Security fix, outside the inbound antispam feature. Found by its
technical review (Opus, 2026-10-12), reproduced on the test stand
before the fix: over an application's level-2 limit, two MAIL FROM on
one connection were answered 451 and then accepted.
Cause. Postfix introduces a client to a milter once per connection.
The milter library (go-milter 0.4.1, session.go) replaces the milter's
session after any reply that is not "continue" - a refusal, or the
accept that used to end a message. The new session never saw Connect,
so it had no client address, and both checks passed a message without
one: overLimit returned early ("no client IP to key on") and
authIPAllowed did the same. So every message after the first on a
connection, and every MAIL FROM after a refused one, skipped the
level-2 limit and an application's client IP list. In the code since
1.9.0 for the list and longer for the limit.
Fix.
- build/postfix-config.sh: milter_mail_macros carries {client_addr},
so the address comes with every MAIL FROM; MailFrom reads it (both
spellings of IPv6) in the journal milter and the inbound journal
milter.
- overLimit no longer asks for a client address: a ceiling is on a
domain or an application.
- authIPAllowed refuses an application that has a client IP list when
no address is known.
- Body replies "continue" in both milters, which lets the message
through as "accept" did and keeps the session.
The inbound journal milter had the same cause with a smaller effect:
rows of a connection's later messages had no client address.
In the same file, the checks of INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER and
INBOUND_JOURNAL_MILTER_SOCKET refuse any character outside their set
first: a glob's "*" matched anything after the first characters.
Tests: a session that never saw Connect is judged by the macro, a
listed and an unlisted address, no address, not an address; the limit
with no client address; the inbound milter answers only "continue".
test/e2e sends two MAIL FROM on one connection over the limit and
wants both refused.
Checked on the test server: e2e red before the fix on exactly that
check, green after; go vet ./... ok, go test ./... ok (22 packages).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
254 lines
7.8 KiB
Go
254 lines
7.8 KiB
Go
package milter
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import (
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"context"
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"log"
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"net"
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"net/textproto"
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"regexp"
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"strings"
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"github.com/emersion/go-milter"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/mailhdr"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
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)
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// InboundStore is what the inbound journal milter needs: the journal itself
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// and the list of inbound domains, since port 25 also takes mail that is not
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// the relay's. *store.Store satisfies it; tests substitute a fake.
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type InboundStore interface {
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InsertInboundSpam(e store.InboundSpamEntry) error
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IsInboundDomain(name string) (bool, error)
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}
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// inboundSession is the inbound journal milter: the last milter on port 25,
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// after the optional external filter. It writes one journal row per recipient
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// of a message that reached end-of-message - that is, one the filter did not
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// refuse; refusals never get this far and are read from mail.log instead.
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//
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// Like the send-log milter it only watches: every callback continues, and
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// Postfix attaches the socket with default_action=accept, so
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// neither an error here nor the panel being down holds up inbound mail.
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type inboundSession struct {
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milter.NoOpMilter
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rec InboundStore
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// filter says whether an external filter is attached in front of this
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// milter. Without one the verdict headers below can only have been written
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// by the sender, and are not read.
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filter bool
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// clientIP is taken at Connect and again from {client_addr} with every
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// MAIL FROM: a session the library made after a non-continue reply never
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// sees Connect (see session.MailFrom in milter.go).
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clientIP string
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from string
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rcpts []string
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subject string
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action string // X-Rspamd-Action
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result string // X-Spamd-Result
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seen bool // any verdict header of the filter
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}
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func (s *inboundSession) Connect(host, family string, port uint16, addr net.IP, m *milter.Modifier) (milter.Response, error) {
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if addr != nil {
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s.clientIP = addr.String()
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}
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return milter.RespContinue, nil
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}
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// MailFrom starts a message: a connection may carry several.
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func (s *inboundSession) MailFrom(from string, m *milter.Modifier) (milter.Response, error) {
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s.reset()
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if ip := clientAddr(m); ip != "" {
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s.clientIP = ip
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}
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s.from = cleanAddress(from)
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return milter.RespContinue, nil
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}
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func (s *inboundSession) RcptTo(rcpt string, m *milter.Modifier) (milter.Response, error) {
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s.rcpts = append(s.rcpts, cleanAddress(rcpt))
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return milter.RespContinue, nil
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}
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// Header keeps the first Subject and the filter's verdict. Postfix hands the
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// message to its milters one after another at end-of-message, each seeing what
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// the one before added, which is how the filter's headers arrive here. The
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// filter replaces headers of these names, so the last one read is its own.
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func (s *inboundSession) Header(name, value string, m *milter.Modifier) (milter.Response, error) {
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switch textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey(name) {
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case "Subject":
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if s.subject == "" {
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s.subject = mailhdr.DecodeSubject(value)
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}
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case "X-Rspamd-Action":
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if s.filter {
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s.action, s.seen = value, true
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}
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case "X-Spamd-Result":
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if s.filter {
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s.result, s.seen = value, true
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}
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}
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return milter.RespContinue, nil
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}
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// Body fires at end-of-message: the message is about to be queued for its
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// upstream. "Continue" lets it through as "accept" would, and keeps this
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// session for the connection's next message.
