Files
selfpost/internal/web/setup.go
T
mix 5e5d157496 release: 0.5.0: Pre-1.0 security review, domain-admin role, doc consolidation
A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
Fixed:
  - A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
  - Log-tailer resumes where it stopped instead of jumping to end-of-file on
  - Level-2 rate limit no longer overshoots under concurrency: messages that
Changed:
  - The project has a single public home: `github.com/mixeme/selfpost`. Codeberg
  - Code comments no longer cite the archived specification. References like
  - `docs/code-review.md` is gone. Its plan is finished — phases 0 (bar the
  - `docs/architecture.md` gained a *Code layers* section: a diagram of
  - Phase 1 doc/code hygiene (`docs/code-review.md`): removed ~30 stale
  … (1 more in CHANGELOG)
Security:
  - Pre-release security review (plan § D, model Fable, 2026-08-06): full pass
  - `saslpasswd2` argv: the application login is now passed after a `--`
Added:
  - Optional password encryption for the two secret-bearing downloads (plan
  - Domain import accepts an encrypted export: the envelope is detected by its
  - `selfpost-backup` writes encrypted archives and reads them back:
  - `TestParseDelivery` covers the exotic mail.log shapes the review asked for
  - docs: README *Encrypting a backup or export*; `docs/security.md` §
  … (14 more in CHANGELOG)
Removed:
  - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk «restore old backup revives session rows»
Changed:
  - docs: `implementation-plan.md` trimmed to the sole open v1.x gate — pre-release
  - docs: `architecture.md` — sessions (SQLite, idle renew, password change),
  - docs: `development.md` — expanded e2e stack and `release.yml` matrix workflow.
  - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk for send-log rows stuck at `queued` after
  - docs: `roadmap.md` — optional send-log / `mail.log` follow-ups under v1.x tail.
  … (10 more in CHANGELOG)

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (0.5.0).
2026-09-22 15:24:51 +03:00

137 lines
4.0 KiB
Go

package web
import (
"crypto/subtle"
"fmt"
"os"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
)
// setupTokenTTL is the lifetime of a setup token (security.md). After it
// elapses the token is regenerated and re-announced on the next /setup hit.
const setupTokenTTL = 10 * time.Minute
// setupManager owns the one-time administrator setup token. The token itself is
// ephemeral (regenerated on restart or expiry) and lives only in memory; the
// persistent "setup complete" fact is the presence of the admin row in the
// store, so once that exists the token is gone for good (security.md).
type setupManager struct {
store *store.Store
hostname string
tokenPath string
mu sync.Mutex
token string
expiresAt time.Time
}
func newSetupManager(st *store.Store, hostname, tokenPath string) *setupManager {
return &setupManager{store: st, hostname: hostname, tokenPath: tokenPath}
}
// bootstrap runs once at startup. If setup is already complete it clears any
// stale token file; otherwise it mints and announces the first token.
func (m *setupManager) bootstrap() error {
done, err := m.store.AdminExists()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if done {
m.clearTokenFile()
return nil
}
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
m.regenerateLocked()
return nil
}
// activeToken returns the current valid setup token, regenerating and
// re-announcing it if none exists or it has expired. It returns ("", false)
// once setup is complete — callers must treat that as "route gone" (404).
func (m *setupManager) activeToken() (string, bool) {
done, err := m.store.AdminExists()
if err != nil {
logf("panel: setup: admin check failed: %v", err)
return "", false
}
if done {
return "", false
}
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
if m.token == "" || time.Now().After(m.expiresAt) {
m.regenerateLocked()
}
return m.token, true
}
// validate reports whether provided matches the active token, using a
// constant-time comparison to avoid leaking a correct prefix via timing
// (security.md). A mismatch does NOT regenerate or invalidate the token: failed
// attempts must not let an attacker DoS a legitimate setup (security.md).
func (m *setupManager) validate(provided string) bool {
token, ok := m.activeToken()
if !ok {
return false
}
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(provided), []byte(token)) == 1
}
// complete marks setup as finished: the admin row now exists, so drop the
// in-memory token and remove the on-disk copy.
func (m *setupManager) complete() {
m.mu.Lock()
m.token = ""
m.expiresAt = time.Time{}
m.mu.Unlock()
m.clearTokenFile()
}
// regenerateLocked mints a fresh token, announces it and mirrors it to disk.
// Caller holds m.mu.
func (m *setupManager) regenerateLocked() {
m.token = randomToken(16) // 128 bits of entropy (security.md)
m.expiresAt = time.Now().Add(setupTokenTTL)
m.announce(m.token)
}
// announce prints the setup link to the container log and writes it to the
// token file so it can be read either way (security.md).
func (m *setupManager) announce(token string) {
url := m.setupURL(token)
logf("panel: ==================================================================")
logf("panel: SelfPost first-run setup — open this one-time link within %s:", setupTokenTTL)
logf("panel: %s", url)
logf("panel: (also written to %s)", m.tokenPath)
logf("panel: ==================================================================")
if m.tokenPath == "" {
return
}
// 0600: the token is a bearer secret for creating the admin.
if err := os.WriteFile(m.tokenPath, []byte(url+"\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
logf("panel: setup: could not write token file %s: %v", m.tokenPath, err)
}
}
func (m *setupManager) setupURL(token string) string {
host := m.hostname
if host == "" {
host = "localhost"
}
return fmt.Sprintf("https://%s/setup/%s", host, token)
}
func (m *setupManager) clearTokenFile() {
if m.tokenPath == "" {
return
}
if err := os.Remove(m.tokenPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
logf("panel: setup: could not remove token file %s: %v", m.tokenPath, err)
}
}