Files
selfpost/internal/web/session.go
T
mix 5e5d157496 release: 0.5.0: Pre-1.0 security review, domain-admin role, doc consolidation
A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
Fixed:
  - A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
  - Log-tailer resumes where it stopped instead of jumping to end-of-file on
  - Level-2 rate limit no longer overshoots under concurrency: messages that
Changed:
  - The project has a single public home: `github.com/mixeme/selfpost`. Codeberg
  - Code comments no longer cite the archived specification. References like
  - `docs/code-review.md` is gone. Its plan is finished — phases 0 (bar the
  - `docs/architecture.md` gained a *Code layers* section: a diagram of
  - Phase 1 doc/code hygiene (`docs/code-review.md`): removed ~30 stale
  … (1 more in CHANGELOG)
Security:
  - Pre-release security review (plan § D, model Fable, 2026-08-06): full pass
  - `saslpasswd2` argv: the application login is now passed after a `--`
Added:
  - Optional password encryption for the two secret-bearing downloads (plan
  - Domain import accepts an encrypted export: the envelope is detected by its
  - `selfpost-backup` writes encrypted archives and reads them back:
  - `TestParseDelivery` covers the exotic mail.log shapes the review asked for
  - docs: README *Encrypting a backup or export*; `docs/security.md` §
  … (14 more in CHANGELOG)
Removed:
  - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk «restore old backup revives session rows»
Changed:
  - docs: `implementation-plan.md` trimmed to the sole open v1.x gate — pre-release
  - docs: `architecture.md` — sessions (SQLite, idle renew, password change),
  - docs: `development.md` — expanded e2e stack and `release.yml` matrix workflow.
  - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk for send-log rows stuck at `queued` after
  - docs: `roadmap.md` — optional send-log / `mail.log` follow-ups under v1.x tail.
  … (10 more in CHANGELOG)

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (0.5.0).
2026-09-22 15:24:51 +03:00

142 lines
4.8 KiB
Go

package web
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"time"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
)
// renewThreshold bounds how often an active session's expiry is written back
// to the database. Renewing on every request would mean a write (and a new
// Set-Cookie) per click; renewing at most once an hour keeps that cost low
// while still keeping a busy admin's session alive indefinitely (plan B.1).
const renewThreshold = time.Hour
// sessionStore persists login sessions in the database (plan B.1): a login
// survives a container restart or redeploy. Only the SHA-256 of the token is
// stored, never the token itself (security.md's crypto-random bearer token), so
// a stolen database file or backup archive cannot be replayed as a session —
// it only extends the login of whichever browser still holds the original
// cookie.
type sessionStore struct {
store *store.Store
// idle is the sliding inactivity window (PANEL_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS). There is
// no absolute cap: an administrator who keeps coming back stays signed in
// indefinitely, deliberately.
idle time.Duration
}
func newSessionStore(st *store.Store, idle time.Duration) *sessionStore {
return &sessionStore{store: st, idle: idle}
}
// MaxAge is the session cookie's Max-Age in seconds, kept equal to the
// sliding idle window so the browser drops the cookie no later than the
// server would have expired it anyway.
func (s *sessionStore) MaxAge() int {
return int(s.idle.Seconds())
}
func hashToken(token string) string {
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}
// Create issues a new session for username and returns its token.
func (s *sessionStore) Create(username string) string {
token := randomToken(32)
now := time.Now()
if err := s.store.CreateSession(hashToken(token), username, now.Add(s.idle)); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: create failed: %v", err)
}
// Opportunistic cleanup: a session nobody ever came back to otherwise sits
// in the table forever. Piggybacking on Create (the one write every login
// already pays for) avoids a dedicated background sweep for what is, on a
// single-admin panel, a handful of rows at most.
if _, err := s.store.DeleteExpiredSessions(now); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: prune expired failed: %v", err)
}
return token
}
// Lookup returns the session username for a token if it exists and is
// unexpired.
func (s *sessionStore) Lookup(token string) (string, bool) {
if token == "" {
return "", false
}
hash := hashToken(token)
row, found, err := s.store.LookupSession(hash)
if err != nil {
logf("panel: session: lookup failed: %v", err)
return "", false
}
if !found {
return "", false
}
if time.Now().After(row.ExpiresAt) {
if err := s.store.DeleteSession(hash); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: delete expired failed: %v", err)
}
return "", false
}
return row.Username, true
}
// Touch extends a session's sliding expiry if it has been at least
// renewThreshold since the last extension, and reports whether it did so —
// the caller uses that to decide whether the response needs a fresh
// Set-Cookie. It assumes the caller has just confirmed the session is valid
// (e.g. via Lookup); it does nothing for a token that no longer exists.
func (s *sessionStore) Touch(token string) bool {
hash := hashToken(token)
row, found, err := s.store.LookupSession(hash)
if err != nil {
logf("panel: session: touch lookup failed: %v", err)
return false
}
if !found {
return false
}
// expiresAt = lastRenewal + idle, so this recovers when the session was
// last extended without a separate column.
lastRenewal := row.ExpiresAt.Add(-s.idle)
now := time.Now()
if now.Sub(lastRenewal) < renewThreshold {
return false
}
if err := s.store.RenewSession(hash, now.Add(s.idle)); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: renew failed: %v", err)
return false
}
return true
}
// Rename updates the username carried by a session, keeping its expiry. It is
// used when the administrator renames their own account so the current
// session keeps working under the new name.
func (s *sessionStore) Rename(token, username string) {
if err := s.store.RenameSession(hashToken(token), username); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: rename failed: %v", err)
}
}
// DestroyOthers invalidates every session except keep. It is called when the
// administrator changes their password: a stolen cookie issued under the old
// password must stop working, while the admin performing the change stays
// signed in.
func (s *sessionStore) DestroyOthers(keep string) {
if err := s.store.DeleteOtherSessions(hashToken(keep)); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: destroy others failed: %v", err)
}
}
// Destroy invalidates a session token (logout).
func (s *sessionStore) Destroy(token string) {
if err := s.store.DeleteSession(hashToken(token)); err != nil {
logf("panel: session: destroy failed: %v", err)
}
}