#!/bin/sh
# Container entrypoint (runs as root, PID 1 until it execs supervisord).
#
# SELFPOST_HOSTNAME is checked first (plan B.3): it must fail fast with a clear
# message before /data normalisation or Postfix config, so a bad identity never
# looks like a permissions or packaging problem (and so the e2e hostname-gate
# tests see the FATAL text rather than an earlier set -e abort).
set -e

# SELFPOST_HOSTNAME is an identity, not a setting with a safe default: it must
# simultaneously match the PTR/rDNS record, the certificate CN/SAN, and the
# Cyrus SASL realm. The panel (main.go saslRealm()) and postfix-config.sh each
# fall back independently when it's unset — to `localhost` and to the container
# hostname respectively — so accounts get written under one realm and looked up
# under another and authentication silently fails for every application, while
# HELO also stops matching the PTR record and mail that does go out lands in
# spam. No fallback can be correct, so fail loudly here, before either side of
# that split has a chance to run, rather than leave a green panel with broken
# mail.
if [ -z "$SELFPOST_HOSTNAME" ]; then
	cat >&2 <<'EOF'
FATAL: SELFPOST_HOSTNAME is not set.

This is the mail server's identity: it becomes the Postfix HELO/EHLO name,
the Cyrus SASL realm that application passwords are looked up under, and it
must match the TLS certificate's CN/SAN as well as this server's PTR (reverse
DNS) record. There is no safe default — guessing any one of these wrong
breaks authentication for every application or sends outgoing mail to spam,
silently.

Set it to the mail server's fully-qualified domain name, e.g.:

    SELFPOST_HOSTNAME=mail.example.com

in the .env file next to your docker-compose.yml (see deploy/.env.example).
EOF
	exit 1
fi

case "$SELFPOST_HOSTNAME" in
	*[\ \	]* | *://* | *:* )
		echo "FATAL: SELFPOST_HOSTNAME must be a bare hostname (no scheme, port, or spaces): \"$SELFPOST_HOSTNAME\"" >&2
		echo 'Example: SELFPOST_HOSTNAME=mail.example.com' >&2
		exit 1
		;;
	*.*)
		;;
	*)
		echo "FATAL: SELFPOST_HOSTNAME must be a fully-qualified domain name (at least one dot): \"$SELFPOST_HOSTNAME\"" >&2
		echo 'Example: SELFPOST_HOSTNAME=mail.example.com' >&2
		exit 1
		;;
esac

# The persistent root /data is a host bind mount, so it arrives owned by the
# host user (typically root), not by the unprivileged panel user that actually
# writes the SQLite database, setup token and DKIM keys. Fix its ownership here
# — the one place still running as root — before handing off to supervisord,
# which starts the panel as the panel user.
#
# Mode must stay world-traversable (0755): Postfix reaches its trees under
# /data as another user. Go's testing.TempDir is 0700, and a bare chown would
# leave that mode in place — OpenDKIM, which read its tables there until
# 2.8.0, then could not, and the container crash-looped (e2e
# TestHostnameGate/valid_hostname_starts).
# (Go: testing.TempDir uses os.MkdirTemp, src/os/tempfile.go: "created with
# mode 0o700".)
chown panel:panel /data
chmod 755 /data

