit MAIL FROM = %v, want TempFail (4xx)", resp) } if len(rec.rejected) != 1 || rec.rejected[0].Domain != "example.com" { t.Fatalf("want one rejected send-log row for example.com, got %+v", rec.rejected) } } func TestRateLimitRefusesWhenAppOverLimit(t *testing.T) { rec := &fakeRecorder{ limits: map[string]store.RateLimit{ store.RateLimitScopeApp + "|app1": activeLimit(limitIP), }, counts: map[string]int64{store.RateLimitScopeApp + "|app1": 9}, // over max } if resp := mailFrom(t, rec, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespTempFail { t.Fatalf("over app limit = %v, want TempFail", resp) } } func TestRateLimitAllowsUnderLimit(t *testing.T) { rec := &fakeRecorder{ limits: map[string]store.RateLimit{ store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": activeLimit(limitIP), }, counts: map[string]int64{store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": 4}, // < max } if resp := mailFrom(t, rec, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespContinue { t.Fatalf("under limit = %v, want Continue", resp) } if len(rec.rejected) != 0 { t.Fatalf("under limit must not record a rejection: %+v", rec.rejected) } } func TestRateLimitIgnoresUnregisteredIP(t *testing.T) { rec := &fakeRecorder{ limits: map[string]store.RateLimit{ store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": activeLimit("198.51.100.1"), // not limitIP }, counts: map[string]int64{store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": 999}, } // The sender's IP is not in the domain's registered set, so level-2 does not // apply even though the count is huge (level-1 anvil would still cover it). if resp := mailFrom(t, rec, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespContinue { t.Fatalf("unregistered IP = %v, want Continue (level-2 n/a)", resp) } } func TestRateLimitInactiveWithoutCeiling(t *testing.T) { rec := &fakeRecorder{ // IP registered but no ceiling/window: an inert draft, must not enforce. limits: map[string]store.RateLimit{ store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": {AllowedIPs: []string{limitIP}}, }, counts: map[string]int64{store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": 999}, } if resp := mailFrom(t, rec, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespContinue { t.Fatalf("inactive limit = %v, want Continue", resp) } } func TestRateLimitFailsOpenOnLookupError(t *testing.T) { rec := &fakeRecorder{lookupErr: errors.New("db down")} if resp := mailFrom(t, rec, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespContinue { t.Fatalf("lookup error = %v, want Continue (fail-open)", resp) } } func TestRateLimitFailsOpenOnCountError(t *testing.T) { rec := &fakeRecorder{ limits: map[string]store.RateLimit{ store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": activeLimit(limitIP), }, countErr: errors.New("db down"), } if resp := mailFrom(t, rec, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespContinue { t.Fatalf("count error = %v, want Continue (fail-open)", resp) } } func TestRateLimitNoIPKeyDoesNotApply(t *testing.T) { rec := &fakeRecorder{ limits: map[string]store.RateLimit{ store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": activeLimit(limitIP), }, counts: map[string]int64{store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": 999}, } // A session with no client IP (e.g. local submission) cannot be keyed. s := &session{rec: rec} resp, err := s.MailFrom("a@example.com", mods(map[string]string{"auth_authen": "app1"})) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("MailFrom: %v", err) } if resp != milter.RespContinue { t.Fatalf("no-IP session = %v, want Continue", resp) } } // mailFromIn is mailFrom with an explicit shared in-flight registry, so a test // can play several concurrent SMTP sessions of one process against each other. func mailFromIn(t *testing.T, rec Store, fl *inflight, ip, from, login string) (*session, milter.Response) { t.Helper() s := &session{rec: rec, flight: fl} if _, err := s.Connect("h", "tcp4", 0, net.ParseIP(ip), mods(nil)); err != nil { t.Fatalf("Connect: %v", err) } resp, err := s.MailFrom(from, mods(map[string]string{"auth_authen": login})) if err != nil { t.Fatalf("MailFrom: %v", err) } return s, resp } func limitedRecorder(count int64) *fakeRecorder { return &fakeRecorder{ limits: map[string]store.RateLimit{ store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": activeLimit(limitIP), }, counts: map[string]int64{store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": count}, } } // Messages