Files
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 eaa7de0754
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
audit 4: findings of the two reviews
- Two inbound domains on one upstream could never change its TLS mode,
  each save refused for the other (medium): SetTransportAs changes the
  mode for every domain on the upstream when the one saving may change
  them all; a domain user who may not is refused with the mode, not the
  other tenant's domain name (security F1: the first version named it).
- A deletion's leftover DKIM key is removed by Resync (Reload
  configuration, a restore's first start) for names no domain has.
- The backup's write deadline moves before Check.
- hasUnsavedEdit skips password and file fields and compares a multiple
  select's options; htmx.config.timeout 30 s, so a refresh never answered
  ends and is tried again; a failed refresh's promise is handled.
- An empty filtered Outbound log says no message matches the filters.
- The dummy bcrypt hash is made at start; a DMARC part over 8 MiB is
  refused for its size like the other two limits.
- Health's Configuration box says what Reload writes (design first,
  32dfe4a).
- Docs: CHANGELOG, guide § Inbound, security.md (the shared upstream's
  mode, the profile form's "username taken"), architecture.md (owed to an
  address), the plan's notes corrected.
Tests: the shared upstream (service, handler), the leftover key, all eight
Health boxes ordered, the subject from before migration 0011, the new JS
cases.

Tested on the test server: go vet + go test of 25 packages, make e2e (all
pass, 636 s) on this tree.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 12:46:52 +03:00

