Files
selfpost/internal/milter/inbound.go
T
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 ecfe23504e antispam: rspamd 4.2.2-0, no capabilities, only the milter on the network (audit S4)
Security audit 2026-10-17, finding S4 (low), stage 4. The sidecar ran
rspamd 3.11.1 (December 2024) with default capabilities; upstream is 4.2.2
(2026-10-10), and the line between fixed a heap overflow in
util.lower_utf8, a use-after-free on reload and parser crashes - rspamd
reads every byte a stranger sends to port 25.

A read-only reading of rspamd 3.11.1 and 4.2.2 and of rspamd-docker
v3.11.1+3 and v4.2.2+0, side by side (sources in dev/upstream), found every
function SelfPost relies on unchanged: milter_headers (skip_wanted, the
custom routine, remove 0, create_specific_keyed, get_queue_id from {i}),
the X-Spamd-Result text, multimap (from/smtp, ip, the reject pre-result,
file-map rereading), the image's uid 11333 and CMD. It also found that the
image binds the normal worker (which takes client-named file and shm
inputs) and the controller (default password "q1") on every address,
reachable from any container on the compose network - so:

- image rspamd/rspamd:4.2.2-0 (the one build of 4.2.2; the others float);
- cap_drop: [ALL], no-new-privileges (rspamd starts unprivileged, ports
  above 1024, nothing setuid);
- RSPAMD_LOCAL_ADDR=localhost keeps every worker on loopback, and a new
  antispam/rspamd/worker-proxy.inc puts the proxy alone on *:11332. rspamd
  expands its template syntax in comments too - the first version of that
  comment quoted it and the config failed to load; it quotes none now.

Checked in a throwaway container on the test server with the three files
and the fragment's options (dev/server/rspamd-try.sh): proxy on any
address, 11333/11334 on loopback; from a private address a sender's own
verdict headers removed and rspamd's added; X-SelfPost-Filter equal to
openssl's HMAC-SHA256 of the queue id; a denied address refused with the
deny list's message; healthy. The e2e has no rspamd; the live sidecar is
checked at the rollout. Citations re-pointed to 4.2.2.

Docs: guide § Inbound relay (the third file; copy antispam/ again);
CHANGELOG; plan.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-17 22:48:31 +03:00

