328 lines
13 KiB
Go
328 lines
13 KiB
Go
package handlers
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import (
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"bytes"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"time"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/backup"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/domain"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/secretfile"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
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"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/web/validate"
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)
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// maxImportBytes caps a domain-import upload. A domain export is a small JSON
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// document (a DKIM key and a handful of credentials); this leaves generous head
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// room while refusing anything large enough to be an abuse attempt. An
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// encrypted export adds only a header and per-chunk tags, so the same ceiling
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// covers both forms.
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const maxImportBytes = 1 << 20 // 1 MiB
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// HandleBackupPage renders the backup/migration screen: the full-server backup
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// and the domain import are separate actions with different risk, so each gets
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// its own card here rather than sharing a block on the domain list.
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func (h *Handlers) HandleBackupPage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if _, ok := h.requireGlobal(w, r); !ok {
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return
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}
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusOK, "")
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}
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// renderBackupPage draws the page; importErr surfaces a failed domain import
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// (architecture.md § Persistence) next to the form that produced it.
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func (h *Handlers) renderBackupPage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, status int, importErr string) {
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h.renderBackupPageWith(w, r, status, importErr, "")
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}
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// renderBackupPageWith is renderBackupPage with the second of the page's two
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// error slots: backupErr belongs to the full-backup card (a rejected encryption
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// password), importErr to the import card, so neither message appears under the
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// wrong form.
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func (h *Handlers) renderBackupPageWith(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, status int, importErr, backupErr string) {
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data := h.pageBase(r)
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data["Title"] = "SelfPost — backup"
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data["Active"] = "backup"
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data["ImportErr"] = importErr
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data["BackupErr"] = backupErr
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data["MinPwLen"] = validate.MinSecretFilePasswordLen
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h.view.Render(w, status, "backup", data)
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}
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// HandleBackup streams a full-server backup as a download (architecture.md §
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// Persistence). It is an authenticated admin action (this handler sits behind
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// the auth middleware). The archive carries DKIM private keys, the admin
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// password hash and SASL credentials, so it is served with no-store and as an
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// attachment to discourage caching of secret material. When the operator ticks
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// "encrypt with a password", the archive is wrapped in a .spbk envelope on the
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// way out, so the file that lands on their disk — wherever it is copied
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// afterwards — is useless without the password.
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func (h *Handlers) HandleBackup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if _, ok := h.requireGlobal(w, r); !ok {
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return
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}
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password, pwErr := secretFilePassword(r)
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if pwErr != "" {
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h.renderBackupPageWith(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "", pwErr)
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return
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}
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stamp := time.Now().UTC().Format("20060102-150405")
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filename := fmt.Sprintf("selfpost-backup-%s.tar.gz", stamp)
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contentType := "application/gzip"
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if password != "" {
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filename = fmt.Sprintf("selfpost-backup-%s%s", stamp, secretfile.ExtBackup)
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contentType = "application/octet-stream"
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", contentType)
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w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", fmt.Sprintf("attachment; filename=%q", filename))
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w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
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// Everything below streams: past this point headers (and possibly some
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// bytes) are already on the wire, so a failure cannot switch to a clean
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// error page. Log it and let the truncated download fail loudly on the
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// client side — for an encrypted archive that is a missing end-of-stream
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// chunk, which decryption refuses outright.
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sink := io.Writer(w)
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var env *secretfile.Writer
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if password != "" {
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var err error
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// The only failures here are key derivation (which happens before
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// anything is written) and writing the envelope header, which fails only
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// if the client is already gone.
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env, err = secretfile.NewWriter(w, secretfile.TypeFullBackup, password)
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if err != nil {
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logf("panel: full backup: encrypt: %v", err)
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http.Error(w, "backup failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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sink = env
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}
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if err := backup.Create(sink, backup.Params{
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DataDir: h.cfg.DataDir,
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DBPath: h.cfg.DBPath,
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Version: h.cfg.Version,
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}); err != nil {
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logf("panel: full backup failed: %v", err)
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return
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}
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if env != nil {
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if err := env.Close(); err != nil {
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logf("panel: full backup failed: %v", err)
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}
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}
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}
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// HandleExportDomain streams a single-domain export as a secret download
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// (architecture.md § Persistence). Like the full backup it is POST-only (state
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// is not changed, but the response contains the domain's DKIM private key and
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// application passwords, so it must not be prefetchable or cached). Like the
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// full backup it can be encrypted with a password, in which case the download
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// is a .spde envelope instead of plain JSON.
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func (h *Handlers) HandleExportDomain(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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d, ok := h.lookupDomain(w, r)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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password, pwErr := secretFilePassword(r)
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if pwErr != "" {
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h.renderDomainDetail(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, d, detailView{
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FormMode: store.AddressModeWildcard,
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ExportErr: pwErr,
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})
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return
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}
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exp, err := h.domains.Export(d.ID)
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if err != nil {
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logf("panel: export domain %d: %v", d.ID, err)
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http.Error(w, "export failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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body, err := json.MarshalIndent(exp, "", " ")
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if err != nil {
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logf("panel: export domain %d: encode: %v", d.ID, err)
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http.Error(w, "export failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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filename := fmt.Sprintf("selfpost-domain-%s.json", d.Name)
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contentType := "application/json"
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if password != "" {
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// An export is small, so it is sealed in memory: the response is only
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// started once the ciphertext is complete and nothing can half-fail.
