Files
selfpost/internal/web/handlers/handlers_sessions_test.go
T
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 b2fbe91de9 panel-redesign: security review of 2.0 - sessions belong to a user by id
Stage 3, step 2. Reviewed by Fable (read-only), fixed by Sonnet with a
failing test before each fix, checked by Opus. No Critical or High
finding: route authorization, tenant isolation by id, the /server/
subtree guard, output encoding and the origin check were found sound.

Fixed
  - M1: a session was keyed by user name and had no link to the user. A
    deleted or renamed user's cookie stayed alive (renewed on every hit,
    before the user was looked up) and became a session of whoever was
    later created under that name, with that account's role. The
    baseline now has sessions.user_id REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE
    CASCADE; the principal is resolved by id and a session is renewed
    only after its user was found. RenameSession is gone.
  - M2: any user's password change deleted every other user's sessions.
    It ends that user's other sessions only.
  - L1: a password set on the user form ends that user's sessions (an
    administrator editing their own account keeps the current one).
  - L2: store, saslpasswd2 and Postfix reload errors were shown verbatim
    on the application form, the inbound upstream / recipients forms and
    the limit recalculation - pages a domain administrator reaches.
    Validation errors (app.ValidationError, inbound.ValidationError,
    store.ErrNotAutoRateLimit) keep their text; anything else is logged
    and shown as "Could not save ... Check the logs and try again."
  - L3: store.ListDMARCReports treated an empty domain list as "all". It
    takes a scope now (AllDomains or a list; an empty list is no rows),
    and the DMARC hub is open to the domain role as the plan says: the
    reports of the assigned domains, without the instance-wide ingest
    box. The menu entry was already shown to them and led to a 404.
  - I1: /static/ answered with a listing of the embedded assets. A path
    that is not a known asset is a 404.

Consequences
  - The global DMARC hub lists reports of domains that were deleted
    since, too.
  - dev/migrate1x (not in the tree) no longer carries sessions over:
    everyone signs in again after the transfer.
  - docs/schema-migrations.md: the sessions row.

Recorded, not changed - for the owner:
  - L4: the report-address select names the followed user and their
    address to every administrator of the domain, by default the global
    administrator's login name. The plan asks for it.
  - L5: a delegated inbound upstream may be any host and port, loopback
    and private ranges included - within the trusted-operator model; to
    be listed among the accepted risks in security.md.
  - L6: Account's profile is saved without the password; becomes a
    requirement once password-reset mails to users.email.
  - Still echoing an error's text: backup and domain import (global
    only), the domain form's validation messages.

Not checked by the review: anything needing the container (e2e, real
Postfix / DNS), CSP behaviour in a live browser.

  go test -count=1 ./internal/web/... ./internal/store/... ./internal/app/...
    ./internal/inbound/... ./internal/dmarc/... ./cmd/panel
      ok  (all eleven packages; dev/migrate1x also ok)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 03:04:02 +03:00

