Files
selfpost/internal/web/handlers_ratelimit.go
T
mix 5e5d157496 release: 0.5.0: Pre-1.0 security review, domain-admin role, doc consolidation
A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
Fixed:
  - A bounce could be recorded as a successful delivery. The log-tailer's
  - Log-tailer resumes where it stopped instead of jumping to end-of-file on
  - Level-2 rate limit no longer overshoots under concurrency: messages that
Changed:
  - The project has a single public home: `github.com/mixeme/selfpost`. Codeberg
  - Code comments no longer cite the archived specification. References like
  - `docs/code-review.md` is gone. Its plan is finished — phases 0 (bar the
  - `docs/architecture.md` gained a *Code layers* section: a diagram of
  - Phase 1 doc/code hygiene (`docs/code-review.md`): removed ~30 stale
  … (1 more in CHANGELOG)
Security:
  - Pre-release security review (plan § D, model Fable, 2026-08-06): full pass
  - `saslpasswd2` argv: the application login is now passed after a `--`
Added:
  - Optional password encryption for the two secret-bearing downloads (plan
  - Domain import accepts an encrypted export: the envelope is detected by its
  - `selfpost-backup` writes encrypted archives and reads them back:
  - `TestParseDelivery` covers the exotic mail.log shapes the review asked for
  - docs: README *Encrypting a backup or export*; `docs/security.md` §
  … (14 more in CHANGELOG)
Removed:
  - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk «restore old backup revives session rows»
Changed:
  - docs: `implementation-plan.md` trimmed to the sole open v1.x gate — pre-release
  - docs: `architecture.md` — sessions (SQLite, idle renew, password change),
  - docs: `development.md` — expanded e2e stack and `release.yml` matrix workflow.
  - docs: `security.md` — accepted risk for send-log rows stuck at `queued` after
  - docs: `roadmap.md` — optional send-log / `mail.log` follow-ups under v1.x tail.
  … (10 more in CHANGELOG)

Full detail: CHANGELOG.md (0.5.0).
2026-09-22 15:24:51 +03:00

159 lines
5.2 KiB
Go

package web
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/mixeme/selfpost/internal/store"
)
// defaultRateLimitWindowSeconds is the sliding-window length used when an
// admin sets a message ceiling but leaves the window blank (README § Rate
// limiting, matching the level-1 default hour; README § Environment variables:
// RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS).
const defaultRateLimitWindowSeconds = 3600
// rateLimitInput is the validated result of a rate-limit form submission.
// clear means "remove the differentiated limit" (README § Rate limiting: an
// empty IP binding leaves only level 1).
type rateLimitInput struct {
clear bool
ips []string
maxMessages int
windowSeconds int
}
// parseRateLimitForm validates a rate-limit submission on the server
// (security.md). It returns clear=true when the admin removes the limit or
// leaves the IP binding empty; otherwise it requires a positive ceiling and
// window. The returned error's message is safe to show to the admin.
func parseRateLimitForm(r *http.Request) (rateLimitInput, error) {
if err := r.ParseForm(); err != nil {
return rateLimitInput{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid form submission")
}
if r.PostFormValue("clear") != "" {
return rateLimitInput{clear: true}, nil
}
ips, err := parseIPList(r.PostFormValue("allowed_ips"))
if err != nil {
return rateLimitInput{}, err
}
if len(ips) == 0 {
// No IP binding: the differentiated limit does not apply (README § Rate
// limiting).
return rateLimitInput{clear: true}, nil
}
maxMessages, err := parsePositiveInt(r.PostFormValue("max_messages"), 0)
if err != nil || maxMessages <= 0 {
return rateLimitInput{}, fmt.Errorf("enter a message limit greater than zero")
}
windowSeconds, err := parsePositiveInt(r.PostFormValue("window_seconds"), defaultRateLimitWindowSeconds)
if err != nil || windowSeconds <= 0 {
return rateLimitInput{}, fmt.Errorf("enter a time window greater than zero seconds")
}
return rateLimitInput{ips: ips, maxMessages: maxMessages, windowSeconds: windowSeconds}, nil
}
// parseIPList parses the allowed-IP field (IPs separated by newlines, commas or
// whitespace) into a deduplicated list of canonical addresses, rejecting any
// token that is not a valid IP (security.md). The values are only ever stored as
// SQLite parameters and compared in the milter, never written to a config file.
func parseIPList(raw string) ([]string, error) {
fields := strings.FieldsFunc(raw, func(r rune) bool {
return r == '\n' || r == '\r' || r == ',' || r == ' ' || r == '\t' || r == ';'
})
var out []string
seen := make(map[string]bool)
for _, f := range fields {
ip := net.ParseIP(f)
if ip == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%q is not a valid IP address", f)
}
c := ip.String()
if !seen[c] {
seen[c] = true
out = append(out, c)
}
}
return out, nil
}
// parsePositiveInt parses a trimmed integer field, returning def when it is
// blank. A non-numeric value returns an error.
func parsePositiveInt(raw string, def int) (int, error) {
raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
if raw == "" {
return def, nil
}
return strconv.Atoi(raw)
}
// handleDomainRateLimit saves or clears a domain-level differentiated rate
// limit (README § Rate limiting). No reload is needed — the milter reads the
// row live.
func (s *Server) handleDomainRateLimit(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
d, ok := s.lookupDomain(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
in, err := parseRateLimitForm(r)
if err != nil {
s.renderDomainDetail(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, d, detailView{
FormMode: store.AddressModeWildcard,
RateLimitErr: err.Error(),
})
return
}
if err := s.applyRateLimit(in, s.domains.SaveRateLimit, s.domains.ClearRateLimit, d.ID); err != nil {
logf("panel: domain %d: save rate limit: %v", d.ID, err)
http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
http.Redirect(w, r, fmt.Sprintf("/domains/%d?ratelimit=1", d.ID), http.StatusSeeOther)
}
// handleAppRateLimit saves or clears an application-level differentiated rate
// limit (README § Rate limiting).
func (s *Server) handleAppRateLimit(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
a, ok := s.lookupApplication(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
d, err := s.domains.Get(a.DomainID)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
in, err := parseRateLimitForm(r)
if err != nil {
s.renderDomainDetail(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, d, detailView{
FormMode: store.AddressModeWildcard,
RateLimitErr: fmt.Sprintf("%s: %s", a.Login, err.Error()),
})
return
}
if err := s.applyRateLimit(in, s.apps.SaveRateLimit, s.apps.ClearRateLimit, a.ID); err != nil {
logf("panel: application %d: save rate limit: %v", a.ID, err)
http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
http.Redirect(w, r, fmt.Sprintf("/domains/%d?ratelimit=1", a.DomainID), http.StatusSeeOther)
}
// applyRateLimit dispatches a validated input to the save or clear method of the
// relevant service, keyed by the domain or application id.
func (s *Server) applyRateLimit(
in rateLimitInput,
save func(id int64, ips []string, maxMessages, windowSeconds int) error,
clear func(id int64) error,
id int64,
) error {
if in.clear {
return clear(id)
}
return save(id, in.ips, in.maxMessages, in.windowSeconds)
}