Files
selfpost/internal/web/validate/validate.go
T
mix 155b721438
test / test (push) Has been cancelled
Split internal/web into subpackages before domain-admin growth.
Lay out view, auth, validate, and handlers under internal/web while keeping
the cmd/panel API unchanged; update roadmap and changelog for web-split closure.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-08-10 23:19:09 +03:00

149 lines
4.7 KiB
Go

// Package validate holds shared server-side form validation for the panel.
package validate
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
"unicode"
)
// MinAdminPasswordLen is the floor for the administrator password. The panel is
// public (security.md), so this is deliberately not tiny.
const MinAdminPasswordLen = 12
const (
minUsernameLen = 3
maxUsernameLen = 64
)
// MinSecretFilePasswordLen is the floor for the password protecting an
// encrypted backup or domain export. Such a file is offline and can be attacked
// at leisure, so the floor matches the administrator password's rather than the
// weaker "any password is better than none".
const MinSecretFilePasswordLen = MinAdminPasswordLen
// Username enforces a strict server-side whitelist (security.md): letters,
// digits, dot, dash, underscore. Client validation is never trusted.
func Username(u string) error {
if len(u) < minUsernameLen || len(u) > maxUsernameLen {
return fmt.Errorf("username must be %d-%d characters", minUsernameLen, maxUsernameLen)
}
for _, r := range u {
if r > unicode.MaxASCII || (!isASCIILetterOrDigit(r) && r != '.' && r != '-' && r != '_') {
return fmt.Errorf("username may contain only letters, digits, '.', '-' and '_'")
}
}
return nil
}
// AdminPassword enforces a minimum length. Composition rules beyond length tend
// to reduce entropy in practice, so length is the sole gate.
func AdminPassword(p string) error {
if len(p) < MinAdminPasswordLen {
return fmt.Errorf("password must be at least %d characters", MinAdminPasswordLen)
}
return nil
}
func isASCIILetterOrDigit(r rune) bool {
return (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || (r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z') || (r >= '0' && r <= '9')
}
const maxDomainLen = 253 // RFC 1035 limit on a fully-qualified name
// NormalizeDomain lower-cases and trims a domain name. Domain names are
// case-insensitive, and the generated OpenDKIM tables/keys use the canonical
// lower-case form, so we normalise before both validation and storage.
func NormalizeDomain(name string) string {
return strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(name))
}
// Domain enforces a strict server-side whitelist for sending-domain names
// (security.md). The result is safe to write verbatim into the OpenDKIM
// KeyTable/SigningTable and to use as a filesystem path segment: only
// lower-case letters, digits, '.' and '-' are allowed, in valid DNS label
// shape. Input must already be normalised with NormalizeDomain.
func Domain(name string) error {
if name == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("domain is required")
}
if len(name) > maxDomainLen {
return fmt.Errorf("domain must be at most %d characters", maxDomainLen)
}
labels := strings.Split(name, ".")
if len(labels) < 2 {
return fmt.Errorf("domain must include at least one dot (e.g. example.com)")
}
for _, label := range labels {
if err := domainLabel(label); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func domainLabel(label string) error {
if len(label) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("domain must not contain an empty label")
}
if len(label) > 63 {
return fmt.Errorf("each domain label must be at most 63 characters")
}
if label[0] == '-' || label[len(label)-1] == '-' {
return fmt.Errorf("domain labels must not start or end with '-'")
}
for i := 0; i < len(label); i++ {
c := label[i]
lower := c >= 'a' && c <= 'z'
digit := c >= '0' && c <= '9'
if !lower && !digit && c != '-' {
return fmt.Errorf("domain may contain only lower-case letters, digits, '.' and '-'")
}
}
return nil
}
// freemailDomains lists public mail hosts that cannot publish _report._dmarc
// authorisation for third-party sending domains.
var freemailDomains = map[string]struct{}{
"gmail.com": {},
"googlemail.com": {},
"outlook.com": {},
"hotmail.com": {},
"live.com": {},
"yahoo.com": {},
"icloud.com": {},
"me.com": {},
"proton.me": {},
"protonmail.com": {},
}
// Email checks a DMARC rua= mailbox. Empty is allowed (policy-only).
func Email(addr string) error {
addr = strings.TrimSpace(addr)
if addr == "" {
return nil
}
at := strings.LastIndex(addr, "@")
if at <= 0 || at >= len(addr)-1 {
return fmt.Errorf("enter a valid email address")
}
local := addr[:at]
domain := NormalizeDomain(addr[at+1:])
if err := Domain(domain); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("email domain is invalid: %w", err)
}
for _, r := range local {
if r > unicode.MaxASCII {
return fmt.Errorf("email address must be ASCII")
}
if !isASCIILetterOrDigit(r) && r != '.' && r != '-' && r != '_' && r != '+' {
return fmt.Errorf("email address contains invalid characters")
}
}
if _, blocked := freemailDomains[domain]; blocked {
return fmt.Errorf("use an address on a domain you control; public mail hosts cannot receive authorised DMARC reports")
}
return nil
}