5598b62e4e
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Close Unreleased for security, tests, docs, and release CI; pin compose and docs to 1.3.0. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
116 lines
6.4 KiB
YAML
116 lines
6.4 KiB
YAML
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# SelfPost — default deployment, reverse-proxy = Apache (spec 10, 10.5).
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#
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# This file only runs SelfPost itself. Apache is assumed to already be
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# installed on the HOST (the target audience for this project typically runs
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# Apache there already — spec 10.5) and reverse-proxies HTTPS for the panel;
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# it is not containerised here. See ../apache/selfpost-vhost.conf for a ready
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# vhost fragment, and docs/guide.md "Reverse proxy" for the
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# certbot steps that produce the PEM files this compose file mounts.
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#
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# Usage:
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# 1. Copy this file (and .env.example as .env) next to your own ./data and
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# ./certs directories, or adjust the paths below.
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# 2. Fill in .env (at minimum SELFPOST_HOSTNAME). Put PEM files in ./certs —
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# TLS paths are fixed in this file to match that bind mount, not .env.
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# 3. docker compose up -d
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#
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# The image tag below is FIXED on purpose (spec 10 p.10, 7.5.A): backup
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# restore compares the manifest version against the running binary's version,
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# so ":latest" would make that check meaningless. Bump the tag deliberately
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# when you want to upgrade.
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services:
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selfpost:
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image: ghcr.io/mixeme/selfpost:1.3.0
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restart: unless-stopped
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environment:
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SELFPOST_HOSTNAME: "${SELFPOST_HOSTNAME:?set the mail/panel hostname, e.g. mail.example.com}"
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# Path Postfix reads inside the container — matches the certs bind mount
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# below. Point these at your reverse-proxy's PEM output (spec 10 p.2).
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TLS_CERT_FILE: /etc/postfix/tls/fullchain.pem
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TLS_KEY_FILE: /etc/postfix/tls/privkey.pem
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# Set to true to also publish RFC 6409 submission (587/STARTTLS)
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# alongside the primary 465/smtps listener (spec 5).
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SUBMISSION_ENABLE: "${SUBMISSION_ENABLE:-false}"
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# Level-1 backstop rate limit (anvil, spec 5.5, 7.4); per-domain/app
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# limits (level 2) are configured later from the panel itself.
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RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGES_PER_IP: "${RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGES_PER_IP:-100}"
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RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS: "${RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS:-3600}"
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# How long the send log keeps rows before the background sweep deletes
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# them (spec 7.3, 9) — the main driver of /data growth over time.
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SEND_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS: "${SEND_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS:-90}"
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# Sliding idle timeout for the panel login session, in days (spec 7.6.6).
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PANEL_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS: "${PANEL_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS:-7}"
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# Resolvers the panel's PTR/SPF/DKIM/DMARC checks query directly, so they
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# report what the internet sees rather than what this host's own stub
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# resolver synthesises. Empty uses public defaults.
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SELFPOST_DNS_RESOLVERS: "${SELFPOST_DNS_RESOLVERS:-}"
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# Reverse-proxy CIDRs allowed to supply X-Forwarded-For for login/setup
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# rate-limiting. See docs/guide.md "Environment variables" — wrong value lets a
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# client spoof its rate-limit key.
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TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR: "${TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR:-}"
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volumes:
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# All persistent state lives under /data (spec 9): SQLite DB, DKIM keys,
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# sasldb2, sender map, setup token. Back this up (panel button or the
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# selfpost-backup CLI) before you touch it directly.
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# Postfix's mail.log is here too (./data/log, rotated daily, 14 files
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# kept) so the delivery lines that resolve a queued send-log row survive
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# a container recreate; it is diagnostics and is left out of backups.
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- ./data:/data
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# Read-only: SelfPost only ever reads certificates, never manages them
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# (spec 10 p.2). Point this at wherever your reverse-proxy/certbot
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# writes PEM files, e.g. /etc/letsencrypt on the host.
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- ./certs:/etc/postfix/tls:ro
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ports:
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# 465 (smtps, primary) and optionally 587 (submission/STARTTLS) are
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# published directly — mail traffic bypasses Apache entirely, it only
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# ever proxies the panel's HTTP(S) (spec 10 p.2-3). The panel itself
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# (8080) is intentionally NOT published here: Apache reaches it over
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# the host network at 127.0.0.1:8080 (see the vhost fragment), so the
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# panel is never directly reachable from the internet without TLS.
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- "465:465"
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# 587 is mapped even when SUBMISSION_ENABLE=false; Postfix listens only
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# when the variable is true — see docs/guide.md "Published ports".
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- "587:587"
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- "127.0.0.1:8080:8080"
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# Hardening (spec 10 p.6). SelfPost's entrypoint still needs to run as
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# root very briefly to fix /data ownership and normalise permissions
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# under the shared `selfpost` group (see build/entrypoint.sh) before
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# supervisord drops the panel to an unprivileged user — so this cannot be
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# `user: panel` or a fully read-only rootfs without breaking that startup
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# self-healing. What IS applied: no privilege escalation past what the
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# image already grants, and every Linux capability dropped except the
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# small set the root startup phase and Postfix/OpenDKIM genuinely need:
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# - NET_BIND_SERVICE — bind 465/587 (and 25 outbound) below 1024;
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# - CHOWN — entrypoint re-owns /data (bind mount) to `panel`;
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# - FOWNER — entrypoint then chmods those now panel-owned /data
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# dirs/files while still root (owner-check bypass);
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# - FSETID — set the setgid bit (2750) on the shared /data dirs
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# when the process gid differs from the dir's group;
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# - SETUID/SETGID — supervisord drops the panel to the unprivileged
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# `panel` user; Postfix switches to its own users;
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# - DAC_OVERRIDE — cross-user file access within the `selfpost` group.
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# - KILL — supervisord (root) sends SIGUSR1 to opendkim (a
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# different uid) on domain add/remove to reload its
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# KeyTable/SigningTable; without it os.kill() fails
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# with EPERM even though the caller is root, because
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# the kernel's signal permission check for
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# cross-uid kill() still consults CAP_KILL.
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# FOWNER/FSETID are required by build/entrypoint.sh's permission
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# self-healing; without them chmod fails with EPERM and the container
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# crash-loops on start.
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security_opt:
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- no-new-privileges:true
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cap_drop:
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- ALL
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cap_add:
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- NET_BIND_SERVICE
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- CHOWN
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- FOWNER
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- FSETID
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- SETUID
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- SETGID
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- DAC_OVERRIDE
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- KILL
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