353 lines
13 KiB
Go

package milter
import (
"context"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"log"
"net"
"net/textproto"
"regexp"
"strings"
"github.com/emersion/go-milter"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/mailhdr"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
)
// InboundStore is what the inbound journal milter needs: the journal itself
// and the list of inbound domains, since port 25 also takes mail that is not
// the relay's. *store.Store satisfies it; tests substitute a fake.
type InboundStore interface {
InsertInboundSpamMessage(e store.InboundSpamEntry, rcpts []store.InboundRecipient) error
IsInboundDomain(name string) (bool, error)
ForgetInboundQueueID(queueID string) error
}
// inboundSession is the inbound journal milter: the last milter on port 25,
// after the optional external filter. It writes one journal row per recipient
// of a message that reached end-of-message - that is, one the filter did not
// refuse; refusals never get this far and are read from mail.log instead.
//
// Like the send-log milter it only watches: every callback continues, and
// Postfix attaches the socket with default_action=accept, so
// neither an error here nor the panel being down holds up inbound mail.
//
// Postfix 3.10.13, src/milter/milter.c, milter_message(): the milters are asked
// in turn while the reply is null, so one that refuses is the last asked;
// src/milter/milter8.c, milter8_comm_error(): default_action=accept gives no
// reply when this milter cannot answer.
type inboundSession struct {
milter.NoOpMilter
rec InboundStore
// key is what the filter signs each message with (FilterSignature), or
// empty when no filter is attached. A verdict is read only next to a
// signature that fits: the filter is attached so that mail flows when it is
// down, and then the verdict headers of a message are whatever its sender
// wrote.
key string
// clientIP is taken at Connect and again from {client_addr} with every
// MAIL FROM: a session the library made after a non-continue reply never
// sees Connect (see session.MailFrom in milter.go).
clientIP string
from string
rcpts []string
subject string
action string // X-Rspamd-Action
result string // X-Spamd-Result
seen bool // any verdict header of the filter
sig string // X-SelfPost-Filter
}
func (s *inboundSession) Connect(host, family string, port uint16, addr net.IP, m *milter.Modifier) (milter.Response, error) {
if addr != nil {
s.clientIP = addr.String()
}
return milter.RespContinue, nil
}
// MailFrom starts a message: a connection may carry several.
func (s *inboundSession) MailFrom(from string, m *milter.Modifier) (milter.Response, error) {
s.reset()
if ip := clientAddr(m); ip != "" {
s.clientIP = ip
}
s.from = cleanAddress(from)
return milter.RespContinue, nil
}
// RcptTo keeps the recipient as Postfix logs it, so that the delivery lines
// that carry the upstream's answer find the row (recipientAsLogged): a quoted
// local part that needs no quotes is written without them.
//
// A recipient given twice - in any case - is one row, as on the outbound side
// (session.RcptTo): Postfix accepts a repeated RCPT up to
// smtpd_recipient_limit and sends the milter each, and one message used to be
// a thousand rows (security audit 2026-10-17, M3).
func (s *inboundSession) RcptTo(rcpt string, m *milter.Modifier) (milter.Response, error) {
to := recipientAsLogged(rcpt)
for _, have := range s.rcpts {
if strings.EqualFold(have, to) {
return milter.RespContinue, nil
}
}
s.rcpts = append(s.rcpts, to)
return milter.RespContinue, nil
}
// Header keeps the first Subject, the filter's verdict and its signature.
// Postfix hands the message to its milters one after another at
// end-of-message, each seeing what the one before added, which is how the
// filter's headers arrive here. The filter replaces headers of these names, so
// the last one read is its own - when it is up. Whether it was is decided at
// end-of-message, by the signature.
//
// Postfix 3.10.13, src/milter/milter.c, milter_message(), hands each milter the
// queue file from the start of the content; src/milter/milter8.c,
// milter8_message(), reads it with rec_get(), which follows the pointer
// records src/cleanup/cleanup_milter.c, cleanup_add_header(), leaves after
// the last header for a header the milter before added.
// rspamd 4.2.2 (as 3.11.0), src/plugins/lua/milter_headers.lua, routines x-spamd-result
// and x-rspamd-action: remove = 0, every instance
// (src/libserver/milter.c, rspamd_milter_remove_header_safe()), and the new
// one added at the end (order -1, ADDHEADER) - when skip_wanted() does not
// skip the routine (skip_local, skip_authenticated).
func (s *inboundSession) Header(name, value string, m *milter.Modifier) (milter.Response, error) {
switch textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey(name) {
case "Subject":
if s.subject == "" {
s.subject = mailhdr.DecodeSubject(value)
}
case "X-Rspamd-Action":
s.action, s.seen = value, true
case "X-Spamd-Result":
s.result, s.seen = value, true
case signatureHeader:
s.sig = strings.TrimSpace(value)
}
return milter.RespContinue, nil
}
// SignatureHeader is the header the filter signs a message in
// (deploy/antispam/rspamd/milter_headers.conf writes it).
const SignatureHeader = "X-SelfPost-Filter"
var signatureHeader = textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey(SignatureHeader)
// FilterSignature is what the filter writes into SignatureHeader for a message:
// the HMAC-SHA256 of its queue id under the key SelfPost shares with the
// filter, in hex. The key is used as the text it is stored as. A signature
// fits one queue id, so the header going on to the upstream with the mail
// gives nothing to whoever reads it there.
//
// Measured, not read: what rspamd 3.11 writes for a key and a queue id was
// taken in a throwaway container on 2026-10-12
// (TestFilterSignatureIsWhatTheFilterWrites); rspamd 4.2.2-0 wrote the
// HMAC-SHA256 openssl computes, on 2026-10-17 (security audit, S4).
func FilterSignature(key, queueID string) string {
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(key))
mac.Write([]byte(queueID))
return hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
}
// signed reports whether the message carries the filter's signature for its
// queue id. No key, no queue id or no signature is "no".
func (s *inboundSession) signed(queueID string) bool {
if s.key == "" || queueID == "" || s.sig == "" {
return false
}
