Files
selfpost/internal/web/web.go
T
mixandClaude Opus 5.5 c171fb5bc7
test / test (push) Canceled after 0s
from-header-binding: the sender check, what it costs, its pages; guide, architecture, security
A message's From: line is held against the application that sends it, under
the rule Postfix holds the envelope sender to. OpenDKIM chooses the key by
that line, so until now an application could have mail signed as another
domain of the server or as the server itself.

The check (internal/milter/sender.go)
- A role of the panel on a socket of its own (SENDER_CHECK_SOCKET), first in
  smtpd_milters and strict: default_action=tempfail. The journal milter keeps
  its socket and stays fail-open. postfix-wrapper waits for the new socket.
- It reads no database: what an application may send as comes from Postfix's
  own sender_login_maps, what the server signs for from OpenDKIM's
  SigningTable. Both are read again when they change; one that cannot be
  read defers mail.
- One From: field, one address, allowed by the envelope's lookup; then no
  other name of the SigningTable may appear anywhere in the raw line.
  Refused: 550 5.7.1 naming the line, reduced to printable ASCII.
- A refusal is a send-log row with reason "from" and the header address
  (migration 0006), written by another goroutine and not waited for. The
  journal's refusals record their reason too (limit, client), and the
  notifier takes only a limit's.

What it costs (docs/plans/from-header-binding.md, Statistics)
- The role marks itself alive every 2 s; at start the gap since the mark is
  downtime, counted from Postfix's start if later and not at all when
  supervisord says Postfix is not running.
- The log tailer counts the connections Postfix turned away: a warning that
  names the socket, then milter-reject "Service unavailable" from the same
  smtpd. Seen on the stand: the client is refused from CONNECT on and leaves
  at AUTH (454), so no MAIL line is ever written.
- sender_check_days, a row per UTC day, kept a year.

Pages
- Health: the card "Sender check", the socket's row, and the cards layout -
  boxes numbered by importance in two stacks read in rows; the left stack
  polls, the three readings of the right one are swapped in by id.
- Outbound log: a refused row says why in its tag (wrong From, wrong client,
  rate-limited); the message's page shows the From: line and what the
  application may send as.
- Help: topic "Sender check", word for word the mockup's.

Found by the stand, fixed here: the names for the second look came from the
sender bindings, and a domain with a key and no application yet was not
among them.

e2e: negative_journal_milter_fail_open is gone - it proved that mail passes
with the panel down, which is no longer so. In its place
sender_check_holds_the_from_line (another domain's From:, the hostname's, a
stranger's, an address off the list, another sender in the display name -
refused; own addresses - delivered) and panel_down_defers_mail (4xx with the
panel stopped, the container alive, mail again after, downtime and one
deferred message on Health, the card warning).

Test server, this tree before the last cosmetic edits (a fixture row, a
fact's size, docs): go vet ok, go test 23 packages ok, make e2e ok (337 s).
Locally after them: internal/web/view ok.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 19:35:43 +03:00