# What follows runs as root over a tree the panel user writes: /data is the
# panel's, and so is /data/postfix. A symbolic link the panel put where a
# directory or a file of its own is expected would lead root's mkdir, ": >",
# chmod and chgrp to whatever it names (chmod follows a link; so do a
# redirect and mkdir -p; chown -R and find do not descend into one given as
# their operand). None of these paths is ever a link in a working
# installation, so a link there is removed and the path made anew below.
# (Security review of base-trixie, 2026-10-15: no escalation found, as the
# TLS key copy and the read-only mounts stand, but nothing for root to
# follow either.)
drop_links() {
	for p in "$@"; do
		if [ -L "$p" ]; then
			echo "entrypoint: removing the symbolic link $p" >&2
			rm -f "$p"
		fi
	done
}
drop_links /data/dkim /data/dkim.new /data/opendkim /data/sasl /data/postfix /data/antispam /data/log \
	/data/dkim/keys /data/dkim/selectors /data/opendkim/keys \
	/data/sasl/sasldb2 /data/postfix/queue \
	/data/postfix/sender_login_maps /data/postfix/relay_domains \
	/data/postfix/transport /data/postfix/relay_recipients /data/postfix/tls_policy \
	/data/log/mail.log
# Restored backups or previously-created state may contain panel-owned files
# under /data; make sure they stay writable without disturbing anything that a
# later phase deliberately hands to another service. /data/log is exempt: it is
# deliberately owned by postfix (postlogd writes the delivery log there) and is
# normalised on its own below, as are the trees shared through group selfpost
# and the one OpenDKIM read until 2.8.0, which is left as it was (below).
# A file's owner is a number: an entry whose user or group is not the panel's
# by that number - unpacked by root, or written under another image whose
# image gave the panel other ids (999:999 until 2.7.0, 10999:10999 since) - is
# handed over whole.
find /data -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 ! -name log ! -name postfix ! -name opendkim ! -name sasl ! -name antispam \
	\( ! -user panel -o ! -group panel \) -exec chown -R panel:panel {} +

# DKIM keys and the selector table, /data/dkim: the panel's alone - it makes
# the keys, writes the table and signs (internal/domain, Keys; internal/milter,
# sign.go). Until 2.8.0 the keys were under /data/opendkim, shared with
# OpenDKIM through group selfpost. That tree is kept for an image of 2.7.x
# rolled back to (docs/plans/panel-dkim-signing.md, Q2), but nothing of
# 2.8.0 reads it beyond the copy below: it is the panel's alone like the new
# one - a 2.7.x start gives it back to group selfpost itself - and a backup
# leaves it out (internal/backup, excludedFromArchive). While /data/dkim
# holds no key and the old tree does, the keys are copied over. The copy is
# made as the panel user, which can read nothing there the panel could not,
# into a directory beside, renamed into place when it is whole: a start that
# stops midway copies again. A copy that fails stops the start (set -e) - the
# panel would otherwise make the server's own name a new key, and its
# published record would no longer match. The selector table is written by
# the panel before its signer serves (cmd/panel/signer.go). After a rollback
# to 2.7.x, a domain added there has its key only in the old tree: remove
# /data/dkim before the next start of 2.8.x to copy again.
# (util-linux 2.41, setpriv(1): --reuid, --regid, --clear-groups; cp(1)
# -P: never follow a symbolic link in the source; chown -R and find never
# follow one either. GNU chmod keeps a directory's set-group-ID bit under a
# numeric mode unless it is cleared by name - "g-s" - and 2.7.x set it on
# the old tree: e2e TestStartsOnA27Data.)
has_keys() { [ -d "$1" ] && [ -n "$(find "$1" -type f -name '*.private' | head -n 1)" ]; }
if [ -d /data/opendkim ]; then
	chown -R panel:panel /data/opendkim
	find /data/opendkim -type d -exec chmod 0700 {} + -exec chmod g-s {} +
	find /data/opendkim -type f -exec chmod 0600 {} +
fi
rm -rf /data/dkim.new
if ! has_keys /data/dkim/keys && has_keys /data/opendkim/keys; then
	setpriv --reuid=panel --regid=panel --clear-groups -- \
		sh -c 'mkdir /data/dkim.new && cp -RP /data/opendkim/keys /data/dkim.new/keys'
	rm -rf /data/dkim
	mv /data/dkim.new /data/dkim
	echo "entrypoint: the DKIM keys were copied from /data/opendkim to /data/dkim; /data/opendkim is left for a rollback" >&2
fi
mkdir -p /data/dkim/keys
chown -R panel:panel /data/dkim
find /data/dkim -type d -exec chmod 0700 {} + -exec chmod g-s {} +
find /data/dkim -type f -exec chmod 0600 {} +