return hmac.Equal([]byte(strings.ToLower(s.sig)), []byte(FilterSignature(s.key, queueID)))
}
// Body fires at end-of-message: the message is about to be queued for its
// upstream. "Continue" lets it through as "accept" would, and keeps this
// session for the connection's next message.
//
// The queue id: Postfix 3.10.13, src/global/mail_params.h, DEF_MILT_EOD_MACROS
// "i", answered by src/cleanup/cleanup_milter.c, cleanup_milter_eval(). The
// rest as session.Body in milter.go.
func (s *inboundSession) Body(m *milter.Modifier) (milter.Response, error) {
// The queue id is known only now, and with it whether the verdict headers
// read on the way here are the filter's. The rows keep it: the delivery
// lines that put the upstream's answer on them name it (logtail).
queueID := macro(m, "i")
if !s.signed(queueID) {
s.seen = false
}
s.record(queueID)
s.reset()
return milter.RespContinue, nil
}
func (s *inboundSession) Abort(m *milter.Modifier) error {
s.reset()
return nil
}
func (s *inboundSession) reset() {
s.from, s.rcpts, s.subject = "", nil, ""
s.action, s.result, s.seen, s.sig = "", "", false, ""
}
// record writes one row per recipient at an inbound domain, with the queue id
// of the message and "queued" - "held" when the filter's verdict had Postfix
// hold it (src/cleanup/cleanup_milter.c: a milter's HOLD puts the message in
// the hold queue, which qmgr does not schedule). The message is about to be
// queued for its upstream, and the rows are written before Postfix goes on,
// so before any delivery line of it; older rows of a queue id Postfix uses
// again are detached first. With no queue id (none came) the rows have no
// result: nothing could report one. Other recipients of port 25 (a DMARC
// report address at the server's own name) are not the relay's mail and get
// no row. Failures are logged, never propagated.
func (s *inboundSession) record(queueID string) {
e := store.InboundSpamEntry{
ClientIP: s.clientIP,
From: s.from,
Subject: s.subject,
Decision: store.SpamDecisionAccept,
Engine: store.SpamEngineSelfPost,
}
if s.seen {
action, detail := rspamdVerdict(s.action, s.result)
e.Engine, e.Detail = store.SpamEngineRspamd, detail
if action == "quarantine" {
e.Decision = store.SpamDecisionQuarantine
}
}
if queueID != "" {
e.QueueID, e.Upstream = queueID, store.UpstreamQueued
if e.Decision == store.SpamDecisionQuarantine {
e.Upstream = store.UpstreamHeld
}
if err := s.rec.ForgetInboundQueueID(queueID); err != nil {
log.Printf("inbound-journal: detach older rows of %s: %v", queueID, err)
}
}
var rows []store.InboundRecipient
for _, to := range s.rcpts {
domain := domainOf(to)
ok, err := s.rec.IsInboundDomain(domain)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("inbound-journal: look up %s: %v", domain, err)
continue
}
if ok {
rows = append(rows, store.InboundRecipient{Domain: domain, To: to})
}
}
if err := s.rec.InsertInboundSpamMessage(e, rows); err != nil {
log.Printf("inbound-journal: record %s -> %d recipients: %v", s.from, len(rows), err)
}
}
// What the journal keeps of a verdict: enough to see why, on one line.
const (
verdictMaxSymbols = 6
verdictMaxBytes = 255
)
// ListSymbolPrefix starts the names of the symbols the filter lists' rules add
// (deploy/antispam/rspamd/multimap.conf): SELFPOST_ALLOW_IP, _FROM, _DOMAIN.
const ListSymbolPrefix = "SELFPOST_"
// rspamd 4.2.2 (as 3.11.0), src/plugins/lua/milter_headers.lua, routine x-spamd-result:
// string.format('default: %s [%.2f / %.2f]', ...), then one
// '%s(%.2f)[%s]' per symbol, joined by '; '.
var (
// "default: False [7.20 / 15.00]" - the score and the reject threshold.
rspamdScore = regexp.MustCompile(`\[(-?[0-9]+(?:\.[0-9]+)?) / (-?[0-9]+(?:\.[0-9]+)?)\]`)
// "BAYES_SPAM(5.10)[100.00%]" - a symbol and its weight.
rspamdSymbol = regexp.MustCompile(`([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{1,63})\((-?[0-9]+(?:\.[0-9]+)?)\)`)
)
// rspamdVerdict reduces the filter's headers to an action and a one-line
// summary: the action, the score against the threshold, and the first few
// symbols that carried weight. It reads only what it recognises - the headers
// are read only next to the filter's signature, and even so nothing of them is
// kept verbatim except through these patterns.
func rspamdVerdict(actionHeader, resultHeader string) (action, detail string) {
action = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(actionHeader))
for _, r := range action {
if (r < 'a' || r > 'z') && r != ' ' {
action = ""
break
}
}
if len(action) > 32 {
action = ""
}
var parts []string
if action != "" {
parts = append(parts, action)
}
if m := rspamdScore.FindStringSubmatch(resultHeader); m != nil {
parts = append(parts, "score "+m[1]+" / "+m[2])
}
detail = strings.Join(parts, ", ")
// The filter lists' own symbols come first and are kept whatever else there
// is: Filter lists counts how often an entry decided by finding them here,
// and rspamd writes symbols heaviest first, which puts an allow entry's
// -100 last, behind any six others.
var symbols, rest []string
for _, m := range rspamdSymbol.FindAllStringSubmatch(resultHeader, -1) {
if strings.Trim(m[2], "-0.") == "" { // weight zero: informational
continue
}
if strings.HasPrefix(m[1], ListSymbolPrefix) {
if len(symbols) < verdictMaxSymbols {
symbols = append(symbols, m[1]+"("+m[2]+")")
}
continue
}
rest = append(rest, m[1]+"("+m[2]+")")
}
for _, sym := range rest {
if len(symbols) == verdictMaxSymbols {
break
}
symbols = append(symbols, sym)
}
if len(symbols) > 0 {
if detail != "" {
detail += "; "
}
detail += strings.Join(symbols, " ")
}
if len(detail) > verdictMaxBytes {
detail = detail[:verdictMaxBytes]
}
return action, detail
}
// ServeInbound runs the inbound journal milter on ln until ctx is cancelled.
// key is what the external filter in front of it signs messages with, or
// empty when none is attached (INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER): no verdict is then
// read at all. It returns nil on a clean shutdown. What it relies on of
// go-milter and Postfix is cited at Serve in milter.go.
func ServeInbound(ctx context.Context, ln net.Listener, rec InboundStore, key string) error {
srv := &milter.Server{
NewMilter: func() milter.Milter { return &inboundSession{rec: rec, key: key} },
Actions: 0, // read-only
Protocol: milter.OptNoBody, // headers and end-of-message, not the body
}
go func() {
<-ctx.Done()
_ = srv.Close()
}()
if err := srv.Serve(ln); err != nil {
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return nil
}
return err
}
return nil
}