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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env, err := secretfile.NewWriter(&buf, secretfile.TypeDomainExport, password)
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if err == nil {
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_, err = env.Write(body)
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}
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if err == nil {
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err = env.Close()
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}
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if err != nil {
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logf("panel: export domain %d: encrypt: %v", d.ID, err)
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http.Error(w, "export failed", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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body = buf.Bytes()
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filename = fmt.Sprintf("selfpost-domain-%s%s", d.Name, secretfile.ExtDomainExport)
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contentType = "application/octet-stream"
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", contentType)
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w.Header().Set("Content-Disposition", fmt.Sprintf("attachment; filename=%q", filename))
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w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
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_, _ = w.Write(body)
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}
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// HandleImportDomain accepts an uploaded domain-export file and re-creates the
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// domain on this instance (architecture.md § Persistence). The domain name is
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// normalised and validated here (security.md); the domain service validates
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// the selector, each login and address, and the DKIM key before writing
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// anything. On success it redirects to the new domain's page; on failure it
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// re-renders the backup page, where the import form lives, with a friendly
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// message.
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func (h *Handlers) HandleImportDomain(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if _, ok := h.requireGlobal(w, r); !ok {
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return
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}
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r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxImportBytes)
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if err := r.ParseMultipartForm(maxImportBytes); err != nil {
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Could not read the uploaded file (too large or not a valid upload).")
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return
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}
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file, _, err := r.FormFile("file")
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if err != nil {
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Choose a domain export file to import.")
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return
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}
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defer file.Close()
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// An encrypted export announces itself with the envelope magic, so the file
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// decides which path it takes; the password field is only consulted when the
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// file actually needs it, and a password typed for a plain file is a plain
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// mistake worth reporting.
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head := make([]byte, secretfile.MagicLen)
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n, err := io.ReadFull(file, head)
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if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) && !errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) {
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Could not read the uploaded file.")
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return
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}
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source := io.MultiReader(bytes.NewReader(head[:n]), file)
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password := r.PostFormValue("import_password")
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if secretfile.HasMagic(head[:n]) {
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if password == "" {
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "That file is encrypted — enter the password it was exported with.")
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return
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}
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env, err := secretfile.NewReader(source, password)
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if err != nil {
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, decryptErrorMessage(err))
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return
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}
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if env.Type() != secretfile.TypeDomainExport {
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "That file is an encrypted "+env.Type().String()+", not a domain export.")
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return
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}
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// Read the whole plaintext first: authentication of the last chunk is
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// what proves the file is intact, and a streaming JSON decoder could
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// accept a truncated document before ever reaching it.
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plain, err := io.ReadAll(env)
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if err != nil {
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, decryptErrorMessage(err))
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return
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}
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source = bytes.NewReader(plain)
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} else if password != "" {
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "That file is not encrypted — leave the password empty.")
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return
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}
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var exp domain.DomainExport
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dec := json.NewDecoder(source)
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dec.DisallowUnknownFields()
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if err := dec.Decode(&exp); err != nil {
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "That file is not a valid SelfPost domain export.")
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return
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}
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// Normalise and validate the domain name before it reaches the service, the
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// same gate the add-domain form uses (security.md).
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exp.Domain = validate.NormalizeDomain(exp.Domain)
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if err := validate.Domain(exp.Domain); err != nil {
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid domain in export file: "+err.Error())
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return
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}
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d, err := h.domains.Import(exp)
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if err != nil {
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logf("panel: import domain %q: %v", exp.Domain, err)
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status, msg := importErrorMessage(err)
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h.renderBackupPage(w, r, status, msg)
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return
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}
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http.Redirect(w, r, fmt.Sprintf("/domains/%d?imported=1", d.ID), http.StatusSeeOther)
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}
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// secretFilePassword reads the "encrypt this download with a password" controls
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// shared by the full-backup and domain-export forms. It returns the password to
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// encrypt with — empty when the box is not ticked, which keeps the plain
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// .tar.gz/.json behaviour of earlier versions — or a message to show above the
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// form. The confirmation field is checked here rather than in the browser
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// because a typo in an encryption password is unrecoverable: the archive would
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// be sealed with a secret the operator does not know.
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func secretFilePassword(r *http.Request) (password, errMsg string) {
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if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
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return "", "Invalid form submission."
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}
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if r.PostFormValue("encrypt") == "" {
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return "", ""
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}
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password = r.PostFormValue("password")
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if len([]rune(password)) < validate.MinSecretFilePasswordLen {
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return "", fmt.Sprintf("The encryption password must be at least %d characters.", validate.MinSecretFilePasswordLen)
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}
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if password != r.PostFormValue("password_confirm") {
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return "", "The two passwords do not match."
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}
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return password, ""
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}
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// decryptErrorMessage phrases an envelope failure for the operator. A wrong
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// password and a damaged file are deliberately indistinguishable to the code,
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// so the message names both possibilities.
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func decryptErrorMessage(err error) string {
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switch {
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case errors.Is(err, secretfile.ErrWrongPassword):
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return "Wrong password, or the file has been altered since it was exported."
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case errors.Is(err, secretfile.ErrCorrupt):
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return "That file is damaged or incomplete."
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case errors.Is(err, secretfile.ErrNotEncrypted):
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return "That file is not a SelfPost export."
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default:
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return "Could not decrypt the file."
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}
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}
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// importErrorMessage maps a domain-import failure (already logged by the caller)
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// to an HTTP status and a user-facing message. Duplicate domain/login are called
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// out specifically; other failures — validation errors describing what is wrong
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// with the file, or an internal write/reload problem — are surfaced verbatim to
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// this admin-only panel so the operator can act on them.
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func importErrorMessage(err error) (int, string) {
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switch {
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case errors.Is(err, store.ErrDomainExists):
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return http.StatusConflict, "A domain with that name already exists here. Delete it first, or import into a fresh instance."
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case errors.Is(err, store.ErrLoginExists):
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return http.StatusConflict, "One of the application logins in the file is already in use on this instance. Application logins must be unique across all domains."
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default:
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return http.StatusBadRequest, "Could not import the domain: " + err.Error()
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}
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}
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