Files
selfpost/cmd/selfpost-backup/main.go
T
mix 5e5d157496 release: 0.5.0: Pre-1.0 security review, domain-admin role, doc consolidation
A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
Fixed:
  - A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
  - Log-tailer resumes where it stopped instead of jumping to end-of-file on
  - Level-2 rate limit no longer overshoots under concurrency: messages that
Changed:
  - The project has a single public home: `github.com/mixeme/selfpost`. Codeberg
  - Code comments no longer cite the archived specification. References like
  - `docs/code-review.md` is gone. Its plan is finished — phases 0 (bar the
  - `docs/architecture.md` gained a *Code layers* section: a diagram of
  - Phase 1 doc/code hygiene (`docs/code-review.md`): removed ~30 stale
  … (1 more in CHANGELOG)
Security:
  - Pre-release security review (plan § D, model Fable, 2026-08-06): full pass
  - `saslpasswd2` argv: the application login is now passed after a `--`
Added:
  - Optional password encryption for the two secret-bearing downloads (plan
  - Domain import accepts an encrypted export: the envelope is detected by its
  - `selfpost-backup` writes encrypted archives and reads them back:
  - `TestParseDelivery` covers the exotic mail.log shapes the review asked for
  - docs: README *Encrypting a backup or export*; `docs/security.md` §
  … (14 more in CHANGELOG)
Removed:
  - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk «restore old backup revives session rows»
Changed:
  - docs: `implementation-plan.md` trimmed to the sole open v1.x gate — pre-release
  - docs: `architecture.md` — sessions (SQLite, idle renew, password change),
  - docs: `development.md` — expanded e2e stack and `release.yml` matrix workflow.
  - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk for send-log rows stuck at `queued` after
  - docs: `roadmap.md` — optional send-log / `mail.log` follow-ups under v1.x tail.
  … (10 more in CHANGELOG)

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (0.5.0).
2026-09-22 15:24:51 +03:00

189 lines
5.3 KiB
Go

// Command selfpost-backup produces the full persistent-state archive from inside
// the container, invoked via `docker exec` for scripted/cron backups — the CLI
// equivalent of the panel's backup button (architecture.md § Persistence).
//
// By default the gzip-compressed tar is written to stdout, so the usual form is:
//
// docker exec <container> selfpost-backup > selfpost-backup.tar.gz
//
// Use -o to write to a file instead. The resulting archive contains DKIM private
// keys, the admin password hash and SASL credentials — treat it as a secret
// (architecture.md § Persistence).
//
// Given a password (SELFPOST_BACKUP_PASSWORD or -password-file, never an
// argument, which would show up in the process list) the archive is written as
// an encrypted .spbk envelope instead. Turn one back into a plain .tar.gz with
// the same password:
//
// docker exec -i <container> selfpost-backup -decrypt < backup.spbk > backup.tar.gz
package main
import (
"flag"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/backup"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/buildinfo"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/secretfile"
)
// passwordEnv names the environment variable holding the encryption password.
// A password must never be a command-line argument: the process list is
// readable by every process in the container.
const passwordEnv = "SELFPOST_BACKUP_PASSWORD"
func main() {
showVersion := flag.Bool("version", false, "print version and exit")
out := flag.String("o", "", "write the output to this file instead of stdout")
in := flag.String("i", "", "read the encrypted archive from this file instead of stdin (-decrypt only)")
decrypt := flag.Bool("decrypt", false, "decrypt an encrypted backup (.spbk) back to a plain .tar.gz")
pwFile := flag.String("password-file", "", "read the encryption password from this file (first line); "+passwordEnv+" is used when unset")
flag.Parse()
if *showVersion {
fmt.Println(buildinfo.Version)
return
}
password, err := readPassword(*pwFile)
if err == nil {
if *decrypt {
err = runDecrypt(*in, *out, password)
} else {
err = run(*out, password)
}
}
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "selfpost-backup: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
}
// run writes a backup, encrypting it when a password was supplied.
func run(outPath, password string) error {
dataDir := envDefault("SELFPOST_DATA_DIR", "/data")
dbPath := envDefault("SELFPOST_DB_PATH", filepath.Join(dataDir, "selfpost.db"))
w, closeOut, err := openOutput(outPath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer closeOut()
sink := w
var env *secretfile.Writer
if password != "" {
env, err = secretfile.NewWriter(w, secretfile.TypeFullBackup, password)
if err != nil {
return err
}
sink = env
}
if err := backup.Create(sink, backup.Params{
DataDir: dataDir,
DBPath: dbPath,
Version: buildinfo.Version,
}); err != nil {
return err
}
if env != nil {
if err := env.Close(); err != nil {
return err
}
}
if outPath != "" {
kind := "plain"
if password != "" {
kind = "encrypted"
}
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "selfpost-backup: wrote %s (%s, SelfPost %s)\n", outPath, kind, buildinfo.Version)
}
return nil
}
// runDecrypt turns a .spbk envelope back into the plain gzip tar, so an
// encrypted backup can be extracted with ordinary tools during a restore.
func runDecrypt(inPath, outPath, password string) error {
if password == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("-decrypt needs the password (set %s or use -password-file)", passwordEnv)
}
r := io.Reader(os.Stdin)
if inPath != "" {
f, err := os.Open(inPath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer f.Close()
r = f
}
env, err := secretfile.NewReader(r, password)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if env.Type() != secretfile.TypeFullBackup {
return fmt.Errorf("that file is a %s, not a full backup", env.Type())
}
w, closeOut, err := openOutput(outPath)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer closeOut()
if _, err := io.Copy(w, env); err != nil {
return err
}
if outPath != "" {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "selfpost-backup: wrote %s (decrypted)\n", outPath)
}
return nil
}
// openOutput returns stdout, or a freshly created owner-only file: both plain
// and encrypted backups are secret enough to keep off other users' eyes.
func openOutput(outPath string) (io.Writer, func(), error) {
if outPath == "" {
return os.Stdout, func() {}, nil
}
f, err := os.OpenFile(outPath, os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY|os.O_TRUNC, 0o600)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return f, func() { _ = f.Close() }, nil
}
// readPassword takes the password from the given file (first line) or, when no
// file is named, from the environment. An empty result means "no encryption".
func readPassword(pwFile string) (string, error) {
if pwFile == "" {
return os.Getenv(passwordEnv), nil
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(pwFile)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("read password file: %w", err)
}
// A password file is usually written with a trailing newline; take the first
// line and strip the line ending, but keep any other whitespace, which may
// well be part of the password.
line, _, _ := strings.Cut(string(data), "\n")
line = strings.TrimSuffix(line, "\r")
if line == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("password file %s is empty", pwFile)
}
return line, nil
}
func envDefault(key, def string) string {
if v := os.Getenv(key); v != "" {
return v
}
return def
}