Files
selfpost/internal/store/domains.go
T
mixandClaude Opus 5 23d52bab7c
test / test (push) Has been cancelled
fix: port-25 milter chain, DMARC report validation, auto rate-limit window
Review pass over the 1.4.0-1.9.1 work.

Port 25 no longer inherits main.cf's submission milter chain: smtpd_milters
is always overridden on smtp/inet, to the antispam milter or to nothing.
Without that, OpenDKIM (strict, tempfail) gated relayed mail during a signing
outage, and the journal-milter filed inbound mail into the outbound send log
under the sender's domain -- so Deliveries showed other people's mail and a
forged From: consumed that domain's level-2 budget. architecture.md already
described the intended behaviour; the code now matches.

DMARC reports are checked before they are stored: the policy domain must be a
configured sending domain, and must match the +tag of a per-domain hosted
address. The rua address form is predictable, so anyone able to reach it could
file reports under any domain and evict genuine ones through the retention cap.
Zip attachments are now decompressed as well as gzip.

The auto level-2 ceiling is scaled to the level-1 window before the multiplier
is applied; any window other than 3600s shifted the allowance by window/3600.

Migration 0010 indexes send_log(app_login, created_at) -- both the per-MAIL
FROM rate-limit count and the per-application statistics were scanning the
created_at range.

e2e now regenerates the Postfix config in-container for all four port-25 flag
combinations and requires postfix check to pass; the 1.9.1 crash-loop shipped
in 1.4.0 and survived three releases because only the flags-off path was
exercised.

Migration 0009 stays as shipped -- its conversion branch only fires for a
database carrying application-scope allowed_ips from before 1.9.0. The schema
reference notes that the old list was permissive and the new column is
restrictive; the guide documents the allow-list as a sending control on a
fail-open path, not an authentication boundary.

Also: gofmt across cmd/ and internal/, unused duplicate validators dropped from
internal/web/validate, export no longer swallows store errors.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 14:17:39 +03:00

