Files
selfpost/internal/web/web.go
T
mix 10c41677bd
test / test (push) Has been cancelled
web: give the embedded static assets a content ETag
The assets are baked into the binary, so their FS modification times are the
zero value and http.FileServer sent no Last-Modified. With no ETag either, a
static response carried no validator at all and the browser was free to guess
how long to keep it -- which is how the panel kept showing the previous favicon
in the tab well after the new mark was deployed.

Hash each asset once at startup and serve that as a strong ETag, with
Cache-Control: no-cache so the browser keeps its copy but revalidates. An
unchanged asset then costs a bodyless 304 and a changed one is picked up on the
next load.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 23:35:42 +03:00

271 lines
11 KiB
Go

// Package web implements the SelfPost control panel's HTTP surface: the
// one-time administrator setup flow (security.md), login/session handling
// (security.md) and the authenticated shell the later phases build on.
package web
import (
"embed"
"log"
"net"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/app"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/dnscheck"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/domain"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/health"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
)
//go:embed templates/*.html static/*
var assetsFS embed.FS
// Config holds the panel's HTTP-facing configuration.
type Config struct {
// Hostname is the server's external hostname, used to build the absolute
// setup link shown in the logs (security.md; guide § Environment
// variables for SELFPOST_HOSTNAME).
Hostname string
// CookieSecure sets the Secure attribute on the session cookie. It defaults
// to true (security.md); it exists as a knob only so the panel can be tested
// over plain HTTP in development, never for production.
CookieSecure bool
// SubmissionEnabled mirrors SUBMISSION_ENABLE: whether this deployment also
// runs the 587/STARTTLS submission listener next to the primary 465 one
// (architecture.md § Mail path). The panel only reports it on the domain
// page's connection settings; it is a deploy-time flag, not something the
// panel can verify.
SubmissionEnabled bool
// MailLogPath is where Postfix's delivery log lives, read by the mail.log
// monitoring view (architecture.md § Panel HTTP surface). It is the same path
// the log-tailer role follows in cmd/panel.
MailLogPath string
// DataDir and DBPath locate the persistent state a full backup archives
// (architecture.md § Persistence); Version is stamped into the backup
// manifest. They mirror the panel's own configuration.
DataDir string
DBPath string
Version string
// TrustedProxyCIDRs are the reverse-proxy addresses allowed to supply
// X-Forwarded-For (env TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR). A request whose
// direct peer (RemoteAddr) is not in this list never has its XFF header
// honoured, so the header can't be spoofed by anyone but a trusted proxy.
// Empty (the default) keeps rate-limiting keyed on RemoteAddr only.
TrustedProxyCIDRs []*net.IPNet
// TLSCertFile is the certificate Postfix serves on 465/587 (guide §
// Environment variables), read read-only by the status page to report how
// much validity is left.
TLSCertFile string
// OpenDKIMSocket and JournalSocket are the two milter sockets Postfix
// connects to. The status page stats them: the first is required for mail
// to leave at all (OpenDKIM runs with default_action=tempfail), the second
// only for the send log (the journal-milter fails open).
OpenDKIMSocket string
JournalSocket string
// SessionIdleDays is the sliding inactivity window after which a login
// session expires (env PANEL_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS, plan B.1). Non-positive
// falls back to the 7-day default.
SessionIdleDays int
// DNSResolvers are the recursive resolvers the deliverability checks query
// (env SELFPOST_DNS_RESOLVERS). Empty uses dnscheck.DefaultResolvers. The
// checks must not go through the system resolver — see dnscheck's
// externalResolver — so this is how a closed network points them at its own.
DNSResolvers []string
}
// Server is the panel HTTP application.
type Server struct {
store *store.Store
domains *domain.Service
apps *app.Service
cfg Config
tmpl *templates
sessions *sessionStore
setup *setupManager
dns *dnscheck.Checker
// machine reads the host's CPU, memory and network counters for the
// status page. It has to be one shared sampler for the whole server:
// CPU and throughput are differences between successive readings, so a
// per-request sampler would never have a previous one to subtract.
machine health.MachineSampler
loginLimiter *rateLimiter
setupLimiter *rateLimiter
trustedProxies []*net.IPNet
}
// New builds the panel server. setupTokenPath is where the current setup token
// is mirrored on disk (security.md); domains is the sending-domain service
// that owns DKIM keys and the OpenDKIM tables (architecture.md § OpenDKIM);
// apps owns application SASL accounts and the Postfix sender map
// (architecture.md § Mail path).
func New(st *store.Store, domains *domain.Service, apps *app.Service, cfg Config, setupTokenPath string) (*Server, error) {
tmpl, err := loadTemplates()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
idleDays := cfg.SessionIdleDays
if idleDays <= 0 {
idleDays = 7
}
s := &Server{
store: st,
domains: domains,
apps: apps,
cfg: cfg,
tmpl: tmpl,
sessions: newSessionStore(st, time.Duration(idleDays)*24*time.Hour),
// Published-DNS checks for the status page and the domain pages. The
// checker caches its own results, so page views do not each pay for a
// round of lookups.
dns: dnscheck.New(cfg.DNSResolvers),
// Setup: a handful of attempts per minute per IP is plenty for a
// legitimate admin and blunts automated probing (security.md).
setupLimiter: newRateLimiter(10, time.Minute),
// Login: throttle brute-force by IP (security.md).
loginLimiter: newRateLimiter(10, 15*time.Minute),
trustedProxies: cfg.TrustedProxyCIDRs,
}