209 lines
6.6 KiB
Go

package dmarc
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"mime"
"mime/multipart"
"mime/quotedprintable"
"net/mail"
"net/textproto"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
)
// ErrRejected marks a message that is not a report this relay keeps and never
// will be: it cannot be read as an aggregate report, or it reports on a domain
// that is not sent from here, or it came to another domain's address. Sending
// it again changes nothing, so the caller drops it. Any other error is the
// store's and worth another try.
var ErrRejected = errors.New("dmarc report rejected")
func rejected(err error) error { return fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrRejected, err) }
// MaxMessage is the largest report message taken. One is refused, with that
// reason, rather than cut at the limit and refused as damaged - before
// 2.5.4 a cut message read as a broken attachment (audit 2026-10-12, stage
// 4). Postfix hands over no more than its message_size_limit anyway.
const MaxMessage = 10 << 20
// errTooLarge is a read past its limit.
var errTooLarge = errors.New("larger than its limit")
// readAtMost reads all of r, or fails with errTooLarge once it holds more
// than limit bytes.
func readAtMost(r io.Reader, limit int64) ([]byte, error) {
data, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(r, limit+1))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if int64(len(data)) > limit {
return nil, errTooLarge
}
return data, nil
}
// IngestMessage parses a raw RFC 5322 message from r and stores any DMARC
// aggregate attachment it finds.
//
// The report XML is unauthenticated input: anyone who can reach an allow-listed
// rua= address can post one, and the address form is predictable. So the domain
// the report claims is checked twice before anything is stored — it must be a
// domain this relay actually sends for, and, when the report arrived at a
// per-domain hosted address (dmarc-reports+<domain>@<hostname>), it must be the
// domain that address is tagged for. Without this a stranger could file reports
// under someone else's domain, skew the panel's alignment figures, and push
// genuine reports out through the retention cap.
func IngestMessage(st *store.Store, r io.Reader, recipient string, receivedAt time.Time) error {
raw, err := readAtMost(r, MaxMessage)
if errors.Is(err, errTooLarge) {
return rejected(fmt.Errorf("the message is larger than %d MiB", MaxMessage>>20))
}
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("read message: %w", err)
}
payload, err := extractAggregatePayload(raw)
if err != nil {
return rejected(err)
}
parsed, err := ParseAggregate(payload)
if err != nil {
return rejected(err)
}
recipient = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(recipient))
if err := checkReportDomain(st, parsed.Domain, recipient); err != nil {
return err
}
rep := store.DMARCReport{
Domain: parsed.Domain,
Reporter: parsed.Reporter,
ReportID: parsed.ReportID,
PeriodBegin: parsed.PeriodBegin,
PeriodEnd: parsed.PeriodEnd,
ReceivedAt: receivedAt.UTC(),
ContactEmail: parsed.ContactEmail,
PolicyP: parsed.PolicyP,
PolicySP: parsed.PolicySP,
PolicyPct: parsed.PolicyPct,
PolicyADKIM: parsed.PolicyADKIM,
PolicyASPF: parsed.PolicyASPF,
PassCount: parsed.PassCount,
FailCount: parsed.FailCount,
Recipient: recipient,
}
for _, rec := range parsed.Records {
rep.Records = append(rep.Records, store.DMARCReportRecord{
SourceIP: rec.SourceIP,
Count: rec.Count,
Disposition: rec.Disposition,
SPFResult: rec.SPFResult,
DKIMResult: rec.DKIMResult,
HeaderFrom: rec.HeaderFrom,
})
}
if _, err := st.InsertDMARCReport(rep); err != nil {
return err
}
return st.PruneDMARCReports(rep.Domain)
}
// checkReportDomain refuses a report whose policy domain is not one of this
// relay's sending domains, or that contradicts the +tag of the address it was
// delivered to.
func checkReportDomain(st *store.Store, domain, recipient string) error {
if domain == "" {
return rejected(fmt.Errorf("no policy domain"))
}
if tagged := TaggedDomain(recipient); tagged != "" && tagged != domain {
return rejected(fmt.Errorf("domain %q does not match the address it was sent to (%s)", domain, recipient))
}
ok, err := st.DomainExists(domain)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !ok {
return rejected(fmt.Errorf("%q is not a domain configured on this relay", domain))
}
return nil
}
func extractAggregatePayload(raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
msg, err := mail.ReadMessage(bytes.NewReader(raw))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse message: %w", err)
}
ct := msg.Header.Get("Content-Type")
if ct == "" {
return io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(msg.Body, 8<<20))
}
mediaType, params, err := mime.ParseMediaType(ct)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("content-type: %w", err)
}
if strings.HasPrefix(mediaType, "multipart/") {
boundary := params["boundary"]
if boundary == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("multipart without boundary")
}
mr := multipart.NewReader(msg.Body, boundary)
for {
part, err := mr.NextPart()
if err == io.EOF {
break
}
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("multipart: %w", err)
}
name := strings.ToLower(part.FileName())
if name == "" {
name = strings.ToLower(part.Header.Get("Content-Type"))
}
if !looksLikeAggregate(name) {
continue
}
data, err := readEncodedBody(textproto.MIMEHeader(part.Header), part)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if len(data) > 0 {
return data, nil
}
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no aggregate attachment found")
}
return readEncodedBody(textproto.MIMEHeader(msg.Header), msg.Body)
}
// looksLikeAggregate takes a part by its file name or Content-Type. RFC 7489
// § 7.2.1.1: the report is "application/gzip" if compressed and "text/xml"
// otherwise, its name ending ".xml" or ".xml.gz"; zip is outside the RFC and
// is what some reporters send (see decompress).
func looksLikeAggregate(name string) bool {
name = strings.ToLower(name)
return strings.Contains(name, "xml") || strings.Contains(name, "gzip") || strings.Contains(name, "zip")
}
func readEncodedBody(hdr textproto.MIMEHeader, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
encoding := strings.ToLower(hdr.Get("Content-Transfer-Encoding"))
var body io.Reader = r
switch encoding {
case "base64":
body = base64.NewDecoder(base64.StdEncoding, r)
case "quoted-printable":
body = quotedprintable.NewReader(r)
}
data, err := readAtMost(body, maxAggregateXML)
if errors.Is(err, errTooLarge) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("the report part is larger than %d MiB", maxAggregateXML>>20)
}
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read part body: %w", err)
}
return data, nil
}