200 lines
5.8 KiB
Go

package store
import (
"database/sql"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
"time"
"modernc.org/sqlite"
sqlite3 "modernc.org/sqlite/lib"
)
// ErrDomainExists is returned by AddDomain when the domain is already managed.
var ErrDomainExists = errors.New("domain already exists")
// ErrDomainNotFound is returned when a domain id/name does not exist.
var ErrDomainNotFound = errors.New("domain not found")
// Domain is a sending domain managed through the panel (product.md §
// Multi-domain model). The DKIM key material itself lives on disk under /data;
// this row records the selector and metadata. AppCount is populated by the
// listing queries, not stored.
type Domain struct {
ID int64
Name string
DKIMSelector string
DMARCRua sql.NullString // NULL = inherit profile; Valid+empty = no reports
CreatedAt time.Time
AppCount int
}
// AddDomain inserts a new sending domain. The caller is responsible for having
// validated name (security.md) before it reaches SQL; the query is parameterised
// regardless. A duplicate name maps to ErrDomainExists.
func (s *Store) AddDomain(name, selector string) (Domain, error) {
now := time.Now().UTC()
res, err := s.db.Exec(
"INSERT INTO domains (name, dkim_selector, created_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?)",
name, selector, now.Format(time.RFC3339),
)
if err != nil {
if isUniqueViolation(err) {
return Domain{}, ErrDomainExists
}
return Domain{}, fmt.Errorf("insert domain: %w", err)
}
id, err := res.LastInsertId()
if err != nil {
return Domain{}, fmt.Errorf("domain id: %w", err)
}
return Domain{ID: id, Name: name, DKIMSelector: selector, CreatedAt: now}, nil
}
// ListDomains returns every domain with its bound-application count (product.md),
// ordered by name.
func (s *Store) ListDomains() ([]Domain, error) {
rows, err := s.db.Query(`
SELECT d.id, d.name, d.dkim_selector, d.dmarc_rua, d.created_at,
(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM applications a WHERE a.domain_id = d.id)
FROM domains d
ORDER BY d.name`)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("list domains: %w", err)
}
defer rows.Close()
var out []Domain
for rows.Next() {
d, err := scanDomain(rows)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out = append(out, d)
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
// ListDomainsForUser returns domains assigned to userID with application counts,
// ordered by name.
func (s *Store) ListDomainsForUser(userID int64) ([]Domain, error) {
rows, err := s.db.Query(`
SELECT d.id, d.name, d.dkim_selector, d.dmarc_rua, d.created_at,
(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM applications a WHERE a.domain_id = d.id)
FROM domains d
INNER JOIN user_domains ud ON ud.domain_id = d.id
WHERE ud.user_id = ?
ORDER BY d.name`, userID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("list domains for user: %w", err)
}
defer rows.Close()
var out []Domain
for rows.Next() {
d, err := scanDomain(rows)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out = append(out, d)
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
// GetDomain returns a single domain (with its application count) by id, or
// ErrDomainNotFound.
func (s *Store) GetDomain(id int64) (Domain, error) {
row := s.db.QueryRow(`
SELECT d.id, d.name, d.dkim_selector, d.dmarc_rua, d.created_at,
(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM applications a WHERE a.domain_id = d.id)
FROM domains d
WHERE d.id = ?`, id)
d, err := scanDomain(row)
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
return Domain{}, ErrDomainNotFound
}
if err != nil {
return Domain{}, err
}
return d, nil
}
// DeleteDomain removes a domain. Its applications and their address/binding rows
// go with it via ON DELETE CASCADE (product.md). Returns ErrDomainNotFound if no
// such row existed.
func (s *Store) DeleteDomain(id int64) error {
res, err := s.db.Exec("DELETE FROM domains WHERE id = ?", id)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("delete domain: %w", err)
}
n, err := res.RowsAffected()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("delete domain rows: %w", err)
}
if n == 0 {
return ErrDomainNotFound
}
return nil
}
// scanRow is the minimal surface shared by *sql.Row and *sql.Rows.
type scanRow interface {
Scan(dest ...any) error
}
func scanDomain(r scanRow) (Domain, error) {
var (
d Domain
createdAt string
)
if err := r.Scan(&d.ID, &d.Name, &d.DKIMSelector, &d.DMARCRua, &createdAt, &d.AppCount); err != nil {
return Domain{}, err
}
d.CreatedAt, _ = time.Parse(time.RFC3339, createdAt)
return d, nil
}
// isUniqueViolation reports whether err is a SQLite UNIQUE/PRIMARY-KEY conflict,
// so callers can turn a duplicate insert into a friendly domain-level error.
func isUniqueViolation(err error) bool {
var se *sqlite.Error
if errors.As(err, &se) {
code := se.Code()
return code == sqlite3.SQLITE_CONSTRAINT_UNIQUE || code == sqlite3.SQLITE_CONSTRAINT_PRIMARYKEY
}
return false
}
// UpdateDomainDMARCRua sets how this domain resolves its DMARC rua= destination.
// NULL means inherit the administrator profile; Valid with an empty string means
// policy-only with no aggregate reports for this domain.
func (s *Store) UpdateDomainDMARCRua(id int64, rua sql.NullString) error {
res, err := s.db.Exec("UPDATE domains SET dmarc_rua = ? WHERE id = ?", rua, id)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("update domain dmarc rua: %w", err)
}
n, err := res.RowsAffected()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("update domain dmarc rua rows: %w", err)
}
if n == 0 {
return ErrDomainNotFound
}
return nil
}
// DomainExists reports whether a sending domain with this name is configured.
// Used by the DMARC ingest path to refuse reports for domains this relay does
// not send for (security.md: report XML is attacker-supplied input).
func (s *Store) DomainExists(name string) (bool, error) {
var n int
err := s.db.QueryRow(
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM domains WHERE name = ? COLLATE NOCASE", strings.TrimSpace(name),
).Scan(&n)
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("domain exists %q: %w", name, err)
}
return n > 0, nil
}