mix
5e5d157496
A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's Fixed: - A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's - Log-tailer resumes where it stopped instead of jumping to end-of-file on - Level-2 rate limit no longer overshoots under concurrency: messages that Changed: - The project has a single public home: `github.com/mixeme/selfpost`. Codeberg - Code comments no longer cite the archived specification. References like - `docs/code-review.md` is gone. Its plan is finished — phases 0 (bar the - `docs/architecture.md` gained a *Code layers* section: a diagram of - Phase 1 doc/code hygiene (`docs/code-review.md`): removed ~30 stale … (1 more in CHANGELOG) Security: - Pre-release security review (plan § D, model Fable, 2026-08-06): full pass - `saslpasswd2` argv: the application login is now passed after a `--` Added: - Optional password encryption for the two secret-bearing downloads (plan - Domain import accepts an encrypted export: the envelope is detected by its - `selfpost-backup` writes encrypted archives and reads them back: - `TestParseDelivery` covers the exotic mail.log shapes the review asked for - docs: README *Encrypting a backup or export*; `docs/security.md` § … (14 more in CHANGELOG) Removed: - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk «restore old backup revives session rows» Changed: - docs: `implementation-plan.md` trimmed to the sole open v1.x gate — pre-release - docs: `architecture.md` — sessions (SQLite, idle renew, password change), - docs: `development.md` — expanded e2e stack and `release.yml` matrix workflow. - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk for send-log rows stuck at `queued` after - docs: `roadmap.md` — optional send-log / `mail.log` follow-ups under v1.x tail. … (10 more in CHANGELOG) Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (0.5.0).
119 lines
5.5 KiB
Bash
119 lines
5.5 KiB
Bash
#!/bin/sh
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# Container entrypoint (runs as root, PID 1 until it execs supervisord).
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#
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# The persistent root /data is a host bind mount (spec 9), so it arrives owned
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# by the host user (typically root), not by the unprivileged panel user that
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# actually writes the SQLite database, setup token and DKIM keys (spec 7.6.8).
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# Fix its ownership here — the one place still running as root — before handing
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# off to supervisord, which starts the panel as the panel user.
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set -e
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chown panel:panel /data
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# Restored backups or previously-created state may contain panel-owned files
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# under /data; make sure they stay writable without disturbing anything that a
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# later phase deliberately hands to another service.
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find /data -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 ! -user panel -exec chown -R panel:panel {} +
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# DKIM key tree (spec 6, 9). The panel (user `panel`) generates keys and writes
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# the OpenDKIM tables; OpenDKIM (user `opendkim`) must read them. Normalise the
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# tree on every start so it is correct whether /data is fresh, restarted, or
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# just restored from a backup:
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# - group `selfpost` + setgid on directories so anything the panel creates
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# inherits the shared group OpenDKIM traverses;
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# - private keys and tables group-readable (0640);
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# - both table files present (empty is fine) BEFORE OpenDKIM starts, so the
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# daemon comes up cleanly with no domains yet.
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mkdir -p /data/opendkim/keys
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for t in /data/opendkim/KeyTable /data/opendkim/SigningTable; do
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[ -e "$t" ] || : > "$t"
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done
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chown -R panel:selfpost /data/opendkim
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find /data/opendkim -type d -exec chmod 2750 {} +
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chmod 0640 /data/opendkim/KeyTable /data/opendkim/SigningTable
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find /data/opendkim/keys -type f -name '*.private' -exec chmod 0640 {} +
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# Application SASL accounts (spec 5.1, 9). The panel (user `panel`) writes the
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# sasldb2 via saslpasswd2; Postfix (user `postfix`) reads it to authenticate SMTP
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# clients. Share it through the `selfpost` group the same way as the DKIM tree:
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# setgid directory so new files inherit the group, and the database itself
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# group-readable (0640).