between MAIL FROM and end-of-message are not in the send log yet, so // counting the stored rows alone lets concurrent sessions each pass the same // check and overshoot the ceiling. The last free slot may only be taken once. func TestRateLimitCountsInFlightMessages(t *testing.T) { rec := limitedRecorder(4) // one below the ceiling of 5 fl := &inflight{} if _, resp := mailFromIn(t, rec, fl, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespContinue { t.Fatalf("first message = %v, want Continue (4/5 stored)", resp) } // Same window, nothing written yet: the first message holds the fifth slot. if _, resp := mailFromIn(t, rec, fl, limitIP, "b@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespTempFail { t.Fatalf("concurrent message = %v, want TempFail (would overshoot)", resp) } if len(rec.rejected) != 1 { t.Fatalf("want one rejected send-log row, got %+v", rec.rejected) } } // Once the message is recorded the stored count sees it, so its reservation // must be given back — otherwise it would be counted twice and the ceiling // would drift closed. func TestReservationReleasedAtEndOfMessage(t *testing.T) { rec := limitedRecorder(4) fl := &inflight{} s, resp := mailFromIn(t, rec, fl, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1") if resp != milter.RespContinue { t.Fatalf("first message = %v, want Continue", resp) } if _, err := s.Body(mods(map[string]string{"i": "Q1"})); err != nil { t.Fatalf("Body: %v", err) } if n := fl.count(store.RateLimitScopeDomain+"|example.com", time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)); n != 0 { t.Fatalf("in-flight count after EOM = %d, want 0", n) } } // A transaction the client abandons (RSET, or a Postfix-side rejection) never // reaches the send log, so its slot must not stay claimed. func TestReservationReleasedOnAbort(t *testing.T) { rec := limitedRecorder(4) fl := &inflight{} s, resp := mailFromIn(t, rec, fl, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1") if resp != milter.RespContinue { t.Fatalf("first message = %v, want Continue", resp) } if err := s.Abort(mods(nil)); err != nil { t.Fatalf("Abort: %v", err) } if _, resp := mailFromIn(t, rec, fl, limitIP, "b@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespContinue { t.Fatalf("after abort = %v, want Continue (slot released)", resp) } } // A refused message must not leave the slots it claimed for the limits checked // before the one that tripped, or every refusal would tighten the ceiling. func TestRefusalReleasesEarlierReservation(t *testing.T) { rec := &fakeRecorder{ limits: map[string]store.RateLimit{ store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": activeLimit(limitIP), store.RateLimitScopeApp + "|app1": activeLimit(limitIP), }, counts: map[string]int64{ store.RateLimitScopeDomain + "|example.com": 0, // domain: plenty of room store.RateLimitScopeApp + "|app1": 5, // app: at the ceiling }, } fl := &inflight{} if _, resp := mailFromIn(t, rec, fl, limitIP, "a@example.com", "app1"); resp != milter.RespTempFail { t.Fatalf("app over limit = %v, want TempFail", resp) } if n := fl.count(store.RateLimitScopeDomain+"|example.com", time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)); n != 0 { t.Fatalf("domain reservation left behind after refusal: %d", n) } } // The in-flight count only covers the limit's own window: a reservation older // than it (a session stuck mid-DATA for longer than the window) must not be // counted against a window it no longer belongs to. func TestInflightIgnoresReservationsOutsideWindow(t *testing.T) { fl := &inflight{} r := fl.reserve("domain|example.com") r.at = time.Now().Add(-time.Minute) if n := fl.count("domain|example.com", time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)); n != 1 { t.Fatalf("count inside window = %d, want 1", n) } if n := fl.count("domain|example.com", time.Now().Add(-time.Second)); n != 0 { t.Fatalf("count outside window = %d, want 0", n) } // Past the TTL the reservation is dropped even for a wide window, so a // client that vanished after MAIL FROM cannot hold a slot forever. r.at = time.Now().Add(-2 * reservationTTL) if n := fl.count("domain|example.com", time.Now().Add(-3*reservationTTL)); n != 0 { t.Fatalf("expired reservation still counted: %d", n) } } func TestDomainOf(t *testing.T) { cases := map[string]string{ "user@Example.COM": "example.com", "no-domain": "", "": "", "a@b@c.com": "c.com", } for in, want := range cases { if got := domainOf(in); got != want { t.Fatalf("domainOf(%q) = %q, want %q", in, got, want) } } }