s.setup = newSetupManager(st, cfg.Hostname, setupTokenPath)
return s, nil
}
// Start performs first-run bootstrapping: if there is no administrator yet, it
// generates and announces the setup link (security.md). Safe to call once at
// server startup.
func (s *Server) Start() error {
return s.setup.bootstrap()
}
// Handler returns the panel's HTTP handler (router).
func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
mux := http.NewServeMux()
// Health check stays unauthenticated for the container/orchestrator.
mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", handleHealth)
// Vendored static assets (HTMX). Served from the embedded FS, with a
// content ETag so a replaced asset survives the browser cache (static.go).
mux.Handle("/static/", staticHandler())
// One-time administrator setup (security.md).
mux.HandleFunc("/setup/", s.handleSetup)
// Authentication.
mux.HandleFunc("/login", s.handleLogin)
mux.HandleFunc("/logout", s.handleLogout)
// Authenticated panel. Everything not matched by a more specific pattern
// above falls through to this sub-mux, wrapped once in the auth middleware.
authed := http.NewServeMux()
// The landing page is the server status: the first thing an
// administrator should see after logging in is whether the service is
// healthy, not the domain list. handleLogin still redirects to "/".
authed.HandleFunc("GET /{$}", redirectToStatus)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /status", s.handleStatus)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /status/fragment", s.handleStatusFragment)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /status/recheck", s.handleStatusRecheck)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /domains", s.handleDashboard)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /domains", s.handleAddDomain)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /domains/import", s.handleImportDomain)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /domains/{id}", s.handleDomainDetail)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /domains/{id}/dns-recheck", s.handleDomainDNSRecheck)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /domains/{id}/delete", s.handleDeleteConfirm)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /domains/{id}/delete", s.handleDeleteDomain)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /domains/{id}/applications", s.handleAddApplication)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /domains/{id}/ratelimit", s.handleDomainRateLimit)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /domains/{id}/export", s.handleExportDomain)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /applications/{aid}/mode", s.handleUpdateAppMode)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /applications/{aid}/password", s.handleRegenPassword)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /applications/{aid}/ratelimit", s.handleAppRateLimit)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /applications/{aid}/delete", s.handleDeleteApplication)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /reload", s.handleReload)
// Administrator's own panel credentials.
authed.HandleFunc("/account", s.handleAccount)
// Backup and migration: the page with both actions (architecture.md §
// Persistence-B), and the full-server backup download itself.
authed.HandleFunc("GET /backup", s.handleBackupPage)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /backup", s.handleBackup)
// Monitoring screens (architecture.md § Panel HTTP surface): each page and
// its HTMX polling fragment (architecture.md § Panel HTTP surface — the /rows
// and /body endpoints return HTML, not JSON).
authed.HandleFunc("GET /deliveries", s.handleDeliveries)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /deliveries/rows", s.handleDeliveriesRows)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /deliveries/{id}", s.handleDelivery)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /mail-queue", s.handleMailQueue)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /mail-queue/body", s.handleMailQueueBody)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /system-log", s.handleSystemLog)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /system-log/body", s.handleSystemLogBody)
mux.Handle("/", s.requireAuth(authed))
// Security headers and the origin check wrap everything, including the
// unauthenticated login and setup routes.
return s.secure(mux)
}
// redirectToStatus points the panel root at the status page, so there is one
// canonical URL for that content instead of two.
func redirectToStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Redirect(w, r, "/status", http.StatusSeeOther)
}
func handleHealth(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
if err := health.Liveness(); err != nil {
http.Error(w, "unhealthy\n", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok\n"))
}
// clientIP extracts the peer IP for rate-limiting. By default it is the
// transport peer (RemoteAddr), which cannot be spoofed. If RemoteAddr matches
// one of trustedProxies, the last entry of X-Forwarded-For is used instead —
// that is the address the trusted proxy itself appended, so a client can't
// forge it by sending its own XFF header. With no trusted
// proxies configured, behind a reverse proxy this is the proxy's own address,
// which is an acceptable backstop for a single-admin panel.
func clientIP(r *http.Request, trustedProxies []*net.IPNet) string {
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
host = r.RemoteAddr
}
if len(trustedProxies) > 0 {
if peer := net.ParseIP(host); peer != nil && ipInAny(peer, trustedProxies) {
if xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); xff != "" {
parts := strings.Split(xff, ",")
if ip := net.ParseIP(strings.TrimSpace(parts[len(parts)-1])); ip != nil {
return ip.String()
}
}
}
}
return host
}
func ipInAny(ip net.IP, nets []*net.IPNet) bool {
for _, n := range nets {
if n.Contains(ip) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// logf is a thin wrapper so handlers log with a consistent prefix.
func logf(format string, args ...any) {
log.Printf(format, args...)
}