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docs: agree inbound antispam panel plan for 1.10.0.
Add journal and allow/deny list design, quarantine candidate, roadmap entries, and Composer to Opus to Fable routing note.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-08-19 00:32:03 +03:00

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Plan: inbound-quarantine

Status: candidate — design TBD; needs explicit agreement before any code
Version: TBD (1.x MINOR if opt-in and backward-compatible; may warrant 2.x if it changes inbound storage or backup contract).


Goal (draft)

Let the operator hold suspicious inbound mail instead of only accept/reject at the milter — review in the panel, then release to the configured upstream, delete, or add sender to allow/deny lists.

This is a product boundary question, not a settled design. The item exists so we can compare approaches before committing.

Why it is separate from inbound-antispam-panel

inbound-antispam-panel.md covers metadata (journal + lists). Quarantine implies storing message bodies (or a durable reference to them) under /data, retention, release workflow, and a wider attack/backup surface — closer to "mini-mailbox" than pure relay.

Open questions (to decide before a checklist)

  1. Where mail lives
    • SelfPost store under /data/quarantine/ (panel owns lifecycle), or
    • delegate to rspamd/Redis and panel only proxies release (less storage in SelfPost, tighter rspamd coupling).
  2. What "release" means
    • inject into Postfix as a new delivery to the domain's upstream transport;
    • or manual download only (no automatic forward).
  3. Retention and caps
    • max age, max total bytes, per-domain limits; interaction with backup size.
  4. RBAC
    • global admin only vs domain-admin for assigned inbound domains.
  5. Threat model
    • malware in stored MIME, path traversal on extract, quota DoS on busy MX.
  6. Product fit
    • does this violate product.md "no mailboxes" if we only hold spam suspects briefly? Explicit product decision required.

Context (as-built)

  • Inbound relay forwards or rejects; no local delivery (inbound-relay.md).
  • Optional INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER — external rspamd may quarantine on its own today, without panel integration.
  • DMARC p=quarantine is unrelated (outbound policy for receivers).

Likely out of scope (until revisited)

  • IMAP/webmail for quarantined mail.
  • End-user self-service quarantine (non-admin recipients).
  • Outbound quarantine.

Dependencies

Done when (placeholder)

TBD once approach is chosen. Minimum bar would include: opt-in flag, panel list/detail, release or discard action, retention, backup inclusion documented, security review.

Implementation checklist

None yet — expand this plan after the open questions above are answered.