Files
selfpost/docs/plans/inbound-quarantine.md
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 977d63a2ea roadmap: inbound quarantine is an idea, not a candidate
The owner, 2026-10-12: take quarantine out of the main plan, it is an idea
to think about. Its index row and section leave roadmap.md; a new closing
section, "Ideas, not on the roadmap", keeps a paragraph and the link to the
notes in plans/inbound-quarantine.md. panel-notifications no longer lists
"mail is held in quarantine" among its events. The plans that called it a
candidate say what it is now. The drawn screens stay unbuilt, as they were.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 10:04:44 +03:00

3.3 KiB

Plan: inbound-quarantine

Status: an idea to think about, not on the roadmap (owner, 2026-10-12) — design TBD; needs explicit agreement before any code
Version: TBD (1.x MINOR if opt-in and backward-compatible; may warrant 2.x if it changes inbound storage or backup contract).


Goal (draft)

Let the operator hold suspicious inbound mail instead of only accept/reject at the milter — review in the panel, then release to the configured upstream, delete, or add sender to allow/deny lists.

This is a product boundary question, not a settled design. The item exists so we can compare approaches before committing.

Why it is separate from inbound-antispam-panel

inbound-antispam-panel.md covers metadata (journal + lists). Quarantine implies storing message bodies (or a durable reference to them) under /data, retention, release workflow, and a wider attack/backup surface — closer to "mini-mailbox" than pure relay.

Mockup

A target look is drawn — list and detail — in-quarantine, in-quarantine-message — under the design contract of panel-redesign.md. It assumes answers to the questions below (SelfPost holds the mail, release goes to the upstream, 14 days, headers only in the panel); it does not settle them.

Open questions (to decide before a checklist)

  1. Where mail lives
    • SelfPost store under /data/quarantine/ (panel owns lifecycle), or
    • delegate to rspamd/Redis and panel only proxies release (less storage in SelfPost, tighter rspamd coupling).
  2. What "release" means
    • inject into Postfix as a new delivery to the domain's upstream transport;
    • or manual download only (no automatic forward).
  3. Retention and caps
    • max age, max total bytes, per-domain limits; interaction with backup size.
  4. RBAC
    • global admin only vs domain-admin for assigned inbound domains.
  5. Threat model
    • malware in stored MIME, path traversal on extract, quota DoS on busy MX.
  6. Product fit
    • does this violate product.md "no mailboxes" if we only hold spam suspects briefly? Explicit product decision required.

Context (as-built)

  • Inbound relay forwards or rejects; no local delivery (architecture.md § Mail path).
  • Optional INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER — external rspamd may quarantine on its own today, without panel integration.
  • DMARC p=quarantine is unrelated (outbound policy for receivers).

Likely out of scope (until revisited)

  • IMAP/webmail for quarantined mail.
  • End-user self-service quarantine (non-admin recipients).
  • Outbound quarantine.

Dependencies

  • Inbound relay, shipped in [1.4.0] — as built in architecture.md § Mail path.
  • Sensible to decide after or alongside inbound-antispam-panel.md (journal/lists), but not blocked on it for design discussion.

Done when (placeholder)

TBD once approach is chosen. Minimum bar would include: opt-in flag, panel list/detail, release or discard action, retention, backup inclusion documented, security review.

Implementation checklist

None yet — expand this plan after the open questions above are answered.