# Application SASL accounts. The panel (user `panel`) writes the
# sasldb2 via saslpasswd2; Postfix (user `postfix`) reads it to authenticate SMTP
# clients. Share it through the `selfpost` group the same way as the DKIM tree:
# setgid directory so new files inherit the group, and the database itself
# group-readable (0640).
mkdir -p /data/sasl
chown -R panel:selfpost /data/sasl
chmod 2750 /data/sasl
[ -e /data/sasl/sasldb2 ] && chmod 0640 /data/sasl/sasldb2
# The copy a password change is made on (internal/app, replaceSASLDB), left
# by a panel killed mid-change: a second copy of every password, which the
# next change would remove anyway.
rm -f /data/sasl/sasldb2.new

# Postfix state under /data (architecture.md § Persistence). The panel writes
# sender_login_maps; Postfix owns the on-disk queue tree under queue/.
mkdir -p /data/postfix/queue
[ -e /data/postfix/sender_login_maps ] || : > /data/postfix/sender_login_maps
# Inbound relay maps (written by the panel when INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE=true).
# Empty files keep postfix check happy if the flag is on before any domain exists.
for f in relay_domains transport relay_recipients tls_policy; do
	[ -e "/data/postfix/$f" ] || : > "/data/postfix/$f"
done
# Every map here is the panel's to write and Postfix's to read - the sender
# map, the inbound and the DMARC maps alike - so each file beside queue/ is
# handed to the panel, group selfpost, whatever its name. A restored archive's
# files arrive owned by whoever unpacked them (a backup records no owner, and
# tar run as root makes them root's), and the first start after a restore
# reads every one of them to compare it with the archive's record: one left
# to root alone is a restore refused on every start (review of audit stage 3,
# H1 - the DMARC maps were not among the names listed here).
find /data/postfix -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -type f -exec chown panel:selfpost {} + -exec chmod 0640 {} +
chown panel:selfpost /data/postfix
chmod 2750 /data/postfix

# Filter lists for the external spam filter (written by the panel when
# INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE=true, read by the antispam sidecar, which mounts this
# directory). The sidecar runs under a user of its own in another container,
# so the directory and its files are readable by anyone: they hold sender
# addresses and networks, no secrets.
mkdir -p /data/antispam
chown -R panel:selfpost /data/antispam
chmod 0755 /data/antispam

# Delivery log (architecture.md § Log tailer). postlogd writes it as user
# `postfix`; the panel reads it for the log-tailer and the System log page. It
# lives under /data — not the ephemeral /var/log — so the delivery lines that
# resolve a "queued" send-log row survive a container recreate.
#
# postlogd creates a missing log itself, by default at 0600, which the
# unprivileged panel cannot read (postfix-config.sh now asks it for 0640,
# maillog_file_permissions); so create it here (and re-normalise an existing
# one, plus whatever logrotate left behind) at 0640 owned postfix:selfpost. The setgid
# directory keeps the shared group on anything created inside it later, and
# 2750 keeps it group-traversable but not group-writable — logrotate refuses to
# rotate a log whose directory is writable by a non-root group.
# Postfix 3.10.13: src/util/logwriter.c:99, logwriter_open_or_die(), creates the
# file with logwriter_perms, 0600 (:86) unless maillog_file_permissions says
# otherwise (proto/postconf.proto:18500, default 0600; Postfix 3.9 and later).
# logrotate 3.22.0, logrotate.c:1406-1408, findNeedRotating(): "skipping ...
# because parent directory has insecure permissions" when the directory's
# group is not root and has write permission.
mkdir -p /data/log
[ -e /data/log/mail.log ] || : > /data/log/mail.log
chown -R postfix:selfpost /data/log
chmod 2750 /data/log
find /data/log -type f -exec chmod 0640 {} +