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func (s *inboundSession) Body(m *milter.Modifier) (milter.Response, error) {
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s.record()
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s.reset()
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return milter.RespContinue, nil
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}
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func (s *inboundSession) Abort(m *milter.Modifier) error {
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s.reset()
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return nil
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}
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func (s *inboundSession) reset() {
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s.from, s.rcpts, s.subject = "", nil, ""
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s.action, s.result, s.seen = "", "", false
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}
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// record writes one row per recipient at an inbound domain. Other recipients
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// of port 25 (a DMARC report address at the server's own name) are not the
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// relay's mail and get no row. Failures are logged, never propagated.
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func (s *inboundSession) record() {
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e := store.InboundSpamEntry{
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ClientIP: s.clientIP,
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From: s.from,
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Subject: s.subject,
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Decision: store.SpamDecisionAccept,
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Engine: store.SpamEngineSelfPost,
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}
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if s.seen {
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action, detail := rspamdVerdict(s.action, s.result)
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e.Engine, e.Detail = store.SpamEngineRspamd, detail
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if action == "quarantine" {
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e.Decision = store.SpamDecisionQuarantine
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}
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}
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for _, to := range s.rcpts {
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domain := domainOf(to)
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ok, err := s.rec.IsInboundDomain(domain)
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if err != nil {
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log.Printf("inbound-journal: look up %s: %v", domain, err)
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continue
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}
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if !ok {
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continue
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}
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e.InboundDomain, e.To = domain, to
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if err := s.rec.InsertInboundSpam(e); err != nil {
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log.Printf("inbound-journal: record %s -> %s: %v", s.from, to, err)
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}
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}
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}
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// What the journal keeps of a verdict: enough to see why, on one line.
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const (
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verdictMaxSymbols = 6
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verdictMaxBytes = 255
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)
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// ListSymbolPrefix starts the names of the symbols the filter lists' rules add
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// (deploy/antispam/rspamd/multimap.conf): SELFPOST_ALLOW_IP, _FROM, _DOMAIN.
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const ListSymbolPrefix = "SELFPOST_"
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var (
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// "default: False [7.20 / 15.00]" - the score and the reject threshold.
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rspamdScore = regexp.MustCompile(`\[(-?[0-9]+(?:\.[0-9]+)?) / (-?[0-9]+(?:\.[0-9]+)?)\]`)
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// "BAYES_SPAM(5.10)[100.00%]" - a symbol and its weight.
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rspamdSymbol = regexp.MustCompile(`([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{1,63})\((-?[0-9]+(?:\.[0-9]+)?)\)`)
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)
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// rspamdVerdict reduces the filter's headers to an action and a one-line
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// summary: the action, the score against the threshold, and the first few
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// symbols that carried weight. It reads only what it recognises - the headers
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// are the filter's when it is up, but the sender's own when it is not (it is
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// attached fail-open), so nothing of them is kept verbatim except through
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// these patterns.
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func rspamdVerdict(actionHeader, resultHeader string) (action, detail string) {
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action = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(actionHeader))
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for _, r := range action {
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if (r < 'a' || r > 'z') && r != ' ' {
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action = ""
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break
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}
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}
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if len(action) > 32 {
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action = ""
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}
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var parts []string
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if action != "" {
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parts = append(parts, action)
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}
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if m := rspamdScore.FindStringSubmatch(resultHeader); m != nil {
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parts = append(parts, "score "+m[1]+" / "+m[2])
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}
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detail = strings.Join(parts, ", ")
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// The filter lists' own symbols come first and are kept whatever else there
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// is: Filter lists counts how often an entry decided by finding them here,
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// and rspamd writes symbols heaviest first, which puts an allow entry's
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// -100 last, behind any six others.
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var symbols, rest []string
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for _, m := range rspamdSymbol.FindAllStringSubmatch(resultHeader, -1) {
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if strings.Trim(m[2], "-0.") == "" { // weight zero: informational
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continue
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}
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if strings.HasPrefix(m[1], ListSymbolPrefix) {
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if len(symbols) < verdictMaxSymbols {
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symbols = append(symbols, m[1]+"("+m[2]+")")
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}
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continue
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}
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rest = append(rest, m[1]+"("+m[2]+")")
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}
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for _, sym := range rest {
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if len(symbols) == verdictMaxSymbols {
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break
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}
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symbols = append(symbols, sym)
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}
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if len(symbols) > 0 {
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if detail != "" {
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detail += "; "
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}
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detail += strings.Join(symbols, " ")
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}
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if len(detail) > verdictMaxBytes {
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detail = detail[:verdictMaxBytes]
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}
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return action, detail
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}
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// ServeInbound runs the inbound journal milter on ln until ctx is cancelled.
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// filter says whether an external filter is attached in front of it
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// (INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER). It returns nil on a clean shutdown.
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func ServeInbound(ctx context.Context, ln net.Listener, rec InboundStore, filter bool) error {
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srv := &milter.Server{
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NewMilter: func() milter.Milter { return &inboundSession{rec: rec, filter: filter} },
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Actions: 0, // read-only
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Protocol: milter.OptNoBody, // headers and end-of-message, not the body
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}
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go func() {
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<-ctx.Done()
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_ = srv.Close()
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}()
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if err := srv.Serve(ln); err != nil {
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if ctx.Err() != nil {
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return nil
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}
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return err
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}
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return nil
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}
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