162 lines
6.0 KiB
Go

package handlers
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/web/auth"
"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
)
// sessionCookieName is the panel's cookie without TLS (auth.Config{} here).
const sessionCookieName = "selfpost_session"
// signedIn stores a session for the user the way a login does and returns the
// token the browser would hold.
func signedIn(t *testing.T, h *Handlers, username, token string) string {
t.Helper()
u, err := h.store.GetUserByUsername(username)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("get %s: %v", username, err)
}
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
if err := h.store.CreateSession(hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]), u.ID, time.Now().Add(time.Hour)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create session of %s: %v", username, err)
}
return token
}
func hasSession(t *testing.T, h *Handlers, token string) bool {
t.Helper()
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
_, found, err := h.store.LookupSession(hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("lookup session: %v", err)
}
return found
}
// postWithSession is postFormAs for a request that also carries the session
// cookie of the browser it comes from.
func postWithSession(h http.HandlerFunc, p auth.Principal, token, target string, pathValues map[string]string, values url.Values) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, target, strings.NewReader(values.Encode()))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: sessionCookieName, Value: token})
for k, v := range pathValues {
req.SetPathValue(k, v)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h(rec, auth.RequestWithPrincipal(req, p))
return rec
}
// addUser creates a global user with a known password and returns its principal.
func addUser(t *testing.T, h *Handlers, username, password string) auth.Principal {
t.Helper()
hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(password), bcrypt.MinCost)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
id, err := h.store.CreateUser(username, string(hash), store.RoleGlobal, store.Reach{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create %s: %v", username, err)
}
return auth.Principal{ID: id, Username: username, Role: auth.RoleGlobal}
}
// Changing your own password signs out your other sessions, and only yours:
// the Account page is open to every role, so it cannot reach into anybody
// else's login.
func TestAccountPasswordSignsOutOnlyTheUsersOtherSessions(t *testing.T) {
h, _ := settingsServer(t)
bob := addUser(t, h, "bob", "bobs-long-password-1")
aliceCurrent := signedIn(t, h, "admin", "admin-current")
bobCurrent := signedIn(t, h, "bob", "bob-current")
bobOther := signedIn(t, h, "bob", "bob-other")
const next = "bobs-new-long-password-2"
rec := postWithSession(h.HandleAccountPassword, bob, bobCurrent, "/account/password", nil,
url.Values{"current_password": {"bobs-long-password-1"}, "new_password": {next}, "new_password_confirm": {next}})
if rec.Code != http.StatusSeeOther {
t.Fatalf("POST /account/password = %d:\n%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
if hasSession(t, h, bobOther) {
t.Error("the user's other session survived their password change")
}
if !hasSession(t, h, bobCurrent) {
t.Error("the session that changed the password was signed out")
}
if !hasSession(t, h, aliceCurrent) {
t.Error("another user's session was signed out by someone else's password change")
}
}
// An administrator who sets another user's password on the user form takes
// away every login that user had under the old one.
func TestUserFormPasswordSignsOutThatUsersSessions(t *testing.T) {
h, _ := settingsServer(t)
admin := globalPrincipal
bob := addUser(t, h, "bob", "bobs-long-password-1")
adminCurrent := signedIn(t, h, "admin", "admin-current")
bob1 := signedIn(t, h, "bob", "bob-1")
bob2 := signedIn(t, h, "bob", "bob-2")
rec := postWithSession(h.HandleUserEdit, admin, adminCurrent, "/server/users/"+idStr(bob.ID), map[string]string{"uid": idStr(bob.ID)},
url.Values{"username": {"bob"}, "role": {"global"}, "password": {"a-brand-new-long-password"}})
if rec.Code != http.StatusSeeOther {
t.Fatalf("POST user form = %d:\n%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
if hasSession(t, h, bob1) || hasSession(t, h, bob2) {
t.Error("the user's sessions survived an administrator setting their password")
}
if !hasSession(t, h, adminCurrent) {
t.Error("the administrator's own session was signed out by editing someone else")
}
}
// Saving the form without a new password does not sign anyone out.
func TestUserFormWithoutAPasswordKeepsTheSessions(t *testing.T) {
h, _ := settingsServer(t)
bob := addUser(t, h, "bob", "bobs-long-password-1")
bob1 := signedIn(t, h, "bob", "bob-1")
rec := postWithSession(h.HandleUserEdit, globalPrincipal, "no-session", "/server/users/"+idStr(bob.ID), map[string]string{"uid": idStr(bob.ID)},
url.Values{"username": {"bob"}, "role": {"global"}, "email": {"bob@example.org"}})
if rec.Code != http.StatusSeeOther {
t.Fatalf("POST user form = %d:\n%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
if !hasSession(t, h, bob1) {
t.Error("an edit without a new password signed the user out")
}
}
// An administrator who sets their own password through the user form is signed
// out everywhere except in the browser they are using.
func TestUserFormOwnPasswordKeepsTheCurrentSession(t *testing.T) {
h, _ := settingsServer(t)
current := signedIn(t, h, "admin", "admin-current")
other := signedIn(t, h, "admin", "admin-other")
rec := postWithSession(h.HandleUserEdit, globalPrincipal, current, "/server/users/1", map[string]string{"uid": "1"},
url.Values{"username": {"admin"}, "role": {"global"}, "password": {"a-brand-new-long-password"}})
if rec.Code != http.StatusSeeOther {
t.Fatalf("POST user form = %d:\n%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
if !hasSession(t, h, current) {
t.Error("the administrator's current session was signed out")
}
if hasSession(t, h, other) {
t.Error("the administrator's other session survived their own password change")
}
}