Technical review (Opus) and security review (Fable) of 5be109b..5154bba;
reports in the session's scratchpad. Nothing above low from security; one
bug and three risks from the technical review. Migration 0009 is not
deployed, so it was extended.
- Bug: two refusals of one second swapped their NOQUEUE lines (each line
went to the newest lineless row). AttachRefusalLine now matches the
client address too (send_log.client_ip, written by the journal milter -
Postfix's line names the client and the sender, never the login: the
sasl_username part of the pattern never matched and could be fed by HELO,
security F1/F2), takes the nearest row in time and the oldest of equals,
and a line already on a row goes on no other (security F6).
- Waiting lines and recoveries lived only in memory while the saved offset
moved past them: a stop within 30 s lost them. The tracker now never saves
an offset past the oldest waiting item in its file (tracker.hold,
refusalLines.oldest) - for a recovery, the client= line that names its
login - so they are read again; the "once" guards make that harmless.
- A recovered row whose login the tailer did not see was nobody's: its
domain_id falls back to the envelope domain's.
- The fingerprint's file identity is the inode alone: the device number can
change across a host reboot and make the same log look rotated.
- A refused row carries its queue id; UpdateStatus's "newest row" now skips
refused rows, so a later message with that id does not flip it to sent.
- The alive mark: its age is read first and kept from then on, so asking
supervisord for 30 s cannot make it stale; the entrypoint removes it with
the sockets - a container restart is not the check's downtime, and a mark
from before would have counted the whole outage as "≈".
- Security F3: the sender check prints no ";" of the client's in the From:
text of its reply, and the tailer reads the envelope after the first ";"
- Postfix's own text.
- A refused row with a queue id and no stored lines says so (it was told the
mail.log text of 2.2.0); the fact's em dash is the house hyphen.
- Docs: architecture (client address, no login), guide § Health (warns on
either count), help topics log and sender-check (design 1ca87f2).
- e2e: refusals_show_postfixs_line wants the refusal's own sender in the
line; refusal_recovered_from_the_log waits past the tailer's 30 s and
checks that a refusal the panel wrote got no recovered twin.
Not changed, written down: review 9 (mail.log.1 read to its end at that
moment; postlogd may still write to it until the reload), 10 (a log under
512 bytes has no fingerprint, so places fall back to time briefly after a
rotation), 6 (a 451 at MAIL FROM of another milter reads the same - the
client and sender must match too now), security F5/F12 (info). Review 12:
the refused and closed-by-the-panel variants of out-message were shown to
the owner as pictures of the real templates, not drawn in out-message.html:
the guard ties every drawn screen to a page of the engine, and a variant
has the page's outline.
Evidence on the test server for this tree: go vet clean, go test ./... 23
packages ok, make e2e exit 0 (refusal_recovered_from_the_log 70 s).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
112 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
112 lines
4.2 KiB
Go
package milter
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import (
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"log"
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"time"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
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)
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// overLimit reports whether the message currently being received should be
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// refused under a level-2 differentiated limit (guide § Rate limiting).
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//
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// When an application has an active limit, it overrides the domain limit for
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// that login (the ceiling may be higher or lower than the domain). Otherwise
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// the domain ceiling applies when configured; if neither is set, only level 1
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// applies.
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//
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// It is deliberately fail-open: any store error, or the absence of a usable
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// limit, is treated as "not over limit" so a malfunction of the level-2
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// limiter can never block mail — Postfix's level-1 anvil limit
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// (architecture.md § Mail path) remains the backstop, and it does not depend
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// on this milter at all. Only a clean count at or above a configured ceiling
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// returns true.
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//
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// A message that passes reserves a slot per applicable limit, released once it
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// reaches the send log (or is abandoned) — see inflight for why the stored
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// count alone is not enough.
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func (s *session) overLimit() bool {
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// A ceiling is on a domain or an application, whatever address the mail
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// comes from, so the client address is not asked for here. It used to be,
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// and a message that arrived without one was let through uncounted.
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if s.login != "" {
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rl, ok, err := s.rec.RateLimit(store.RateLimitScopeApp, s.login)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("journal-milter: rate-limit lookup application %q: %v (fail-open)", s.login, err)
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} else if ok && rl.Active() {
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return s.enforceLimit(store.RateLimitScopeApp, s.login, rl)
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}
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}
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domain := domainOf(s.from)
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if domain == "" && s.login != "" {
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// MAIL FROM:<> has no domain to read; the login has one. A null
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// sender is held to its application's domain like any other message
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// of it (review of audit stage 2).
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if a, err := s.rec.ApplicationByLogin(s.login); err == nil {
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domain = a.DomainName
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}
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}
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if domain == "" {
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return false
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}
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rl, ok, err := s.rec.RateLimit(store.RateLimitScopeDomain, domain)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("journal-milter: rate-limit lookup domain %q: %v (fail-open)", domain, err)
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return false
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}
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if !ok || !rl.Active() {
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return false
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}
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return s.enforceLimit(store.RateLimitScopeDomain, domain, rl)
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}
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// enforceLimit counts recent messages for scope/ref and refuses when at or
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// above the ceiling. The stored count and the in-flight slots are weighed and
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// the admitted message's own slot is taken in one atomic step (tryAdmit), so
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// two sessions racing at MAIL FROM cannot both claim the last free slot.
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func (s *session) enforceLimit(scope, ref string, rl store.RateLimit) bool {
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since := time.Now().Add(-time.Duration(rl.WindowSeconds) * time.Second)
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stored, err := s.rec.CountMessages(scope, ref, since)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("journal-milter: rate-limit count %s %q: %v (fail-open)", scope, ref, err)
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return false
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}
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r, n, ok := s.flight.tryAdmit(scope+"|"+ref, since, stored, int64(rl.MaxMessages))
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if !ok {
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log.Printf("journal-milter: %s %q over limit: %d/%d in %ds from %s — refusing 4xx",
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scope, ref, n, rl.MaxMessages, rl.WindowSeconds, s.clientIP)
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return true
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}
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s.reserved = append(s.reserved, r)
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return false
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}
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// releaseReservations gives back every slot this message holds. It runs once
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// the message is in the send log (where the stored count sees it), and whenever
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// the transaction ends without getting there.
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func (s *session) releaseReservations() {
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for _, r := range s.reserved {
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s.flight.release(r)
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}
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s.reserved = nil
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}
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// recordRejected writes a send-log row for a message refused by a level-2
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// limit (guide § Rate limiting — refusals are recorded too) or for its client
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// address, so the rejection shows up in the monitoring screen with its reason
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// (store.Reason*). Only MAIL-stage fields are known; the write is best-effort
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// and never affects the response.
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func (s *session) recordRejected(reason string) {
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err := s.rec.InsertRejected(store.SendLogEntry{
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Domain: domainOf(s.from),
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AppLogin: s.login,
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From: s.from,
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Reason: reason,
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ClientIP: s.clientIP, // Postfix's line about the refusal names it
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})
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("journal-milter: record rejected %s: %v", s.from, err)
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}
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}
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