A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's Fixed: - A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's - Log-tailer resumes where it stopped instead of jumping to end-of-file on - Level-2 rate limit no longer overshoots under concurrency: messages that Changed: - The project has a single public home: `github.com/mixeme/selfpost`. Codeberg - Code comments no longer cite the archived specification. References like - `docs/code-review.md` is gone. Its plan is finished — phases 0 (bar the - `docs/architecture.md` gained a *Code layers* section: a diagram of - Phase 1 doc/code hygiene (`docs/code-review.md`): removed ~30 stale … (1 more in CHANGELOG) Security: - Pre-release security review (plan § D, model Fable, 2026-08-06): full pass - `saslpasswd2` argv: the application login is now passed after a `--` Added: - Optional password encryption for the two secret-bearing downloads (plan - Domain import accepts an encrypted export: the envelope is detected by its - `selfpost-backup` writes encrypted archives and reads them back: - `TestParseDelivery` covers the exotic mail.log shapes the review asked for - docs: README *Encrypting a backup or export*; `docs/security.md` § … (14 more in CHANGELOG) Removed: - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk «restore old backup revives session rows» Changed: - docs: `implementation-plan.md` trimmed to the sole open v1.x gate — pre-release - docs: `architecture.md` — sessions (SQLite, idle renew, password change), - docs: `development.md` — expanded e2e stack and `release.yml` matrix workflow. - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk for send-log rows stuck at `queued` after - docs: `roadmap.md` — optional send-log / `mail.log` follow-ups under v1.x tail. … (10 more in CHANGELOG) Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (0.5.0).
84 lines
2.4 KiB
Go
84 lines
2.4 KiB
Go
package health
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import (
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"crypto/x509"
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"encoding/pem"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"time"
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)
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// certWarnDays is how close to expiry the certificate has to be before the
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// status page complains. Let's Encrypt renews at 30 days left, so two weeks is
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// comfortably past the point where automatic renewal should have happened.
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const certWarnDays = 14
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// Certificate is the state of the TLS certificate Postfix serves on 465/587
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// (README § Environment variables: TLS_CERT_FILE). The panel only reads it —
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// the file is supplied by the reverse proxy through a read-only mount.
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type Certificate struct {
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Path string
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Subject string
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NotAfter time.Time
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DaysLeft int
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Status Status
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Detail string
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}
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// CheckCertificate parses the leaf certificate at path and reports how much
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// validity is left. A missing or unparsable file is an error status rather than
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// an error return: the status page reports it in place, like every other check.
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func CheckCertificate(path string) Certificate {
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c := Certificate{Path: path}
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if path == "" {
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c.Status = StatusUnknown
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c.Detail = "No certificate path is configured (TLS_CERT_FILE)."
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return c
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}
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data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
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if err != nil {
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c.Status = StatusError
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c.Detail = fmt.Sprintf("Could not read the certificate at %s.", path)
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return c
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}
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leaf, err := parseLeaf(data)
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if err != nil {
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c.Status = StatusError
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c.Detail = fmt.Sprintf("%s does not contain a readable certificate.", path)
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return c
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}
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c.Subject = leaf.Subject.CommonName
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c.NotAfter = leaf.NotAfter
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c.DaysLeft = int(time.Until(leaf.NotAfter).Hours() / 24)
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switch {
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case !time.Now().Before(leaf.NotAfter):
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c.Status = StatusError
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c.Detail = "The certificate has expired. Senders will refuse the TLS connection."
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case c.DaysLeft < certWarnDays:
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c.Status = StatusWarn
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c.Detail = fmt.Sprintf("Expires in %d day(s). Check that renewal on the host still works.", c.DaysLeft)
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default:
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c.Status = StatusOK
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c.Detail = fmt.Sprintf("Valid for another %d day(s).", c.DaysLeft)
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}
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return c
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}
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// parseLeaf returns the first certificate in a PEM chain — the leaf, which is
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// the one whose validity clients see.
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func parseLeaf(data []byte) (*x509.Certificate, error) {
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for rest := data; len(rest) > 0; {
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var block *pem.Block
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block, rest = pem.Decode(rest)
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if block == nil {
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break
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}
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if block.Type != "CERTIFICATE" {
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continue
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}
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return x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
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}
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("no CERTIFICATE block found")
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}
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