Comments only, no behaviour changed. go-milter v0.4.1 (session.go: one session per connection, replaced after a non-continue reply; macros per stage), Postfix 3.7.11 (milter8.c, smtpd_check.c reject_auth_sender_login_mismatch(), mail_addr_find.c, showq_compat.c, mail_conf_time.c, mail_params.h), Cyrus SASL 2.1.28 (saslpasswd.c, plugins/sasldb.c: deleting a missing login is not an error), OpenDKIM 2.11.0~beta2 (opendkim-db.c, opendkim-genkey), Berkeley DB 5.3 db_dump, rspamd 3.11.0. Comments that claimed what the source denies are corrected (sasldb keeps the password as given, not hashed; an embedded newline is kept, not truncated; rspamd sorts symbols by absolute weight); fixtures say seen or composed. The sender check's From: parsing gets no citations: it is replaced by the port of OpenDKIM's dkim_mail_parse next. Contradictions left for their own commits: B-G5 cleanAddress, B-PS1 first key wins, B-PQ1 the forced-expire flag, B-PQ10/PQ11 Postfix's time units. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
169 lines
6.1 KiB
Go
169 lines
6.1 KiB
Go
package app
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import (
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
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)
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const (
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minLoginLen = 3
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maxLoginLen = 64
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)
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// ValidationError is a refusal of what was submitted: its text says what the
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// administrator must fix and is written to be shown on the page. Any other
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// error from this package (a failed write, a failed reload) is not, and the
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// caller must not put its text in front of a user.
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type ValidationError struct{ msg string }
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func (e *ValidationError) Error() string { return e.msg }
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func invalid(format string, args ...any) error {
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return &ValidationError{msg: fmt.Sprintf(format, args...)}
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}
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// foldLogin is a new application's login as it is stored: in lower case
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// (audit 2026-10-12, H4; owner: fold, do not refuse). Postfix compares the
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// SASL login with the sender map's without regard to case, so two logins
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// that differ only in case would be one sender to Postfix and two
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// applications to the panel. The store refuses such a pair as well
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// (idx_applications_login_nocase); a login imported from another instance is
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// not folded, since its SASL account and its client use it as it is.
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//
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// Postfix 3.7.11, src/smtpd/smtpd_check.c, reject_auth_sender_login_mismatch():
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// the SASL login is compared with each owner by strcasecmp_utf8().
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func foldLogin(login string) string {
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return strings.ToLower(login)
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}
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// validateLogin enforces a strict server-side whitelist for the SASL login
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// (security.md). It intentionally excludes '@': the login is stored in sasldb2,
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// where '@' separates the user from the realm, so allowing it would change the
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// account's identity. Client validation is never trusted. (Cyrus SASL 2.1.28,
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// common/plugin_common.c, _plug_parseuser(): a login is split into user and
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// realm at its first "@", for saslpasswd2's store and for the lookup alike.)
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//
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// The login is the one piece of user input that is passed to saslpasswd2 as a
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// command argument (never through a shell, security.md); this whitelist is what
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// makes that safe.
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func validateLogin(login string) error {
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if len(login) < minLoginLen || len(login) > maxLoginLen {
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return invalid("login must be %d-%d characters", minLoginLen, maxLoginLen)
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}
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for _, r := range login {
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lower := r >= 'a' && r <= 'z'
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upper := r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z'
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digit := r >= '0' && r <= '9'
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if !lower && !upper && !digit && r != '.' && r != '-' && r != '_' {
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return invalid("login may contain only letters, digits, '.', '-' and '_'")
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// validateImportedPassword guards a password taken from a domain-export file
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// (architecture.md § Persistence) before it is written to sasldb2. Our own
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// exports carry base64url passwords, but the file is untrusted input, so we
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// reject an empty value or one containing control characters — saslpasswd2
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// reads the passphrase from stdin and a newline would silently truncate it
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// (security.md).
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func validateImportedPassword(password string) error {
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if password == "" {
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return invalid("imported application password is empty")
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}
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if len(password) > 1024 {
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return invalid("imported application password is too long")
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}
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for _, r := range password {
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if r < 0x20 || r == 0x7f {
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return invalid("imported application password contains control characters")
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// validateAddressMode checks the submitted mode is one of the two known values.
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func validateAddressMode(mode string) error {
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if mode != store.AddressModeWildcard && mode != store.AddressModeList {
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return invalid("invalid address mode")
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}
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return nil
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}
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// normalizeAddress lower-cases and trims a sender address. Both the local part
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// and domain are treated case-insensitively for the ownership check and for the
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// generated map, matching how addresses are compared elsewhere.
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func normalizeAddress(addr string) string {
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return strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(addr))
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}
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// validateSenderAddress enforces that a list-mode address is well-formed and,
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// critically, belongs to the application's own domain (security.md). The domain
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// check is done here, before anything is written to a config file — not left to
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// smtpd_sender_login_maps to catch at delivery time. domain must already be a
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// validated, normalised domain name.
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func validateSenderAddress(addr, domain string) error {
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at := strings.LastIndexByte(addr, '@')
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if at < 0 {
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return invalid("%q is not a valid email address", addr)
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}
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local, host := addr[:at], addr[at+1:]
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if host != domain {
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return invalid("%q does not belong to domain %s", addr, domain)
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}
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if err := validateLocalPart(local); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("%q: %w", addr, err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// validateLocalPart applies a conservative whitelist to the part before '@'.
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// This is deliberately stricter than RFC 5321 (no quoted local parts) so the
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// value is always safe to write verbatim into the Postfix map (security.md).
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func validateLocalPart(local string) error {
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if local == "" {
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return invalid("missing the part before '@'")
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}
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if local[0] == '.' || local[len(local)-1] == '.' {
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return invalid("local part must not start or end with '.'")
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}
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for i := 0; i < len(local); i++ {
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c := local[i]
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lower := c >= 'a' && c <= 'z'
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digit := c >= '0' && c <= '9'
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if !lower && !digit && c != '.' && c != '-' && c != '_' && c != '+' {
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return invalid("local part may contain only lower-case letters, digits, '.', '-', '_' and '+'")
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// parseAddresses normalises, validates and de-duplicates a list of submitted
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// sender addresses for a list-mode application. It requires at least one address
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// and that each belongs to domain. The returned slice is de-duplicated but keeps
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// submission order stable for display; the store sorts on read.
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func parseAddresses(raw []string, domain string) ([]string, error) {
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seen := make(map[string]bool)
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out := make([]string, 0, len(raw))
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for _, r := range raw {
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addr := normalizeAddress(r)
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if addr == "" {
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continue
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}
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if err := validateSenderAddress(addr, domain); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if seen[addr] {
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continue
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}
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seen[addr] = true
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out = append(out, addr)
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}
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if len(out) == 0 {
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return nil, invalid("list mode requires at least one address")
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}
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return out, nil
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}
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