348 lines
16 KiB
Go

// Package web implements the SelfPost control panel's HTTP surface: the
// one-time administrator setup flow (security.md), login/session handling
// (security.md) and the authenticated shell the later phases build on.
package web
import (
"log"
"net"
"net/http"
"strings"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/app"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/dmarc"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/dnscheck"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/domain"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/health"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/inbound"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/legal"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/postfix"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/web/auth"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/web/handlers"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/web/view"
)
// Config holds the panel's HTTP-facing configuration.
type Config struct {
// Hostname is the server's external hostname, used to build the absolute
// setup link shown in the logs (security.md; guide § Environment
// variables for SELFPOST_HOSTNAME).
Hostname string
// CookieSecure sets the Secure attribute on the session cookie. It defaults
// to true (security.md); it exists as a knob only so the panel can be tested
// over plain HTTP in development, never for production.
CookieSecure bool
// SubmissionEnabled mirrors SUBMISSION_ENABLE: whether this deployment also
// runs the 587/STARTTLS submission listener next to the primary 465 one
// (architecture.md § Mail path). The panel only reports it on the domain
// page's connection settings; it is a deploy-time flag, not something the
// panel can verify.
SubmissionEnabled bool
// MailLogPath is where Postfix's delivery log lives, read by the mail.log
// monitoring view (architecture.md § Panel HTTP surface). It is the same path
// the log-tailer role follows in cmd/panel.
MailLogPath string
// DataDir and DBPath locate the persistent state a full backup archives
// (architecture.md § Persistence); DeployRoot is the operator project
// directory (docker-compose.yml, .env, certs/); Version is stamped into
// the backup manifest. They mirror the panel's own configuration.
DataDir string
DBPath string
DeployRoot string
Version string
// TrustedProxyCIDRs are the reverse-proxy addresses allowed to supply
// X-Forwarded-For (env TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR). A request whose
// direct peer (RemoteAddr) is not in this list never has its XFF header
// honoured, so the header can't be spoofed by anyone but a trusted proxy.
// Empty (the default) keeps rate-limiting keyed on RemoteAddr only.
TrustedProxyCIDRs []*net.IPNet
// TLSCertFile is the certificate Postfix serves on 465/587 (guide §
// Environment variables), read read-only by the status page to report how
// much validity is left.
TLSCertFile string
// OpenDKIMSocket and JournalSocket are the two milter sockets Postfix
// connects to. The status page stats them: the first is required for mail
// to leave at all (OpenDKIM runs with default_action=tempfail), the second
// only for the send log (the journal-milter fails open).
OpenDKIMSocket string
JournalSocket string
// SenderSocket is the sender check's socket, attached strictly.
SenderSocket string
// SessionIdleDays is the sliding inactivity window after which a login
// session expires (env PANEL_SESSION_IDLE_DAYS, plan B.1). Non-positive
// falls back to the 7-day default.
SessionIdleDays int
// DNSResolvers are the recursive resolvers the deliverability checks query
// (env SELFPOST_DNS_RESOLVERS). Empty uses dnscheck.DefaultResolvers. The
// checks must not go through the system resolver — see dnscheck's
// externalResolver — so this is how a closed network points them at its own.
DNSResolvers []string
// RateLimitMessagesPerIP and RateLimitWindowSeconds are the level-1
// Postfix anvil backstop (env RATE_LIMIT_*), mirrored into the panel for
// display and to cap domain/app level-2 ceilings (guide § Rate limiting).
RateLimitMessagesPerIP int
RateLimitWindowSeconds int
// RetryPolicy is this Postfix's deferred-mail timings, snapshotted once
// when the HTTP role starts. Handlers read the cache; they never call
// postconf (architecture.md).
RetryPolicy postfix.RetryPolicy
// InboundEnabled mirrors INBOUND_RELAY_ENABLE.
InboundEnabled bool
// InboundAntispamMilter mirrors INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER (inet:host:port or
// unix:/path) and InboundAntispamAction INBOUND_ANTISPAM_MILTER_ACTION
// ("accept" or "tempfail", "" when the variable holds anything else): the
// panel only reports them.
InboundAntispamMilter string
InboundAntispamAction string
// DMARCEnabled mirrors DMARC_REPORTS_ENABLE.
DMARCEnabled bool
// SendLogRetentionEnvDefault is SEND_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS at panel start.
SendLogRetentionEnvDefault int
// InboundSpamLogRetentionEnvDefault is INBOUND_SPAM_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS at
// panel start.
InboundSpamLogRetentionEnvDefault int
}
// Server is the panel HTTP application.
type Server struct {
cfg Config
auth *auth.Module
handlers *handlers.Handlers
}
// New builds the panel server. setupTokenPath is where the current setup token
// is mirrored on disk (security.md); domains is the sending-domain service
// that owns DKIM keys and the OpenDKIM tables (architecture.md § OpenDKIM);