# The milter socket directory. Postfix (user `postfix`) must actually CONNECT
# to the panel's milter sockets, not just probe them at start-up. The panel
# user creates them, so they are bridged to `postfix` through the shared
# `selfpost` group: a group-owned + setgid dir means each socket created
# inside inherits group `selfpost`, and group-traversable (2750) lets postfix
# reach it. Without this, smtpd cannot talk to the signer and, because
# signing is strict (default_action=tempfail), defers all mail.
mkdir -p /run/selfpost
chown panel:selfpost /run/selfpost
chmod 2750 /run/selfpost
# A container that was killed leaves its sockets behind, and a file nobody
# listens on would satisfy postfix-wrapper.sh's wait: Postfix would start
# before the sender check does and defer mail until it is there. The check's
# alive mark goes too: it tells the downtime of the panel restarting inside a
# running container, and a restart of the whole container is not the check's
# downtime (guide § Health) - a mark left from before would count the whole
# outage when supervisord cannot say since when Postfix runs.
# (test(1), -S: true for any socket file, whether or not anything listens.)
rm -f /run/selfpost/*.sock /run/selfpost/*.alive

# The queue tree belongs to Postfix's users by name. Their numbers are what
# the package's install hands out and depend on what else the image installs:
# without opendkim (2.8.0) postfix went from uid 101 to 100 and postdrop from
# gid 103 to 102, and a queue of an earlier image kept the old numbers. So an
# existing tree is handed over before postfix-config.sh runs "postfix check",
# whose postsuper drops to the mail owner before it reads the queue and
# otherwise stops the start ("scan_dir_push: open directory defer: Permission
# denied", the test server, 2026-10-16; Postfix 3.10.13,
# src/postsuper/postsuper.c:1442, set_ugid(var_owner_uid, var_owner_gid);
# conf/postfix-script:342). After the check it is done again for a tree the
# check has just built.
own_queue() {
	[ -d /data/postfix/queue/active ] || return 0
	chown -R postfix:postfix /data/postfix/queue
	# The recursive chown would leave public/ and maildrop/ in group postfix.
	# Postfix keeps those two in its setgid group: postqueue and postdrop are
	# setgid postdrop and reach the showq socket and the maildrop directory
	# through that group alone. With the wrong group `postqueue -p` run by the
	# panel answers "Connect to the Postfix showq service: Permission denied"
	# and the panel cannot read the queue (the Queue card and the Outbound
	# queue page).
	chgrp postdrop /data/postfix/queue/public /data/postfix/queue/maildrop
	# It would also leave the queue directory itself and pid/ owned by
	# postfix. Postfix keeps those two owned by root (master, which runs as
	# root, is the only writer) and logs "warning: not owned by root" for each
	# at every start. (Postfix 3.10.13, conf/postfix-files:51-68:
	# $queue_directory root 755, maildrop $setgid_group 730, public
	# $setgid_group 710, pid root 755, the other queue directories
	# $mail_owner 700; conf/postfix-script:354-356, "check-warn": "not owned
	# by root".)
	chown root /data/postfix/queue /data/postfix/queue/pid
}
own_queue

# Generate the outbound-relay Postfix configuration from the environment (spec
# 5). Kept out of the image build so cert paths, rate limits, hostname and the
# optional 587 service are all driven by env at run time, and re-derived on every
# start the same way the /data normalisation above is.
/usr/local/bin/postfix-config.sh

# The queue tree, on a first start or after a restore, is built here:
# postfix-config.sh ends with "postfix check", whose check-fatal runs
# "post-install create-missing" (Postfix 3.10.13, conf/postfix-script:314;
# conf/postfix-files:55, "$queue_directory/active:d:$mail_owner:-:700:ucr").
# A "postfix set-permissions" for a missing active/ stood here and never ran
# (assumptions C-P34).
own_queue

# [program:postfix]'s startsecs (build/supervisord.conf): longer than the
# wrapper's wait for the milter sockets, so its exit at the end of the wait is
# one supervisord counts as too quick. A value that is not a number stops the
# start here.
wait_timeout="${MILTER_WAIT_TIMEOUT:-30}"
case "$wait_timeout" in
'' | *[!0-9]*)
	echo "entrypoint: MILTER_WAIT_TIMEOUT must be a whole number of seconds, got '$wait_timeout'" >&2
	exit 1
	;;
esac
# expr, not $((...)): dash's arithmetic reads "010" as octal and refuses
# "08"; expr takes decimal (review of stage 2c, F11).
export POSTFIX_STARTSECS=$(expr "$wait_timeout" + 10)

exec /usr/bin/supervisord -c /etc/supervisor/supervisord.conf