[1.3.0] Security and quality after 1.2.5: domain-admin send-log authorization, fail-closed sign-in and application delete, level-2 rate-limit race fix, restore Resync, expanded tests, operator docs, release CI, and OFL for IBM Plex. Upgrading from 1.2.x is a tag bump; no migration. Added: - licence: the SIL Open Font License 1.1 text now travels with the IBM Plex - docs: agreed roadmap item **queue-retries** — show this Postfix's retry Security: - The independent security review of the send-log authorization and Fixed: - test (e2e): send-log status scrapers follow the badge markup in - security (panel): the Deliveries list is scoped to a domain administrator's - mail (level-2 rate limit): the ceiling is no longer overshot by messages that - panel (sign-in): a session that cannot be written to the database no longer - panel (applications): deleting an application removes its SASL credentials … (2 more in CHANGELOG) Changed: - docs: operator and as-built docs aligned with the code after a full - docs: [guide.md](docs/guide.md) reorganised into **Installation**, **Instance - docs: the 2026-08-13 full-tree review plan is complete — every phase (P0–P7) - licence: [NOTICE](NOTICE) tells modifiers to update `SourceURL` in - ci: the release image is published only for a **published** GitHub Release … (9 more in CHANGELOG) [1.3.1] Retry policy in the panel, persistent Postfix queue, and self-contained full backups. Mail queue and delivery history show this Postfix's first retry, backoff cap, and queue lifetime. Deferred mail survives container recreate. Full backups now archive `data/`, compose, `.env`, and `certs/`; the archive layout breaks 1.3.0 flat backups (unpack those with `tar xzf backup.tar.gz -C ./data` as before). Upgrading from 1.3.0 is a tag bump; no schema migration. Added: - Mail queue and a delivery's history show this Postfix's retry policy - docs: **Plan checklists** in [development.md](docs/development.md) — format, - docs: **Implementation checklists** with model routing in - docs: roadmap candidates **send-log-retention** (panel Settings for delivery - Postfix queue under `/data/postfix/queue` — deferred and active mail survive … (1 more in CHANGELOG) Changed: - **Breaking:** full-backup archive layout — paths are prefixed with `data/`; - docs: operator guide, architecture, security, and backup UI updated for - docs: HTML mockups for a full panel UI refresh Changed: - docs: panel UI mockups after review — Status restored to live readings - docs: panel UI design system and mockups rebuilt as separate pages - docs: panel UI mockups — add-domain sits in the list card (Domains and Fixed: - ci (GHCR): per-arch package tags (`X.Y.Z-amd64`, `X.Y.Z-arm64`) are dropped Squashed CHANGELOG sections: [1.3.0], [1.3.1]. Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.3.0, 1.3.1).
195 lines
5.5 KiB
Go
195 lines
5.5 KiB
Go
// Command selfpost-backup produces the full persistent-state archive from inside
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// the container, invoked via `docker exec` for scripted/cron backups — the CLI
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// equivalent of the panel's backup button (architecture.md § Persistence).
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//
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// By default the gzip-compressed tar is written to stdout, so the usual form is:
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//
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// docker exec <container> selfpost-backup > selfpost-backup.tar.gz
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//
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// Use -o to write to a file instead. The resulting archive is self-contained:
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// data/, docker-compose.yml, .env, and certs/ when present — treat it as a
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// secret (architecture.md § Persistence).
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//
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// Given a password (SELFPOST_BACKUP_PASSWORD or -password-file, never an
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// argument, which would show up in the process list) the archive is written as
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// an encrypted .spbk envelope instead. Turn one back into a plain .tar.gz with
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// the same password:
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//
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// docker exec -i <container> selfpost-backup -decrypt < backup.spbk > backup.tar.gz
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//
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// Copyright (C) 2026 Mikhail Yenuchenko
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package main
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import (
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"flag"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/backup"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/buildinfo"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/secretfile"
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)
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// passwordEnv names the environment variable holding the encryption password.
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// A password must never be a command-line argument: the process list is
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// readable by every process in the container.