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mkdir -p /data/sasl
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chown -R panel:selfpost /data/sasl
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chmod 2750 /data/sasl
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[ -e /data/sasl/sasldb2 ] && chmod 0640 /data/sasl/sasldb2
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# Postfix sender_login_maps (spec 5.1). The panel writes it; Postfix reads it.
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# Ensure the file exists (empty is fine) before Postfix starts so a reload that
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# references it never fails on a missing file, and keep it group-readable.
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mkdir -p /data/postfix
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[ -e /data/postfix/sender_login_maps ] || : > /data/postfix/sender_login_maps
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chown -R panel:selfpost /data/postfix
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chmod 2750 /data/postfix
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chmod 0640 /data/postfix/sender_login_maps
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# Milter socket directories (spec 5 p.3, 7.3). Postfix (user `postfix`) must
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# actually CONNECT to both milter sockets — OpenDKIM's and the panel's
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# journal-milter — not just probe them at start-up. The sockets are
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# created by the opendkim and panel users respectively, so bridge them to
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# `postfix` through the shared `selfpost` group: group-owned + setgid dirs mean
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# each socket created inside inherits group `selfpost`, and group-traversable
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# (2750) lets postfix reach it. Without this, smtpd cannot talk to OpenDKIM and,
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# because signing is strict (default_action=tempfail), rejects all mail.
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mkdir -p /run/opendkim /run/selfpost
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chown opendkim:selfpost /run/opendkim
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chown panel:selfpost /run/selfpost
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chmod 2750 /run/opendkim /run/selfpost
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# SELFPOST_HOSTNAME is an identity, not a setting with a safe default: it must
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# simultaneously match the PTR/rDNS record, the certificate CN/SAN, and the
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# Cyrus SASL realm (spec 5.2 p.3, 8). The panel (main.go saslRealm()) and
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# postfix-config.sh each fall back independently when it's unset — to
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# `localhost` and to the container hostname respectively — so accounts get
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# written under one realm and looked up under another and authentication
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# silently fails for every application, while HELO also stops matching the
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# PTR record and mail that does go out lands in spam. No fallback can be
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# correct, so fail loudly here, before either side of that split has a chance
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# to run, rather than leave a green panel with broken mail.
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if [ -z "$SELFPOST_HOSTNAME" ]; then
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cat >&2 <<'EOF'
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FATAL: SELFPOST_HOSTNAME is not set.
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This is the mail server's identity: it becomes the Postfix HELO/EHLO name,
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the Cyrus SASL realm that application passwords are looked up under, and it
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must match the TLS certificate's CN/SAN as well as this server's PTR (reverse
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DNS) record. There is no safe default — guessing any one of these wrong
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breaks authentication for every application or sends outgoing mail to spam,
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silently.
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Set it to the mail server's fully-qualified domain name, e.g.:
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SELFPOST_HOSTNAME=mail.example.com
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in the .env file next to your docker-compose.yml (see deploy/.env.example).
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EOF
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exit 1
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fi
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case "$SELFPOST_HOSTNAME" in
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*[\ \ ]* | *://* | *:* )
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echo "FATAL: SELFPOST_HOSTNAME must be a bare hostname (no scheme, port, or spaces): \"$SELFPOST_HOSTNAME\"" >&2
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echo 'Example: SELFPOST_HOSTNAME=mail.example.com' >&2
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exit 1
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;;
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*.*)
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;;
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*)
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echo "FATAL: SELFPOST_HOSTNAME must be a fully-qualified domain name (at least one dot): \"$SELFPOST_HOSTNAME\"" >&2
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echo 'Example: SELFPOST_HOSTNAME=mail.example.com' >&2
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exit 1
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;;
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esac
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# Generate the outbound-relay Postfix configuration from the environment (spec
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# 5). Kept out of the image build so cert paths, rate limits, hostname and the
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# optional 587 service are all driven by env at run time, and re-derived on every
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# start the same way the /data normalisation above is.
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/usr/local/bin/postfix-config.sh
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exec /usr/bin/supervisord -c /etc/supervisor/supervisord.conf
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