Review pass over `1.4.0`…`1.9.1`: port 25 no longer shares the submission milter chain, DMARC reports are validated before they are stored, and the auto rate limit is correct for a non-default level-1 window. Schema migration `0010` (index only). Upgrading is a tag bump. Added: - SQLite migration `0010_send_log_app_login_index.sql` — - DMARC aggregate reports are accepted as **zip** as well as gzip or plain XML - e2e: `checkPort25ConfigCombinations` regenerates the Postfix configuration Changed: - README hero line and a **Positioning** block in `docs/product.md` record the Fixed: - The setup account's password is hashed at bcrypt cost `12` like every other - Login/setup rate limiter: protecting blocked buckets from eviction is now - `postqueue -p` output is bounded to 4 MiB (the timeout alone left the size of - [schema-migrations.md](docs/schema-migrations.md): the schema section was - postqueue reader is now time-bounded: `postqueue -p` runs under a 5-second … (11 more in CHANGELOG) Changed: - [roadmap.md](docs/roadmap.md) now carries everything the 2026-08-19 code - Extracted `internal/configsafe` — the empty-value and forbidden-character - Build, deploy and migration comments no longer cite the archived - Dropped the `parseDomainRateLimitForm` / `parseAppRateLimitForm` pass-through - Extracted shared helpers: `internal/atomicfile` (atomic temp-write+rename) and … (7 more in CHANGELOG) Removed: - Unused legacy asset `docs/assets/icon.png` (superseded by the four brand SVGs - Plan documents for already-shipped features: `domain-stats-auto-ratelimit`, Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (1.9.2).
136 lines
3.4 KiB
Go
136 lines
3.4 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"sync"
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"time"
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)
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const defaultMaxBuckets = 4096
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// blockedBucketCeiling is how far past maxBuckets the map may grow while every
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// bucket in it is blocked. Blocked buckets are normally protected from
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// eviction (see evictNearest), but protecting them unconditionally would let
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// an attacker with many source addresses grow the map without bound — each
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// address only has to fail max times. Past the ceiling blocked buckets are
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// evicted too, nearest expiry first: bounded memory wins over holding every
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// block, and the addresses that lose their bucket have to spend max attempts
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// again to get back to blocked.
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const blockedBucketCeiling = 4
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// rateLimiter is a simple fixed-window per-key counter used to throttle the
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// setup and login routes (security.md). Keys are client IPs.
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type rateLimiter struct {
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max int
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window time.Duration
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maxBuckets int
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mu sync.Mutex
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buckets map[string]*rlBucket
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lastOverflow time.Time
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}
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type rlBucket struct {
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count int
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windowEnds time.Time
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}
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func newRateLimiter(max int, window time.Duration) *rateLimiter {
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return &rateLimiter{
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max: max,
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window: window,
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maxBuckets: defaultMaxBuckets,
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buckets: make(map[string]*rlBucket),
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}
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}
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func (r *rateLimiter) startSweeper() {
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go func() {
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ticker := time.NewTicker(r.window)
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defer ticker.Stop()
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for range ticker.C {
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r.mu.Lock()
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r.sweep(time.Now())
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r.mu.Unlock()
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}
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}()
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}
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func (r *rateLimiter) Allow(key string) bool {
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now := time.Now()
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r.mu.Lock()
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defer r.mu.Unlock()
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b := r.buckets[key]
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if b == nil || now.After(b.windowEnds) {
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r.makeRoom(now)
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r.buckets[key] = &rlBucket{count: 1, windowEnds: now.Add(r.window)}
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r.sweep(now)
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return true
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}
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if b.count >= r.max {
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return false
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}
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b.count++
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return true
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}
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func (r *rateLimiter) makeRoom(now time.Time) {
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if r.maxBuckets <= 0 || len(r.buckets) < r.maxBuckets {
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return
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}
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r.sweep(now)
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hardCap := r.maxBuckets * blockedBucketCeiling
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for len(r.buckets) >= r.maxBuckets {
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if r.evictNearest(false) {
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continue
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}
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// Nothing evictable is left: every remaining bucket is blocked. Hold
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// them until the map reaches the hard ceiling, then start evicting
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// blocked buckets as well so memory stays bounded.
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if len(r.buckets) < hardCap {
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break
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}
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if !r.evictNearest(true) {
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break
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}
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if now.Sub(r.lastOverflow) >= r.window {
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r.lastOverflow = now
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logf("panel: login rate limiter holds %d blocked buckets (cap %d) — evicting blocked entries; "+
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"this means many distinct client addresses are failing authentication", len(r.buckets), r.maxBuckets)
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}
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}
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}
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// evictNearest removes the bucket whose window ends soonest and reports whether
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// it removed one. Blocked buckets (count >= max) are skipped unless evictBlocked
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// is set, so an attacker cannot flush active rate-limit state by filling the map
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// with new keys.
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func (r *rateLimiter) evictNearest(evictBlocked bool) bool {
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var bestKey string
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var bestEnds time.Time
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first := true
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for k, b := range r.buckets {
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if !evictBlocked && b.count >= r.max {
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continue
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}
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if first || b.windowEnds.Before(bestEnds) {
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bestKey = k
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bestEnds = b.windowEnds
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first = false
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}
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}
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if bestKey == "" {
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return false
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}
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delete(r.buckets, bestKey)
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return true
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}
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func (r *rateLimiter) sweep(now time.Time) {
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for k, b := range r.buckets {
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if now.After(b.windowEnds) {
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delete(r.buckets, k)
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}
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}
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}
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