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const passwordEnv = "SELFPOST_BACKUP_PASSWORD"
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func main() {
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showVersion := flag.Bool("version", false, "print version and exit")
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out := flag.String("o", "", "write the output to this file instead of stdout")
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in := flag.String("i", "", "read the encrypted archive from this file instead of stdin (-decrypt only)")
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decrypt := flag.Bool("decrypt", false, "decrypt an encrypted backup (.spbk) back to a plain .tar.gz")
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pwFile := flag.String("password-file", "", "read the encryption password from this file (first line); "+passwordEnv+" is used when unset")
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flag.Parse()
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if *showVersion {
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fmt.Println(buildinfo.Version)
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return
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}
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password, err := readPassword(*pwFile)
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if err == nil {
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if *decrypt {
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err = runDecrypt(*in, *out, password)
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} else {
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err = run(*out, password)
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}
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}
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if err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "selfpost-backup: %v\n", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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}
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// run writes a backup, encrypting it when a password was supplied.
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func run(outPath, password string) error {
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dataDir := envDefault("SELFPOST_DATA_DIR", "/data")
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dbPath := envDefault("SELFPOST_DB_PATH", filepath.Join(dataDir, "selfpost.db"))
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w, closeOut, err := openOutput(outPath)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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defer closeOut()
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sink := w
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var env *secretfile.Writer
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if password != "" {
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env, err = secretfile.NewWriter(w, secretfile.TypeFullBackup, password)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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sink = env
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}
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if err := backup.Create(sink, backup.Params{
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DataDir: dataDir,
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DBPath: dbPath,
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Version: buildinfo.Version,
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DeployRoot: envDefault("SELFPOST_DEPLOY_ROOT", "/selfpost-deploy"),
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OnWarn: func(msg string) {
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fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "selfpost-backup: %s\n", msg)
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},
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}); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if env != nil {
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if err := env.Close(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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if outPath != "" {
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kind := "plain"
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if password != "" {
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kind = "encrypted"
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}
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fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "selfpost-backup: wrote %s (%s, SelfPost %s)\n", outPath, kind, buildinfo.Version)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// runDecrypt turns a .spbk envelope back into the plain gzip tar, so an
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// encrypted backup can be extracted with ordinary tools during a restore.
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func runDecrypt(inPath, outPath, password string) error {
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if password == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("-decrypt needs the password (set %s or use -password-file)", passwordEnv)
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}
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r := io.Reader(os.Stdin)
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if inPath != "" {
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f, err := os.Open(inPath)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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defer f.Close()
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r = f
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}
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env, err := secretfile.NewReader(r, password)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if env.Type() != secretfile.TypeFullBackup {
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return fmt.Errorf("that file is a %s, not a full backup", env.Type())
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}
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w, closeOut, err := openOutput(outPath)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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defer closeOut()
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if _, err := io.Copy(w, env); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if outPath != "" {
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fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "selfpost-backup: wrote %s (decrypted)\n", outPath)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// openOutput returns stdout, or a freshly created owner-only file: both plain
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// and encrypted backups are secret enough to keep off other users' eyes.
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func openOutput(outPath string) (io.Writer, func(), error) {
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if outPath == "" {
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return os.Stdout, func() {}, nil
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}
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f, err := os.OpenFile(outPath, os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY|os.O_TRUNC, 0o600)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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return f, func() { _ = f.Close() }, nil
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}
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// readPassword takes the password from the given file (first line) or, when no
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// file is named, from the environment. An empty result means "no encryption".
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func readPassword(pwFile string) (string, error) {
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if pwFile == "" {
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return os.Getenv(passwordEnv), nil
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}
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data, err := os.ReadFile(pwFile)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("read password file: %w", err)
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}
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// A password file is usually written with a trailing newline; take the first
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// line and strip the line ending, but keep any other whitespace, which may
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// well be part of the password.
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line, _, _ := strings.Cut(string(data), "\n")
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line = strings.TrimSuffix(line, "\r")
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if line == "" {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("password file %s is empty", pwFile)
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}
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return line, nil
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}
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func envDefault(key, def string) string {
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if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
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return v
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}
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return def
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}
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