Files
selfpost/internal/web/validate.go
T
mix a7a5ad3f91 Phase 3: sending domains + per-domain OpenDKIM signing
Add/list/delete of sending domains with per-domain DKIM keys and the
OpenDKIM tables that drive signing (spec 6, 7.2.2-4, 7.2.10).

internal/domain:
- Pure-Go RSA-2048 keygen; PKCS#1 PEM written atomically at 0640; the
  published DNS TXT record is derived from the key on disk (single source
  of truth) rather than persisted. No os/exec for key generation.
- KeyTable/SigningTable fully regenerated from the registry on every
  add/delete (idempotent), written atomically; SigningTable via refile:
  with *@domain, KeyTable with absolute key paths. Table writer refuses
  any unsafe character as a backstop (spec 7.6.4).
- Reload without root: the unprivileged panel signals OpenDKIM through
  supervisord (`supervisorctl signal USR1 opendkim`, fixed args, no
  shell, no user input — spec 7.6.3). An existing key is reused, never
  overwritten, so re-adding a domain keeps its published DNS valid.
- Service orchestrates registry -> key -> table rebuild -> reload, with
  rollback of the row if a downstream step fails; delete cascades apps
  via the DB FK and removes the key + table entries.

Infra:
- Shared `selfpost` group bridges panel (writes keys) and opendkim
  (reads them); /data/opendkim is setgid so panel-created files inherit
  the group, keys are 0640, RequireSafeKeys is disabled by design.
- opendkim.conf moves from verify-only (Mode v) to signing (Mode s).
- entrypoint.sh normalises the DKIM tree on every start (ownership,
  setgid, perms, empty tables before opendkim starts) — self-healing
  after a restore.
- supervisord control socket opened to the `selfpost` group so the panel
  can request the reload.

web/store:
- Strict domain-name validation (whitelist [a-z0-9.-], DNS shape, >=2
  labels), lower-case normalisation (spec 7.6.2).
- Domain queries with application counts; delete relies on ON DELETE
  CASCADE. Dashboard lists domains + add form; domain page shows the
  DKIM record; a dedicated confirm page warns about the app cascade
  before deletion (spec 7.2.4); manual reload button (spec 7.2.12,
  OpenDKIM side; Postfix reload lands in Phase 5).
- Authenticated routes moved to a sub-mux using Go 1.22 method/wildcard
  patterns.

Tests: validateDomain, DKIM keygen/record roundtrip, table rendering +
injection-safety, key reuse, store cascade. Verified on the dev server:
gofmt/vet/test green, image builds, container e2e (add/delete a domain,
DKIM record shown, OpenDKIM reads panel keys and reloads, keys and
tables persist across a restart).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 22:20:35 +03:00

102 lines
3.3 KiB
Go

package web
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
"unicode"
)
// minAdminPasswordLen is the floor for the administrator password. The panel is
// public (spec 7.6), so this is deliberately not tiny.
const minAdminPasswordLen = 12
const (
minUsernameLen = 3
maxUsernameLen = 64
)
// validateUsername enforces a strict server-side whitelist (spec 7.6.2):
// letters, digits, dot, dash, underscore. Client validation is never trusted.
func validateUsername(u string) error {
if len(u) < minUsernameLen || len(u) > maxUsernameLen {
return fmt.Errorf("username must be %d-%d characters", minUsernameLen, maxUsernameLen)
}
for _, r := range u {
if r > unicode.MaxASCII || (!isASCIILetterOrDigit(r) && r != '.' && r != '-' && r != '_') {
return fmt.Errorf("username may contain only letters, digits, '.', '-' and '_'")
}
}
return nil
}
// validateAdminPassword enforces a minimum length. Composition rules beyond
// length tend to reduce entropy in practice, so length is the sole gate.
func validateAdminPassword(p string) error {
if len(p) < minAdminPasswordLen {
return fmt.Errorf("password must be at least %d characters", minAdminPasswordLen)
}
return nil
}
func isASCIILetterOrDigit(r rune) bool {
return (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || (r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z') || (r >= '0' && r <= '9')
}
const maxDomainLen = 253 // RFC 1035 limit on a fully-qualified name
// normalizeDomain lower-cases and trims a domain name. Domain names are
// case-insensitive, and the generated OpenDKIM tables/keys use the canonical
// lower-case form, so we normalise before both validation and storage.
func normalizeDomain(name string) string {
return strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(name))
}
// validateDomain enforces a strict server-side whitelist for sending-domain
// names (spec 7.6.2). The result is safe to write verbatim into the OpenDKIM
// KeyTable/SigningTable and to use as a filesystem path segment: only
// lower-case letters, digits, '.' and '-' are allowed, in valid DNS label
// shape. Input must already be normalised with normalizeDomain.
//
// This is deliberately stricter than "any string DNS might accept" — no
// leading/trailing dots or hyphens, no empty or over-long labels, and at least
// two labels so single-word hostnames cannot be registered as sending domains.
func validateDomain(name string) error {
if name == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("domain is required")
}
if len(name) > maxDomainLen {
return fmt.Errorf("domain must be at most %d characters", maxDomainLen)
}
labels := strings.Split(name, ".")
if len(labels) < 2 {
return fmt.Errorf("domain must include at least one dot (e.g. example.com)")
}
for _, label := range labels {
if err := validateDomainLabel(label); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func validateDomainLabel(label string) error {
if len(label) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("domain must not contain an empty label")
}
if len(label) > 63 {
return fmt.Errorf("each domain label must be at most 63 characters")
}
if label[0] == '-' || label[len(label)-1] == '-' {
return fmt.Errorf("domain labels must not start or end with '-'")
}
for i := 0; i < len(label); i++ {
c := label[i]
lower := c >= 'a' && c <= 'z'
digit := c >= '0' && c <= '9'
if !lower && !digit && c != '-' {
return fmt.Errorf("domain may contain only lower-case letters, digits, '.' and '-'")
}
}
return nil
}