test / test (push) Has been cancelled
Review pass over the 1.4.0-1.9.1 work. Port 25 no longer inherits main.cf's submission milter chain: smtpd_milters is always overridden on smtp/inet, to the antispam milter or to nothing. Without that, OpenDKIM (strict, tempfail) gated relayed mail during a signing outage, and the journal-milter filed inbound mail into the outbound send log under the sender's domain -- so Deliveries showed other people's mail and a forged From: consumed that domain's level-2 budget. architecture.md already described the intended behaviour; the code now matches. DMARC reports are checked before they are stored: the policy domain must be a configured sending domain, and must match the +tag of a per-domain hosted address. The rua address form is predictable, so anyone able to reach it could file reports under any domain and evict genuine ones through the retention cap. Zip attachments are now decompressed as well as gzip. The auto level-2 ceiling is scaled to the level-1 window before the multiplier is applied; any window other than 3600s shifted the allowance by window/3600. Migration 0010 indexes send_log(app_login, created_at) -- both the per-MAIL FROM rate-limit count and the per-application statistics were scanning the created_at range. e2e now regenerates the Postfix config in-container for all four port-25 flag combinations and requires postfix check to pass; the 1.9.1 crash-loop shipped in 1.4.0 and survived three releases because only the flags-off path was exercised. Migration 0009 stays as shipped -- its conversion branch only fires for a database carrying application-scope allowed_ips from before 1.9.0. The schema reference notes that the old list was permissive and the new column is restrictive; the guide documents the allow-list as a sending control on a fail-open path, not an authentication boundary. Also: gofmt across cmd/ and internal/, unused duplicate validators dropped from internal/web/validate, export no longer swallows store errors. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
128 lines
3.8 KiB
Go
128 lines
3.8 KiB
Go
package postfix
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import (
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"fmt"
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"path/filepath"
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"sort"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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)
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// InboundRoute is one inbound domain's Postfix map material: the relay
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// domain, the next-hop transport, the TLS policy for that hop, and the
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// recipient list (or a domain catch-all).
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type InboundRoute struct {
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Domain string
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Host string
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Port int
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TLSMode string
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RecipientMode string
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Recipients []string
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}
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func (p *Postfix) inboundMapPaths() (relayDomains, transport, recipients, tlsPolicy string) {
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dir := filepath.Dir(p.senderLoginMapsPath)
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return filepath.Join(dir, "relay_domains"),
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filepath.Join(dir, "transport"),
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filepath.Join(dir, "relay_recipients"),
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filepath.Join(dir, "tls_policy")
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}
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// RebuildInboundMaps regenerates the inbound relay lookup tables from the full
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// set of configured routes and reloads Postfix. Domains with an empty host are
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// omitted so mail is never accepted with nowhere to send it. Full regeneration
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// keeps the files a pure function of the registry (security.md).
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func (p *Postfix) RebuildInboundMaps(routes []InboundRoute) error {
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relay, transport, recipients, tlsPolicy, err := renderInboundMaps(routes)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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rd, tr, rc, tl := p.inboundMapPaths()
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if err := writeFileAtomic(rd, relay, 0o640); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := writeFileAtomic(tr, transport, 0o640); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := writeFileAtomic(rc, recipients, 0o640); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := writeFileAtomic(tl, tlsPolicy, 0o640); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return p.reload()
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}
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func renderInboundMaps(routes []InboundRoute) (relay, transport, recipients, tlsPolicy []byte, err error) {
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sort.Slice(routes, func(i, j int) bool { return routes[i].Domain < routes[j].Domain })
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var relayB, transportB, recipB, tlsB strings.Builder
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for _, r := range routes {
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if strings.TrimSpace(r.Host) == "" {
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continue
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}
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if err := assertInboundRouteSafe(r); err != nil {
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return nil, nil, nil, nil, err
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}
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nexthop := inboundNexthop(r.Host, r.Port)
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fmt.Fprintf(&relayB, "%s OK\n", r.Domain)
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fmt.Fprintf(&transportB, "%s smtp:%s\n", r.Domain, nexthop)
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fmt.Fprintf(&tlsB, "%s %s\n", nexthop, r.TLSMode)
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switch r.RecipientMode {
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case "any":
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fmt.Fprintf(&recipB, "@%s OK\n", r.Domain)
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default:
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addrs := append([]string(nil), r.Recipients...)
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sort.Strings(addrs)
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for _, addr := range addrs {
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fmt.Fprintf(&recipB, "%s OK\n", addr)
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}
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}
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}
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return []byte(relayB.String()), []byte(transportB.String()), []byte(recipB.String()), []byte(tlsB.String()), nil
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}
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// inboundNexthop is the Postfix next-hop [host]:port form. The brackets are
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// what disable the MX lookup, so the operator's explicit upstream is used as
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// given; they also delimit a bare IPv6 address.
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func inboundNexthop(host string, port int) string {
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return "[" + host + "]:" + strconv.Itoa(port)
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}
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func assertInboundRouteSafe(r InboundRoute) error {
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if err := assertMapToken(r.Domain, "domain"); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := assertMapToken(r.Host, "host"); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if r.Port < 1 || r.Port > 65535 {
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return fmt.Errorf("postfix: invalid inbound port %d", r.Port)
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}
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switch r.TLSMode {
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case "may", "encrypt", "none":
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default:
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return fmt.Errorf("postfix: invalid tls mode %q", r.TLSMode)
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}
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if r.RecipientMode != "list" && r.RecipientMode != "any" {
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return fmt.Errorf("postfix: invalid recipient mode %q", r.RecipientMode)
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}
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for _, addr := range r.Recipients {
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if err := assertMapToken(addr, "recipient"); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// assertMapToken rejects values that could break out of a texthash line.
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func assertMapToken(v, what string) error {
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if v == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("postfix: empty %s", what)
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}
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if strings.ContainsAny(v, " \t\r\n,\\") {
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return fmt.Errorf("postfix: unsafe character in %s %q", what, v)
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}
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return nil
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}
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