// apps owns application SASL accounts and the Postfix sender map
// (architecture.md § Mail path).
func New(st *store.Store, domains *domain.Service, apps *app.Service, inboundSvc *inbound.Service, lists *inbound.Lists, dmarcSvc *dmarc.Service, cfg Config, setupTokenPath string) (*Server, error) {
v, err := view.New(cfg.Version)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
v.SetInboundEnabled(cfg.InboundEnabled)
v.SetDMARCEnabled(cfg.DMARCEnabled)
a := auth.New(st, auth.Config{
CookieSecure: cfg.CookieSecure,
Hostname: cfg.Hostname,
SessionIdleDays: cfg.SessionIdleDays,
TrustedProxyCIDRs: cfg.TrustedProxyCIDRs,
}, v, setupTokenPath)
h := handlers.New(st, domains, apps, inboundSvc, lists, dmarcSvc, handlers.Config{
Hostname: cfg.Hostname,
SubmissionEnabled: cfg.SubmissionEnabled,
MailLogPath: cfg.MailLogPath,
DataDir: cfg.DataDir,
DBPath: cfg.DBPath,
DeployRoot: cfg.DeployRoot,
Version: cfg.Version,
TLSCertFile: cfg.TLSCertFile,
OpenDKIMSocket: cfg.OpenDKIMSocket,
JournalSocket: cfg.JournalSocket,
SenderSocket: cfg.SenderSocket,
RateLimitMessagesPerIP: cfg.RateLimitMessagesPerIP,
RateLimitWindowSeconds: cfg.RateLimitWindowSeconds,
RetryPolicy: cfg.RetryPolicy,
InboundEnabled: cfg.InboundEnabled,
InboundAntispamMilter: cfg.InboundAntispamMilter,
InboundAntispamAction: cfg.InboundAntispamAction,
DMARCEnabled: cfg.DMARCEnabled,
SendLogRetentionEnvDefault: cfg.SendLogRetentionEnvDefault,
InboundSpamLogRetentionEnvDefault: cfg.InboundSpamLogRetentionEnvDefault,
}, v, dnscheck.New(cfg.DNSResolvers), &health.MachineSampler{}, a)
return &Server{cfg: cfg, auth: a, handlers: h}, nil
}
// Start performs first-run bootstrapping: if there is no administrator yet, it
// generates and announces the setup link (security.md). Safe to call once at
// server startup.
func (s *Server) Start() error {
return s.auth.Bootstrap()
}
// Handler returns the panel's HTTP handler (router).
func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
mux, authed := s.muxes()
mux.Handle("/", s.auth.RequireAuth(authed))
return s.secure(mux)
}
// muxes registers every route: the public ones, and the ones behind a session.
// Both muxes are flat — one pattern per route, nothing mounted as a sub-router —
// and building them only takes method values, it never calls into s.auth or
// s.handlers: the route guard test (guard_routes_test.go) runs this on a bare
// Server and asks each mux which pattern answers a path.
func (s *Server) muxes() (public, authed *http.ServeMux) {
mux := http.NewServeMux()
h := s.handlers
mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", handleHealth)
mux.HandleFunc("/license", handleLicense)
mux.Handle("/static/", view.StaticHandler())
mux.HandleFunc("/setup/", s.auth.HandleSetup)
mux.HandleFunc("/login", s.auth.HandleLogin)
mux.HandleFunc("/logout", s.auth.HandleLogout)
authed = http.NewServeMux()
// A URL reads like the menu: /<group>/<page>, an entity under its list, an
// action under the thing it changes (docs/plans/panel-redesign.md §
// Routes). The pre-2.0 paths are gone, not redirected.
authed.HandleFunc("GET /{$}", redirectHome)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /help", h.HandleHelp)
// Account: every signed-in user's own.
authed.HandleFunc("GET /account", h.HandleAccount)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /account/profile", h.HandleAccountProfile)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /account/password", h.HandleAccountPassword)
// Overview. Its handler checks the role itself: the page is global-only
// but does not live under /server/.
authed.HandleFunc("GET /overview", h.HandleOverview)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /overview/fragment", h.HandleOverviewFragment)
// Outbound: checked per domain in the handlers (lookupDomain,
// lookupApplication), adding and deleting by role.
authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/domains", h.HandleDashboard)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains", h.HandleAddDomain)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/domains/{id}", h.HandleDomainDetail)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/dns-recheck", h.HandleDomainDNSRecheck)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/domains/{id}/delete", h.HandleDeleteConfirm)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/delete", h.HandleDeleteDomain)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/domains/{id}/settings", h.HandleDomainSettings)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/settings/reports", h.HandleDomainDMARC)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/settings/ratelimit", h.HandleDomainRateLimit)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/settings/ratelimit/recalc", h.HandleDomainRateLimitRecalc)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/settings/export", h.HandleExportDomain)
// An application lives under its domain, and its form is one POST: sender,
// client IPs and rate limit are saved together. The page that shows a new
// password is the response to its POST and has no GET path.
authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/domains/{id}/applications/new", h.HandleApplicationNew)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/applications/new", h.HandleApplicationCreate)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/domains/{id}/applications/{aid}", h.HandleApplicationEdit)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/applications/{aid}", h.HandleApplicationSave)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/applications/{aid}/password", h.HandleRegenPassword)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/applications/{aid}/ratelimit/recalc", h.HandleAppRateLimitRecalc)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /outbound/domains/{id}/applications/{aid}/delete", h.HandleDeleteApplication)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/log", h.HandleDeliveries)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/log/fragment", h.HandleDeliveriesRows)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/log/{id}", h.HandleDelivery)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/queue", h.HandleMailQueue)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/queue/fragment", h.HandleMailQueueBody)
if s.cfg.DMARCEnabled {
authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/dmarc", h.HandleDMARCList)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/dmarc/reports/{id}", h.HandleDMARCReport)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /outbound/dmarc/domains/{id}", h.HandleDMARCDomain)
}
// Inbound: checked per inbound domain (requireInboundDomain).
if s.cfg.InboundEnabled {
authed.HandleFunc("GET /inbound/domains", h.HandleInboundList)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /inbound/domains", h.HandleAddInbound)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /inbound/domains/{id}", h.HandleInboundDetail)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /inbound/domains/{id}/dns-recheck", h.HandleInboundDNSRecheck)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /inbound/domains/{id}/upstream", h.HandleInboundTransport)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /inbound/domains/{id}/recipients", h.HandleInboundRecipients)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /inbound/domains/{id}/delete", h.HandleInboundDeleteConfirm)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /inbound/domains/{id}/delete", h.HandleInboundDelete)
// The log is for everyone who reaches an inbound domain (scoped to
// theirs); the lists are the instance's, so the handlers keep the
// global role's check (requireInboundGlobal) and answer 404 to the rest.
authed.HandleFunc("GET /inbound/log", h.HandleInboundLog)
authed.HandleFunc("GET /inbound/filter-lists", h.HandleFilterLists)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /inbound/filter-lists", h.HandleFilterListAdd)
authed.HandleFunc("POST /inbound/filter-lists/{id}/delete", h.HandleFilterListDelete)
}
// Server: everything under /server/ is for the global role, so the subtree
// is guarded once, here, by server() — a route added to this group cannot
// forget the check. The handlers keep their own requireGlobal as well.
server := func(pattern string, handler http.HandlerFunc) {
if _, path, _ := strings.Cut(pattern, " "); !strings.HasPrefix(path, "/server/") {
panic("web: server() registers routes under /server/ only: " + pattern)
}
authed.HandleFunc(pattern, globalOnly(handler))
}
server("GET /server/health", h.HandleHealth)
server("GET /server/health/fragment", h.HandleHealthFragment)
server("POST /server/health/recheck", h.HandleHealthRecheck)
server("POST /server/health/reload", h.HandleReload)
server("GET /server/log", h.HandleSystemLog)
server("GET /server/log/fragment", h.HandleSystemLogBody)
server("GET /server/backup", h.HandleBackupPage)
server("POST /server/backup", h.HandleBackup)
server("POST /server/backup/import", h.HandleImportDomain)
server("GET /server/users", h.HandleUsers)
server("GET /server/users/new", h.HandleUserNew)
server("POST /server/users/new", h.HandleUserNew)
server("GET /server/users/{uid}", h.HandleUserEdit)
server("POST /server/users/{uid}", h.HandleUserEdit)
server("GET /server/users/{uid}/delete", h.HandleUserDeleteConfirm)
server("POST /server/users/{uid}/delete", h.HandleUserDelete)
server("GET /server/settings", h.HandleServerSettings)
server("POST /server/settings", h.HandleServerSettings)
server("GET /server/components", h.HandleComponents)
return mux, authed
}
// globalOnly answers 404 to anyone but the global role before the wrapped
// handler runs — the same answer a missing page gets, so the panel does not
// confirm to a domain administrator that the Server pages exist.
func globalOnly(next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
p, ok := auth.PrincipalFromRequest(r)
if !ok || !p.IsGlobal() {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
next(w, r)
}
}
func redirectHome(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
p, ok := auth.PrincipalFromRequest(r)
if ok && !p.IsGlobal() {
// A domain administrator lands on what they reach: their sending
// domains, or the inbound ones when that is all they are assigned.
if !p.HasOutbound() && p.HasInbound() {
http.Redirect(w, r, "/inbound/domains", http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
http.Redirect(w, r, "/outbound/domains", http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
http.Redirect(w, r, "/overview", http.StatusSeeOther)
}
func handleHealth(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
if err := health.Liveness(); err != nil {
http.Error(w, "unhealthy\n", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
_, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok\n"))
}
func handleLicense(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodGet && r.Method != http.MethodHead {
http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
if r.Method == http.MethodHead {
return
}
_, _ = w.Write(legal.License)
}
func logf(format string, args ...any) {
log.Printf(format, args...)
}